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At least 127 records · Page 7

Demonstration of Integrated Hazard Analysis for Digital Reactor Trip Systems

Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) upgrades are a vital research area for nuclear industry. Despite their performance benefits, deployment of digital I&C in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been limited. Digital I&C systems exhibit complex failure modes including common cause failures (CCFs) which can be difficult to identify. This paper describes the development of a redundancy-guided application of the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the hazard analysis of digital I&C in advanced NPPs. The resulting Redundancy-guided System-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) is applied for the case study of a representative state-of-the-art digital reactor trip system. The analysis qualitatively and systematically identifies the most critical CCFs and other hazards of digital I&C systems. Ultimately, RESHA can help researchers make informed decisions for how, and to what degree, defensive measures such as redundancy, diversity, and defense-in-depth can be used to mitigate or eliminate the potential hazards of digital I&C systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Limitations of traditional tools for beyond design basis external hazard PRA

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is being used increasingly by the nuclear industry for safety during normal operations as well as for the protection against external hazards. Computation of total risk in an external hazard PRA is dependent on hazard assessment, fragility assessment, and systems analysis. A systems analysis for propagation of component fragilities is conducted using event and fault trees. The event and fault trees for an actual power plant can be fairly large in size, which imposes computational challenges. Hence, certain assumptions are employed for computational efficiency. These assumptions typically represent the conditions imposed during the design basis (DB) scenario. The traditional PRA tools based on these assumptions are also widely applied to perform risk assessment in the context of beyond design basis (BDB) scenarios. However, some of these assumptions may not be valid for certain BDB scenarios. In addition, the probability of dependent failures also increases in BDB scenarios due to common cause failures (CCF) which usually results from design modifications, human errors, etc. In this manuscript, a simple and a relatively more complex illustrative examples are used to show the limitation of these assumptions in the numerical quantification of risk for the case of BDB conditions. Case studies with CCF events across multiple fault trees are also presented to illustrate the effect of these assumptions when traditional approach is used in BDB risk assessment. It is shown that the assumptions are valid for the case of DB conditions but may lead to excessively conservative risk estimates in the case of BDB conditions. Finally, a Bayesian network based top-down algorithm is proposed as an alternative tool for accurate numerical quantification of total risk in systems analysis.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Achieving Improved Reliability with Failure Analysis

Reliability is the ability of a product to properly function, within specified performance limits, for a specified period of time, under the life cycle application conditions. Failure analysis is a vital tool in the effort to ensure reliability of electronic products and systems throughout their product lifecycle. Today, organizations involved in activities within the electronics supply chain are facing new challenges, not just from complex assembly styles, harsher lifecycle environments, and sophisticated supply chains, but also from customers who are demanding a quicker turn-around. Unfortunately, root cause failure analysis is often performed incompletely, leading to a poor understanding of failure mechanisms and causes and, customer dissatisfaction due to recurring failures. The PDC (Professional Development Course) starts with an introduction to reliability concepts, physics of failure and an overview of failure mechanisms that affect PCBs (Printed Circuit Boards), PCBAs (Printed Circuit Board Assembly) and components. The PDC then dives into root cause hypothesizing techniques (Pareto, FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), fishbone (Cause-And-Effect Diagram), FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)), non-destructive and destructive analysis and, materials characterization will be discussed. Numerous failure analysis case studies will be used to illustrate the techniques and analysis principles to arrive at the root cause(s) of field failures on printed circuit boards, active components, and assemblies. What Attendees will Learn: Topics include: Overview of Reliability Concepts Failure mechanisms of electronic products Root cause analysis Failure analysis techniques -Non-destructive techniques (optical, CSAM (Confocal Scanning Electron Microscopy) etc.) -Destructive analysis (DPA (Destructive Physical Analysis), Decap (Decapsulation), FIB (Focused Ion Beam) etc.) -Materials characterization (XRF (X-Ray Fluorescence) , EDS (Error Detection Sequential), TMA/DSC (Thermal Mechanical Analysis/Differential Scanning Calorimetry) etc.)

