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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Idaho & Oregon Agriculture: Monitoring Vegetation Impacts of Livestock Management Practices Used to Reduce Predator Conflicts on Idaho and Oregon Grazing Allotments

The practice of night penning, which involves corralling livestock into a fenced, secure area overnight, aims to safeguard animals from predators. Although this method has proven successful in minimizing interactions between livestock and wildlife, the extent of its impact on vegetation communities is still being explored. This project examines the feasibility of using Net Primary Productivity (NPP) values from the Rangeland Analysis Platform (RAP) to quantify the impacts of night penning on rangeland vegetation communities. RAP provides spatially distributed values of vegetation composition, cover, and productivity, and is derived from imagery from Landsat 5, Landsat 7 & Landsat 8 at a 30m resolution for rangelands across the United States. Our DEVELOP team partnered with Alderspring Ranch, Krebs Livestock, and the U.S Department of Agriculture Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to analyze the impacts of night penning on vegetation communities. We identified control sites that captured the topographic characteristics of night pen sites used by our partners. We then quantified and compared changes in annual NPP between night pen and control sites. Our analysis of RAP NPP data, using a control-treatment design did not find impacts of night penning on vegetation. However, this was a preliminary analysis, and does not conclusively quantify the impacts of night penning on rangeland vegetation. Our analysis indicated that RAP may be a feasible tool to study livestock management impacts on rangeland vegetation; however, future studies could further validate these findings through ground observations.

Rangeland Analysis Platform (RAP)↗
DOE OSTI2026

American Made Infrastructure: Evolution of Federal Incentives and Requirements

Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB) represent the latest evolution of a multi-year legislative trajectory responding to national security concerns about foreign control – and particularly FEOC control – of energy infrastructure. Beginning with Executive Order 14017 (February 2021), which initiated comprehensive federal review of critical supply chain vulnerabilities in semiconductors, battery energy storage systems, and critical minerals, policymakers have progressively expanded restrictions on foreign participation. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2019 established precedent for component-level prohibitions on foreign information and communications technology procurement, while NDAA 2024 extended these restrictions to six major People’s Republic of China (PRC) battery manufacturers. Complementary measures such as the Build America, Buy America (BABA) Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) introduced domestic content thresholds and FEOC eligibility criteria for federal funding programs. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) 2022 further operationalized FEOC restrictions through electric vehicle tax credit requirements, creating a scalable framework for excluding foreign-controlled components. Recent executive actions and state-level policies have reinforced this trajectory, reflecting sustained alignment across federal and state governments. Collectively, these developments demonstrate a bipartisan policy approach that pairs incentives for advanced energy deployment with safeguards designed to prevent subsidizing adversaries or entities that present foreign-sourcing risk.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Microreactor Security-by-Design Recommendations for Domestic and International Deployments

This report outlines methods vendors can use to incorporate security-by-design (SeBD) into their microreactor facility design to support and address security for both U.S. and international deployment. The team developed a hypothetical below-grade microreactor with a physical protection system (PPS) to protect the microreactor against acts of theft and sabotage and evaluated it against two adversary attack scenarios defined by a group of adversary subject matter experts (SMEs). The hypothetical microreactor facility consists of two distinct buildings. The first is the above-grade protected area (PA) entry control point (ECP) building, which houses security personnel responsible for conducting screenings and managing access to the PA. The second building is the reactor building, which features both an above-grade floor and a below-grade floor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Guidance—Implementing CIE in Early Systems Engineering Lifecycle Stages

Traditionally, cybersecurity is not considered in the design process. Design engineers typically focus on building safety and reliability into their products and applications. Security against malicious cyber incidents is often an afterthought, resulting in deployment of security solutions during installation or operation. Unfortunately, waiting to consider cybersecurity until later in the systems engineering lifecycle often results in less effective and more expense security. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) developed the concept of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in 2015 to provide a framework that enables cybersecurity to be built into systems beginning at the conceptual design stage. In addition to ongoing research by INL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response has recently developed a National CIE Strategy document for incorporating CIE into the design and operation of infrastructure systems reliant on digital monitoring or controls. This paper provides a brief review of this National CIE Strategy as well as a roadmap to historical, current, and future CIE research by INL through the U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development Program. A near-term focus of the DOE-NE’s research and development is to extend the foundational CIE work into detailed guidance for implementation during initial systems engineering stages in nuclear digital instrumentation and control projects and to demonstrate use of the guidance in an integrated energy systems project.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

