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Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY20) Appendix E: Mechanical Testing

This report documents work performed under the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). This work was performed to fulfill Level 2 Milestone M2SF-21OR010201032, “ORNL High Burnup Confirmatory Demo Sibling Rod Testing Results,” within work package SF-21OR01020103 and is an update to the work reported in M2SF-19ORO010201026 and M2SF-19OR010201028.

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Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY20), Appendix F: Cyclic Integrated Reversible-Bending Fatigue Tests

This report documents work performed under the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). This work was performed to fulfill Level 2 Milestone M2SF-21OR010201032, “ORNL High Burnup Confirmatory Demo Sibling Rod Testing Results,” within work package SF-21OR01020103 and is an update to the work reported in M2SF-19ORO010201026 and M2SF-19OR010201028.

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L-SCIE and SUPCRTNE model and database development

This progress report (Level 3 Milestone Number M3SF-25LL010301052) summarizes research conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) within the Argillite Host Rock Properties & Processes Work Package SF-25LL01030105. The focus of this milestone is to create an initial SUPCRTNE database and extensively test the SUPCRTNE code. We prepared a draft manuscript describing our workflow and approach for developing a next-generation thermodynamic database for the Spent Fuel and High Level Waste Disposition campaign. The goal is to ease any future formal software qualification effort as was done on the Yucca Mountain Project for codes including SUPCRT92 and EQ3/6. We are attempting to extend the SUPCRTNE database to include more species, mainly from the NEA volumes. We can also take advantage of thermodynamic database activities that are ongoing at Thermochimie and as part of the EURADII program. However, our effort is limited by the funds available and the changes to program scope that was initiated in mid-FY25.

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Technology Development for Dry Storage of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20490

A candidate disposition pathway for the > 13 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, is the drying and placement of the SNF into sealed-canister dry storage, with the ASNF-in- canisters 'road-ready' for transportation to and final direct disposal in a repository waste package. Technical information gaps in fuel drying, and fuel dry storage behavior, have previously challenged the declaration of technology readiness for drying and placement of this fuel into the DOE Standard Canister design for > 50 years of safe dry storage. The principal technical information gaps included: i) characterization and thermal dehydration behavior of aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films attendant on the cladding due to film formation during reactor operation and during post-discharge up to long-term wet storage histories; and ii) G-value data to enable estimation of the radiolytic gas generation from the cladding with its (oxy)hydroxide films. Thus, the oxide films on the ASNF challenged the safety of a sealed storage canister with thermal and radiolytic decomposition of the waters on the films that can lead to corrosion, pressurization, and flammability issues. These gaps in the technical information base have largely been closed. This paper discusses the investigations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Savannah River National laboratory (SRNL), and outlines the pending technology development work for input to an engineering design to enable a road-ready dry storage system for ASNF. The ASNF inventory considered for road-ready dry storage is stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) at the INL. The ASNF inventory in the SRS L Basin is from foreign and domestic research reactors (FRR and DRR), and is diverse in terms of design, irradiation, and post-reactor-discharge storage conditions; these factors yield a range of characteristics of cladding oxide films on ASNF. Mixed aluminum (oxy)hydroxide (boehmite and bayerite/gibbsite) films, non-uniform in thicknesses up to a maximum local thickness bounded by 25 μm, were observed on ASNF materials removed from wet storage in the L Basin and in non-sealed dry storage at the SRS following reactor service and a long-term (up to 40+ years) interim storage history. The ASNF inventory at INTEC, in both wet and vented dry storage, is predominantly from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), but it also includes DRR and FRR fuel. To address a profound behavior of these films, radiolysis testing of aluminum specimens with mixed type boehmite/bayerite oxide films was performed to develop basic data on G-values for production of radiolytic hydrogen under dry storage conditions with nominal relative humidity, temperature, and cover gas. Modeling and simulation of canister internal environments with postulated inventories of oxide films provides estimation of the evolution of the conditions of the canister loaded with ASNF. Simultaneous Thermal Analysis (TGA/DSC) of hydrated oxide powders, and laboratory-scale aluminum specimens with a bayerite film (∼10 μm) using TGA methods, inform drying time/temperature conditions to be used for the ASNF. A demonstration project is recommended for Verification and Validation of the drying and storage of the ASNF. Remaining major tasks leading up to the hot demonstration include scale-up radiolysis testing and scale-up drying testing. Engineering design with the information from the technology program will establish the safety basis and enable long-term (> 50 years) dry storage compatibility with ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister pending its transportation to and disposal in a repository. This full capability would show the ASNF-in-canister storage system to be road-ready. (authors)

