Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Safety Analysis Report”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7

Expanded Content Envelope For The Model 9977 Packaging

An Addendum was written to the Model 9977 Safety Analysis Report for Packaging adding a new content consisting of DOE-STD-3013 stabilized plutonium dioxide materials to the authorized Model 9977 contents. The new Plutonium Oxide Content (PuO{sub 2}) Envelope will support the Department of Energy shipment of materials between Los Alamos National Laboratory and Savannah River Site facilities. The new content extended the current content envelope boundaries for radioactive material mass and for decay heat load and required a revision to the 9977 Certificate of Compliance prior to shipment. The Addendum documented how the new contents/configurations do not compromise the safety basis presented in the 9977 SARP Revision 2. The changes from the certified package baseline and the changes to the package required to safely transport this material is discussed.

42 ENGINEERING↗

TRACE/PARCS modelling of rips trip transients for Lungmen ABWR

The objectives of this study are to examine the performances of the steady-state results calculated by the Lungmen TRACE/PARCS model compared to SIMULATE-3 code, as well as to use the analytical results of the final safety analysis report (FSAR) to benchmark the Lungmen TRACE/PARCS model. In this study, three power generation methods in TRACE were utilized to analyze the three reactor internal pumps (RIPs) trip transient for the purpose of validating the TRACE/PARCS model. In general, the comparisons show that the transient responses of key system parameters agree well with the FSAR results, including core power, core inlet flow, reactivity, etc. Further studies will be performed in the future using Lungmen TRACE/PARCS model. After the commercial operation of Lungmen nuclear power plant, TRACE/PARCS model will be verified. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Managing Aging Effects on Dry Cask Storage Systems for Extended Long-Term Storage and Transportation of Used Fuel

The cancellation of the Yucca Mountain repository program in the United States raises the prospect of extended long-term storage (i.e., >120 years) and deferred transportation of used fuel at operating and decommissioned nuclear power plant sites. Under U.S. federal regulations contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.42, the initial license term for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) must not exceed 40 years from the date of issuance. Licenses may be renewed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the expiration of the license term upon application by the licensee for a period not to exceed 40 years. Application for ISFSI license renewals must include the following: (1) Time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs) that demonstrate that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety will continue to perform their intended function for the requested period of extended operation; and (2) a description of the aging management program (AMP) for management of issues associated with aging that could adversely affect SSCs important to safety. In addition, the application must also include design bases information as documented in the most recent updated final safety analysis report as required by 10 CFR 72.70. Information contained in previous applications, statements, or reports filed with the Commission under the license may be incorporated by reference provided that those references are clear and specific. The NRC has recently issued the Standard Review Plan (SRP) for renewal of used-fuel dry cask storage system (DCSS) licenses and Certificates of Compliance (CoCs), NUREG-1927, under which NRC may renew a specific license or a CoC for a term not to exceed 40 years. Both the license and the CoC renewal applications must contain revised technical requirements and operating conditions (fuel storage, surveillance and maintenance, and other requirements) for the ISFSI and DCSS that address aging effects that could affect the safe storage of the used fuel. The information contained in the license and CoC renewal applications will require NRC review to verify that the aging effects on the SSCs in DCSSs/ ISFSIs are adequately managed for the period of extended operation. To date, all of the ISFSIs located across the United States with more than 1,500 dry casks loaded with used fuel have initial license terms of 20 years; three ISFSIs (Surry, H.B. Robinson and Oconee) have received their renewed licenses for 20 years, and two other ISFSIs (Calvert Cliffs and Prairie Island) have applied for license renewal for 40 years. This report examines issues related to managing aging effects on the SSCs in DCSSs/ISFSIs for extended long-term storage and transportation of used fuels, following an approach similar to that of the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) report, NUREG-1801, for the aging management and license renewal of nuclear power plants. The report contains five chapters and an appendix on quality assurance for aging management programs for used-fuel dry storage systems. Chapter I of the report provides an overview of the ISFSI license renewal process based on 10 CFR 72 and the guidance provided in NUREG-1927. Chapter II contains definitions and terms for structures and components in DCSSs, materials, environments, aging effects, and aging mechanisms. Chapter III and Chapter IV contain generic TLAAs and AMPs, respectively, that have been developed for managing aging effects on the SSCs important to safety in the dry cask storage system designs described in Chapter V. The summary descriptions and tabulations of evaluations of AMPs and TLAAs for the SSCs that are important to safety in Chapter V include DCSS designs (i.e., NUHOMS{reg_sign}, HI-STORM 100, Transnuclear (TN) metal cask, NAC International S/T storage cask, ventilated storage cask (VSC-24), and the Westinghouse MC-10 metal dry storage cask) that have been and continue to be used by utilities across the country for dry storage of used fuel to date. The goal of this report is to help establish the technical basis for extended long-term storage and transportation of used fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The SAVY 4000 Container Storage Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17313

