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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

A Review of the Literature on the Radiolytic Stability of the Next-Generation Solvent

The Original Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) solvent (based on the BOBCalixC6 extractant) currently in use at the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) is set to be replaced by the Next-Generation Solvent (NGS, based on the MaxCalix extractant). Current SWPF flammability safety controls use G-values for volatile gases obtained from radiolysis studies with the Original CSSX solvent. A review of past irradiation tests of both solvent systems was performed to assess the radiolytic stability of NGS with respect to flammable gas generation from radiolysis.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 129: Perspectives (US and Non-US) on the Use of Risk and Dose Assessment Tools (R9.3)

This panel focused on various dose and risk assessment tools for assessments, Deactivation and Decommissioning, remediation, and closure of sites of chemical and radioactive wastes. Representatives from the US government agencies, non-US countries and their representative regulatory bodies or authorities, as well as performance/risk assessment practitioners compared and contrasted the various guidance from regulatory agencies and authorities on how tools such as the Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRG) calculator, the Dose Compliance Concentrations (DCC) calculator, and Residual Radioactivity (RESRAD) should be used in support of analyses and decisions for environmental cleanup activities. Panelists with presentations: Cumulative Impact Evaluation: Innovative Tools for Evaluation of Groundwater Protection (Alaa Aly); Superfund Evaluation Process for Alternative Risk and Dose Models (with Focus on EPA and DOE Tools) (Stuart Walker); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Los Alamos National Laboratory Floodplain Assessment for the Technical Area 72 Outdoor Live Fire Range Safety Upgrades Project

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is proposing new construction and upgrade activities in lower Sandia Canyon at Technical Area (TA) 72 at the Outdoor Live Fire Range facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The proposed upgrades are intended to improve range safety to help fulfill the mission requirements of maintaining a trained and qualified armed Protective Force.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Structural, Criticality, and Radiation Dose Calculations to Support SNF Loading into a DOE Standard Canister

The DOE Standard Canister Demonstration Project includes the development of an internal support structure (ISS) for the 4.6-m-long and 45.7-cm-diameter canister. This study presents structural evaluations, criticality safety assessments, and dose rate calculations conducted within the scope of the ISS design process to support smooth canister loading operations and to ensure safe storage, transportation, and disposal of Peach Bottom 1 Core II (PB2) and Fort St. Vrain (FSV) SNF, currently stored at INL’s CPP-603 facility. The ISS includes a 316L stainless-steel basket that holds 12 PB2 SNF rods. The PB2 basket rests on top of six individual, 78.7-cm-long, 316L stainless-steel columns that are equally spaced and welded to the inner canister wall at the lower end of the shell. These columns represent the FSV basket and can hold one FSV SNF element. An A92014 T6 aluminum spacer disc is bolted to the bottom plate of the PB2 basket to vertically restrain the FSV SNF element after the PB2 basket is placed inside the canister above the FSV basket. The structural evaluations of the ISS followed applicable ASME BPVC.III.3 guidelines and included finite element (FE) analyses of the PB2 basket structure; analyses of welds and bolds; buckling analyses of selected components, and acceptability assessments of the expected basket deformations under loading operations. The criticality safety assessments used the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software architecture Version 6.2, including ENDF/B-V continuous-energy cross-section libraries, considering intact SNF in a single storage overpack or two multistorage overpack configurations and intact or failed SNF configured for disposal. The dose rate computations are based on source terms taken from the DOE Spent Fuel Database. The isotopic composition was decay corrected for the year 2022 using the ORIGEN module in the SCALE suite. A 19-group photon spectrum and a 27-group neutron-source spectrum were generated and used in MCNP to calculate estimated dose-equivalent rates, both on DOE Standard Canister contact and at a radial distance of 1 m from the canister surface. The results of this study indicate a structurally sound system that can uphold its criticality safety functions throughout its intended operational phases. Furthermore, this study provides confidence that sufficient radiological protection is technically achievable.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