The Optics of Deterrence: How Science Assures the Nuclear Stockpile's Reliability In Lieu of Testing

When designing a product intended to perform a certain function and satisfy some set of criteria, the standard engineering method to assess its ability to perform is to test it. This nearly universal concept works consistently, assuring proper function and generally avoiding or mitigating the consequence of failure to within acceptable limits. What would happen if the product developers were told that they must continue to certify and validate the performance without testing it, that the landscape in which the product must serve its purpose is constantly evolving, and that the product in question is the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile? This is the position the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) finds itself in; the reliability of the stockpile must be verified without actually testing it to see if it works as intended.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Towards Three-Dimensional Neutron Imaging with Light-field Technology

A broad range of applications in nuclear safeguards and security can benefit from compact, fast neutron imagers with large angular acceptance. However, accurate 3D multi-vertex reconstruction in a monolithic detector remains a significant barrier to realization. Current approaches, such as the centroiding approach and the use of shadow masks, have not yet resulted in a successful demonstration in a light-starved environment. This project explored the use of cutting-edge technology—a light field camera—which inherently preserves both the spatial and directional information of incident light. Such technology can, in principle, resolve multi-vertex events and offer accurate position reconstruction in 3D with relatively simple readout electronics. Since the project's inception in May 2023, we have built an experimental setup to calibrate and characterize a commercial light-field camera (Lytro Illum). We assessed its 3D event reconstruction capability in a relatively low-light intensity environment by analyzing the cross-correlation of a series of 2D images of a characterized tunable light source taken at various distances. A sub-cm resolution, lower than typical neutron interaction separations in a compact scintillator volume, was observed with the LED light source, suggesting the promising capability of its nominal optics design to provide the adequate resolution required for a compact monolithic neutron directional detector. However, using a light-field-based readout for a neutron camera requires incorporating an ultra-low-noise light sensor, which is beyond the scope of this project. We also initiated the development of a 3D light-field-based reconstruction algorithm tailored to sparse scenes, as expected from particle interactions in a scintillator medium. Additionally, we demonstrated the capability of the algorithm to replicate the ground truth. Finally, we began the development of a neutron directional detector simulation to determine the performance criteria for light-field-based reconstruction that allows for good neutron directional reconstruction. This Feasibility Study has led to a successful follow-up project under the DNN R&D innovation portfolio starting May 2024.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Overview and Current Progress of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Training and Education Program

Since 2011, the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has been providing a two-week nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner course to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities, and, in 2017, an additional course was proposed for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs). In addition to hands-on training, other NCSP-funded tasks include training on sensitivity/uncertainty methods, NCS resource pipeline tasks, development of NCS guides, maintenance and development of Nuclear Criticality Safety Education Training (NCSET) modules and designing of a new subcritical assembly for hands-on training purposes. This paper provides an overview of the NCSP training and education program. The status of the NCSP hands-on training program will also be provided.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Digital risk analysis in nuclear engineering projects: Designing for safety, performance, reliability, and security

Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are important in promoting the need to identify cybersecurity concerns early in the systems engineering lifecycle so risks from adversarial cyber-attacks can be eliminated or reduced through engineering design practices. In addition to adversarial risk, risk in operational technology systems also includes non-adversarial and unintentional risk from other factors such as human performance errors, environmental conditions, design flaws, and device degradation or failure. This paper introduces a new concept for characterizing digital risk, both adversarial and non-adversarial, and provides the basis for initial research into a novel digital risk analysis approach focused on incorporating attack difficulty into a multi-attribute analysis technique using robust decision-making. This digital risk characterization is also used to frame a discussion on the challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements in an integrated energy system project that incorporates a small modular reactor and industrial facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Nonparametric Multiparticle Set Methods for Interpreting Environmental Samples

