Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “TERRORISM”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7

Novel Separation of Actinides

The separation of actinides and other elements of interest for nuclear forensics and threat reduction is currently performed using decades-old chemistries and ion-exchange columns. We propose to determine the technical feasibility of a novel method for separating actinide ions in solution. This method is based upon isotachophoresis (ITP), which has been applied in the purification of pharmaceuticals and other biochemical applications. This technique has the potential to separate inorganic ions more effectively than existing methods, which is key to analyzing very small samples. We will perform a quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of specific isotachophoretic approaches including predicting the physical and chemical properties, such as ion mobility, of inorganic ions under specific solvent conditions using a combination of ab initio calculations and semi-empirical methods. We expect to obtain a thorough understanding of the analytical systems parameters under which ITP is most effective for the separation of inorganic samples, including the influence of the double layer surrounding actinide ions, the Debye length for different ions and ion complexes, and Debye-Hueckel limits. Inorganic separations are key to nuclear forensics for countering terrorism and nuclear proliferation. If found to be feasible and potentially superior to currently used separation approaches, ITP could provide the conceptual basis for an improved means to separate samples of nuclear explosion debris for nuclear forensic analysis, in support of the Laboratory's missions in homeland and national security.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Very High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP)

This report documents the detailed background information that has been compiled to support the preparation of a much shorter white paper on the design features and fuel cycles of Very High-Temperature Reactors (VHTRs), including the proposed Next-Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP), to identify the important proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR&PP) aspects of the proposed concepts. The shorter white paper derived from the information in this report was prepared for the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Science and Technology for the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) VHTR Systems Steering Committee (SSC) as input to the GIF Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PR&PPWG) (http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/horizontal/proliferation.htm). The short white paper was edited by the GIF VHTR SCC to address their concerns and thus may differ from the information presented in this supporting report. The GIF PR&PPWG will use the derived white paper based on this report along with other white papers on the six alternative Generation IV design concepts (http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/systems/index.htm) to employ an evaluation methodology that can be applied and will evolve from the earliest stages of design. This methodology will guide system designers, program policy makers, and external stakeholders in evaluating the response of each system, to determine each system's resistance to proliferation threats and robustness against sabotage and terrorism threats, and thereby guide future international cooperation on ensuring safeguards in the deployment of the Generation IV systems. The format and content of this report is that specified in a template prepared by the GIF PR&PPWG. Other than the level of detail, the key exception to the specified template format is the addition of Appendix C to document the history and status of coated-particle fuel reprocessing technologies, which fuel reprocessing technologies have yet to be deployed commercially and have only been demonstrated in testing at a laboratory scale.

Moses, David Lewis↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Integrated Program Plan

Nuclear power has safely, reliably, and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 70%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. Domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to experience a 31% growth from 2009 to 2035. At the same time, most of the currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their initial 20-year extension to their original 40-year operating license for a total of 60 years of operation. Figure E-1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years, the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will begin to decline - even with the expected addition of new nuclear generating capacity. The oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy's Research and Development Roadmap (Nuclear Energy Roadmap) organizes its activities around four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The four objectives are as follows: (1) develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors; (2) develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration's energy security and climate change goals; (3) develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and (4) understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document summarizes the LWRS Program's plans.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Global Security (GS) Program Update: LLNS/LANS Mission Committee Meeting [Slides]

Recent events continue to show the national security imperative of the global security mission: (1) Fighting Proliferation - (a) At Yongbyon, 'a modern, industrial-scale U-enrichment facility w/2000 centrifuges' seen Nov. 2010, (b) In Iran, fueling began at Bushehr while P5+1/Iran talks delayed to Dec. 2010; (2) Continuing need to support the warfighter and IC - (a) tensions on the Korean peninsula, (b) primitive IEDs a challenge in Afghanistan, (c) cyber command, (d)another Georgian smuggling event; and (3) Countering terrorisms on US soil - (a) toner cartridge bomb, (b) times square bomb, (c) Christmas tree bomb. Joint Technical Operations Team (JTOT) and Accident Response Group (ARG) elements deployed to two East Coast locations in November to work a multi-weapon scenario. LANL provided 70% of on-duty field and reconstitution teams for both Marble Challenge 11-01 and JD 11-01. There were a total of 14 deployments in FY10.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Fuel Cycle Research & Development Technical Monthly – May 2012

