Results for “corrective actions” — Page 7

NASA NTRS2017

A Fuzzy Logic Approach for Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance for Unmanned Aerial Systems

In the coming years, operations in low altitude airspace will vastly increase as the capabilities and applications of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) continue to multiply. Therefore, solutions to managing sUAS in highly congested airspace must be explored. In this study, a Fuzzy Logic based approach was used to help mitigate the risk of collisions between aircraft using separation assurance and collision avoidance techniques. The system was evaluated for its effectiveness to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions between aircraft. This system utilizes only current state information and can resolve potential conflicts without knowledge of intruder intent. The avoidance logic was verified using formal methods and shown to select the correct action in all instances. Additionally, the Fuzzy Logic Controllers were shown to always turn the vehicles in the correct direction. Numerical testing demonstrated that the avoidance system was able to prevent a mid-air collision between two sUAS in all tested cases. Simulations were also performed in a three-dimensional environment with a heterogenous fleet of sUAS performing a variety of realistic missions. Simulations showed that the system was 99.98 effective at preventing mid-air collisions when separation assurance was disabled (unmitigated case) and 100 effective when enabled (mitigated case).

Verification & Validation of a Fuzzy Logic Control↗

DOE OSTI2024

Innovating the next generation of commercial smart building software

Nearly 30% of commercial building energy use is wasted due to equipment faults and HVAC controls problems. The result is increased emissions, compromised comfort and productivity, and less reliable coordination of building power needs with a clean grid. The energy impact alone represents $17 billion in potential savings. Today’s smart building software provides a robust solution to address these operational deficiencies. Energy management and information systems (EMIS) are saving up to 9% on average, with two-year paybacks. They are being incorporated into energy management processes, commissioning services, and utility programs. As effective as they are, two barriers prevent even deeper benefits; limited personnel to fix problems once they are identified, and the expense and time to manually implement changes in control systems. In partnership with the research community, the EMIS industry is developing new capabilities to overcome these barriers. Moving beyond siloed products for either fault detection and diagnostics, or optimal control, these new capabilities empower users to not only automatically identify faults, but also to push corrective action, and control improvements to their buildings. In this paper, several areas for enhancements are documented: ‘one-time’ correction of faults such as setpoints, schedules, and economizer lockouts; short-term active testing for automated proportional integral derivative (PID) loop tuning and functional testing; and continuous supervisory control for demand flexibility and year-round efficiency. Results are presented from a pair of partner implementations out of a dozen providers integrating these enhancements into their products, including field tests from across the country, and insights into operator acceptance and integration into operations and maintenance practices.

Casillas, Armando↗

NASA NTRS1990

Analysis of MMU FDIR expert system

This paper describes the analysis of a rulebase for fault diagnosis, isolation, and recovery for NASA's Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU). The MMU is used by a human astronaut to move around a spacecraft in space. In order to provide maneuverability, there are several thrusters oriented in various directions, and hand-controlled devices for useful groups of them. The rulebase describes some error detection procedures, and corrective actions that can be applied in a few cases. The approach taken in this paper is to treat rulebases as symbolic objects and compute correctness and 'reasonableness' criteria that use the statistical distribution of various syntactic structures within the rulebase. The criteria should identify awkward situations, and otherwise signal anomalies that may be errors. The rulebase analysis agorithms are derived from mathematical and computational criteria that implement certain principles developed for rulebase evaluation. The principles are Consistency, Completeness, Irredundancy, Connectivity, and finally, Distribution. Several errors were detected in the delivered rulebase. Some of these errors were easily fixed. Some errors could not be fixed with the available information. A geometric model of the thruster arrangement is needed to show how to correct certain other distribution nomalies that are in fact errors. The investigations reported here were partially supported by The Aerospace Corporation's Sponsored Research Program.