ANDRA's Underground Research Laboratory in Bure: Major Role in the Cigeo Development - 20005

The Industrial Center for Geological Disposal, also called Cigeo, is the deep geological disposal facility project developed by Andra since 1991. It is intended for the final disposal of High-Level Waste (HLW) and Intermediate Level Waste-Long Lived (ILW-LL) generated in France by the nuclear industry. Cigeo is located in the east of France (Meuse/Haute-Marne site). The disposal will be implemented in a 140 to 160 m thick clay layer at about 500 m depth. The license application file will be submitted in 2020. If the license is granted, the construction of the pilot phase of Cigeo (ramp, shafts, drifts, initial disposal vaults) could start in 2025 at the earliest. Since 2000, the development of the safety case of Cigeo for post closure has been supported by a three-stage construction, design, and scientific and technological experiment program performed in the French Underground Research Laboratory (URL) in Bure. These stages of the URL activities supported the iterative interactions between the knowledge acquired by scientific and technological R and D program, the design process and the safety assessment. The stages focused on assessing the suitability of the disposal concept, providing the basis for safety options and construction design, and preparing for licensing using large scale demonstrations. Recently, Andra launched the fourth development stage of the URL to implement a new set of technological experiments aiming at consolidating the design options of disposal cells and galleries for the pilot phase of Cigeo and at assessing monitoring technologies. Recently, Andra launched the fourth development stage of the URL to implement a new set of technological experiments aiming at consolidating the design of the pilot phase of Cigeo and at assessing design options and monitoring technologies. Removal of a segment ring, construction of an X drift crossing, improved construction techniques for HLW vaults, and construction of an ILW-LL prototype disposal vault are example activities during the fourth phase. In the future, the URL in Bure will remain a unique location to carry out research on promising technical solutions, to reduce Cigeo's construction and operation risks and strengthen the long-term safety assessment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Quantitative and three-dimensional assessment of holdup material

Nuclear material deposited in equipment, transfer lines, and ventilation systems of a processing facility is usually referred to as holdup. Operators need to know the location and amount of holdup in their facility for radiation safety and material accountability. In this work, we propose to use an array of detectors co-axial to the inspected pipe to measure the holdup material. This method is implementable into an automated system capable of crawling on surfaces and pipes of various curvatures, which would enable faster, easier, and more accurate holdup safeguards measurements. We first demonstrated that the current holdup assay procedure could lead to a non-negligible bias in the estimate of special nuclear material mass, due to the simplified assumption of deposited geometry introduced by the Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) model. The new approach consists of imaging the inner holdup material by characterizing the detector array’s response and unfolding it from the measured light output. Our experimental proof of principle consists of three NaI(Tl) detectors surrounding an aluminum pipe containing two cesium-137 ( 137 Cs) sources. We derived the source distribution inside the pipe by first calculating the detector response matrix using a method adaptive to the surface geometry of the object containing the measured holdup material. Creating a matrix of the detector array’s measured counts, we then proceed to solve an inverse problem, resulting in an accurately located source position and activity distribution within the response matrix’s spatial resolution. Furthermore, we then developed a simulated model of the envisioned experimental setup, which accurately described both the activity and position of the source in 2D. Finally, we extended our model onto a discretized three-dimensional model of the system, encompassing 36 detectors. The model was simulated to measure the source distribution and activity of multiple sources in pipes of varied geometries, which could then be conveniently translated to a real-time holdup measurement protocol. For the 3D simulation of four different source geometries, the model accurately localized the source position in 3D, while the activity retained a maximum relative error of ±5.32%.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

An Improved Model For Determining Salinity Recharge Time for Deep Borehole Disposal - 20405

