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At least 127 records · Page 7

Swedish Solution for Reconditioning, Transport, Interim Storage and Final Disposal of Failed Fuel - 17024

Despite today's increasingly more reliable operation of nuclear power plants, failed fuel rods exist in all Swedish plants. Managing intermediate storage and sub-sequential final disposal of such rods has been a growing problem. The Swedish system for spent fuel management uses the principle of intermediate storage of the fuel in a central intermediate storage facility (CLAB) before disposal in a final repository according to the KBS-3 method. However, the intermediate storage facility does not allow storage of failed fuel and the final repository has limitations on moisture in the deposited fuel and hence failed or broken fuel rods cannot be accepted as-is. The nuclear power companies in Sweden have jointly established the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, SKB, to manage the spent fuel and the operational waste. To find a solution to transport the failed fuel to storage, SKB has established a project with the goal to have all currently failed fuel rods from all the Swedish nuclear power plants reconditioned and transported to the intermediate storage facility before the year of 2020. The project has established the acceptance criteria for reconditioned failed fuel in the final repository and evaluated a number of options for treatment, encapsulation and transportation of the failed fuel rods. Furthermore, two suppliers have developed reconditioning methods fulfilling the criteria and contracts were signed with both suppliers in May 2016. This paper outlines the details of the Swedish solution for treatment and storage of failed fuel including the technical requirements for the reconditioning method and transportability. (authors)

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Radioactive waste management in France: taking-up present and future challenges - 15120

The reduction of the volume and radiotoxicity of radioactive waste has been one of the key drivers for the implementation of the French nuclear program. Interactions between the nuclear industry, the administration, the competent authorities and other stakeholders including the civil society has led to a continuous evolution of the industrial facilities, practices, solutions and products to move towards waste minimization. Bringing a solution to the management of ultimate radioactive waste is clearly a requirement for the sustainable development of nuclear energy whose crucial role in the world's future energy mix has been confirmed in the past few months by several international organizations. The first question to be answered concerns the definition of radioactive waste. This notion may be seen as self-evident. It is not. For example, used fuel is considered a High Level Waste in Finland or Sweden, but a recyclable material in countries including China, France, India, Japan, Russia, and the Netherlands. In France, a definition is provided by law to clarify this notion. Indeed, the 2006 French law concerning the Sustainable Management of Radioactive Materials and Waste stipulates that 'ultimate radioactive waste shall include any radioactive waste for which no further processing is possible under current technical and economic conditions, notably by extracting their recoverable fraction or by reducing their polluting or hazardous character'. Used fuel is thus reprocessed in order to reduce the final waste volume and long term radiotoxicity, while extracting value from the recovered materials. Even if the general approach and the processes may be common for waste management, it is important to clearly make the distinction between the wastes stemming from used fuel processing or conditioning (when considered as waste), the wastes generated through the operation of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities, and the waste arising from the dismantling of nuclear installations. After a brief overview of the different types of waste stemming from nuclear power generation, this paper will review solutions and processes already implemented for their safe and efficient management. It will also practically illustrate the evolution of these processes and related facilities to further gain in efficiency, notably in terms of volume reduction; the related R and D outcomes will be addressed. It will also describe the upcoming challenges in this field and the envisioned solutions to respond to them; the efficiency, the completeness and consistency of these solutions with the currently considered global framework, based on a stepwise and long term approach from waste generation to disposal, will also be analyzed. (authors)

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Treatment of contaminated non-iron metals for clearance - 15361

Iron based metals and concrete make up most of the structures in a nuclear power plants and most other nuclear installations. During the last few decades, a lot of effort has been put into the treatment of steel in order to allow recycling of the metal and to reduce the volume for final disposal. In addition to the iron based metals, there are also other metals in significant amounts that can be treated for recycling and waste minimisation. Aluminium, lead, titanium, brass and copper have all been treated by Studsvik in the metals treatment facility in Sweden over the years. Some of these metals like lead and aluminium causes certain concerns (for reasons not related to their radioactivity) if they were to be disposed as radioactive waste. Other as copper and titanium has a high economic value if recycled outside the nuclear industry. Studsvik experience from treatment of non-iron metals is reported in this paper. (authors)