PCB quality↗

Identification of Critical Infrastructure via PageRank

Assessing critical infrastructure vulnerabilities is paramount to arranging efficient plans for their protection. Critical infrastructures are cyber-physical systems that can be represented as a network consisting of nodes and edges and highly interdependent in nature. Given the interdependent nature of critical infrastuctures, failure in one node may cause failure in many others resulting in a cascade of failures. In this paper, we propose a node criticality metric that uses Google’s PageRank algorithm to identify nodes that are likely to fail (are vulnerable), nodes whose failure may cascade to many other sites in the network (are important), and nodes that are both vulnerable and important (are critical). We then present a series of experiments to understand how protecting certain critical nodes can help mitigate massive cascading failures. Simulating failures in a real-world network with and without critical node protections demonstrates the importance of identifying critical nodes in an infrastructure network.

Kay, Bill↗

Redundant computing for exascale systems.

Exascale systems will have hundred thousands of compute nodes and millions of components which increases the likelihood of faults. Today, applications use checkpoint/restart to recover from these faults. Even under ideal conditions, applications running on more than 50,000 nodes will spend more than half of their total running time saving checkpoints, restarting, and redoing work that was lost. Redundant computing is a method that allows an application to continue working even when failures occur. Instead of each failure causing an application interrupt, multiple failures can be absorbed by the application until redundancy is exhausted. In this paper we present a method to analyze the benefits of redundant computing, present simulation results of the cost, and compare it to other proposed methods for fault resilience.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

MAGNETAR OUTBURSTS FROM AVALANCHES OF HALL WAVES AND CRUSTAL FAILURES

We explore the interaction between Hall waves and mechanical failures inside a magnetar crust, using detailed one-dimensional models that consider temperature-sensitive plastic flow, heat transport, and cooling by neutrino emission, as well as the coupling of the crustal motion to the magnetosphere. We find that the dynamics is enriched and accelerated by the fast, short-wavelength Hall waves that are emitted by each failure. The waves propagate and cause failures elsewhere, triggering avalanches. We argue that these avalanches are the likely sources of outbursts in transient magnetars.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Metrics for Anomalous Charging currents in Polymer Tantalum Capacitors

Anomalous charging currents (ACC) in polymer tantalum capacitors may appear as a temporary short circuit that can last for dozens of milliseconds, cause failures to the parts, or cause malfunctions to fast operating electronic systems. Currently, there is no standard technique or set of metrics to evaluate the level of ACC which compares results obtained by different users and manufacturers. In this work, ACC in different types of capacitors were characterized by analysis of current transients during the constant voltage ramp or power surge testing (PST) techniques. It is shown that although the shape of transients may vary at different test conditions, the transfer charge and energy remain practically the same. The level of ACC is characterized by the energy dissipated in the part during PST. Variations of the dissipated energy with moisture content, test temperature, and voltage are evaluated. Effects of different reflow soldering conditions and long-term (up to 3000 hours) storage at 125 °C are discussed.

polymer tantalum capacitor↗

Achieving Improved Reliability with Failure Analysis

Reliability is the ability of a product to properly function, within specified performance limits, for a specified period of time, under the life cycle application conditions. Failure analysis is a vital tool in the effort to ensure reliability of electronic products and systems throughout their product lifecycle. Today, organizations involved in activities within the electronics supply chain are facing new challenges, not just from complex assembly styles, harsher lifecycle environments, and sophisticated supply chains, but also from customers who are demanding a quicker turn-around. Unfortunately, root cause failure analysis is often performed incompletely, leading to a poor understanding of failure mechanisms and causes and, customer dissatisfaction due to recurring failures. The PDC starts with an introduction to reliability concepts, physics of failure and an overview of failure mechanisms that affect PCBs, PCBAs and components. The PDC then dives into root cause hypothesizing techniques (Pareto, FMEA, fishbone, FTA), non-destructive and destructive analysis and, materials characterization will be discussed. Numerous failure analysis case studies will be used to illustrate the techniques and analysis principles to arrive at the root cause(s) of field failures on printed circuit boards, active components, and assemblies. What Will You Learn: Topics include: Overview of Reliability Concepts Failure mechanisms of electronic products Root cause analysis Failure analysis techniques -Non-destructive techniques (optical, CSAM etc.) -Destructive analysis (DPA, Decap, FIB etc.) -Materials characterization (XRF, EDS, TMA/DSC etc.) Who Will Benefit: Reliability engineers, failure analysis engineers, engineering managers, design engineers, component engineers, quality assurance functions and, personnel involved with reliability activities within their company.