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in the U.S. Defense Nuclear Safety Board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based storage container design, the SAVY-4000{sup R}. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is the first vented general use nuclear material container demonstrated to meet the requirements of DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is an innovative and creative design demonstrated by the fact that it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without torque wrenches or other tools; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas, yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates, and prevents release of material even in a 12 foot drop. Finally, it has been fire then drop tested and will reduce the risk to the public in the event of an earthquake/fire scenario. This will allow major nuclear facilities to credit the container towards source term Material at Risk (MAR) reduction. The container was approved for nuclear material storage in the TA-55 Plutonium Facility on March 15, 2011, and there are currently over 2000 SAVY-4000{sup R} containers available for use within the facility. A Safety Analysis Report was developed to demonstrate Manual 441.1-1 compliance and was approved April, 2014. The first four SAVY-4000{sup R} containers were packaged with plutonium on August 2, 2011. Key aspects of the SAVY-4000{sup R} vented storage container design will be discussed which include design description, qualification and testing, surveillance strategy, and the design life extension program as enhanced by surveillance activities with the intent to extend well beyond the current five year design life. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modeling and Simulations for the High Flux Isotope Reactor Cycle 400

A concerted effort over the past few years has been focused on enhancing the core model for the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), as part of a comprehensive study for HFIR conversion from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. At this time, the core model used to perform analyses in support of HFIR operation is an MCNP model for the beginning of Cycle 400, which was documented in detail in a 2005 technical report. A HFIR core depletion model that is based on current state-of-the-art methods and nuclear data was needed to serve as reference for the design of an LEU fuel for HFIR. The recent enhancements in modeling and simulations for HFIR that are discussed in the present report include: (1) revision of the 2005 MCNP model for the beginning of Cycle 400 to improve the modeling data and assumptions as necessary based on appropriate primary reference sources HFIR drawings and reports; (2) improvement of the fuel region model, including an explicit representation for the involute fuel plate geometry that is characteristic to HFIR fuel; and (3) revision of the Monte Carlo-based depletion model for HFIR in use since 2009 but never documented in detail, with the development of a new depletion model for the HFIR explicit fuel plate representation. The new HFIR models for Cycle 400 are used to determine various metrics of relevance to reactor performance and safety assessments. The calculated metrics are compared, where possible, with measurement data from preconstruction critical experiments at HFIR, data included in the current HFIR safety analysis report, and/or data from previous calculations performed with different methods or codes. The results of the analyses show that the models presented in this report provide a robust and reliable basis for HFIR analyses.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC): An Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Reports Concerning PDC Related Errors

Airlines operating in the United States are required to operate under instrument flight rules (EFR). Typically, a clearance is issued via voice transmission from clearance delivery at the departing airport. In 1990, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began deployment of the Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC) system at 30 U.S. airports. The PDC system utilizes aeronautical datalink and Aircraft Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) to transmit departure clearances directly to the pilot. An objective of the PDC system is to provide an immediate reduction in voice congestion over the clearance delivery frequency. Participating airports report that this objective has been met. However, preliminary analysis of 42 Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports has revealed problems in PDC procedures and formatting which have caused errors in the proper execution of the clearance. It must be acknowledged that this technology, along with other advancements on the flightdeck, is adding more responsibility to the crew and increasing the opportunity for error. The present study uses these findings as a basis for further coding and analysis of an additional 82 reports obtained from an ASRS database search. These reports indicate that clearances are often amended or exceptions are added in order to accommodate local ATC facilities. However, the onboard ACARS is limited in its ability to emphasize or highlight these changes which has resulted in altitude and heading deviations along with increases in ATC workload. Furthermore, few participating airports require any type of PDC receipt confirmation. In fact, 35% of all ASRS reports dealing with PDC's include failure to acquire the PDC at all. Consequently, this study examines pilots' suggestions contained in ASRS reports in order to develop recommendations to airlines and ATC facilities to help reduce the amount of incidents that occur.