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The role of Aspo Hard Rock laboratory for the Swedish nuclear fuel and waste management's research, developing and demonstration programme for a final repository of spent nuclear fuel - 15378

The Aspo Hard Rock Laboratory (HRL), located in the Simpevarp area in the municipality of Oskarshamn in Sweden, Figure 1, constitutes an important part of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management (SKB) work with design and construction of a deep geological repository for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. One of the fundamental reasons behind SKB's decision to construct an underground laboratory was to create an opportunity for research, development and demonstration in a realistic and undisturbed rock environment down to repository depth. Most of the research has concerned with processes of importance for the long-term safety of a future final repository and the capability to model the processes taking place at repository depth. Demonstration addresses the performance of the engineered barriers and practical means of constructing a repository and emplacing the canisters containing spent fuel. SKB will in the coming years more focus on using the Aspo HRL for demonstrating technology for and function of important parts of the repository system before constructing and operate the spent nuclear fuel repository in Forsmark. Aspo HRL includes both a research village with office space for 100 persons and different laboratories, e.g. Chemistry and Material Science Laboratory and Bentonite Laboratory, and an underground research laboratory to a depth of 460 m. The Aspo HRL is also open for other organisations to be used for their own projects and experiments not only related to nuclear waste management research. (authors)

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Separation and recovery of uranium from residues to allow disposal as VLLW - 15379

During fabrication of uranium fuel, significant amounts of uranium contaminated wastes are generated. The uranium concentration in the waste is typically 1-10% in weight. With this uranium concentration, the residues constitute long lived Low Level Waste (LL-LLW) which need to be disposed of in a repository specifically for this type of waste. Through recovery of uranium from the primary waste, the potential for reducing the concentration of uranium to such low levels that the remaining waste qualifies as Very Low Level Waste (VLLW) are significant. The remaining waste could then be disposed of in a less costly disposal than the primary waste. A method for recovery of uranium from waste has been developed and used in Sweden and includes leaching with sulphuric acid, solvent extraction and precipitation. The final result is ammonium di-uranate (ADU). The remaining waste typically has residual uranium content in the range of 100 g uranium per tonne of waste. In several countries this would permit disposal at a hazardous waste landfill site after conditional clearance. During the development process, it has been shown that for certain types of waste it's possible to reduce the uranium concentration even further. The paper gives an overview of the technology, its applications as well as advantages and limitations. (authors)

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Decontamination of uranium contaminated metals - 15 years of experience - 15528

Uranium contaminated waste is somewhat of a special case among radioactive waste as the uranium, if enriched, also is a valuable asset. Incineration and pyrolysis of uranium contaminated dry active waste (DAW) was covered during WM'14. Uranium contaminated metals is however somewhat different when it comes treatment and recovery of uranium. Since the late 1990's the Metals Treatment and Recycling Facility in Studsvik Sweden has treated approximately 1500 tonnes of metals contaminated by uranium. Depending on the metal, melt-decontamination may or may not be a way of salvaging metals if the pre-treatment was not enough. The only metals that currently are subject to melt decontamination are iron based materials as well as lead. Other metals such as aluminium, brass and copper must all be cleaned prior to melting. Recovery of uranium from the secondary waste is most likely economically feasible only from the first step, the pre-melting decontamination, as the slag is just that, a slag, which is molten at a high temperature, and thereafter cooled under non-controlled conditions so uranium is trapped inside in an unspecified chemical form. This paper will describes experiences and lessons learned from 15 years of treatment, including melt-decontamination, of uranium contaminated metals. (authors)

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Repository planning for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste: insights from U.S.. and international programs - 15638