non-destructive techniques↗

Independent Review Support for Phoenix Mars Mission Robotic Arm Brush Motor Failure

The Phoenix Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent peer review of the Robotic Arm (RA) Direct Current (DC) motor brush anomalies that originated during the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) Project and recurred during the Phoenix Project. The request was to evaluate the Phoenix Project investigation efforts and provide an independent risk assessment. This includes a recommendation for additional work and assessment of the flight worthiness of the RA DC motors. Based on the investigation and findings contained within this report, the IRT concurs with the risk assessment Failure Cause / Corrective Action (FC/CA) by the project, "Failure Effect Rating "3"; Major Degradation or Total Loss of Function, Failure Cause/Corrective Action Rating Currently "4"; Unknown Cause, Uncertainty in Corrective Action."

McManamen, John P.↗

Effects of Fine Particle Shot Peening Treatment on Fatigue Properties of Al-7Si-0.3Mg Alloy

In this study, two different fine particle shot peening (FPSP) treatments were performed on Al-7Si-0.3Mg alloy specimens to evaluate their effects on fatigue properties. After the treatment, the microstructure morphology of the specimens was observed, and the surface roughness and residual stress distribution were measured. Rotating bending fatigue tests were conducted, and the fatigue fracture surfaces were observed using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). The crack initiation and propagation behavior were investigated using the replica method. The results indicate that FPSP can introduce residual stress on the surface layer of the material and refine the surface microstructure, and also change the surface roughness. At low stress amplitude levels, FPSP can improve fatigue life significantly. At 5 × 10{sup 7} cycles, the fatigue strength of shot-peened specimens increased by 33% compared to unpeened specimens. In unpeened and steel shot-peened (SSP) specimens, both crystal slip and casting defects can induce fatigue failure, while only casting defects can cause failure in the case of ceramic shot-peened (CSP) specimens. Moreover, FPSP can move the crack initiation site to the subsurface from the surface. The range of threshold stress intensity factor of the material can be improved significantly by this treatment. Casting defects have a significant influence on fatigue strength; the effect on fatigue strength can be well evaluated by the modified Murakami equation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Flight experience with Apollo spacecraft propulsion systems

Apollo 17 ended the most successful application of rocket propulsion systems in man's history. A total of 23 developmental and manned operational flights were made. Seven hundred and sixty-three spacecraft rocket engines were flown in the program. Over 6 h of manned rocket flights were logged by the spacecraft propulsion systems and approximately one million rocket engine firings were made. One engine failure was encountered on an early unmanned flight as a result of a failure in the guidance programmer which caused the engine to operate in a manner known to cause failures. Numerous operational problems and malfunctions were observed; however, system and component redundancy prevented loss of mission objectives and never jeopardized crew safety. Performance of all systems was usually nominal and most problems were merely nuisances. This paper will present some highlights of Apollo propulsion performance and will provide a bibliography of all flight results.

Thibodaux, J. G., Jr.↗

Introduction of Diverse Manual Actuation Design for APR1400

APR1400 is an Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) design with enhanced plant safety and advanced design features. One unit is in commercial operation and 11 are currently under construction, 4 abroad and 7 in Korea. APR1400 adopts full digitalized Man-Machine Interface System (MMIS) to perform the function of control, indication and alarming for safety and non-safety systems APR1400 MMIS is designed to operate the plant from the Main Control Room (MCR) under all anticipated operating conditions including design basis accidents. This advanced MMIS is designed to meet the latest codes, standards and regulatory requirements including the defense-in-depth and diversity requirements, which is intended to mitigate the consequence of a total failure of the digital safety system caused by a software Common Cause Failure (CCF) coupled with anyone of the Design Basis Events. The redundancy of the safety system could be defeated during this CCF condition and the protective function could be rendered inoperable.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Digital Actuator Technology