Collection and analysis of environmental samples is commonly used by a range of stakeholders in nuclear safeguards and security contexts. While the ubiquity of samples and their transport in the environment allow regular collection, developing and demonstrating methods for analyzing these samples is difficult. In this work, an environmental sample consists of a set of one or more individual particles. Recent advances in reactor simulation have allowed us to generate data that are more representative of real-world environmental samples, enabling statistically defensible method development and testing. The most notable of these advances is a drastic increase in the number of material depletion regions, which allows our simulations to capture the variation in isotopic composition seen at length scales consistent with environmental samples. Traditional approaches for handling multiparticle samples treat each particle in the sample individually, estimating the quantity of interest (e.g., core-average burnup) resulting from measurement and analysis of signatures (e.g., nuclide assays) from each individual particle. Individual estimates are then averaged to generate a single estimate of the quantity of interest over the entire sample. In this presentation, we introduce two novel approaches for interpreting environmental samples that comprise of multiple particles: (1) the Quantile-Quantile Comparator, which uses a multivariate generalization of quantile-quantile plots for comparing unknown statistical distributions, and (2) the Set Transformer, an attention-based neural network module designed to model interactions among elements (particles) in the input set (sample). Statistically representative sampling cannot be guaranteed as samples are passively collected and are beholden to what particles are available in the environment. These new analysis methods for set-input problems are expected to be more robust than traditional approaches to issues of sampling bias where particles are not uniformly distributed throughout regions of interest, as well as generally outperform traditional approaches by jointly considering all elements in the set. We will present results comparing the performance of traditional single particle approaches and the novel Quantile-Quantile Comparator and Set Transformer for interpretation of simulated environmental samples.

Phathanapirom, Birdy↗
DOE OSTI2025

Machine Learning for Anomaly Detection in Neural Network Security and SRF Cavities

This dissertation explores the development and deployment of machine learning approaches to address critical challenges in anomaly detection across two distinct domains: neural network security in federated learning settings and cavity behavior analysis in particle accelerator operations at Jefferson Lab in Newport News, Virginia. Anomaly detection identifies deviations from expected patterns, safeguarding systems in cybersecurity, industry, and research against malicious activities and failures. This dissertation demonstrates how our machine learning approaches enhance detection accuracy and efficiency in both neural network security and industrial applications. First, we investigate vulnerabilities in deep neural networks deployed in federated learning. Although federated learning preserves user privacy by training models locally, it remains vulnerable to backdoor attacks, in which malicious participants embed hidden triggers that induce targeted misbehavior. We propose a self-supervised contrastive learning framework to detect and mitigate such backdoor attacks. In our experiments, this method achieves higher detection accuracy and lower false positive rates than existing defenses, while operating without access to local model updates or original training data and thus preserving the privacy guarantees of the federated setting. Second, we address the operational reliability of superconducting radio-frequency (SRF) cavities at the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility (CEBAF). Our research leverages an unsupervised learning approach, combined with Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and k-means clustering, to identify anomalous behaviors in SRF cavities. Our method detects subtle anomalous behavior by analyzing SRF signal data. This knowledge allows for the early detection and resolution of potential faults, significantly improving the efficiency and reliability of operations. Third, we extend these insights to time-series anomaly detection more broadly. We design a contrastive-learning based model tailored to increasingly dynamic environments and academic research. This model improves detection accuracy in settings that require real-time monitoring and predictive maintenance. Our research underscores the broader applicability and impact of advanced machine learning techniques in anomaly detection. By extracting meaningful patterns from complex data, machine learning can significantly enhance security in distributed neural networks and improve the efficiency of particle accelerator operations. This dissertation serves as a stepping stone for future investigations into the vast possibilities of anomaly detection, inspiring further exploration and development of machine learning techniques in this field.

