Initial Site-Specific De-Inventory Report for Zion
This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the Zion Nuclear Power Station (Zion) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the Zion Nuclear Power Station (Zion) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.
The United States government currently manages nearly 13 metric tons of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (SNF) without a long-term storage solution, so a fundamental understanding of corrosion processes occurring on aluminum alloy surfaces is of utmost importance to plan for extended (>50 years) interim dry storage of aluminum-clad SNF. While thermal and chemical corrosion processes are well characterized for aluminum, radiation effects are not. To help understand the impacts of radiation on aluminum-clad SNF, here the radiation-induced molecular hydrogen gas (H 2 ) generation from pristine and pre-corroded aluminum alloy 1100 (Al-1100) coupons have been studied. Corrosion of coupons was achieved by submerging coupons in water at 95 °C for 29 days, yielding a ~5 μm boehmite/bayerite oxide film. Pre-corroded coupons were exposed to cobalt-60 gamma radiation to absorbed doses of up to 1.0 MGy under a variety of conditions: cover-gas composition (argon, nitrogen, or air), relative humidity (0, 50, and 100%), and temperature (ambient, 100, and 200 °C). Post-irradiation measurements demonstrated that the yield of H 2 was directly attributable to the presence of the Al-1100 coupons and their physisorbed water with dependence on absorbed gamma dose, relative humidity, and cover-gas composition. No H 2 was quantified in the presence of air, while both nitrogen and argon environments afforded higher H 2 yields with increasing relative humidities. This was attributed to the greater availability of adsorbed water for radiolytic processes. Irradiation of pre-corroded Al-1100 coupons at different temperatures under 0% relative humidity argon conditions yielded statistically equivalent H 2 yields for ambient temperatures and 100 °C. However, irradiation at 200 °C promoted a 3 to 4-fold increase in the yield of H 2 , possibly due to the transformation of bayerite to boehmite and/or improved efficiency of H • and H 2 release from oxide surfaces.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is currently managing nearly 13 metric tons of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) with the intention of extended (> 50 years) dry storage in helium-backfilled canisters. Due to in-reactor and cooling pond conditions, oxyhydroxide corrosion layers have formed on the surface of the ASNF elements. These corrosion layers are susceptible to radiolysis and the formation of molecular hydrogen gas (H 2 ) due to the fuel’s inherent radiation field. Consequently, a rigorous evaluation of the effect of helium gas on radiolytic H 2 production is necessary to support the Technical Considerations and Challenges for Extended (> 50 yrs) Dry Storage of ASNF program, especially as previous Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution work demonstrated a significant effect of gas composition on the radiolytic yield (G-value) of H 2 . Here we report preliminary G-values for the radiolytic formation of H 2 from the gamma irradiation of pre-corroded aluminum alloy 1100 coupons flame sealed in helium environments. Irradiations yielded G(H 2 ) values of (5.1 ± 0.5) x 10 –4 and (9.4 ± 0.9) x 10 –4 µmol J –1 for pristine coupons, and (10.1 ± 0.4) x 10 –4 and (15.1 ± 1.2) x 10 –4 µmol J –1 for pre-corroded coupons for 0% and 50% relative humidity, respectively. These helium environment G(H 2 ) values are between 28% and 58% higher than previously reported values for argon environments. This enhancement is attributed to the significant difference in first ionization energy between helium (24.59 eV) and argon (15.76) facilitating additional processes, e.g., Penning ionization. These new preliminary helium environment G(H 2 ) values will be employed by Task 3 - Sealed and Vented System Episodic Breathing and Gas Generation Prediction to model the effect of radiolytic H 2 accumulation in helium environments to evaluate the practicality of the extended storage standard canister design.
The question of whether centralized storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. Since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) (U.S. House of Representatives 1982) was enacted, the need for interim storage facilities (ISFs) as part of the federal waste management system has been analyzed and documented in numerous reports and studies. This paper summarizes the advantages and disadvantages as described in those reports of incorporating an ISF into the waste management system.
The question of whether centralized storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. Since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) [1] was enacted, the need for interim storage facilities (ISFs) as part of the federal waste management system has been analyzed and documented in numerous reports and studies. This presentation summarizes the advantages and disadvantages, as described in those reports, of incorporating an ISF into the waste management system.
This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the Crystal River 3 Nuclear Power Plant (CR-3) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.
This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.