Montalyo, Michael L.↗

The Water Ingress Effects on the Reactivity Change of the Conceptual Designed Reactor at NIST

The conceptual research reactor design with a split core for a replacement reactor project at the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) Center for Neutron Research is underway. The reactor core is cooled and moderated by light water and reflected by heavy water in a reflector tank. The reactor core is immersed in light water, which is isolated from heavy water with a slightly pressurized boundary box made of zirconium alloy. The heavy water is contained in a large size cylindrical tank which also provides ample space to accommodate neutron beam tubes, cold sources and other irradiation equipment. The reflector tank is placed in the center of a large light water pool, which provides thermal and biological shielding to the reactor. Light water and heavy water have distinct physical properties in regard to neutron moderation. Light water is generally known to have greater moderating power and absorption cross-sections, while heavy water has a higher moderating ratio. Due to these differences in properties, the accidental mixing of light water and heavy water in either direction will inevitably affect the reactivity of the reactor. Moreover, since the neutron flux spectrum at different locations of the reactor will have significantly different characteristics (for example, the spectrum at the heavy tank should be much softer than that at the core center region), the effect of reactivity changes becomes complicated and will depend on the water mixing locations. From the reactor safety analysis perspective, the water ingress reactivity change is one of the required design base reactivity accidents that must be evaluated in the final safety analysis report. Given these concerns, neutronics calculations have been performed to determine the effect and trend of the reactivity changes due to water ingress in different scenarios by purposely mixing the waters at three representative places in the reactor: the reflector area, the center coolant area and the peripheral coolant area. These three places were selected for the study because of their uniqueness in the flux spectrum (as shown in the results section). Simple static neutronics calculations were performed using MCNP6 to examine the reactivity effects due to water ingress. It should be noted that all calculations performed in this study assume homogeneous water mixing in the area of interest; therefore, the local effect of the mixing situation would possibly be missed by this study. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Risk Analysis of Radiological Release from Pu-238 Targets During Manual Handling

Pu-238 Isotope Production Targets are routinely installed in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) core, transferred, and stored in the spent fuel canal. These evolutions involve manual handling and manipulation of the targets underwater using long handled tools. The ATR Safety Analysis Report (SAR) postulates a design basis accident which results in damage from manual manipulation of targets, and radiological consequences must be determined for receptors inside the reactor facility, as well as public receptors. This presentation presents the analysis used to determine the radiological consequences due to potential target damage in the ATR canal. The analysis considered radionuclide release fractions, damage ratios for handling evolutions, and entrainment of radionuclides in the canal water.

Advanced Test Reactor↗

Combined Effort to De-Inventory the New Brunswick Laboratory of Plutonium Certified Reference Materials - 20504

To de-inventory plutonium Certified Reference Materials standards (CRMs) from the New Brunswick National Laboratory (NBL), the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) formed a unique team. This teaming arrangement leveraged the different capabilities and expertise of both laboratories, helping to ensure the effort would be performed both safely and cost-effectively. With the NBL then physically housed on the ANL site, ANL served as the host-site, providing the necessary facilities and support services (e.g., supplying everything from hoods, loading equipment, and scales to Health Physics supports). From a packaging perspective, ANL's responsibilities focused mainly on characterizing and preparing the contents for shipment, followed by performing the Shipper of Record activities. With SRNL being the Package Design Authority of the 9978, the Type B packaging used for this effort, SRNL's scope included developing a Safety Analysis Report in Packaging (SARP) Letter Amendment to add the CRMs as authorized contents to the 9978. Recognizing competency, ANL prodigiously tasked SRNL to perform the actual loading of the CRMs into the 9978s, while physically on the ANL site. This paper details five different aspects of this effort. They are: 1. Characterization/validation of the CRM contents. 2. Development of the 9978 SARP Letter Amendment for the content change. 3. Development of the nitrogen inerting method to address SARP identified potential flammability concerns. 4. Renewal of the SRNL 9978 loading procedure. 5. Performance of the actual work execution activities. In 2017, the first nine packages were successfully loaded and shipped from NBL, while in 2019, the last ten were successfully loaded and planned for shipment. Without ANL leveraging SRNL's strengths, the de-inventorying of NBL of its plutonium CRMs would have likely taken many years longer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Methodology for Loading the Advanced Test Reactor Driver Core for Experiment Analysis