Landauer, Christopher↗

NASA NTRS2016

Supply Warehouse#3, SWMU 088 Operations, Maintenance, and Monitoring Report Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This document presents the findings, observations, and results associated with Operations, Maintenance, and Monitoring (OM&M) activities of Corrective Measures Implementation (CMI) activities conducted at Supply Warehouse #3 (SW3) located at John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida from October 8, 2015, to September 12, 2016, and performance monitoring results for semi-annual sampling events conducted in March and September 2016. The primary objective of SW3 CMI is to actively decrease concentrations of trichloroethene (TCE) and vinyl chloride (VC) to less than Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) Natural Attenuation Default Concentrations (NADCs), and the secondary objective is to reduce TCE, cis-1,2-dichloroethene (cDCE), trans-1,2-dichloroethene (tDCE), 1,1-dichloroethene (11DCE), and VC concentrations to less than FDEP Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (GCTLs). The SW3 facility has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 088 under KSC's Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Corrective Action Program. Based on the results to date, the SW3 air sparging (AS) system is operating at or below the performance criteria as presented in the 2008 SW3 Corrective Measures Implementation (CMI) Work Plan and 2009 and 2012 CMI Work Plan Addenda. Since the start of AS system operations on December 19, 2012, through the September 2016 groundwater sampling event, TCE concentrations have decreased to less than the GCTL in all wells within the Active Remediation Zone (ARZ), and VC results remain less than NADC but greater than GCTL. Based on these results, team consensus was reached at the October 2016 KSC Remediation Team (KSCRT) meeting to continue AS system operations and semi-annual performance monitoring of volatile organic compounds in March 2017 at ten monitoring wells at select locations, and in September 2017 at four monitoring wells at select locations to reduce VC concentrations to below GCTL. Additionally, surface water samples will be collected at locations SW0001, SW0002, and SW0003 during both the March and September 2017 events. Team consensus was also reached at the October 2017 KSCRT meeting to continue with operation and maintenance (O&M) of the AS system at SW3.

REPORT↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRS1999

DS-2 Mars Microprobe Battery

In January of 1999 the NM DS-2 Mars microprobe will be launched to impact on Mars in December. The technical objectives of the missions are to demonstrate: key technologies, a passive atmospheric entry, highly integrated microelectronics which can withstand both low temperatures and high decelerations, and the capability to conduct in-situ, surface and subsurface science data acquisition. The scientific objectives are to determine if ice is present below the Martian surface, measure the local atmospheric pressure, characterize the thermal properties of the martian subsurface soil, and to estimate the vertical temperature gradient of the Martian soil. The battery requirements are 2-4 cell batteries, with voltage of 6-14 volts, capacity of 550 mAh at 80C, and 2Ah at 25C, shelf life of 2.5 years, an operating temperature of 60C and below, and the ability to withstand shock impact of 80,000 g's. The technical challenges and the approach is reviewed. The Li-SOCL2 system is reviewed, and graphs showing the current and voltage is displayed, along with the voltage over discharge time. The problems encountered during the testing were: (1) impact sensitivity, (2) cracking of the seals, and (3) delay in voltage. A new design resulted in no problems in the impact testing phase. The corrective actions for the seal problems involved: (1) pre weld fill tube, (2) an improved heat sink during case to cover weld and (3) change the seal dimensions to reduce stress. To correct the voltage delay problem the solutions involved: (1) drying the electrodes to reduce contamination by water, (2) assemblage of the cells within a week of electrode manufacture, (3) ensure electrolyte purity, and (4) provide second depassivation pulse after landing. The conclusions on further testing were that the battery can: (1) withstand anticipated shock of up to 80,000 g, (2) meet the discharge profile post shock at Mars temperatures, (3) meet the required self discharge rate and (4) meet environmental requirements.

Frank, H.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Evaluation of Low Cost, User-Centered Alerting Devices for the Mitigation of Flight Crew Spatial Disorientation