Molten-salt reactors (MSRs) represent a promising solution for next-generation nuclear energy, offering advantages in safety, fuel efficiency, and waste minimization. However, their liquid-fueled design presents unique challenges for spent fuel management, making post-shutdown waste characterization essential for developing effective strategies. Despite this need, there is a notable absence of visualization platforms specifically tailored to the unique characteristics and analytical requirements of MSR waste management. Existing tools in the nuclear industry are primarily designed for reactor operations or generic data exploration and lack both integration with MSR-specific multiphysics frameworks and the ability to simultaneously visualize time-dependent thermal fields, chemical composition evolution, and radiation distribution patterns. To address these limitations, this paper presents an immersive virtual reality (VR) visualization platform that processes and displays high-fidelity multiphysics simulation output from the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE) framework in real-time, using Unity. The platform visualizes MSR waste characteristics such as nuclide decay, salt cooling, and corrosion by using Exodus II output data and running on a VR headset. It includes a user-friendly interface with features such as visibility toggling, cross-sectional slicing, and time-series animation for exploring simulation data. These capabilities support experimental design, stakeholder engagement, and public communication by making complex reactor behavior more accessible and understandable. By enhancing spatial reasoning and reducing cognitive load, this immersive environment fosters more effective communication and decision-making in MSR waste management.
While Congress plays political football, spent nuclear fuel continues to sit in de facto interim nuclear waste storage sites throughout the country. This ad hoc approach - if it can even be called an approach - to nuclear waste management is in no one's best interests, because of financial, safety, environmental, and national security concerns with the status quo. Senate leadership had asserted that an up-or-down vote on the Yucca Mountain Project would take place in September or October 2019, but that did not occur. Rather, a conference bill was agreed to, and it provided that, although the nuclear program should receive some funding, funding was not made available for centralized interim storage ('CIS') or the Yucca Mountain Project. The President's FY2021 Budget Request does not contain any proposed funding for the Yucca Mountain Project ('the Project'). This paper will discuss the implications of that process, both for the Project itself and for the U.S. nuclear waste program more generally. In order to provide context for the current situation, this paper will begin by chronicling the history of U.S. nuclear waste management, from the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and to the present day. It will discuss the roles of the U.S. Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, federal and state political delegations, and the nuclear energy industry. The paper will then identify key themes that can be expected to affect the future of nuclear waste management in the United States. For example, it will consider whether development of additional CIS facilities is a viable short- to medium-term solution. CIS facilities may relieve immediate pressure at decommissioned or soon-to-be-decommissioned nuclear power plants; but with that pressure partially alleviated, support for building a long-term repository may be reduced. It will also discuss opposition by the State of New Mexico and others to the proposed New Mexico CIS project, based not only on siting concerns but also whether it might become a de facto repository, and whether the State of Texas and others may also be opposed, for similar reasons, to the proposed CIS facility in Texas. Additionally, the paper will examine consent-based siting and its implications for Nevada and other states that are potential hosts for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal facilities. Further, if the Project is not a politically viable solution, the paper will examine whether it is now time for serious consideration of an alternate location for a permanent repository, as well as consideration of other options entirely, such as deep geologic disposal. The paper will conclude by looking ahead to the 2020 elections. It will describe the positions of candidates (particularly Presidential candidates) on spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal options, without advocating for any particular candidate or political party. Perhaps in 2020, we will at least see a start to a solution to the seemingly intractable problem of nuclear waste management in the United States. (authors)
Radiation and radioactive substances result in the production of radioactive wastes which require safe management and disposal to avoid risks to human health and the environment. To ensure permanent safe disposal, the performance of a deep geological repository for radioactive waste is assessed against internationally agreed risk-based standards. Assessing postclosure safety of the future system's evolution includes screening of features, events, and processes (FEPs) relevant to the situation, their subsequent development into scenarios, and finally the development and execution of safety assessment (SA) models. Global FEP catalogs describe important natural and man-made repository system features and identify events and processes that may affect these features into the future. By combining FEPs, many of which are uncertain, different possible future system evolution scenarios are derived. Repository licensing should consider both the reference or “base” evolution as well as alternative futures that may lead to radiation release, pollution, or exposures. Scenarios are used to derive and consider both base and alternative evolutions, often through production of scenario-specific SA models and the recombination of their results into an assessment of the risk of harm. Furthermore, while the FEP-based scenario development process outlined here has evolved somewhat since its development in the 1980s, the fundamental ideas remain unchanged. A spectrum of common approaches is given here (e.g., bottom–up vs. top–down scenario development, probabilistic vs. bounding handling of uncertainty), related to how individual numerical models for possible futures are converted into a determination as to whether the system is safe (i.e., how aleatoric uncertainty and scenarios are integrated through bounding or Monte Carlo approaches).