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is one of the premier irradiation facilities in the world. The ATR hosts experiments from a variety of laboratories, companies, and disciplines. Because of its flexibility in providing customized irradiation conditions to experiments, such as coolant chemistry, temperature, and reactor power, analysis for experiments, both from a programmatic and safety perspective, can be a challenging endeavor. Because of these experiment variables, there is always an effort to improve upon the existing analysis methodology in order to provide the sponsor of any given experiment with the most accurate predictions possible. The paper discusses the effort to improve upon the methodology for loading the ATR driver core for experiment analysis. Experiment analysis at INL is generally broken up into three separate disciplines: neutronics, thermal-hydraulics, and structural. The focus of this paper is neutronics analysis. After the experiment has a preliminary design, the neutronics analyst will create a model in the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code to calculate fuel and material heating rates from MCNP tallies and provide those to the thermal-hydraulics analyst, and calculate reactivity worths, perturbation on the axial fission profile of the ATR driver core by the experiment, void worths, and experiment backup worths. Also, there are usually several programmatic parameters that the experiment sponsor requests that the neutronics analyst calculates. These can include heat generation rates, burnup and displacements per atom (DPA). In order to accurately analyze these parameters, an important input into the physics analyst's MCNP model is the loading of the ATR driver core. The ATR driver core consists of 40, 19-plate highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements, arranged in a serpentine shape, as pictured in Figure 1. The ATR driver core is responsible for the vast majority of the thermal power of the reactor and the nuclear interactions with the experiments being irradiated in ATR. A unique feature of ATR is the 'power tilt' across the reactor. A power tilt means that the Northwest, Northeast, Southwest, and Southeast Lobes of ATR frequently operate at different powers, providing different irradiation conditions for the experiments in and around the lobes of the reactor. In order to achieve lobe power splits, different fuel elements for each of the 40 positions are chosen by ATR Reactor Engineering so that lobe power splits can be maintained during an operating cycle. A typical fuel loading for an ATR cycle consists of 14 to 18 new fuel elements and 2 to 26 depleted fuel elements. These loadings are typically chosen from three different types of fuel elements. All three ATR fuel element types share a common design, spelled out in Chapter 4 of the ATR Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The fuel element meat is HEU UAlx dispersion fuel sandwiched between aluminum cladding with a length of 121.92 cm (4 ft), with 19 plates per fuel element. The three variations of this common design are designated by the first two letters in their serial numbers: XA, YA, and NB. XA elements are most commonly used. These elements have nominally 1075 g of uranium-235 and 0.66 g of boron-10. The NB elements have the same uranium-235 loading as the XA elements, but no boron in any plates. These elements are used when excess reactivity is needed. The YA elements have the same loading as the XA elements, except that the outermost plate (Plate 19) has no boron or uranium. These elements are used to mitigate aged reflector damage. In order to accurately model the ATR driver core, all three types of fuel elements must be accounted for in the MCNP model. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition). The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Revision 3, issued November 2012) contains detailed design review procedures. As part of the review process, the interfaces between plant personnel and the plant's systems and components are evaluated for conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3), provides the guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces (HSIs). Because these guidelines only address the HFE aspects of design and not other related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a design-specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: information displays, user-interface interaction and management, and analog displays and controls. These elements are used as building blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the guidelines for reviewing the following HSI systems: alarm system, safety parameter display system, group-view display system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, automation system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for the review of HSI support (i.e., maintainability of digital systems and degraded HSI and instrumentation and control conditions).