In a previous publication (K. P. Travis, D. Burley and F. G. F. Gibb, WM2017 Conference, Phoenix Arizona paper no. 17480) we introduced a numerical model to estimate the time it would take for a pressure perturbation to subside following its creation from the construction of a deep geological borehole in water-saturated rock. The model was based on the notion of a point source of momentum - a solution of the time-dependent pressure-diffusion equation. Using the model, we estimated that it would take on the order of 10 k years for physical equilibrium to become re-established following the sinking of a 5 km borehole in granite. The significance of such a model is that it places an upper bound on the lifetime required of a borehole sealing system - a necessary input to a borehole post-closure safety case assessment. No engineered sealing system has ever been devised which is capable of retaining its sealing properties for 10 half-lives of long-lived radioisotopes in spent fuel or high-level waste. One of the key advantages of disposing of nuclear waste via Deep Borehole Disposal (DBD) is the natural sealing provided by density stratified groundwater. Upon sinking of a borehole, and subsequent filling with fresh water, brine or drilling mud, this natural barrier may be temporarily damaged. Over time, fresh brine from the far-field will flow towards or away from the hole (driven by a pressure gradient) and will eventually re-establish the original salinity gradient. It follows that the engineered seals need last only as long as the time required for this salinity gradient to reset itself. One of the limitations of our previous model was the use of a static boundary condition on the borehole wall. The model used a boundary pressure which varied quadratically with depth (arising from differences between the pressure of a column of fresh water in the borehole and that of a column of brine in the host rock). However as brine replaces fresh water in the borehole (driven by a pressure gradient), the boundary function must change with time. We now introduce an improved model which takes this time dependent boundary condition into account. The model also takes into account the time taken for a mixture of brine and fresh water to re-establish chemical equilibrium through the process of diffusion. The paper contains the mathematical details of our new iterative model as well as results showing the time taken to reach steady state, and concentration profiles for the components of the brine-filled borehole as a function of time together with a discussion on the implications of the results for developing a post-closure safety assessment for DBD. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the Advanced Reactor Concepts 100 (ARC-100) sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design. The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, and used fuel assembly wash station. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. However, the consequence assessment results are the similar to a previously assessed generic SFR. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. This work will continue in the Fiscal Year 2025 for the remaining ARC-100 systems, including cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks (dewar bottles), and used fuel dry storage facility, to provide safety-and-security-by-design insights and recommendations on non-core systems. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Requirements and Conceptual Design of Off-gas Systems for the Reprocessing of Metallic Fuels

