Managing Cybersecurity in Small Modular Reactors: Strategies for Addressing Modularity, Cloud, and Remote Operation Risks
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This report provides an analysis of the U.S. standards and regulatory landscape for digital energy systems, focusing on cybersecurity, safety, and reliability requirements. It examines the interplay between federal mandates, state regulations, voluntary industry standards, and utility-specific policies, highlighting critical gaps between compliance and real-world risk mitigation. While NERC CIP standards enforce cybersecurity for Bulk Electric System assets, distribution-level infrastructure and emerging technologies often fall outside mandatory oversight, creating vulnerabilities. The report identifies systemic challenges such as reliance on self-attestation, uneven state adoption of safety codes, and lagging standards for advanced technologies like battery energy storage and inverter-based resources. Through a detailed gap analysis, it underscores the urgency of proactive risk-based approaches, independent verification, and strategic engagement with state and federal entities. Recommendations include adopting tiered security frameworks, strengthening procurement practices, and addressing emerging technology risks to ensure resilient and secure digital energy infrastructure. This guidance is intended for utilities, regulators, and stakeholders navigating compliance obligations and seeking to enhance cybersecurity and safety beyond minimum standards.
The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) architecture is leveraged from the Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) concept of operations. Within the UAM environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within that environment. As a recognized need, various views of UAM flight information are provided to the public and public safety entities. To accomplish this, among other goals, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can coordinate flight information between the FAA controlled National Airspace System (NAS) and the UAM environments through the FAA-Industry Data Exchange Protocol (FIDXP). This concept of UAM proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) or short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. To garner the support of UAM and to realize its potential, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Understanding the various components communicating with one-another cybersecurity, like in other industries, has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. With the planned growth and reach of UAM systems, it’s clear that the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. Consequently, as these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well. While learning is always the goal, the overall intent of this workshop is to make recommendations on the following: (1) how future UAM environments can be protected against cyber-attacks, and (2) what mechanisms should be put in place to detect attacks against UAM environments.
Electric grids around the world are undergoing rapid structural and operational change, making it more important than ever to understand evolving risks and improve grid resilience and security against natural and human disruptions. Through tailored technical assistance, NREL is working with partners to support the secure and resilient deployment of energy systems and address grid integration challenges.
The accelerating deployment of digital energy infrastructure, ranging from inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), to advanced grid control platforms, has brought unprecedented visibility, flexibility, and efficiency to the electric grid. However, this digital transformation also introduces new cybersecurity challenges, particularly in the form of supply chain risks and operational blind spots at the grid edge. Over the past year, the Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through its Rapid Risk Assessment initiative, along with the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), through its Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, have supported a series of on-site network engagements led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These engagements, conducted in partnership with asset owners across the country, have focused on identifying real-world vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in operational environments, many of which are not detectable through remote assessments or traditional compliance audits. The goal of this report is to distill key findings and lessons learned during network hunt engagements from INL’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 - 2025. It is intended to help asset owners—regardless of their participation in the program—better understand the evolving threat landscape and adopt practical measures to secure their digital energy infrastructure.
As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.
To realize the potential of Urban Air Mobility (UAM), an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. UAM is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. The intent of this work is to leverage a permissioned blockchain to simulate secure data exchange and storage for the UAM operational intent use case. In this case study, two vehicle operators are operating in the same airspace. Their intent is to fly vehicles that land at a shared vertiport, securely.
To realize the potential of Urban Air Mobility (UAM), an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. UAM is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. The intent of this work is to leverage a permissioned blockchain to simulate secure data exchange and storage for the UAM operational intent use case.
To realize the potential of Urban Air Mobility (UAM), an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. UAM is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. The intent of this work is to leverage a permissioned blockchain to simulate secure data exchange and storage for the UAM operational intent use case.
This document supports the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) within the context of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) to enhance cyber-resilience. It highlights that many critical infrastructure organizations use ERM to manage business risks and emphasizes the importance of evaluating critical systems and assets. The proposed approach can be adopted independently of formal ERM processes and offers a starting point for integrating CIE alongside existing or new ERM practices. Both CIE and ERM are iterative, and their alignment fosters continuous improvement and supports the engineering and operations cultures of an organization.