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is conducting research into technologies which have the potential to reduce flight crew Spatial Disorientation (SD). While flight deck technology has advanced rapidly over the past fifty (50) years, the reported occurrences of flight crew SD have not decreased. The Cost-Effective Devices for Alerting Research (CEDAR) effort has focused on the identification and development of low cost, user-centered alerting solutions for the purpose of mitigating the occurrence of flight crew SD. This effort seeks to evaluate both existing technologies as well as new and emerging technologies which have a viable path to implementation in commercial aviation within the next five (5) years. This research is intended to develop a proof-of-concept for real-time SD mitigation which could eventually be utilized to improve safety in future air transport operations. NASA has partnered with the United States Naval Aeromedical Research Unit in Dayton, OH (NAMRU-D) to conduct flight crew SD research utilizing their Disorientation Research Device (DRD), dubbed “The Kraken”. This high-tech simulator features never-before-seen capabilities for side-by-side commercial aviation flight crew SD research, and is capable of re-creating the forces necessary to induce SD illusions in a safe and repeatable manner. Prototype SD mitigation solutions were incorporated into this simulator for scenario-based testing and evaluation using airline pilots within a contextually representative operational environment. SD mitigation technology prototypes designed to provide haptic feedback for both alerting and guidance, as well as innovative visual and aural alerting displays were evaluated. In December 2014, as a result of analyzing eighteen (18) loss-of-control events, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) recommended research into flight deck technologies that have potential to mitigate the problems and contributing factors that lead to flight crew loss of airplane state awareness (ASA) and conditions likely to produce SD. The aviation community (government, industry and academia) have been charged with conducting research into cost-effective, user-centered flight deck alerting systems to alert flight crews; especially for the two conditions that produced SD (sub-threshold rolls and the somatogravic illusion). Somatogravic illusions are defined as illusions in which “there is a false perception of attitude on exposure to a force vector that differs in direction and/or magnitude from the normal gravitational force”. The sub-threshold roll illusion (aka the “leans” illusion) is a false sensation of roll attitude. A prolonged roll of less than two degrees becomes physiologically imperceptible to the pilot, and can lead to an incorrect perception of aircraft orientation. The sub-threshold roll illusion forms the entry point for the “graveyard spiral”, a maneuver in which the pilot’s corrective action (based on their false perception of aircraft orientation) causes the aircraft to spiral down into the ground. In both of these SD illusions, it is when the pilot attempts to correct the aircraft’s attitude (based on a false perception of its state) that problems arise, sometimes with lethal consequences.

Ronald J Daiker↗

DOE OSTI2025

Fostering Nuclear Security Culture through Effective Leadership: An Operational Perspective

Security culture plays a critical role in determining the effectiveness of an organization's security performance, making its significance impossible to overemphasize. It encompasses the collective values, shared perceptions, and habitual actions embraced by all individuals within a nuclear organization—from leadership to frontline staff. When the entire workforce recognizes the reality of potential threats, accepts that security is a shared duty, and integrates security-minded behavior into everyday routines, it fosters an environment where strong security practices are the norm. In such a setting, everyone can take pride and feel reassured in being part of an organization where a strong security culture is deeply embedded. Security culture is based on the broader concept of organizational culture. All organizations—whether families, social clubs, religious institutions, businesses, non-governmental organizations, or governments—possess an underlying culture shaped by core values and beliefs. These values and beliefs influence attitudes and drive behavior throughout the organization. While multiple factors contribute to the development of a strong security culture, leadership plays a particularly pivotal role. In organizations where security culture is well-established, leaders go beyond rhetoric; they demonstrate a genuine commitment to security through their actions. They implement policies and procedures that actively engage all employees, foster open dialogue around security concerns, and encourage teamwork in resolving issues. Furthermore, they reward proactive behavior and ensure that corrective actions are taken promptly. Regular assessments of the organization's security culture allow such leaders to gauge its effectiveness and take strategic steps to strengthen it when necessary. This paper leverages practical, real-world experience to guide leadership and senior management within nuclear organizations through the foundational steps of cultivating a robust, organization-wide culture of nuclear security. It emphasizes the critical importance of early leadership engagement in shaping this culture and outlines a comprehensive approach that includes strategic, tactical, and operational measures. Additionally, it explores methods for fostering a unified vision across all levels of the organization to ensure alignment, commitment, and continuous improvement in nuclear security practices.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

NASA NTRS1988

Electrical noise reduction techniques contributing to improved data quality at the National Transonic Facility

In initial use, the high-speed digital data acquisition systems at Langley Research Center's National Transonic Facility produced data containing unacceptably high noise levels. Described is a process whereby the contributing noise sources were identified and eliminated. The effects of 60 Hz power, system grounding, EMI/RFI, and other problems are discussed and the corrective action taken is outlined. The overall effort resulted in an improvement of greater than 5:1 in system performance. Although the report describes a system specifically used for wind tunnel data acquisition, the corrective techniques employed are generally applicable to large scale high-speed data systems where signal resolution in the low microvolts range is important.