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Plan for Development and Application of Risk Assessment Approach for Transportation Package Approval of an MNPP for Domestic Highway Shipment

For nuclear reactors, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been conducted since the 1970s [e.g., see WASH-1400 (NRC 1975), NUREG-1150 (NRC 1990), and NUREG-1935 (Chang et al. 2012)]. PRA has also been used to assess a dry cask storage system at a nuclear power plant [see NUREG-1864 (NRC 2007)]. PRA techniques have also been applied to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, most notably in NUREG/CR-4829 (Fischer et al. 1987), NUREG/CR-6672 (Sprung et al. 2000), and NUREG-2125 (NRC 2014). Additional guidance is provided in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA-TECDOC-1346 (2003). Transportation PRA was also used in the evaluations of transportation impacts in reports such as the Repository Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2002) and the Repository Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2008).

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GDSA Repository Systems Analysis Investigations (FY2020)

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

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GDSA Repository Systems Analysis Investigations in FY2021

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

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GDSA Repository Systems Analysis Investigations in FY2022

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

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Modeling Radiolysis and Chemical Reactions during Dry Storage of Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel

After aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) is removed from the reactor, it is initially stored in spent fuel pools, which are specially designed water-filled basins that provide temporary cooling to reduce the temperature of the fuel assemblies and provide radiation shielding. ASNF continues to generate heat due to the radioactive decay of elements within the fuel, which persists for many years post-shutdown as the residual radioactive products decay into more stable elements. During the wet storage period, an oxyhydroxide layer composed of boehmite/bayerite forms on the surfaces of the aluminum cladding from exposure to water in the pools. Road-ready packaging for long-term disposition of the ASNF involves dry storage in helium backfilled DOE standard canisters (DSCs). When the ASNF is removed from water storage and dried, most of the water is removed, but some physisorbed and chemisorbed water remains in the oxyhydroxide layers. This residual water can produce hydrogen when exposed to radiation from the ASNF during dry storage. Predicting hydrogen accumulation over time in the DSCs is critical for long-term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have developed coupled computational fluid dynamics (CFD)-chemical models to simulate temperature, pressure, and gas phase concentrations within the DSCs. These models use the thermal field predicted by CFD as input to a radiolysis model for the gas phase and the surface oxyhydroxide layer chemistry. Given the long storage period of the DSCs and the impracticality of long-term experiments, a simulation-based approach is necessary to assess chemical evolution within the canisters. This study advances the development of a modeling framework designed to simulate the chemical evolution of spent fuel canisters. Both thermal and radiation-driven reactions are considered, with radiation kinetics quantified using G-values. Sensitivity analysis identifies key parameters influencing species composition. Reaction pathway diagrams offer insight into dominant species formation routes, enabling more effective comparisons between model predictions and experimental observations, particularly regarding the production of hydrogen. Results show that the model predicts significant hydrogen gas production with minimal oxygen generation, primarily due to hydrogen formation via boehmite pathways. These findings underscore the importance of accurately characterizing surface-bound species and radiolysis kinetics. A deeper understanding of these mechanisms is critical for evaluating the long-term safety of nuclear waste storage.

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Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System

To better enable informed decision making regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring the research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed SNF. DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified HLW similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.

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Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory

This report provides information on the inventory of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States located at Nuclear Power Reactor (NPR) and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) sites, as well as SNF and reprocessing waste located at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites and other research and development (R&D) centers as of the end of calendar year 2024. Actual quantitative values for current inventories are provided along with inventory forecasts derived from examining different future nuclear power generation scenarios, based on information available and assumptions made at the time the scenarios were developed. The report also includes select information on the characteristics associated with the wastes examined (e.g., type, packaging, heat generation rate, decay curves).