42 ENGINEERING↗

University of Nevada, Reno Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging

This paper describes a new Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging (GCNP). Nuclear materials are currently used for large-scale production of electricity without greenhouse gas generation, advanced medical treatments, food sterilization, and sophisticated measurement technologies. In order to benefit from these uses, nuclear materials packaging must be developed, manufactured, inspected, and maintained for storage, transfer, transport, and disposal that protect the public and the environment. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program (PCP) originally offered the following ten, one-day to ten-day training courses. 1. Methods for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages and Performing Confirmatory Analysis; 2. Welding Criteria for Shipping Containers; 3. Structural Analysis and Acceptance Criteria; 4. Quality Assurance (QA) for Radioactive Material Packaging Training; 5. Application of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code to Radioactive Material Transportation Packaging; 6. ARG-US Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) System for Management of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials; 7. Packaging Operations and Maintenance; 8. Packaging Leakage Test Training; 9. Management of SARP Preparation; 10. Transport Security of Radioactive Material. These courses were designed in accordance with DOE standards. They were taught at a rigorous graduate-university level by experienced technical staff who are coordinated by Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Savannah River National Laboratories. The courses were taught at these Laboratories or nearby locations. The PCP courses are attended by personnel from government agencies, national laboratories, and the nuclear industry, from both inside and outside the United States. Students in these classes have generally earned undergraduate or higher degrees. These courses are designed to assist student with specialized job duties, and may provide them a competitive advantage when seeking employment or promotion in the nuclear packaging and other related fields. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Best Practices for Finite Element Analysis of Spent Nuclear Fuel Transfer, Storage, and Transportation Systems

Storage casks and transportation packages for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are designed to confine SNF in sealed canisters or casks, provide structural integrity during accidents, and remove decay through a storage or transportation overpack. The transfer, storage, and transportation of SNF in dry storage casks and transport packages is regulated under 10 CFR Part 72 and 10 CFR Part 71, respectively. Finite Element Analysis (FEA) is used with increasing frequency in Safety Analysis Reports and other regulatory technical evaluations related to SNF casks and packages and their associated systems. Advances in computing power have made increasingly sophisticated FEA models more feasible, and as a result, the need for careful review of such models has also increased. This paper identifies best practice recommendations that stem from recent NRC review experience. The scope covers issues common to all commercially available FEA software, and the recommendations are applicable to any FEA software package. Three specific topics are addressed: general FEA practices, issues specific to thermal analyses, and issues specific to structural analyses. General FEA practices covers appropriate documentation of the model and results, which is important for an efficient review process. The thermal analysis best practices are related to cask analysis for steady state conditions and transient scenarios. The structural analysis best practices are related to the analysis of casks and associated payload during standard handling and drop scenarios. The best practices described in this paper are intended to identify FEA modeling issues and provide insights that can help minimize associated uncertainties and errors, in order to facilitate the NRC licensing review process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Decommissioning of obsolete Nuclear Facilities in the UJV Rez, a. s. - 19027

UJV Rez, a. s. (further also UJV) is a leading institution in all areas of nuclear R and D in the Czech Republic and has had a dominant position in the nuclear program since it was established in 1955 as the Nuclear Research Institute Rez. The activities of UJV encompass nuclear physics, chemistry, nuclear power and many other topics. The main issues addressed at UJV in past decades have included research, development and services for NPPs, the fuel cycle and irradiation services for research and development in the industrial sector and medicine. UJV also manages most institutional radioactive wastes (RAW) produced in the Czech Republic (approx. 90 %). After more than 60 years of activities of the UJV in the nuclear field, there were obsolete nuclear facilities to be decommissioned. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities UJV is the only ongoing decommissioning project in the Czech Republic. Preparations for decommissioning began in 1996. Safety analysis report (SAR) was performed comprising the identification and characterization of potential sources of risk, potentially exposed receptors and exposure pathways, potential chemical compounds, radionuclides and media of concern. The results of the SAR enabled to determine the priorities of the decommissioning, the decommissioning the expenses and as well as project implementation. The decommissioning project was revised on the base of information obtained during decommissioning. The decommissioning was divided into two phases according to the level of risk and the financing limitations. The Ministry of Finance significantly financially contributed the decommissioning, although the UJV also contributed a considerable amount. Overall cost is close to the amount of Eur 27 million. Decommissioning started in 2003 and will be finished in 2018. Almost all facilities have already been successfully decommissioned. In the following table, the status of decommissioning of facilities is described. 1) Reloading site for RAW storage (Building 211/6): last item in progress 2003 - 2018; 2) Special Sewage System: decommissioned 2004 - 2005, reused; 3) Liquid RAW storage tanks (Building 211/3): decontaminated 2004 - 2013, reused; 4) Technology for RAW treatment (Building 241): decommissioned 2003 - 2011; 5) Contaminated equipment (Building 250): decommissioned 2003 - 2016; 6) Systems for storage of sealed sources (Building 261); decommissioned 2003 - 2005; 7) Decay tanks (Building 211/5); decommissioned 2003 - 2014, reused; 8) Old bituminating unit (Building 211/3); decommissioned 2004 - 2008; 9) Surface RAW storage site; decommissioned 2009 - 2014. Later, other unused decommissioning facilities, which were not included in the decommissioning project financed by the state, were included. These facilities are continuously decommissioned and financed from own resources of UJV. These facilities are like facilities already decommissioned: radiochemical laboratories, (including glove boxes), liquid RW storage tanks (including sewage systems), liquid RW treatment technology, hot cells, accumulated RW, etc. Realization started 2016 and expected duration is till 2026. Estimated budget is approximately Eur 17 million. The decommissioning of nuclear facilities in UJV is being carried out on the high level of radiation protection and up to now there was no extraordinary event or accident, although some challenges we were forced to address. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Decontamination and Decommissioning Activities of a Radiopharmaceuticals Production Facility - 18067