Mcphee, J. R.↗

DOE OSTI2023

Technical Specification Surveillance Interval Extension Using Self-Diagnostics

As part of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability program, an ongoing research effort is being conducted on technical specifications surveillance interval extension of digital equipment in nuclear power plants. The research team is led by Idaho National Laboratory and includes Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Technology Resources, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This research focuses on developing methods for applying the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)–approved guidance to implement a licensee-controlled, risk-informed surveillance frequency change program in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems that include self-diagnostics and online monitoring (OLM) capabilities. Although approved methods exist for extending technical specifications (TS) surveillance test intervals (STIs) for general equipment, including analog I&C equipment, gaps remain in technology and guidance on crediting newer digital equipment’s internal self-diagnostics and OLM characteristics. Previous research described a general methodology for crediting internal self-diagnostics for extending surveillance test intervals. The methodology used self-diagnostics to detect—and credited recovery from—failure. Self-diagnostics were also applied for performance monitoring during the extended surveillance interval. This report discusses the status of recent activities to evaluate the previously developed methodology using a pilot study. Although both a utility partner for a pilot study and a specific digital asset were identified in FY2020, delays in obtaining proprietary information resulted in a limited ability to fully evaluate the methodology, and further interactions were complicated by the COVID pandemic. Therefore, at that time, the use of public-domain information—along with current processes for surveillance interval extension through a surveillance frequency control program—identified the need to fully assess diagnostic coverage as part of the pilot study. Furthermore, self-diagnostics were also identified as a potential option to replace the drift analyses conducted as part of current STI extension procedures. In FY2022, the project was reconstituted with the industry partner, and information and data were made available by the industry partner to the research team for review. The shared information included failure event descriptions and data for a digital I&C system since its implementation, as well as recent STI extension interval reports developed by the utility partner on that digital I&C system. This report presents an evaluation of this information and data and describes an application of the proposed methodology cited above. The methodology seeks to take advantage of the self-diagnostics and OLM capabilities to reduce risk or reduce the level of qualitative monitoring assessment needed to perform a risk-informed STI extension using existing NRC approved guidance or both. Addressing these issues of STI extension by crediting self-diagnostics is likely to result in benefits for current and future nuclear power plant (NPP) operations, including lowering the barriers to adoption of digital I&C systems and increasing cost savings by deferring or eliminating unneeded preventive maintenance (tasks or checks or activities). Specifically, self-diagnostic and OLM capabilities of newer digital equipment being installed in non-safety and safety applications are designed to detect failures, provide early warning of potential failures, and notify plant operators to take appropriate action to reduce out of service (OOS) time thus protecting safety margins. Moreover, the equipment is expected to provide information that time-related operational degradation is identified early to ensure timely and planned corrective actions instead of a reactive and unplanned approach ahead of an extended-surveillance interval.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2010

Sustaining Human Space Flight: From the Present to the Future

This slide presentation reviews some of the efforts to ensure that human space flight continues in NASA. With the aging shuttle orbiter fleet, some actions have been taken to assure safe operations. Some of these are: (1) the formation of a Corrosion Control Review Board (CCRB) that will assess the extent and cause of corrosion to the shuttle, and provide short term and long term corrective actions, among other objectives, (2) a formalization of an aging vehicle assessment (AVA) as part of a certification for the Return-to-Flight, (3) an assessment of the age life of the materials in the space shuttle, and (4) the formation of the Aging Orbiter Working Group (AOWG). There are also slides with information about the International Space Station. There is also information about the need to update the Kennedy Space Center, to sustain a 21st century launch complex and the requirement to further the aim of commercial launch capability.