Management and Integration LANL - Initial coordination meetings with NE and NA-20 were held the first week of May. Additional meetings, to include NA-82 and the new Proliferation and Terrorism Risk Assessment task are scheduled for June. Work package planning as part of the NTD transition is ongoing. Microcalorimetry LANL - Some parts to attempt repair of a malfunctioning water chiller that has been holding up work on the current detector array have arrived. We will attempt to begin running the compressor/cryostat next week to resume work on commissioning the detector array. We have also been working on a backup plan to temporarily move our system to a different lab space. Completed data analysis and prepared a paper summarizing Pu measurements for peer-review journal. Two members of our team presented work at the SORMA West 2012 conference. Completed data analysis and prepared a milestone report summarizing the development of Monte Carlo tools to study systematic errors. Electrochemical Sensor INL - The second sensor test was stopped short due to the work stand-down. Some activities related to this work have resumed, but not all. The sensor used during the second test was removed from the furnace and it showed cracks and later crumbled when being rinsed for sample preparation. The sensor material will be submitted to SEM analysis once work is resumed in the facilities where analysis is performed. A third sensor test has started. Tests with different arrangements will continue and will be oriented based on post-test analysis of the first three sensor tests. Materials with different annealing temperatures will also be prepared for analysis. Lead slowing down spectrometer LANL - Continued work on perturbation method for LSDS analysis. We are running simulations to delineate issues and are checking additional data libraries to see whether there are differences in simulation results. Electrochemical sensor INL - The second sensor test was stopped short due to the work stand-down. Some activities related to this work have resumed, but not all. The sensor used during the second test was removed from the furnace and it showed cracks and later crumbled when being rinsed for sample preparation. The sensor material will be submitted to SEM analysis once work is resumed in the facilities where analysis is performed. A third sensor test has started. Tests with different arrangements will continue and will be oriented based on post-test analysis of the first three sensor tests. Materials with different annealing temperatures will also be prepared for analysis. Fast Neutron Multiplicity analysis INL - The University of Michigan team continues its work on the post-experiment analysis of the validation data from JRC ISPRA, as well as scoping studies using the simulation tool MCNPX-PoliMi. At INL, our new staff member working on this project is now working to model performance capabilities for the fast-neutrons scintillator design concepts. At INL our primary analysis approach is focused on the Feynman mean-to-variance approach. At the University of Michigan, the primary analysis approach is multiplicity coincidence analysis. Fast Neutron Imaging to Quantify Nuclear Materials ORNL - Completed additional measurements of the two 'trainer' configurations as well as calibration measurements with sources on an x-y stage. The imager was shipped to Pantex for an NA-22 obligation at the end of May. Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer LANL - Continued to look into He4 detector. A Swiss company was located that makes He4 detectors and associated electronics. Had a teleconference with them to assess the possible help we can get from them. We are also looking in to constructing one locally. Ongoing perturbation calculations are providing information on the fundamental systematic error limits of LSDS. In order to achieve separating the contribution of Pu and 235U to the signal, there will need to be tight controls on systematic errors. Multi-isotope Process Monitor PNNL - Attended a training call in advanced multivariate classification and analysis methods. These methods were applied to the multivariate analysis of fuel characteristics based on simulated gamma. Work continued on a computational framework to quantify the impact of gamma-ray counting statistical precision on principal component regression (PCR) analysis of a multi-component (i.e. multi-isotope) gammaray spectrum. Tests of the simulation framework are anticipated to begin in early June. Development of a proposal to instrument H-Canyon is being prepared in conjunction with SRNL and the NNSA's NGSI program is ongoing.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