Ferguson, Hal [Old Dominion University]↗
DOE OSTI2024

Temperature and Pressure Instrumentation for LYNM PE1 Chemical Explosive Testing

Underground chemical explosive testing has been conducted at the Nevada National Security Site under the Physics Experiment 1 (PE1) to validate explosive computer modeling and, ultimately, improve the accuracy of subsurface explosive detection. This SAND Report describes the dynamic temperature and pressure measurements within the chamber induced by the chemical explosive for the first of three experiments, PE1-A. The report details the instrumentation used for the experiment, the emplacement of the hardware, and the measured results. Dynamic temperature measurements were accomplished with the use of optical spectrometers and dynamic pressure was measured with a series of high-rated pressure transducers. This report includes details of the design and results of four cavity sensor systems used to measure early-time temperature, early-time pressure, late-time temperature, and late time pressure. The outcomes of PE1-A were used to inform the design of the remaining PE1 series experiments, PE1-B and PE1-DL.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Enhancing Reliability of Classified Shipments Between the Nuclear Security Enterprise

The extent of this project, as related to by the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE), is related to the current shipping and logistical issues and optimization opportunities between several different NSE sites that are the basis of the enterprise. This current scope is part of every site’s, described as Design Agency (DA) and Production Agency (PA), normal operation to meet the needs and mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NSE has a broad mission scope encompassing several differing DA and PA sites to meet the NNSA’s mission. These sites require frequent interaction and shipments of material and items between one another in order to meet the mission needs of the enterprise. Currently, there is no methodology that integrates schedules, standards, orders, processes, and best practices to optimize transfers between the differing sites. A centralized location and standard shipping process will optimize and improve the systems behavior, reducing lag time and increasing throughput at sites today. Ultimately this project proposes a central logistical platform, tiered escalation process, and standardized shipping forms to reduce taxpayer costs to meet the NSE’s mission more efficiently. This increase in processing logistics and process accuracy of shipments will save the NSE, not only from a monetary value, but it will reduce the frustrations of individuals working these outdated and over processed systems to improve their quality of life.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

ORNL Package Testing Program Overview

When transporting radioactive or hazardous materials, safety and security are top priorities. Packaging and transportation regulations require reliable evidence that containers have passed rigorous performance tests to ensure that the public and the environment are protected from the hazardous nature of the cargo. Because of its long history in energy and security research, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has needed to ship hazardous packages for the past 65 years. Since the 1940s, ORNL has made significant contributions to transportation regulations and has been at the forefront of regulatory testing development. Today, ORNL is a leader in standards development and testing of designs of radioactive material packages. ORNL plays a critical role in ensuring the safe transportation of radioactive materials across the United States by executing rigorous testing campaigns of packages that contain radioactive materials. Early testing activities focused on supporting the development of transportation regulations established by both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Currently, all package testing activities are performed under the Package Testing Program (PTP) at the Package Evaluation Facility (PEF) located at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC), which is about 10 miles from the main ORNL campus. The PTP develops and evaluates testing solutions, ensuring that they are safe efficient, and in compliance with regulatory requirements. The vision for the PTP is to be a world-class leader in the evaluation and testing of radioactive and hazardous material packages. The key elements necessary to fulfill this mission are an experienced and professional staff; state-of-the-art facilities, equipment, and instrumentation; and completion of challenging programs and projects important to package transportation. Collaborations with other internal and external organizations play a significant role in building stronger teams and achieving this vision. By adhering to and advancing regulatory standards, ORNL’s PTP supports development of safe and compliant packaging, safeguarding the transportation process from potential risks associated with radioactive material logistics.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

2020 LLNL Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program (NS 3 IP) is designed to give graduate students an opportunity to come to LLNL for 8–10 weeks of hands-on research. Students conduct research under the supervision of a staff scientist, attend a weekly lecture series, interact with other students, and present their work in poster format at the end of the program. Students also have the opportunity to meet staff scientists one-on-one, participate in LLNL facility tours (e.g., the National Ignition Facility and Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry), and gain a better understanding of the various science programs at LLNL. Due to the travel and access restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 NS 3 IP was organized as an “all-virtual” internship program. With LLNL’s extensive institutional support, students accessed the laboratory’s cyberinfrastructure through a secure virtual desktop environment and all seminars, mentor interactions, summer presentations, and laboratory tours were performed remotely. While this virtual internship format did not allow for hands-on laboratory research projects, both the interns and their mentors constructed creative research projects that maximized student exposure to nuclear science research that is relevant to DTRA and LLNL interests in nuclear security.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