Russell, Rick↗

NASA NTRS2008

Problem Reporting System

The Problem Reporting System (PRS) is a Web application, running on two Web servers (load-balanced) and two database servers (RAID-5), which establishes a system for submission, editing, and sharing of reports to manage risk assessment of anomalies identified in NASA's flight projects. PRS consolidates diverse anomaly-reporting systems, maintains a rich database set, and incorporates a robust engine, which allows tracking of any hardware, software, or paper process by configuring an appropriate life cycle. Global and specific project administration and setup tools allow lifecycle tailoring, along with customizable controls for user, e-mail, notifications, and more. PRS is accessible via the World Wide Web for authorized user at most any location. Upon successful log-in, the user receives a customizable window, which displays time-critical 'To Do' items (anomalies requiring the user s input before the system moves the anomaly to the next phase of the lifecycle), anomalies originated by the user, anomalies the user has addressed, and custom queries that can be saved for future use. Access controls exist depending on a user's role as system administrator, project administrator, user, or developer, and then, further by association with user, project, subsystem, company, or item with provisions for business-to-business exclusions, limitations on access according to the covert or overt nature of a given project, all with multiple layers of filtration, as needed. Reporting of metrics is built in. There is a provision for proxy access (in which the user may choose to grant one or more other users to view screens and perform actions as though they were the user, during any part of a tracking life cycle - especially useful during tight build schedules and vacations to keep things moving). The system also provides users the ability to have an anomaly link to or notify other systems, including QA Inspection Reports, Safety, GIDEP (Government-Industry Data Exchange Program) Alert, Corrective Actions, and Lessons Learned. The PRS tracking engine was designed as a very extensible and scalable system, able to support additional applications, with future development possibilities already discussed, including Incident Surprise Anomalies (for anomalies occurring during Operations phases of NASA Flight projects), GIDEP and NASA Alerts, and others.

Potter, Don↗

NASA NTRS1960

An Exploratory Statistical Analysis of a Planet Approach-Phase Guidance Scheme Using Angular Measurements with Significant Error

An exploratory analysis of vehicle guidance during the approach to a target planet is presented. The objective of the guidance maneuver is to guide the vehicle to a specific perigee distance with a high degree of accuracy and minimum corrective velocity expenditure. The guidance maneuver is simulated by considering the random sampling of real measurements with significant error and reducing this information to prescribe appropriate corrective action. The instrumentation system assumed includes optical and/or infrared devices to indicate range and a reference angle in the trajectory plane. Statistical results are obtained by Monte-Carlo techniques and are shown as the expectation of guidance accuracy and velocity-increment requirements. Results are nondimensional and applicable to any planet within limits of two-body assumptions. The problem of determining how many corrections to make and when to make them is a consequence of the conflicting requirement of accurate trajectory determination and propulsion. Optimum values were found for a vehicle approaching a planet along a parabolic trajectory with an initial perigee distance of 5 radii and a target perigee of 1.02 radii. In this example measurement errors were less than i minute of arc. Results indicate that four corrections applied in the vicinity of 50, 16, 15, and 1.5 radii, respectively, yield minimum velocity-increment requirements. Thrust devices capable of producing a large variation of velocity-increment size are required. For a vehicle approaching the earth, miss distances within 32 miles are obtained with 90-percent probability. Total velocity increments used in guidance are less than 3300 feet per second with 90-percent probability. It is noted that the above representative results are valid only for the particular guidance scheme hypothesized in this analysis. A parametric study is presented which indicates the effects of measurement error size, initial perigee, and initial energy on the guidance requirements. Measurement error size significantly affects both guidance accuracy and velocity-increment expenditure. The initial trajectory, as given by its perigee and energy, affects the velocity-increment expenditure but not final guidance accuracy.