For decades, the United States and other nations with nuclear programs have been planning for permanent disposition of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, to address the increasingly difficult problem of storing these materials for the long term. These plans are complicated by issues ranging from technological factors to regulatory approaches and public concerns about health and environmental protection. In its 2012 report, the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future identified a number of recommendations for creating a safe, long-term solution to the nation's problem of managing and disposing of its spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. These include a recommendation that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revise its standards for a high-level waste repository. The EPA is currently reviewing and synthesizing literature relevant to such standards, including: (1) existing national and international standards and guidelines for repositories; and (2) benefits and barriers to such standards, including limitations related to current technologies, as well as siting, licensing, and construction processes. This paper highlights findings of this literature review and synthesis. More than 90 countries, from Albania to Vietnam and Yemen, were identified as potential sources of relevant information based on existing nuclear programs or consideration of such programs to address future energy needs. Pursuant to the BRC recommendations, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has compiled extensive information resources relevant to spent fuel and radioactive waste repositories in the Centralized Used Fuel Resource and Information Exchange (CURIE) database developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Further valuable sources of information include annual proceedings of recent Waste Management Symposia, which provide insights into recent trends and progress across various national and international programs. Recent literature from a number of countries, including the United States and Canada, and the United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, France, Germany, and other countries in Western Europe, as well as other regions including Australia, indicates that consent-based siting has emerged as a dominant theme. In addition to effective siting processes, key program needs identified in the literature include regulatory standards and performance context, as well as reliable technologies and engineered systems, such as for deep drilling and assured safe containment of these radioactive materials extending into the very long term. (authors)

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The root causes of siting failures in nuclear waste management - 15652

For many decades, the global nuclear industry and associated governments have attempted to establish new facilities for the storage and disposal of nuclear wastes. Success has been rare (France, Sweden and Finland being the examples) and remains elusive for many programs despite attempts to change the selection process in some cases. Success has been aided by local and national consent in the few cases that are proceeding. A small study of several countries lack of success is examined to determine the dominant reasons for such failures. The goal of the study is to inform the planning process for efforts to site new facilities by feeding back some lessons learned from past failed efforts. This limited review of international experience indicates that there is no simple approach available for siting deep geologic disposal or even centralized storage facilities. A number of countries have tried multiple times to find an acceptable site. Two studies [1, 2] clearly indicate that there must be adequate assurance of social as well as technical acceptability for successfully siting such facilities. It is evident that even though the technology and science may be proven, it is the politics and public engagement in siting processes that dominate the failures. However, the detailed reasons within each effort present a richer set of lessons. This paper will summarize the findings and present them such that they can be used to inform future siting efforts by a nation. (authors)

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Importance of Upfront Preparatory Works for Vessel Internals Segmentation Projects - 16096

For more than thirty years, Westinghouse has been involved in reactor internals segmentation activities in the U.S. and Europe. Westinghouse completed in 2015 the segmentation of the reactor vessel and reactor vessel internals at the Jose Cabrera nuclear power plant in Spain and a similar project is on-going at Chooz A in France. Four more major reactor internals segmentation projects have been recently awarded in Sweden (Barsebaeck 1-2) and in Germany. (Philippsburg 1 and Neckarwestheim 1). For all reactor dismantling projects, it is essential that all activities are thoroughly planned and discussed upfront together with the customer. Detailed planning is crucial for achieving a successful project. One key activity in the preparation phase is the 'Segmentation and Packaging Plan' that documents the sequential steps required to segment, separate, and package each individual component, based on an activation analysis and component characterization study. Detailed procedures and specialized rigging equipment have to be developed to provide safeguards for preventing certain identified risks. The preparatory work can include some plant civil structure modifications for making the segmentation work easier and safer. Some original plant equipment is sometimes not suitable enough and need to be replaced. Before going to the site, testing and qualification are performed on full scale mock-ups in a specially designed pool for segmentation purposes. The mockup testing is an important step in order to verify the function of the equipment and minimize risk on site. This paper is describing the typical activities needed for preparing the reactor internals segmentation activities using under water mechanical cutting techniques. It will provide experiences and lessons learned that Westinghouse has collected from its recent projects and that will be applied for the new awarded projects. (authors)

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Characterization and Clearance of m/s Sigyn - 16412