An assessment has been conducted to determine how key regulations regarding volatile radionuclide emissions to the atmosphere may apply to the off-gas streams associated with electrochemical reprocessing. The scope of this assessment was based upon a generic electrochemical reprocessing scheme with a throughput rate of 200 MTIHM/y applied to metallic fuel discharged from a sodium fast reactor (SFR), but the findings are able to be translated to other advanced nuclear scenarios as merited. Air dispersion modeling was performed using the EPA CAP-88 model and evaluated the uncontrolled decontamination factors (DFs) that would be required to achieve regulatory compliance with the dose-based limits set forth by EPA regulation 40 CFR 190.10(a). These DFs were compared to those required by fuel cycle–based limits set forth by EPA regulation 40 CFR 190.10(b). Two theoretical sites with disparate climatological conditions were selected for air dispersion modeling (Idaho and Tennessee). The radionuclides modeled included 3 H, 85 Kr, 129 I, and selected alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes (referred to here as 239 Pu-TRU <1y ). It was found that the fuel cycle-based limits in 40 CFR 190.10(b) are most restrictive for 85 Kr and 239 Pu-TRU <1y , with DFs of 3 and 6.1E+09, respectively. The dose-based limit as derived from 40 CFR 190.10(a) could require mitigation of tritium in some scenarios, with an estimated DF of about 3 for the reference scenarios. The fuel cycle-based limit for 129 I resulted in a DF of about 240 for the reference scenario. The need for iodine mitigation based on dose to the public depended upon the physical form of iodine as either particulate or vapor-phase species. Emission of iodine from the facility as a vapor necessitated DFs of about 2 but emission as a particulate would require DFs >6,000 to meet thyroid dose-based limits. Effects of physical form on needed iodine mitigation are significant, but the understanding of speciation of iodine both during electrochemical reprocessing and after release to the atmosphere is limited. The electrochemical processing unit operations were evaluated to identify potential release points for the volatile radionuclides and to assess the potential for retention of the radionuclides within the process (thus decreasing the need for mitigation). Mitigation strategies for 3 H, 85 Kr, 129 I, and 239 Pu-TRU <1y were identified. In all cases, there are reasonably achievable pathways to regulatory compliance, although in some cases additional R&D is merited to verify the chemical speciation of these isotopes and to develop and demonstrate potential treatment technologies for this application. Whether or not additional off-gas controls (beyond common operations such as HEPA filtration and oxygen and moisture control) are needed for any of these regulated or volatile radionuclides depends on the (a) type of facility (NRC-regulated or DOE), (b) used fuel process rate, (c) used fuel burnup and composition, (d) speciation and retention of volatile radionuclides in the process and in the cell gas cleanup system, (e) site-specific parameters such as location, meteorology, stack height, and site boundaries, and (f) levels of conservatism and safety factors used in assessing compliance to air emissions regulations. Performance of this assessment revealed several areas where information is lacking or additional research is required in order to better determine if or what kinds of off-gas control might be needed. First, and most significantly, the understanding of the chemical speciation and physical form and partitioning of iodine during electrochemical processing operations is lacking and prevents the ability to accurately assess the potential iodine mitigation requirements. Future research in this area should be multifaceted and include thermodynamic modeling of iodine speciation in different process steps, experiments to quantify the kinetics of vapor-phase and melt-phase transitions, bench-scale experiments to determine the potential chemical and physical form of iodine emissions from the electrorefining process, and verification of iodine behavior with experiments utilizing operational facilities. Similarly, an improved understanding of iodine behavior in the environment after release from the facility stack will be required to refine dose estimations, as particulate and vapor-phase emissions result in significantly different doses to the MEI.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2014

Temporal Wind Pairs for Space Launch Vehicle Capability Assessment and Risk Mitigation

Space launch vehicles incorporate upper-level wind assessments to determine wind effects on the vehicle and for a commit to launch decision. These assessments make use of wind profiles measured hours prior to launch and may not represent the actual wind the vehicle will fly through. Uncertainty in the winds over the time period between the assessment and launch introduces uncertainty in assessment of vehicle controllability and structural integrity that must be accounted for to ensure launch safety. Temporal wind pairs are used in engineering development of allowances to mitigate uncertainty. Five sets of temporal wind pairs at various times (0.75, 1.5, 2, 3 and 4-hrs) at the United States Air Force Eastern Range and Western Range, as well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Wallops Flight Facility are developed for use in upper-level wind assessments on vehicle performance. Historical databases are compiled from balloon-based and vertically pointing Doppler radar wind profiler systems. Various automated and manual quality control procedures are used to remove unacceptable profiles. Statistical analyses on the resultant wind pairs from each site are performed to determine if the observed extreme wind changes in the sample pairs are representative of extreme temporal wind change. Wind change samples in the Eastern Range and Western Range databases characterize extreme wind change. However, the small sample sizes in the Wallops Flight Facility databases yield low confidence that the sample population characterizes extreme wind change that could occur.

Decker, Ryan K.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Temporal Wind Pairs for Space Launch Vehicle Capability Assessment and Risk Mitigation