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Damaged Fuel in the United States - 20325

Throughout the history of commercial nuclear power plant operations in the U.S., many fuel assemblies have lost the capability to perform all of their desired functions. Since they can no longer be handled, stored, or transported in accordance with established regulations, they are classified as damaged fuel. The causes of these failed assemblies are diverse and plant-specific. The majority of these failed assemblies are contained in damaged fuel cans to be used in conjunction with storage and/or transportation systems. These systems have a limited number of slots that can be filled with damaged fuel cans. A damaged fuel can is generally a stainless-steel container that confines damaged spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and is closed at one end by mesh endpoints that allow gaseous and liquid media to escape but minimize the dispersal of gross particulate material. Out of extreme caution, a few reactors have loaded high burnup fuel into damaged fuel cans. Damaged fuel is not licensed for storage or transport in the U.S. because relevant regulations do not specify exactly how to classify damaged fuel. Instead, these regulations license/certify packages that specify approved contents. Damaged fuel must be included among the approved contents to be considered acceptable. In many cases, damaged SNF is encapsulated in damaged fuel cans to ensure it can confine gross fuel particles, debris, and/or damaged assemblies to known volumes within loaded casks. A damaged fuel can may then be utilized in the same way as an assembly in a storage and transportation system. Some storage cask systems utilize top and bottom plugs to confine debris in damaged fuel. The most recent domestic documentation on damaged SNF was published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), which used data from U.S. reactors compiled from 1968 to June 30, 2013, to produce Form GC-859, 'Nuclear Fuel Data Survey.' According to this form, there were 136,821 boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF assemblies and 104,647 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF assemblies, for a combined total of 241,468. Of these, 4,521 were classified as failed. Some were also disassembled and the fuel rods or pieces of fuel rods combined to make consolidated assemblies. These consolidated assemblies may include damaged fuel or were perhaps consolidated as part of a demonstration project. The GC-859 data includes 2,550 consolidated assemblies containing 0 - 264 entire fuel rods. These consolidated assemblies could be placed in single assembly canisters and stored in the spent fuel pool. For dry storage and transportation, a single assembly canister is generally placed in each damaged fuel can. In addition to the consolidated assemblies, 2,391 un-canistered fuel rod pieces exist, which were removed from 494 assemblies. (authors)

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Digital Twin Technology for Safety, Security, and Training in Spent Nuclear Fuel Handling

The increasing complexity of spent nuclear fuel handling requires significant resources to ensure safety, security, and personnel training. As nuclear facilities have continued to advance in scale and technology, the integration of digital tools has become indispensable. Among these tools, digital twins, which are virtual models of physical systems, are emerging as invaluable tools for enhancing safety protocols, security measures, and training in the nuclear sector. These models were conceptualized in the Industry 4.0 revolution. Digital twins can process data from physical systems in real time (by using sensors), include multiple code packages to enable simulations of different physics applications, and even implement artificial intelligence or machine learning techniques for advanced data processing. Despite the advantages that digital twins provide, challenges still exist regarding their widespread implementation. For instance, data used by a digital twin must be accurate to ensure that the digital twin is accurately tuned. Furthermore, if insecure digital twins are targeted by hackers, then they can pose serious risks to the security and safety of nuclear facilities.

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Drop Analysis of Department of Energy Standard Canister with Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF at the INL site for ?road-ready dry storage?. ?Road-ready dry storage? is a SNF management concept where SNF is packaged into dry and sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transportation. The forward-looking goal of the Demonstration is establishing the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. The Demonstration will first package Fort Saint Vrain SNF currently stored at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters. These Standard Canisters will then be loaded into another commercial transportation or storage containment system (e.g., storage cask or transportation package). The Standard Canister is a class of standardized canisters designed for containing the large variety of DOE-managed SNF during interim storage, transportation and/or disposal at a geological repository. One critical aspect of road-ready dry storage is the ability to license the DOE Standard Canisters and its associated transportation package to 10 CFR 71. Depending on the SNF and transportation strategy, the Standard Canisters may have to maintain structural integrity under normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident scenarios (i.e., drop events). The Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs. However, no analysis has been completed to support the recent Demonstration. This analysis will consider the Ø0.5 m × 5.1 m Standard Canister under drop scenario(s) considered in previous INL tests and analyses, including the 9 m drop at 80 degree off vertical. However, this analysis will consider the more recent Fort Saint Vrain loading configurations proposed for the Demonstration. This analysis will performed using strain-based acceptance criteria established by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 3. It will be compared to previous analyses and form the foundation of further formal calculations that will be used to support licensing efforts of the road-ready dry storage system at INL.