On May 2012, Best Medical Belgium S.A. (BMB), a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products located on the nuclear site of Fleurus, was declared bankrupt. According to the Belgian law, ONDRAF/NIRAS (Belgian Radioactive Waste Management Agency) was entrusted with the clean-up and decommissioning operations of the former BMB facilities, nowadays known as 'ONDRAF Site Fleurus' (ONSF). In June 2015, ONSF launched a Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) program, for which Tractebel: - Supports the definition of the clean-up and decommissioning strategies; - Drafts the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) and Safety Analysis Report (SAR) that will be submitted to FANC/AFCN (Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control) in order to get the License for decommissioning; - Drafts the technical specifications of the public tendering process related to the D and D program; - Ensures the day to-day follow-up of the D and D activities on site. Four nuclear buildings are part of the D and D activities. One of them, building 14 (B14), represents the most challenging and extensive task with the clean-up of highly contaminated areas and its further decommissioning up to the final state. This building features two cyclotrons (CGR and IBA cyclotrons) successively used to produce radioisotopes, as well as hot cells and glove boxes used for their purification and the conditioning of the final pharmaceutical product. The present paper aims at presenting the most recent development steps of the clean-up phase regarding the adaptations of existing facilities and the upcoming activities in preparation of the decommissioning activities. To allow the sorting and the treatment of the radioactive material identified in the physical and radiological inventory, several workshops have been implemented within the B14 building in order to deal with radioactive materials arising from the clean-up and D and D activities. Following the conceptual design phase, Tractebel has actively monitored the on-site activities for the construction of those workshops such as: - The modification of the civil works; - The revamping of the ventilation system; - The installation of dedicated lifting equipment and workstations equipped with cutting devices; - The assembly of a docking station for filling the radioactive packages. The removal of the activated concrete surrounding the IBA cyclotron requires the erection of a containment structure and an extension structure. The containment structure, composed of light metallic beams, is located above the cyclotron and its irradiation zones. For operational security reasons and working efficiency, the cutting process of the concrete ceilings and walls will be performed from the top inside the containment structure by means of an eight tons overhead bridge crane. Concrete blocks resulting from the cutting process will then be lifted, without any loss of containment, towards the extension zone of the nuclear zone of the IBA cyclotron for further resizing, sorting and evacuation towards the identified waste routes. To prepare this task which will be performed during the decommissioning phase, Tractebel sets up the necessary technical specifications. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

