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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Refining a Novel Process Monitoring Method to Safeguard Continuously Cycling Designs Using Isotopic Ratios

In advanced reactor (AR) designs, a common feature is continuous chemical processing and circulation of the nuclear material. This work bridges a significant measurement gap in safeguarding reactors with circulating fuel or continuous refueling by leveraging and building on the isotope ratio method first developed by our team under an FY21 Advanced Reactors International Safeguards Engagement (ARISE) project (Uribe et al. 2021). In circulating fuel designs, the radioisotope inventory changes from traditional effects (e.g., radioactive decay, fission) but also includes material transport due to pressure and temperature gradients. Such designs may also require regular or continuous additions or removals during operation, which significantly increases the rate of inventory change compared to traditional pressurized water reactor (PWR)s. Thus, directly tracking the nuclear inventory is ineffective since the isotopes are continuously added and removed. The isotope ratio method instead focuses on detecting changes to the input and output flows of radioisotopes. Previous work showed that for well-chosen pairs of isotopes, the isotopic ratio provides a sensitive and lasting indicator of deviation from normal conditions (e.g., startup, shutdown, diversion). The isotope ratio method is a process monitoring method with potential for application in for forward-looking approaches to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The original process monitoring method was developed for a specific case—the decay tank of a thorium-fueled molten salt breeder reactor. In this expanded work, we explored other types of reactors and processes with nonstationary (e.g., flowing) nuclear material, which are difficult to safeguard with traditional methods because of the transient nature of the systems. The goal of the present work is to generalize the isotope ratio method for use in processes with continuously flowing nuclear material. All continuous processes have an average time for isotopes to be replaced in the system. The isotope ratio method works by choosing radioisotopes with half-lives both above and below the processing time. The present work seeks to explore which isotopes are suitable for the method by simulating the nuclear inventory, radioisotope emissions, and detector responses for several classes of advanced reactors. While the method can in principle be applied to other processes (e.g., enrichment or reprocessing facilities), the present work limits scope to ARs with continuously flowing fuel. Section 2 details the mathematics supporting the isotope ratio method, and Section 3 introduces the representative ARs selected for this work. Section 4 discusses how each reactor was analyzed, and Section 5 showcases the results for each representative reactor. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks and suggests pathways for further analysis.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Development of a Discrete Event Simulation Model for Pyroprocessing Safeguardability

Advanced nuclear energy systems offer benefits for energy sustainability, independence, security, economic growth, and carbon emission reduction. Nuclear fuel fabricated for these systems utilize remotely-handled facilities for batch processing in hot cells. Because special nuclear material is in both different physical and chemical form than that of the contemporary fuel cycle, new challenges arise in terms of safeguardability. To that end, we are developing a system model for a commercial pyroprocessing facility that can also produce quantitative metrics to assess facility design. This paper presents the progress of a first build of a material throughput model using discrete event simulation for the fuel fabrication subsystem. The intent is to study the Type I error, or false alarm, as a metric for safeguardability. Initiating events that could cause false alarms arise from safeguards, safety, and security. False alarms can necessitate a facility shutdown until the anomaly is resolved by facility inspection. A high number would be costly for the facility operator both in terms of operation throughput goals and possible compensatory penalties. Therefore, different conceptual facility designs exhibit different frequencies for the false alarm per initiating event, and this can provide a measure of the safeguardability of each design. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Neutrino-detector design for safeguarding small modular reactors

Nuclear reactors have long been a favored source for antineutrino measurements for estimates of power and burnup. With appropriate detector parameters and background rejection, an estimate of the reactor power can be derived from the measured antineutrino event rate. Antineutrino detectors are potentially attractive as a safeguards technology that can monitor reactor operations and thermal power from a distance. Advanced reactors have diverse features that may present challenges for current safeguards methods. By comparison, neutrino detectors offer complementary features, including a remote, continuous, unattended, and near-real-time monitoring capability, that may make them useful for safeguarding certain classes of advanced reactors. This study investigates the minimum depth and size of an antineutrino detector for a small modular reactor to meet safeguards needs for advanced reactors. Furthermore, extrapolating performance from several prior reactor antineutrino experiments, this study uses an analytical approach to develop a possible design for a remote antineutrino-based monitoring device.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2015

Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Safeguards in Pyroprocessing: an Integrated Model Development and Measurement Data Analysis

Pyroprocessing is an electrochemical method based on the molten salt electrolyte, mainly the LiCl-KCl eutectic molten salt, to recycle the used nuclear fuel. For a conceptual design of commercial pyroprocessing facility, tons of special nuclear materials, namely U and Pu, may be involved, which could be used for non-peaceful purposes if they are diverted. Effective safeguards approaches have to be developed prior to the development and construction of a pyroprocessing facility. Present research focused on two main objectives, namely calculating the properties of nuclear species in LiCl-KCl molten salt and developing integrated model to safeguard a pyroprocessing facility. Understanding the characteristics of special nuclear materials in LiCl-KCl eutectic salt is extremely important to understand their behaviors in an electrorefiner. The model development for the separation processes in the pyroprocessing, including electrorefining, actinide drawdown, and rare earth drawdown benefits the understanding of material transport and separation performance of these processes under various conditions. The output signals, such as potential, current, and species concentration contribute to the material balance closure and provide safeguards signatures to detect the scenarios of diversion. U and Pu are the two main elements concerned in this study due to our interest in safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Development of a Two-Fluid Molten Salt Reactor Safeguards Model

This work outlines the development of a two-fluid molten salt reactor process and safeguards model. The model is split into two parts consisting of a process model and a safeguards model. The process model is based on a design by Flibe Energy, the Liquid-Fluoride Thorium Reactor, which is a two-fluid molten salt reactor that performs full salt processing on-site to remove fission products and re-fuel the reactor. The model simulates feed and consumption rates of the reactor fuel and blanket salts. The process model includes the reactor core and salt processing loops. The reactor core model has a robust architecture that allows for integration with other tools and data sets as they become available. A majority of the effort to date has been focused on the process model, and the safeguards model will be developed in detail in future work. A preliminary safeguards analysis was performed based on actinide inventories, and a preliminary materials accountancy approach was initialized. The results of this analysis are presented along with a description of the model development.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Fork Experiments in the Hot Cell Using Spent Fuel Rods for International Nuclear Safeguards

This work leveraged the rare availability of 25 full-length pressurized water reactor spent fuel rods and 1 irradiated mixed-oxide rod at an Oak Ridge National Laboratory hot cell. This was done to collect measurement data with two Fork detectors to assess the detectors’ capability of verifying operator declaration data and detecting partial defects in spent fuel, which are the two primary goals of international safeguards on spent nuclear fuel. The data can also be used to benchmark the ORIGEN module, which has been adopted in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s)/European Atomic Energy Community’s (Euratom’s) Integrated Review and Analysis Program to predict the Fork detector count rates in real time. In this project, the authors first calibrated two Fork detectors—a standard one and a modified one—by using known strong neutron and gamma sources. Then, the authors measured all 26 fuel rods at multiple locations along the length. The fuel rods were then assembled into three arrays—2 × 2, 3 × 3, and 5 × 5—by using specially designed support grids to mimic fuel assemblies and measure the arrays with both detectors. For the 5 × 5 array, 4 and 8 fuel rods of the array were replaced in two separate cases with short stainless-steel rods to mimic two partial defect scenarios, and the arrays were measured before and after the replacements. Polyethylene blocks were used in this experiment to mimic water. The results show that the Fork detectors were able to verify operator declarations and detect partial defects in spent fuel, and the authors were the first to demonstrate this through experiments. A discovery was also made that determined the root cause of the nonlinear response to gamma dose in the ion chambers used in IAEA and Euratom’s Fork detectors. After the experiments, both detectors were retrieved from the hot cell for future use. The data collected in this project will be used in a parallel International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) project to enhance the safeguards in the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation plant, and the data will be useful to other projects in the future given the increased safeguards needs due to spent fuel transfer and disposal activities worldwide.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

An Enhanced Safeguards Approach for Accelerator Driven Systems utilized to Close the Fuel Cycle