Friedlander, Alan L.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Fault Management Techniques in Human Spaceflight Operations

This paper discusses human spaceflight fault management operations. Fault detection and response capabilities available in current US human spaceflight programs Space Shuttle and International Space Station are described while emphasizing system design impacts on operational techniques and constraints. Preflight and inflight processes along with products used to anticipate, mitigate and respond to failures are introduced. Examples of operational products used to support failure responses are presented. Possible improvements in the state of the art, as well as prioritization and success criteria for their implementation are proposed. This paper describes how the architecture of a command and control system impacts operations in areas such as the required fault response times, automated vs. manual fault responses, use of workarounds, etc. The architecture includes the use of redundancy at the system and software function level, software capabilities, use of intelligent or autonomous systems, number and severity of software defects, etc. This in turn drives which Caution and Warning (C&W) events should be annunciated, C&W event classification, operator display designs, crew training, flight control team training, and procedure development. Other factors impacting operations are the complexity of a system, skills needed to understand and operate a system, and the use of commonality vs. optimized solutions for software and responses. Fault detection, annunciation, safing responses, and recovery capabilities are explored using real examples to uncover underlying philosophies and constraints. These factors directly impact operations in that the crew and flight control team need to understand what happened, why it happened, what the system is doing, and what, if any, corrective actions they need to perform. If a fault results in multiple C&W events, or if several faults occur simultaneously, the root cause(s) of the fault(s), as well as their vehicle-wide impacts, must be determined in order to maintain situational awareness. This allows both automated and manual recovery operations to focus on the real cause of the fault(s). An appropriate balance must be struck between correcting the root cause failure and addressing the impacts of that fault on other vehicle components. Lastly, this paper presents a strategy for using lessons learned to improve the software, displays, and procedures in addition to determining what is a candidate for automation. Enabling technologies and techniques are identified to promote system evolution from one that requires manual fault responses to one that uses automation and autonomy where they are most effective. These considerations include the value in correcting software defects in a timely manner, automation of repetitive tasks, making time critical responses autonomous, etc. The paper recommends the appropriate use of intelligent systems to determine the root causes of faults and correctly identify separate unrelated faults.

O'Hagan, Brian↗

NASA NTRS1972

Power conditioning equipment for a thermoelectric outer planet spacecraft, volume 1, book 1

Equipment was designed to receive power from a radioisotope thermoelectric generator source, condition, distribute, and control this power for the spacecraft loads. The TOPS mission, aimed at a representative tour of the outer planets, would operate for an estimated 12 year period. Unique design characteristics required for the power conditioning equipment results from the long mission time and the need for autonomous on-board operations due to large communications distances and the associated time delays of ground initiated actions. The salient features of the selected power subsystem configuration are: (1) The PCE regulates the power from the radioisotope thermoelectric generator power source at 30 vdc by means of a quad-redundant shunt regulator; (2) 30 vdc power is used by certain loads, but is more generally inverted and distributed as square-wave ac power; (3) a protected bus is used to assure that power is always available to the control computer subsystem to permit corrective action to be initiated in response to fault conditions; and (4) various levels of redundancy are employed to provide high subsystem reliability.

Andrews, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS2000

WSTF Pyrovalve Test Program Status: 2000

Extensive propulsion and pyrotechnic testing has been in progress at NASA/JSC White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) since 1995, starting with the Mars Observer Propulsion and Pyrotechnics Corrective Action Test Program (MOCATP). The MOCATP has been concluded, but extensive pyrovalve testing plus research and development continues at WSTF. Our capability to accurately characterize pyrovalve combustion product blow-by into propellant systems, evaluate hydrazine and monomethylhydrazine (MMH) thermal decomposition initiated by blow-by, and characterize valve actuation operation, continues to be used and refined. Data from this and several low blow-by pyrovalves manufactured by Conax and other corporations continues to be evaluated as a potential corrective measure for blow-by induced propellant explosions. Additionally, new measurement techniques are being developed, advanced pyrovalve development is under-way, and nondestructive examination (NDE) methods are being developed to help ensure pyrovalve safety. Starting in 2000 these data are being formatted into a pyrovalve application and testing handbook. Near-term testing includes evaluation of 3/8-in. Conax pyrovalves and other commercially available valves; development of advanced pyrovalve subcomponent technology; investigation of NDE techniques to evaluate pyrovalve ram seals and real-time measurement of housing deformation; and investigation of pyrotechnically induced explosive hydrazine decomposition both through testing and modeling. Evaluation of 3/8-in. Conax valves is to include operational margin testing to be accomplished at the NASA Langley Research Center.

Saulsberry, Regor L.↗