There are significant developments underway in new types of actuators for power plant active components. Many of these make use of digital technology to provide a wide array of benefits in performance of the actuators and in reduced burden to maintain them. These new product offerings have gained considerable acceptance in use in process plants. In addition, they have been used in conventional power generation very successfully. This technology has been proven to deliver the benefits promised and substantiate the claims of improved performance. The nuclear industry has been reluctant to incorporate digital actuator technology into nuclear plant designs due to concerns due to a number of concerns. These could be summarized as cost, regulatory uncertainty, and a certain comfort factor with legacy analog technology. The replacement opportunity for these types of components represents a decision point for whether to invest in more modern technology that would provide superior operational and maintenance benefits. Yet, the application of digital technology has been problematic for the nuclear industry, due to qualification and regulatory issues. With some notable exceptions, the result has been a continuing reluctance to undertake the risks and uncertainties of implementing digital actuator technology when replacement opportunities present themselves. Rather, utilities would typically prefer to accept the performance limitations of the legacy analog actuator technologies to avoid impacts to project costs and schedules. The purpose of this report is to demonstrate that the benefits of digital actuator technology can be significant in terms of plant performance and that it is worthwhile to address the barriers currently holding back the widespread development and use of this technology. It addresses two important objectives in pursuit of the beneficial use of digital actuator technology for nuclear power plants: 1. To demonstrate the benefits of digital actuator technology over legacy analog sensor technology in both quantitative and qualitative ways. 2. To recognize and address the added difficulty of digital technology qualification, especially in regard to software common cause failure (SCCF), that is introduced by the use of digital actuator technology.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Investigation of heat transfer in zirconium potassium perchlorate at low temperature: A study of the failure mechanism of the NASA standard initiator

The objective of this work was to study the reasons for the failure of pyrotechnic initiators at very low temperatures (10 to 100 K). A two-dimensional model of the NASA standard initiator was constructed to model heat transfer from the electrically heated stainless steel bridgewire to the zirconium potassium perchlorate explosive charge and the alumina charge cup. Temperature dependent properties were used in the model to simulate initiator performance over a wide range of initial temperatures (10 to 500 K). A search of the thermophysical property data base showed that pure alumina has a very high thermal conductivity at low temperatures. It had been assumed to act as a thermal insulator in all previous analyses. Rapid heat transfer from the bridgewire to the alumina at low initial temperatures was shown to cause failure of the initiators if the wire did not also make good contact with the zirconium potassium perchlorate charge. The mode is able to reproduce the results of the tests that had been conducted to investigate the cause for failure. It also provides an explanation for previously puzzling results and suggests simple design changes that will increase reliability at very low initial temperatures.

Varghese, Philip L.↗

Reliability Assessment of Safety-Critical Network Communication in a Digitalized Nuclear Power Plant

In analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems for nuclear power plants (NPPs), most connections are comprised of hardwired point-to-point types. Since they are based on analog technologies, they are fragile to noise and require analog-to-digital conversion time. Therefore, many NPPs have adopted communication network for the exchange of safety-critical data between programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in digital I and C systems to effectively accommodate a huge number of field controllers. However, the primary issue of digital network communication in a safety-critical system involves potential hazards, such as partial or total loss of communication between PLCs, which may result in a failure of safety critical signal generation when it is needed. Therefore, the probability that a safety-critical system in digitalized NPP becomes unsafe due to a network failure must be evaluated to quantify the risk of digital I and C system. In Korea, the Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) was developed as one of the digital safety-critical system in Advanced Power Reactor- 1400 (APR-1400). The function of a digital engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation system and field actuator controllers of conventional NPPs are performed by the ESF-CCS. In this system, safety-critical network, High Reliable- Safety Data Network (HR-SDN), was employed for the safety-critical data transmission from group controllers (GCs) to loop controllers (LCs). In this study, a framework for assessing the reliability of a HR-SDN network communication between GCs and LCs in the ESF-CCS in addition to a fault-tree model for ESF components considering network failure between GCs and LCs were developed to assess the plant risk effect of a newly developed digitalized ESF-CCS. Based on the case studies and cut set analysis, the risk effect of network failure on plant risk and the important risk contributors of network failure were quantitatively addressed. A framework for identifying the potential hazardous states of network communication in the ESFCCS was proposed. In addition, a fault-tree model for network communication failure was developed to estimate the risk effects of network failure between the GCs and LCs on ESF-CCS signal failure. The developed fault-tree model was then applied to several case studies. The fault-tree model of ESF-CCS signal failure for ESF components required for various mitigation actions regarding NPP DBAs was designed by considering the identified hazardous states of network failure that would result in a failure to provide input signals to the corresponding LC. As a sensitivity study, three case studies were performed based on the periodic test methods for hardware components in HR-SDN module and their test intervals in this study. The quantitative results for three case studies demonstrated that the probability of overall network communication failure, which was calculated as the sum of the failure probability associated with each failure cause, contributed up to 1.58% on the Small-LOCA CD frequency. The results also revealed the important basic events related to network failure in the case studies which included CCF of hardware and software in HR-SDN module. This study is expected to provide insight into the development of the fault-tree model for the network failure in digital I and C system and into the quantification of the risk effect of network failure for safety-critical data transmission in NPPs. As a further study, the risk effects of network failure in the ESF-CCS on the plant risk can be estimated in a more detailed manner by analyzing the failure modes and causes in a sub-component level and the fault detection coverage of the fault tolerance techniques for network failure implemented in ESF-CCS after the detailed configuration of ESF-CCS is decided. In terms of the failure of manual ESF actuation, the relationship among the human action failures must be investigated to consider multiple human error condition since ESF-CCS provides multiple manual actuation to assure the diversity of the system. Since the conventional HEP method cannot accommodate the multiple conditions in a fault tree, condition-based human reliability assessment (CBHRA) method or the dynamic human reliability modeling approach can be applied to include a complex relationship among the automated safety signal generation and the human operator's manual actuation, avoiding the optimistic estimation of HEP of the human action failure.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Review of Quantitative Software Reliability Methods