LANL Continuity of Operations Plan

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is a premier national security research institution, delivering scientific and engineering solutions for the nation's most crucial and complex problems. Our primary responsibility is to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. LANL emphasizes worker safety, effective operational safeguards and security, and environmental stewardship, outstanding science remains the foundation of work at the Laboratory. In addition to supporting the Laboratory's core national security mission, our work advances bioscience, chemistry, computer science, earth and environmental sciences, materials science, and physics disciplines. To accomplish LANL's mission, we must ensure that the Laboratory EFs continue to be performed during a continuity event, including localized acts of nature, accidents, technological or attack-related emergencies, and pandemic or epidemic events. The LANL Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan documents the overall LANL COOP Program and provides the operational framework to implement continuity policies, requirements, and responsibilities at LANL, as required by DOE 0 150.1, Continuity Programs, May 2008. LANL must maintain its ability to perform the nation's PMEFs, which are: (1) maintain the safety and security of nuclear materials in the DOE Complex at fixed sites and in transit; (2) respond to a nuclear incident, both domestically and internationally, caused by terrorist activity, natural disaster, or accident, including mobilizing the resources to support these efforts; and (3) support the nation's energy infrastructure. This plan supports Continuity of Operations for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This plan issues LANL policy as directed by the DOE 0 150.1, Continuity Programs, and provides direction for the orderly continuation of LANL EFs for 30 days of closure or 60 days for a pandemic/epidemic event. Initiation of COOP operations may be required to support an allhazards event, including a national security emergency, major fire, catastrophic natural disaster, man-made disaster, terrorism event, or technological disaster by rendering LANL buildings, infrastructure, or Technical Areas unsafe, temporarily unusable, or inaccessible.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Twenty-Five Year Site Plan, FY2013 - FY2037

Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) is the nation's premier national security science laboratory. Its mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the United States (U.S.) nuclear stockpile; reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and terrorism; and solve national problems in defense, energy, and the environment. The fiscal year (FY) 2013-2037 Twenty-Five Year Site Plan (TYSP) is a vital component for planning to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) commitment to ensure the U.S. has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The Laboratory also uses the TYSP as an integrated planning tool to guide development of an efficient and responsive infrastructure that effectively supports the Laboratory's missions and workforce. Emphasizing the Laboratory's core capabilities, this TYSP reflects the Laboratory's role as a prominent contributor to NNSA missions through its programs and campaigns. The Laboratory is aligned with Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) modernization activities outlined in the NNSA Strategic Plan (May 2011) which include: (1) ensuring laboratory plutonium space effectively supports pit manufacturing and enterprise-wide special nuclear materials consolidation; (2) constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF); (3) establishing shared user facilities to more cost effectively manage high-value, experimental, computational and production capabilities; and (4) modernizing enduring facilities while reducing the excess facility footprint. Th is TYSP is viewed by the Laboratory as a vital planning tool to develop an effi cient and responsive infrastructure. Long range facility and infrastructure development planning are critical to assure sustainment and modernization. Out-year re-investment is essential for sustaining existing facilities, and will be re-evaluated on an annual basis. At the same time, major modernization projects will require new line-item funding. This document is, in essence, a roadmap that defines a path forward for the Laboratory to modernize, streamline, consolidate, and sustain its infrastructure to meet its national security mission.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Progammatic mission transformation - chemistry and metallurgy research replacement (CMRR) project

Nuclear posture and policy objectives are: (1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy; (3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; (4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring US allies and partners; and (5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor Project: FY12 Progress and Accomplishments

The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor, being developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), provides an efficient approach to monitoring the process conditions in reprocessing facilities in support of the goal of "...(minimization of) the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism." The MIP Monitor measures distributions of a suite of indicator (radioactive) isotopes present within product and waste streams of a nuclear reprocessing facility. These indicator isotopes are monitored on-line by gamma spectrometry and compared, in near-real-time, to spectral patterns representing "normal" process conditions using multivariate pattern recognition software. The monitor utilizes this multivariate analysis and gamma spectroscopy of reprocessing streams to detect small changes in the gamma spectrum, which may indicate changes in process conditions. Multivariate analysis methods common in chemometrics, such as principal component analysis (PCA) and partial least squares regression (PLS), act as pattern recognition techniques, which can detect small deviations from the expected, nominal condition. By targeting multiple gamma-emitting indicator isotopes, the MIP Monitor approach is compatible with the use of small, portable, relatively high-resolution gamma detectors that may be easily deployed throughout an existing facility. The automated multivariate analysis can provide a level of data obscurity, giving a built-in information barrier to protect sensitive or proprietary operational data. Proof-of-concept simulations and experiments have been performed in previous years to demonstrate the validity of this tool in a laboratory setting. Development of the MIP Monitor approach continues to evaluate the efficacy of the monitor for automated, real-time or near-real-time application. This report details follow-on research and development efforts sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy Fuel Cycle Research and Development related to the MIP Monitor for fiscal year 2012 (FY12).

fuel characterization↗

Imprinted Genes and Transpositions: Epigenomic Targets for Low Dose Radiation Effects (Final Report)