Space launch vehicles incorporate upper-level wind assessments to determine wind effects on the vehicle and for a commit to launch decision. These assessments make use of wind profiles measured hours prior to launch and may not represent the actual wind the vehicle will fly through. Uncertainty in the winds over the time period between the assessment and launch introduces uncertainty in assessment of vehicle controllability and structural integrity that must be accounted for to ensure launch safety. Temporal wind pairs are used in engineering development of allowances to mitigate uncertainty. Five sets of temporal wind pairs at various times (0.75, 1.5, 2, 3 and 4-hrs) at the United States Air Force Eastern Range and Western Range, as well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Wallops Flight Facility are developed for use in upper-level wind assessments on vehicle performance. Historical databases are compiled from balloon-based and vertically pointing Doppler radar wind profiler systems. Various automated and manual quality control procedures are used to remove unacceptable profiles. Statistical analyses on the resultant wind pairs from each site are performed to determine if the observed extreme wind changes in the sample pairs are representative of extreme temporal wind change. Wind change samples in the Eastern Range and Western Range databases characterize extreme wind change. However, the small sample sizes in the Wallops Flight Facility databases yield low confidence that the sample population characterizes extreme wind change that could occur.

Decker, Ryan K.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Methods for the Enhancement of Security Probabilistic Risk Assessments

The US Department of Energy is exploring the methods associated with probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and how they could be used to enhance physical security evaluations for nuclear facilities. A brief review of both international and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission physical security assessment methods is presented. From this review, and with an understanding of the technical elements associated with a traditional nuclear safety PRA, several observations are made pertaining to where physical security analysis methods could be enhanced. These observations principally support and enhance the answers within a physical security context to the risk triplet: (1) What can go wrong? (2) What is the likelihood? and (3) What are the consequences? Finally, benefits and technical challenges toward the development of a full security PRA are presented.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The NREL Sensor Laboratory: Status and Future Directions for Hydrogen Detection

The NREL Hydrogen Sensor Laboratory was commissioned in 2010 as a resource for the national and international hydrogen community to ensure the availability and proper use of hydrogen sensors. Since then, the Sensor Laboratory has provided unbiased verification of hydrogen sensor performance for sensor developers, end-users, and regulatory agencies and has also provided active support for numerous code and standards development organizations. Although sensor performance assessment remains a core capability, the mission of the NREL Sensor Laboratory has expanded toward a more holistic approach regarding the role of hydrogen detection and its implementation strategy for both assurance of facility safety as well as for process control applications. Active monitoring for detection of unintended releases has been identified by the NFPA 2 Storage Task Group as a viable approach for improving facility safety and lowering setbacks. The current research program for the Sensor Laboratory addresses both conventional and advanced developing detection strategies in response to the emerging large-scale markets, such as those envisioned by H2@Scale. These emerging hydrogen applications may require alternative detection strategies that supplement and may ultimately supplant the use of traditional sensors for monitoring hydrogen releases. Research focus areas for the NREL Sensor Laboratory now encompasses the characterization of released hydrogen behavior to optimize detection strategies for both indoor and outdoor applications, advanced methods of hydrogen leak detection such as hydrogen wide area monitoring approaches for large scale and distributed applications, the incorporation of active monitoring as a risk reduction strategy to improve safety at hydrogen facilities, and continuing support of hydrogen safety codes and standards. In addition to assurance of safety, detection will be critical for process control applications, such as hydrogen fuel quality verification for fuel cell vehicle applications and for monitoring and controlling of hydrogen-natural gas blend composition.