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Crystalline Disposal R&D at LBNL: FY20 Progress Report

Within the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Program, research work continues further with the goal to better understand long-term performance of disposal systems in three main geologic rock types: clay/shale, salt, and crystalline rock. This report documents LBNL’s research activities related to investigations of crystalline host rock according to the scope of two work packages: SF-20LB01030207 “Crystalline International Collaborations – LBNL,” and SF-20LB01030203 “Crystalline Disposal R&D – LBNL.” These research activities correspond are related to key Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs), ranked in importance from medium to high, as listed in Table 7 of the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Disposal Research and Development Roadmap (FCR&D-USED-2011-000065 REV0) (Nutt, 2011). Specifically, these research activities address FEP 2.2.01, Excavation Disturbed Zone (EZD). The results of these research activities provide important insights into understanding and predicting flow and transport processes that could occur in low-permeability crystalline rocks, in which fractures might serve as main conduits for fluid flow and radionuclide transport. The evolution of the EDZ during the excavation of the tunnel as well as the evolution of microcrack growth within the EDZ after the emplacement of backfill are critical for predicting the long- term behavior of the EDZ. A number of factors including stress, temperature, water activity, capillary pressure, chemistry, and mineralogy can affect the rock evolution, which require advanced experimental tools to study it.

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Shaker Table Test Plan

Currently, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is stored in onsite independent spent fuel storage facilities (ISFSIs), which is a dry storage facility, at 55 nuclear power plant sites. The majority of SNF in dry storage is in welded metal canisters (2,917 canisters at the end of 2019). The canisters are loaded for storage in storage overpacks (vertical casks or horizontal storage modules) and placed on outdoor concrete pads. Because the SNF will be stored at ISFSIs for an extended period of time, there is growing concern with regards to the behavior of the SNF within these dry storage systems during earthquakes. To address these concerns, the SFWST program is considering conducting an earthquake shaker table test. The goal of this test is to determine the strains and accelerations on fuel assembly hardware and cladding during earthquakes of different magnitudes to better quantify the potential damage an earthquake could inflict on spent nuclear fuel rods. The seismic integrity of the storage system has been addressed in the past by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and is not the focus of this potential test. Instead the DOE would benefit from knowing the condition of the fuel cladding from storage, transportation, to disposal so that it can ascertain repository performance for the fuel and packaging in its final state. A seismic event is part of the possible loading events that the fuel could experience in its lifetime. This report proposes several earthquake shaker table tests with different degrees of complexity. Alternative 1 was defined in the FY20 work scope. Alternatives 2 and 3 were recently developed to take advantage of the NUHOMS 32PTH dry storage canister that may be available in FY21 for this test at a minimum cost to the project. The selection of the alternative(s) will depend on the available budget and the SFWST program priorities for the near future.

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M3SF-24LL010301062-Surface Complexation/Ion Exchange Data Integration for Radionuclide Sorption to Clay Minerals

This progress report (Level 3 Milestone Number M3SF-24LL010301062) summarizes research conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) within the Argillite International Collaborations Work Package SF-24LL01030106. The activity is focused on our long-term commitment to engaging our partners in international nuclear waste repository research. The focus of this milestone is the establishment of international collaborations for sorption modeling and the associated impacts of unlocking larger, community-based datasets. More specifically, we are developing a database framework for Spent Fuel and Waste and Science Technology (SFWST) that is aligned with the Helmholtz Zentrum Dresden Rossendorf (HZDR) and other international sorption database development groups in support of the database needs of the SFWST program.

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Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF– 24138

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

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