LOCA Analysis for the NIST Research Reactor

The research reactor (aka NBSR) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a heavy water cooled, moderated, and reflected tank-type research reactor that operates at atmospheric pressure and a design power of 20 MW. Core power is generated in 30 fuel elements, each with 17 fuel plates in an upper section and a separate lower section. Power is removed using forced convection and heat exchangers in the cooling loop. The licensing analysis of the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in the NBSR was addressed in the current Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The SAR discusses the low probability of a significant pipe break: 'the main piping is located in protected areas, system pressures are low, and flow rates are small so that wear is not an issue.' Therefore, the probability of a large break, including a double-ended guillotine break, is extremely low. For smaller breaks where the operator has time to take action, procedures are in place to 1) mitigate a loss of water by tripping pumps and closing control valves to isolate the reactor vessel after the falling water level in the vessel is detected by instrumentation, and 2) ensure that emergency cooling water continues to flow for as long as needed. The SAR also refers to an analysis of why there is sufficient water without forced cooling to cool the fuel elements (FEs) in a LOCA if the flow channels between two fuel plates (or a fuel plate and an outside plate) remain filled with water. That analysis was based on a flooding-limited critical power but assumed that reactor trip had taken place. A more recent study showed that some scenarios may lead to the draining of water from the coolant channels. In these cases, the cooling on the inside of the fuel element is from emergency cooling water that falls only along the inner surface of one of the side plates in the fuel elements; the remaining surfaces within the fuel element being exposed to gas. The analysis therein was done for both the present high-enriched uranium fuel (HEU) and the proposed low-enriched uranium fuel (LEU). The LOCA analyses done previously assumed that there is sufficient cooling during the short-term, i.e., before the water level reaches the top of the fuel plates and begins to drain from the coolant channels or before decay heat becomes low enough such that the flooding-limited critical power shows that there is no problem. The present study is to determine if that assumption is correct, i.e., to consider the situation immediately after the break, before and after reactor trip when the power is still relatively high.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

SCALE inventory and reactivity analysis as part of the Hermes 2021 PSAR review

The readiness of SCALE for comprehensive studies of pebble-bed reactors has been demonstrated through detailed analysis of a fluoride salt–cooled, high-temperature pebble-bed reactor (PB-FHR). The methods developed for pebble-bed reactor modeling in SCALE, particularly for inventory generation, have proven effective in gaining insights into the reactor physics of this advanced reactor. Excellent agreement with another code package has been observed, further highlighting SCALE’s strong performance. The SCALE results supported the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s construction permit application review of the Hermes low-power PB-FHR demonstration reactor. A SCALE model of the Hermes reactor was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory using information from the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and supplemented with publicly available data. SCALE reactivity coefficient simulations reproduced PSAR results within 1σ statistical uncertainties. Sensitivity studies emphasized the importance of graphite specifications for accurate keff predictions.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Dose Rate Evaluation for the ES-3100 Package with HEU Content Using MCNP, ADVANTG, Monaco, and MAVRIC

Here, this paper presents a comparative study of dose rate calculations for the ES-3100 package with highly enriched uranium (HEU) content for different source configurations using computer codes: (1) MCNP; (2) Automated Variance Reduction Generator (ADVANTG)/MCNP; (3) Monaco; and (4) Monaco with Automated Variance Reduction using Importance Calculations (MAVRIC). The Model ES-3100 package was developed at the Y-12 National Security Complex for domestic and international transportation of Type B fissile radioactive material. In this study, six different source configurations (i.e., solid cylinder, cylindrical hemi-shell, cylindrical shell, rectangular plate, cylindrical rod, or cylindrical segment form) having 36 kg of HEU metal inside the package containment vessel (based on configurations in the ES-3100/HEU safety analysis report for packaging) are evaluated. Dose rates at the package surfaces and 1 m from the package surfaces are calculated for these different source configurations. MCNP and Monaco cases are run without any biasing options to accelerate the convergence. Consistent Adjoint Driven Importance Sampling (CADIS) and Forward-Weighted CADIS (FW-CADIS) methods developed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory are implemented in ADVANTG/MCNP and MAVRIC codes to accelerate the convergence. ADVANTG generates variance reduction parameters using Denovo code, and MCNP is used with the variance reduction parameters to accelerate the convergence. MAVRIC uses Denovo code to construct an importance map and a biased source distribution that are supplied to Monaco to accelerate the Monte Carlo simulation. The FW-CADIS option in ADVANTG and MAVRIC is used to accelerate the convergence in this study. The accelerated convergence cases (ADVANTG/MCNP and MAVRIC) are about 100 times faster with 100 times less particle simulation than those cases run without biasing options (analog MCNP and analog Monaco). Lastly, the MCNP, ADVANTG/MCNP, Monaco, and MAVRIC calculated dose rates at the package surfaces and at 1 m from the package surfaces for the different source configurations are compared and are found to be in general agreement.

42 ENGINEERING↗