The current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing process for digital systems rests on deterministic engineering criteria. In its 1995 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) policy statement, the Commission encouraged the use of PRA technology in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data. Although many activities have been completed in the area of risk-informed regulation, the risk-informed analysis process for digital systems has not yet been satisfactorily developed. Since digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are expected to play an increasingly important role in nuclear power plant (NPP) safety, the NRC established a digital system research plan that defines a coherent set of research programs to support its regulatory needs. One of the research programs included in the NRC's digital system research plan addresses risk assessment methods and data for digital systems. Digital I&C systems have some unique characteristics, such as using software, and may have different failure causes and/or modes than analog I&C systems; hence, their incorporation into NPP PRAs entails special challenges. The objective of the NRC's digital system risk research is to identify and develop methods, analytical tools, and regulatory guidance for (1) including models of digital systems into NPP PRAs, and (2) using information on the risks of digital systems to support the NRC's risk-informed licensing and oversight activities. For several years, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has worked on NRC projects to investigate methods and tools for the probabilistic modeling of digital systems, as documented mainly in NUREG/CR-6962 and NUREG/CR-6997. However, the scope of this research principally focused on hardware failures, with limited reviews of software failure experience and software reliability methods. NRC also sponsored research at the Ohio State University investigating the modeling of digital systems using dynamic PRA methods. These efforts, documented in NUREG/CR-6901, NUREG/CR-6942, and NUREG/CR-6985, included a functional representation of the system's software but did not explicitly address failure modes caused by software defects or by inadequate design requirements. An important identified research need is to establish a commonly accepted basis for incorporating the behavior of software into digital I&C system reliability models for use in PRAs. To address this need, BNL is exploring the inclusion of software failures into the reliability models of digital I&C systems, such that their contribution to the risk of the associated NPP can be assessed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Evaluation Between Existing and Improved CCF Modeling Using the NRC SPAR Models

Abstract: The NRC SPAR models currently employ the alpha factor common cause failure (CCF) methodology and model CCF for a group of redundant components as a single “rolled-up” basic event. These SPAR models will be updated to employ a more computationally intensive and accurate approach by expanding the CCF basic events for all active components to include all terms that appear in the Basic Parameter Model (BPM). A discussion is provided to detail the differences between the rolled-up common cause group (CCG) and expanded BPM adjustment concepts based on differences in core damage frequency and individual component importance measures. Lastly, a hypothetical condition is evaluated with a SPAR model to show the difference in results between the current adjustment method (rolled-up CCF events) and the newer method employing all of the expanded terms in the BPM. The event evaluation on the SPAR model employing the expanded terms will be solved using the graphical evaluation module (GEM) and the proposed method discussed in Reference 1.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. Here this paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