The overall hypothesis of this grant application is that low dose ionizing radiation (LDIR) elicits adaptive responses in part by causing heritable DNA methylation changes in the epigenome. This novel postulate was tested by determining if the level of DNA methylation at the Agouti viable yellow (A vy ) metastable locus is altered, in a dose-dependent manner, by low dose radiation exposure (<10 cGy) during early gestation. This information is particularly important to ascertain given the increased use of CT scans in disease diagnosis, increased number of people predicted to live and work in space, and the present concern about radiological terrorism. We showed for the first time that LDIR significantly increased DNA methylation at the A vy locus in a sex-specific manner (p=0.004). Average DNA methylation was significantly increased in male offspring exposed to doses between 0.7 cGy and 7.6 cGy with maximum effects at 1.4 cGy and 3.0 cGy (p<0.01). Offspring coat color was concomitantly shifted towards pseudoagouti (p<0.01). Maternal dietary antioxidant supplementation mitigated both the DNA methylation changes and coat color shift in the irradiated offspring (p<0.05). Thus, LDIR exposure during gestation elicits epigenetic alterations that lead to positive adaptive phenotypic changes that are negated with antioxidants, indicating they are mediated in part by oxidative stress. These findings provide evidence that in the isogenic A vy mouse model epigenetic alterations resulting from LDIR play a role in radiation hormesis, bringing into question the assumption that every dose of radiation is harmful. Our findings not only have significant implications concerning the mechanism of hormesis, but they also emphasize the potential importance of this phenomenon in determining human risk at low radiation doses. Since the epigenetic regulation of genes varies markedly between species, the effect of LDIR on other epigenetically labile genes (e.g. imprinted genes) in animals and humans needs to be defined.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Data Measured on Water Collected from Fall River Springs, California

In October 1997 field collection of water emerging from large volume springs located at the headwater of Fall River in northeastern California resulted in the measurement of stable isotope, radiocarbon, tritium, and dissolved noble gases. This work was follow-on to previous studies on similar spring systems in Hat Creek Valley and surrounding Mt. Shasta in northern California (Rose and Davisson, 1996; Rose et al., 1996; Davisson and Rose, 1997). The data for Fall River springs was never formally published and is therefore tabulated in Table 1 in order to be recorded in public record. These studies, along with many parallel and subsequent ones using isotopes and elemental concentrations, are all related to the general research area of tracing sources and quantifying transport times of natural and man-made materials in the environment. This type of research has direct relevance in characterizing environmental contamination, understanding resource development and protection, designing early detection in WMD related terrorism, and application in forensics analysis.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Integrated Program Plan

Nuclear power has safely, reliably, and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 70%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. Domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to experience a 31% growth from 2009 to 2035. At the same time, most of the currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their initial 20-year extension to their original 40-year operating license for a total of 60 years of operation. Figure E-1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years, the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will begin to decline—even with the expected addition of new nuclear generating capacity. The oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Research and Development Roadmap (Nuclear Energy Roadmap) organizes its activities around four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The four objectives are as follows: (1) develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors; (2) develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration’s energy security and climate change goals; (3) develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and (4) understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document summarizes the LWRS Program’s plans.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A methodology to quantify the release of spent nuclear fuel from dry casks during security-related scenarios

Assessing the risk to the public and the environment from a release of radioactive material produced by accidental or purposeful forces/environments is an important aspect of the regulatory process in many facets of the nuclear industry. In particular, the transport and storage of radioactive materials is of particular concern to the public, especially with regard to potential sabotage acts that might be undertaken by terror groups to cause injuries, panic, and/or economic consequences to a nation. For many such postulated attacks, no breach in the robust cask or storage module containment is expected to occur. However, there exists evidence that some hypothetical attack modes can penetrate and cause a release of radioactive material. This report is intended as an unclassified overview of the methodology for release estimation as well as a guide to useful resource data from unclassified sources and relevant analysis methods for the estimation process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Summary of Internship Experience for 2010 DHS/ORISE summer program

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has deemed as a threat to national security the possibility of fissionable materials being concealed in intermodal cargo containers. Detecting these materials is critical to preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Thus, several high-energy photon-based imaging applications are being developed to detect materials with Z>72 in such containers. In an initial study, an array made of plastic scintillator material was considered for a detector in combination with a bremsstrahlung sources. While plastic is a practical and cheap material to use, it has relatively poor energy resolution. When studying the full spectrum of available materials, Bi 4 Ge 3 O 12 (BGO) 2 was considered and was eventually chosen as the scintillation material for its high mass density which permits high spatial resolution with reasonable detection efficiency. The final geometry of the detector chosen by UC Berkeley and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was an 8-by-8 array of 0.5-cm-by- 0.5-cm-by-5-cm Bi 4 Ge 3 O 12 (BGO) crystals, with pixels shielded by 1-mm of lead. The purpose of my research was to model the detector response using MCNP, a Monte Carlo3 code to demonstrate its expected sensitivity and ability to generate images, under conditions that could be tested experimentally and to determine the lowest energy threshold applicable.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Aerial Measuring System (AMS)/Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) Joint Comparison Study Report