The Three Mile Island, Unit Two (TMI-2) pressurized water reactor core underwent a significant meltdown in 1979 due to an untimely combination of maintenance problems that led to a loss of feedwater, followed by a series of operational misunderstandings and errors. Primary coolant discharging through a malfunctioning valve represented what was analyzed as a “small-break” loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and ultimately became a full core meltdown. The melted core recovery process required the development of a wide array of tools. After approximately three years of water management and other cleanup actions, the first views of the core revealed a much higher degree of damage than previously expected. Approximately 62 metric tons of the core had melted, leaving only 42 of the 177 fuel assemblies standing with fuel rods intact. The core to be recovered was composed of loose, gravel-like and granular particulate material and a central solidified mass of formerly molten fuel. Molten fuel had also penetrated some of the pressure vessel internals and resolidified below the main core support structure. Robotic tools that had been designed for the task were of limited effectiveness due to the range of material types and phases.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the Vermont Yankee independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.
This report documents the selection of components as part of the efforts initiated to develop a remote, canister-monitoring system (RCMS) for determining and monitoring environmental conditions within dry fuel storage canisters containing aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These efforts are in support of Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) investigations into technical issues associated with extended dry storage (50+ years) of ASNF. The capability to establish and monitor the performance of ASNF in situ provides the opportunity to (1) evaluate the appropriate technologies for monitoring, (2) collect canister environment conditions as soon as possible, (3) verify and validate current laboratory-based study results and analytic modeling approaches, and (4) potentially identify additional dry storage options for ASNF at the INL site. The improved understanding of ASNF behavior gained by performing this work would also contribute to the safety basis for extended dry storage in current and future configurations as well as to provide information for future transportation, conditioning, and disposal of ASNF. The parameters to be monitored by the RCMS include temperature, relative humidity, hydrogen gas concentration and radiation environment (dose). Components are selected based on the expected environmental conditions within the canister and fuel storage area, and the desired performance of the RCMS. Several of these components have been purchased and received. Future activities include component testing and calibration, software development for operation of the integrated sensor module and fabrication of a representative test volume. The results of these tests and changes to desired performance characteristics will inform subsequent activities.
The processing of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear materials is a critical component of nuclear material management with implications for global security. The first step of fuel processing is dissolution, with several charges of fuel sequentially added to a batch of solvent. The incomplete dissolution of a charge precludes the addition of the next charge. As the dissolution takes place in a heated, highly corrosive and radiological vessel, direct monitoring of the process is not possible. We discuss the use of Raman spectroscopy to indirectly monitor dissolution through an analysis of the gaseous emissions from the dissolver. Challenges associated with the implementation of Raman spectroscopy include the composition and physical characteristics of the offgas stream and the impact of operating conditions. Nonetheless, we observed that NO2 concentrations serve as a reliable indicator of process activity and correlate to the amount of fuel material that remains undissolved. These results demonstrate the promise of the method for monitoring nuclear material dissolution.
This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, related to designing, fabricating and testing prototype railcars that will comply with the safety standard S-2043. This standard was developed by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) specifically for railcars used to transport High-Level Radioactive Material (HLRM). AAR defines the term HLRM to include both spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). DOE is in the process of developing and testing prototype railcars that will satisfy Standard S-2043. This is a technical paper that does not take into account contractual limitations or obligations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). For example, under the provisions of the Standard Contract, spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters is not an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract governs the obligations of the parties, and this paper in no manner supersedes, overrides, or amends the Standard Contract. This paper reflects technical work which could support future decision making by the Department of Energy (DOE or Department). No inferences should be drawn from this paper regarding future actions by DOE, which are limited both by the terms of the Standard Contract and a lack of Congressional appropriations for the Department to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act including licensing and construction of a spent nuclear fuel repository. (authors)
This report addresses the tasks, equipment, and interfaces necessary for the complete de-inventory of the San Onofre independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) site.
The immobilization of irradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel is a critical component of nuclear waste management and non-proliferation efforts. In Kazakhstan, at National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan special attention is given to managing legacy HEU fuel from research reactors. One such case involves the IGR research reactor, whose first core containing irradiated HEU uranium-graphite fuel was operated from 1961 to 1966 and removed following reactor modernization. This fuel now requires a reliable and secure immobilization strategy. Here, this paper presents the development of a technological process for immobilizing this fuel to reduce its enrichment to below 20 % in terms of 235U content. The proposed method involves down-blending irradiated HEU fuel with depleted uranium, followed by encapsulation in a Portland cement matrix. Full-scale experiments were conducted to assess the uniformity of uranium distribution within the matrix. The results confirm the effectiveness of this approach, ensuring reliable immobilization of fuel in accordance with international requirements, including IAEA standards and Kazakhstan's regulatory framework. These findings contribute to the broader effort of adapting immobilization strategies for the safe management of spent fuel from research reactors.