codes and standards↗
NASA NTRS1999

Industrial Hygiene Issues

This breakout session is a traditional conference instrument used by the NASA industrial hygiene personnel as a method to convene personnel across the Agency with common interests. This particular session focused on two key topics, training systems and automation of industrial hygiene data. During the FY 98 NASA Occupational Health Benchmarking study, the training system under development by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was deemed to represent a "best business practice." The EPA has invested extensively in the development of computer based training covering a broad range of safety, health and environmental topics. Currently, five compact disks have been developed covering the topics listed: Safety, Health and Environmental Management Training for Field Inspection Activities; EPA Basic Radiation Training Safety Course; The OSHA 600 Collateral Duty Safety and Health Course; and Key program topics in environmental compliance, health and safety. Mr. Chris Johnson presented an overview of the EPA compact disk-based training system and answered questions on its deployment and use across the EPA. This training system has also recently been broadly distributed across other Federal Agencies. The EPA training system is considered "public domain" and, as such, is available to NASA at no cost in its current form. Copies of the five CD set of training programs were distributed to each NASA Center represented in the breakout session. Mr. Brisbin requested that each NASA Center review the training materials and determine whether there is interest in using the materials as it is or requesting that EPA tailor the training modules to suit NASA's training program needs. The Safety, Health and Medical Services organization at Ames Research Center has completed automation of several key program areas. Mr. Patrick Hogan, Safety Program Manager for Ames Research Center, presented a demonstration of the automated systems, which are described by the following: (1) Safety, Health and Environmental Training. This system includes an assessment of training needs for every NASA Center organization, course descriptions, schedules and automated course scheduling, and presentation of training program metrics; (2) Safety and Health Inspection Information. This system documents the findings from each facility inspection, tracks abatement status on those findings and presents metrics on each department for senior management review; (3) Safety Performance Evaluation Profile. The survey system used by NASA to evaluate employee and supervisory perceptions of safety programs is automated in this system; and (4) Documentation Tracking System. Electronic archive and retrieval of all correspondence and technical reports generated by the Safety, Health and Medical Services Office are provided by this system.

Brisbin, Steven G.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Monitoring System for Storm Readiness and Recovery of Test Facilities: Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) Approach

Severe weather events are likely occurrences on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. It is important to rapidly diagnose and mitigate the effects of storms on Stennis Space Center's rocket engine test complex to avoid delays to critical test article programs, reduce costs, and maintain safety. An Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) approach and technologies are employed to integrate environmental (weather) monitoring, structural modeling, and the suite of available facility instrumentation to provide information for readiness before storms, rapid initial damage assessment to guide mitigation planning, and then support on-going assurance as repairs are effected and finally support recertification. The system is denominated Katrina Storm Monitoring System (KStorMS). Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) describes a comprehensive set of capabilities that provide insight into the behavior the health of a system. Knowing the status of a system allows decision makers to effectively plan and execute their mission. For example, early insight into component degradation and impending failures provides more time to develop work around strategies and more effectively plan for maintenance. Failures of system elements generally occur over time. Information extracted from sensor data, combined with system-wide knowledge bases and methods for information extraction and fusion, inference, and decision making, can be used to detect incipient failures. If failures do occur, it is critical to detect and isolate them, and suggest an appropriate course of action. ISHM enables determining the condition (health) of every element in a complex system-of-systems or SoS (detect anomalies, diagnose causes, predict future anomalies), and provide data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) to control systems for safe and effective operation. ISHM capability is achieved by using a wide range of technologies that enable anomaly detection, diagnostics, prognostics, and advise for control: (1) anomaly detection algorithms and strategies, (2) fusion of DIaK for anomaly detection (model-based, numerical, statistical, empirical, expert-based, qualitative, etc.), (3) diagnostics/prognostics strategies and methods, (4) user interface, (5) advanced control strategies, (6) integration architectures/frameworks, (7) embedding of intelligence. Many of these technologies are mature, and they are being used in the KStorMS. The paper will describe the design, implementation, and operation of the KStorMS; and discuss further evolution to support other needs such as condition-based maintenance (CBM).

Figueroa, Fernando↗
DOE OSTI2023

Preliminary Nuclear Containment Vessel Modeling for Multi-Hazard Probabilistic Risk Assessment under Seismic Hazards and Concrete Degradation