Under the 13th Bilateral Meeting to Combat Nuclear Terrorism conducted on January 8–9, 2013, the committee approved the development of a cost-effective proposal to conduct a Comparison Study of the Aerial Measuring System (AMS) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). The study was to be held at the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL), Nellis Air Force Base, Las Vegas, Nevada, with measurements at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The goal of the AMS and the IAEC joint survey was to compare the responses of the two agencies’ aerial radiation detection systems to varied radioactive surface contamination levels and isotopic composition experienced at the NNSS, and the differing data processing techniques utilized by the respective teams. Considering that for the comparison both teams were using custom designed and built systems, the main focus of the short campaign was to investigate the impact of the detector size and data analysis techniques used by both teams. The AMS system, SPectral Advanced Radiological Computer System, Model A (SPARCS-A), designed and built by RSL, incorporates four different size sodium iodide (NaI) crystals: 1" × 1", 2" × 4" × 4", 2" × 4" ×16", and an “up-looking” 2" × 4" × 4". The Israel AMS System, Air RAM 2000, was designed by the IAEC Nuclear Research Center – Negev (NRCN) and built commercially by ROTEM Industries (Israel) and incorporates two 2" diameter × 2" long NaI crystals. The operational comparison was conducted at RSL-Nellis in Las Vegas, Nevada, during week of June 24–27, 2013. The Israeli system, Air RAM 2000, was shipped to RSL-Nellis and mounted together with the DOE SPARCS on a DOE Bell-412 helicopter for a series of aerial comparison measurements at local test ranges, including the Desert Rock Airport and Area 3 at the NNSS. A 4-person Israeli team from the IAEC NRCN supported the activity together with 11 members of the RSL team, which consisted of pilots, mechanics, scientists, a data analyst, equipment operators, and operation specialists. All planned flight activities followed by scientific discussions on the collected data were completed. For IAEC, the joint survey provided an opportunity to characterize their system’s response to extended sources of various fission products at the NNSS. As both systems play an important role in their respective countries’ (United States and Israel) national framework of radiological emergency response and are subject to multiple mutual cooperation agreements, it was important for each country to obtain more thorough knowledge of how they would employ these important assets and define the roles that they would each play in an actual response.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Epigenomic Adaptation to Low Dose Radiation

The overall hypothesis of this grant application is that low dose ionizing radiation (LDIR) elicits adaptive responses in part by causing heritable DNA methylation changes in the epigenome. This novel postulate was tested by determining if the level of DNA methylation at the Agouti viable yellow (Avy) metastable locus is altered, in a dose-dependent manner, by low dose radiation exposure (<10 cGy) during early gestation. This information is particularly important to ascertain given the increased use of CT scans in disease diagnosis, increased number of people predicted to live and work in space, and the present concern about radiological terrorism.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Quantitative adaptation analytics for assessing dynamic systems of systems: LDRD Final Report

Our society is increasingly reliant on systems and interoperating collections of systems, known as systems of systems (SoS). These SoS are often subject to changing missions (e.g., nation- building, arms-control treaties), threats (e.g., asymmetric warfare, terrorism), natural environments (e.g., climate, weather, natural disasters) and budgets. How well can SoS adapt to these types of dynamic conditions? This report details the results of a three year Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project aimed at developing metrics and methodologies for quantifying the adaptability of systems and SoS. Work products include: derivation of a set of adaptability metrics, a method for combining the metrics into a system of systems adaptability index (SoSAI) used to compare adaptability of SoS designs, development of a prototype dynamic SoS (proto-dSoS) simulation environment which provides the ability to investigate the validity of the adaptability metric set, and two test cases that evaluate the usefulness of a subset of the adaptability metrics and SoSAI for distinguishing good from poor adaptability in a SoS. Intellectual property results include three patents pending: A Method For Quantifying Relative System Adaptability, Method for Evaluating System Performance, and A Method for Determining Systems Re-Tasking.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