Urban air mobility (UAM) is a concept that proposes to develop short-range aerial vehicles to overcome increasing surface congestion. Within the UAM environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within the UAM environment. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. To address these challenges, this research focuses on the secure data exchange and storage of this decentralized UAM environment. The intent of this research is to leverage a permissioned blockchain approach to address cybersecurity threats that may impact a UAM environment.
Urban air mobility (UAM) is a concept that proposes to develop short-range aerial vehicles to overcome increasing surface congestion. Within the UAM environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within the UAM environment. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. To address these challenges, this research focuses on the secure data exchange and storage of this decentralized UAM environment. The intent of this research is to leverage a permissioned blockchain approach to address cybersecurity threats that may impact a UAM environment.
The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.
Digitization in the power industry enables wide connectivity among multiple new entrants such as DERs, prosumers, and P2P counterparts within or outside the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). The use of DLT to improve resilience in the power grid has growing support, but new technology provides new opportunities for adversaries to cause harm. This work completed by the Cybersecurity- focused task force of IEEE SA P2418.5 evaluates the potential risks by applying the MITRE ATT&CK® ICS matrix to the DLT Engineering and Cybersecurity Stack designed for power systems applications
The increasing complexity and business requirements of operational technology (OT) devices is beginning to break the normal segmentation between information technology (IT) and OT networks. The introduction of industry 4.0 devices such as industrial internet of things (IIoT) and other intelligent industrial devices (IID), virtualized OT systems, OT cloud integration, and artificial intelligence (AI)-driven industrial control systems (ICS) has challenged traditional IT/OT cybersecurity strategies. Industry 4.0 devices are analyzed through the lens of well-regarded models such as the PERA model and confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security objectives, showing the division between what is needed and traditional cybersecurity countermeasures. In this paper, the practice of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is proposed to bridge the gap between IT/OT security, enhance the practice of cybersecurity in this modern age, and reduce the impacts of consequential events in OT.
The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. A comprehensive exploration of BESS cybersecurity supply chain risks, systematic vendor risk assessment through the BESS Procurement Guide, and practical application of the INL SCRM Chatbot for enhanced supply chain resilience. This is Session 2 of 3. (Full Version)
This report delves into the critical aspects of grid services provided by solar inverter-based resources (IBRs), with an emphasis on the evolving landscape of microgrids, virtual power plants (VPPs), aggregators, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). As the energy sector undergoes a transformative shift towards more decentralized and resilient grid architectures, understanding the multifaceted risks associated with these technologies becomes paramount. The report categorizes these risks into organizational, technical, and procedural domains, providing a thorough risk assessment framework that stakeholders can utilize to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. In addressing the increasing complexity of grid interconnections, the report highlights the importance of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). By embedding engineering controls and cybersecurity measures into the early stages of system design, this approach aims to fortify grid infrastructure against emerging cyber threats. The analysis includes an exploration of best practices and strategies for integrating CIE principles to enhance grid security and resilience. To provide practical insights, the report conducts a detailed consequence analysis of various grid services and cyber mitigations that can be applied through the interconnection process. This analysis evaluates the potential impacts of different failure modes and vulnerabilities, offering a clear understanding of the consequences that could arise from disruptions within the energy grid. The findings are further enriched by a series of case studies that illustrate real-world scenarios and lessons learned from past incidents. Through this comprehensive examination of grid services and their criticality, the report aims to prepare industry professionals with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate the complexities of modern energy systems. By providing a comprehensive approach that includes risk assessment, cybersecurity, and consequence analysis, solar stakeholders can more effectively guarantee the reliability, efficiency, and security of the energy grid.
Emergence of Cybersecurity has increased the focus on security risks to Information Technology (IT) assets going beyond traditional Information Assurance (IA) concerns: More sophisticated threats have emerged from increasing sources as advanced hacker tools and techniques have emerged and proliferated to broaden the attack surface available across globally interconnected networks.