Further to our previous safeguards approach for Accelerator Driven Systems, which focused on estimates of fissile material production using relevant proton accelerator systems and corresponding safeguards needs for fuel storage, the subcritical reactor, and spent fuel storage material balances areas, this report is more expansive and considers utilization of ADS for either burning of transuranics or breeding of fissile materials. We find that the recycled fuels likely intended for ADS will be thermally and radioactively hot to such a degree that it is likely reprocessing and fuel fabrication will have to be co - located with the ADS reactor facility to avoid impractical hot fuel transportation issues. As such, we consider in detail the full ADS system to include material balance areas for spent fuel receiving, reprocessing, storage & cooling, fuel fabrication, subcritical reactor area, and waste storage & handling. Furthermore, aqueous - based separation methods like PUREX cannot tolerate the intense heat of the ADS fuels, so pyroprocessing will likely be required. With these considerations, we developed an Enhanced Safeguards Approach for ADS beyond the work done in our first report, and conclude that significant diagnostic development is needed , a nd provide safeguards recommendations. We have also included an appendix regarding some country programs, in particular the Chinese ADANES burner/breeder program a nd the Indian thorium - based breeder program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Advanced Facility Design and AI/ML Enabled Safeguards to Establish Secure, Economical Recycling of Fast Reactor Fuels (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The project, "Advanced Facility Design and AI/ML Enabled Safeguards to Establish Secure, Economical Recycling of Fast Reactor Fuels," represents a significant advancement in nuclear fuel recycling technology. It integrates cutting-edge multimodal sensor fusion, machine learning (ML), and digital twin (DT) technologies to address challenges in material safeguarding, process optimization, and regulatory compliance for pyroprocessing facilities. This research has significantly enhanced the understanding of pyrochemical fuel recycling processes by developing innovative tools and methodologies. The Multimodal Safeguards Monitoring Unit (MSMU) combines electroanalytical techniques, Raman spectroscopy, and differential thermal analysis (DTA) to enable high-fidelity, near-real-time material accountancy measurements. Machine learning techniques, such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) autoencoders, are utilized to detect anomalies in material balances and sensor data, improving the reliability of safeguards monitoring. Additionally, digital twin technology has been established to provide real-time system-level monitoring and diagnostics, integrating physics-based models with sensor data to optimize process safety and efficiency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and Security by Design to Address Real Time Threats in Nuclear Facilities

Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3 However, once a facility is operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations. This separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality.Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility. Will they notify security so they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering? Not doing so might give the advantage to an insider who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building. If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility.This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats.

Schanfein, Mark J.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Analysis of PNAR Spent Fuel Safeguards Measurements using the ORIGEN Data Analysis Module

This paper summarizes the analysis of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) measurements using the ORIGEN data analysis module for 23 boiling water reactor spent fuel assemblies that were performed in Finland under an international collaboration on spent fuel safeguards verification methods. PNAR is part of the proposed integrated nondestructive system to be used for safeguards verifications at the planned Finnish encapsulation facility. Besides measuring passive neutron and gamma emission rates from an assembly like a Fork detector, PNAR also measures the PNAR ratio, which is expected to correlate with the fissile content in the assembly. The emission rates and PNAR ratio can be used to verify the operator declarations and the fissile content of an assembly, respectively. The analysis was performed using the ORIGEN Data Analysis Module, which was originally developed for predicting Fork detector neutron and gamma signals for spent fuel measurements and has been integrated into the Integrated Review and Analysis Package developed by Euratom and the IAEA. The Module includes the ORIGEN burnup analysis code and integrates detector response functions pre-generated using MCNP to predict detector signals in several seconds per assembly. In this study, new response functions specific to PNAR measurements were generated for ORIGEN Module. The study also analyzes impacts of using detailed fuel design and operation information vs. standard safeguards information on results calculated by ORIGEN Module. Using detailed information reduced the standard deviation of relative differences between calculated and measured neutron count rates among the 23 assemblies from ~10% to ~4%. The results obtained using standard safeguards information for these PNAR measurements were similar to those obtained for the Fork detector. A clear trend was found between the calculated net neutron multiplications and the measured PNAR ratios of the 23 assemblies. This paper describes how ORIGEN Module calculates the expected PNAR neutron and gamma signals and PNAR ratio and how they compare with corresponding measured values.