The current practice for natural phenomena hazards (NPH) risk assessment of nuclear facilities is to compute the risk for each hazard independently and then compound the total risk as a combination of single hazard risks. This state of practice does not consider correlations between hazards and the cascading impacts to structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and could thus underestimate the NPH risk or overestimate the nuclear facility safety. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of multi-hazard risk considerations to nuclear power plants (NPPs) that quantify the cascading damage effects to SSCs in the risk models. Moreover, the current fleet of NPPs in the United States is aging; these NPPs are now expected to operate well beyond their initially planned design life. Aging-related deterioration can potentially decrease the capacity of critical structures such as containment vessels to withstand NPH. Such aging considerations may not be adequately accounted for by the current NPH risk assessment guidelines. This paper presents a preliminary modeling and simulation of a representative reinforced concrete containment vessel subjected to seismic mainshock and aftershock considering concrete degradation due to alkali silica reaction. The broader aim is to develop multi-hazard time-dependent fragility functions that could be subsequently used in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model. The multi-hazard component comes into play due to the consideration of damage to the containment vessel under seismic loads and concrete degradation. Consideration of concrete degradation also brings into play the time-dependent nature of the containment vessel response. The response of the containment vessel under varying degrees of concrete degradation to seismic loads is investigated. The results presented are simulated using the Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) software for seismic analysis and the Blackbear software for concrete degradation and damage modeling. Both software are open source and developed within the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE).

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Hazard Analysis to Support Fusion Systems Safety Assessments

Reliability, safety, and performance are vital aspects of any nuclear operation. Fusion technology continues to grow in public, private, and research interest, and coupled with rapidly growing energy needs, fusion technology research is poised for fast progress. The development of a Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) is seen as stepping stone for demonstrating long-cycle fusion. Naturally, such operation requires systems that are available, reliable, and safe. This work provides a novel demonstration of systems theory coupled with traditional hazard analysis to provide insights into the risk priority of components and systems found within the FNSF. The results of this work are a set of identified hazards that should be considered for the risk-informed design and development of the FNSF.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Description of FY25 Theory and Simulation Performance Target: Development of an integrated modeling framework for fusion reactor design and assessment

The urgency to deliver fusion power is growing now more than ever, with increasing pressure for both public programs and private companies to meet milestones timelines and overcome significant remaining technical challenges to ensure growth of a nascent fusion industry in time to meet rapidly growing clean energy demands. With incredible advancements in computation and years of investment in fusion model development and validation, integrated modeling is poised to fill a key role in accelerating the timeline to a fusion pilot plant (FPP). Future fusion pilot plants will operate in regimes far beyond current experience, and device design will rely on physics-based prediction and extrapolation. Many concepts will also rely on simulation to assess safety (shielding, tritium management, materials activation and lifetimes), economics and scalability before the decision to build. Importantly, integrated simulation can be used to reveal and solve the complexities of system integration that may otherwise not be apparent in physical components or models developed in isolation. New experimental test facilities that produce relevant conditions to validate and resolve key technical challenges for various subsystems (materials, blankets, fuel cycle, etc.) have been repeatedly called for by the fusion community but are not yet realized. Integrated modeling has an important role in identifying realistic load conditions (thermal, electromagnetic, plasma, neutron and photon loads, etc.) and defining the components and experiments for these test facilities in order to ensure meaningful validation that sufficiently reduces modeling uncertainties and technical risk for the full integrated reactor. The Fusion REactor Design and Assessment (FREDA) SciDAC project is building a component-based integrated modeling framework & data structure to enable self-consistent, multi-fidelity, iterative optimization workflows for the fusion reactor design process. FREDA aims to shorten the time to viable designs by providing a set of flexible workflows to support the various stages of the design process using an integrated model hierarchy, ranging from the simple analytic descriptions to the highest fidelity, theory-based plasma and engineering modeling developed by the fusion and fission communities. These tools are expected to be needed for timely support of FPP design in the milestone program and in the FIRE collaboratives. The plasma simulation backbone of FREDA is IPS-FASTRAN with newly developed coupled Core-Edge Pedestal-SOL (CESOL) workflows, which is being extended to the far-SOL region up to the plasma facing components. FREDA incorporates the FERMI engineering modeling suite and will enable self-consistent evaluation of the thermal shields, limiters, blanket, magnets, and other surrounding structures with predictions of temperatures, erosion, dpa, activation, tritium generation and transport, creep, corrosion, material degradation, etc. Parametric generation of 3D CAD enables rapid iteration of component geometry in response to plasma and loading specifications.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