Ilas, Germina↗
DOE OSTI2021

Safeguards Material Control And Accountancy Considerations For Molten Salt Reactors

Molten salt reactors are a class of nuclear reactor designs with features and operational characteristics that vary significantly. Variations in design features include the physical, chemical, and isotopic composition of fresh and irradiated fuel, neutron energy spectrums, breeding ratios, and the design’s plans for chemical processing. Specific designs within these variations affect the material control and accountancy approaches implemented by both domestic and international nuclear safeguards. This paper identifies safeguards-relevant design features for molten salt reactors and describes how each feature might influence both domestic and international nuclear safeguards implementation. Additionally, this paper describes two potential general categories of material control and accountancy approaches that may be appropriate for molten salt reactors: a black box material-balance approach with measurements on the feed and waste streams combined with robust containment and surveillance on the nuclear material within the reactor or an approach that aims to quantify the nuclear material throughout the reactor (i.e., a process monitoring approach). This paper describes the benefits and challenges of these approaches to meet technical safeguards objectives and identifies gaps in current technologies.

Hogue, Karen↗
DOE OSTI2023

Integration of Nuclear Material Accounting Data and Process Monitoring Data for Improvement on Detection Probability in Safeguarding Electrochemical Processing Facilities (Final Technical Report)

The KAERI advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) process is a critical component of the US- South Korean nuclear cooperation and the following “123 Agreement.” Its development has received considerable attention in both countries. The ACP is an electrochemical processing (pyroprocessing) that recycles over 96% of the used nuclear fuel (UNF). It is also intrinsically proliferation-resistant in theory. In normal operation, the U/TRU product is very hot radiologically. In addition, the Cm provides a high level of spontaneous neutrons, making the product unsuitable for weapon use. However, as pointed in some study, “the need for safeguards to protect against the diversion and misuse of separated plutonium applies essentially equally to all grades of plutonium.” As pointed by many studies, the well-established traditional Nuclear Material Accounting (NMA) approach cannot be directly applied to electrochemical processing because of the lack of an input accountability tank, the non-continuous material flow, and the unsatisfactory level of confidence in sampling methods. Therefore, nuclear safeguards remain a grand challenge in the developing of commercial electrochemical separations facilities, especially around the heart of such facilities, the electrorefiner (ER) systems. In contrast to NMA data, process monitoring (PM) data is normally an indirect measurement of the SNM and is acquired much more frequently. In a broad sense, PM includes monitoring by various types of equipment, e.g. radiation detectors, cameras, voltage, current sensors. Because it is already being collected by the operator, the additional cost to safeguards is low. It has long been believed that PM data can supplement NMA data and help improve safeguards, although the benefits are hard to quantify. The U.S. DOE’s Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technology (MPACT) campaign has made substantial investments into innovative PM sensor technology and predictive model development for real- or near real-time measurement and prediction of molten salt density and level, salt composition and actinide concentration especially Pu, the cell voltage, and the cell current to supplement traditional NMA. For aqueous-based reprocessing facilities, it is reported that PM, integrated with traditional NMA, have a high detection probability for specific diversions. For electrochemical reprocessing, preliminary studies have shown that PM data can support traditional NMA in various ways by providing a basis to estimate some of the in-processing nuclear material inventories. Despite early success, further studies on fusion of PM data and NMA data are still needed, which is the goal of this proposed work.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Statistical Approaches for Pebble Bed Reactor Operations and Safeguards

The design of pebble bed reactors (PBRs) and their method of operation align more closely with statistical approaches used in manufacturing and process control than traditional safeguards statistical approaches. The reason is PBRs will employ a nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement (burnup measurement system [BUMS]) that is part of the fuel handling system supporting discharge decisions in addition to the reactor code which monitor performance. The integration of these two approaches provides the opportunity to monitor reactor performance statistically for both operations and safeguards in ways not achievable using other reactor designs. For light water reactors (LWRs), knowledge about reactor code performance in predicting irradiated special nuclear material (SNM) content historically was only achieved from special measurement campaigns or from fuel reprocessing. Conversely, through statistical comparison of the BUMS with the reactor code-predicted values, PBRs can achieve this in real time. The resulting SNM distribution is an indicator of reactor performance because factors such as transit time and path of the pebble fuel through the reactor determine the plutonium production and uranium depletion. By analyzing the predicted and measured values, opportunities exist to adjust operating parameters, fuel design, and other characteristics to optimize performance and fuel utilization. From a safeguards perspective, this approach also provides the information necessary to validate declared values and evaluate whether the reactor is being operated as expected. This paper outlines statistical approaches for PBRs that can be used to support both operations and safeguards.

Ball, Cory↗
DOE OSTI2024

Legal and Regulatory Aspects Related to Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for Safeguards Implementation

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is exploring the use of innovative technologies such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to address safeguards verification challenges such as difficulties in accessing nuclear material in high radiation environments, and remotely located installations, as well as to increase the efficiency of safeguards implementation by automating repetitive and time-consuming tasks. As UAS continue to advance and their use becomes more frequent in high security conscious industries such as nuclear, their advantages in contributing to greater safety and security may weigh in favor of their use. However, as the IAEA begins to use these technologies, the legal, policy, and operational considerations associated with these advanced technologies will also need to be considered to identify any key opportunities, challenges, or areas of concern for the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will explore these areas and identify important considerations for the IAEA and its Member States to consider as the use of UAS is explored further for safeguards applications. It will also provide a series of recommendations for anticipating and addressing legal, regulatory, and policy challenges related to the use of UAS for safeguards implementation.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗
DOE OSTI2020

Genetic algorithm optimization of tin–copper graded shielding for improved plutonium safeguards measurements

Plutonium nuclear material safeguards is essential to ensure that states do not divert plutonium to clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Traditional safeguards methods rely on correlated neutron measurements. Detection systems based on organic scintillators, which are sensitive to fast neutrons and photons, are gaining support for use in safeguards applications due to increased capabilities and shorter measurement times compared to the current state-of-the-art. A drawback of organic scintillators in plutonium measurements is data throughput limitations; 241 Am builds up in plutonium samples and emits 60-keV gamma rays with a high specific activity. In this work, a genetic algorithm is used to design graded shielding made of tin and copper to attenuate the 60-keV gamma rays. The shield is designed to limit the attenuation of the higher-energy, fission photons, because fission photons can be used as a signature. The genetic algorithm optimization takes days to run, while a complete search space exploration would take years. The genetic algorithm was run for different levels of 60-keV gamma-ray attenuation, and the thickness of the required shielding layers was determined at each level. Tin–copper shielding was placed in front of an array of organic scintillation detectors for a measurement of approximately 4.5 kg of alpha-phase, weapons-grade plutonium, an AmLi source, and a 252 Cf source. We show that the shield successfully attenuated low-energy, non-fission gamma rays, which significantly improved the organic scintillator performance.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Examining Fuel-Cycle Scenarios with the Safeguards Analysis Toolbox

SafeGuards Analysis (SGA) is a toolbox developed to allow engineers and scientists to create detailed simulations of safeguards material control and accountability simulations. SGA accepts material flow data from an external material flow model, and can be used with any existing fuel cycle or material control code. This work examines some new developments to the SGA code that allow the code to consider material losses over long timeframes. The first scenario described in this paper examined an enrichment facility consisting of two material balance areas (MBAs). Cumulative sum and basic control chart tests evaluate to a case involving a loss of material from both MBAs simultaneously and a case in which material is removed from the facility over a timescale of double the one that the tests were calibrated to detect. A second scenario represents an entire fuel-cycle consisting of four MBAs and two materials of interest (low-enriched uranium and plutonium). This scenario evaluated the calibrated safeguards system with three blind unidentified stream cases, with the goal of determining the calibrated system’s ability to detect where the material loss occurred in each case. SGA was able to produce the expected results for all of the examples examined in this paper, demonstrating that modules produced using the toolbox are capable of examining larger systems in realistic multi-MBA scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