M/s Sigyn was a 2044 ton ship that transported contaminated material between 1982 and 2013. Most of the transports were with spent nuclear fuel between Swedish nuclear power plants and the Swedish fuel repository, Clab. In addition to spent fuel, m/s Sigyn also transported big contaminated components, from nuclear power plants in Europe, to Studsvik for analysis or decontamination and melting. She also transported components from Swedish nuclear power plants to final disposal of short lived waste, SFR. Even though all transported items have been cleaned, checked and wrapped with plastics, some activity ended up as contamination onboard. In December 2013 it was decided that m/s Sigyn was subject for decommissioning due to her age. This Paper describes the method in which the activity onboard m/s Sigyn was characterized and clearance levels were calculated. This method for radiological characterization and clearance has recently been developed in Sweden, the method is efficient in that it does not need a big pre characterization survey. Only the nuclide distribution and history of the object, is needed to start the final survey. In the future there will be further development of the method, making it possible to reduce the number of measurements even more. This will further optimize the method and reduce the cost for final surveys and clearance. (authors)

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Constructing Memory Through Artistic Practices - 18197

I have been investigating radioactive waste sites internationally since 1994, analyzing how this archaeological stratum of the 21. century can be read in the landscape. Over more than twenty years of work this research has led me to visit several sites around the world. My focus has become the identification of the disposal sites in the landscape, as well as finding ways to pass on memory. Reports on Disposal Sites and Exhibitions: - Dessel, Belgium - exhibition at De Markten, Brussels; - Sacavem, Portugal - participation to the World Exhibition in Lisbon; - El Cabril, Spain - workshop at the University of Bilbao; - Angra dos Reis, Brazil - exhibition at Centre cultural Puc, Rio de Janeiro; - Rokkasho Mura, Japan - exhibition at gallery Gen, Tokyo; - Soulaines D'Huys, France - exhibition at art gallery Cours Carree, Paris; - CSM, Beaumont-Hague, France - exhibition at the House of Culture in Tournai, Belgium; - Fortsmark, Sweden - exhibition at 340 Muzeum, Brussels; - Cnesten Maamora, Morocco - exhibition at Villa des Arts, Casablanca; - Bhabha Atomic Research, Trombay, India - I was allowed to visit it but it was forbidden to make photographs or drawings. (authors)

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Lessons Learned from the Remote Reactor Vessel Internals Segmentation at Barsebaeck 2 - 18231

Westinghouse is performing a decommissioning project at Barsebaeck in Sweden that was awarded in June 2015. Barsebaeck is an ABB-designed boiling water reactor (BWR) plant (2 units of 615 MW) located 30 kilometers from Malmoe. The first reactor, Barsebaeck 1, was permanently shut down on Nov. 30, 1999, and the second one, Barsebaeck 2, ceased operation on May 31, 2005. The scope of work covers the underwater segmentation and packaging of the Reactor Vessel internals at Barsebaeck 1 and 2, including the up-front engineering studies and equipment manufacturing and qualification. The Barsebaeck Unit 2 was selected for starting the site work in August 2016. Cutting was performed with different types of Westinghouse designed cutting equipment (hydraulic shears, band saw, disc saw). All segmentation tools are remotely controlled due to the high radiation levels and ALARA and personal safety is the number one priority during the site work. The cutting equipment proved to be reliable and flexible which is very valuable for the execution of such a challenging project. The Barsebaeck Unit 2 cutting activities have been finished end of October 2018 and its lessons learned will be taken into consideration for the Unit 1 activities. (authors)

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Challenges of Remote Handling in Windowless Hot Cells - 18341

Facilities such as nuclear power stations and neutron sources produce radioactive waste, which must be handled in shielded containment chambers [hot cells]. Traditionally these hot cells are built with lead glass windows to allow direct observation by operators, however, as the complexity and size of handling operations increases, the restrictions imposed by such windows becomes problematic. For the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor [ITER] under construction in the South of France and the European Spallation Source [ESS] under construction in Lund, Sweden the hot cell must be capable of processing large, activated and contaminated components, requiring the dexterous tele-manipulation of high dose payloads in the cell. Using lead glass windows would severely restrict the operational envelope within the cell to the volumes directly in front of the windows. This places unreasonable constraints on the types of handling operations that can be carried out. Conversely, a windowless configuration is much more flexible and maximises the operational space for robotic manipulators. Windowless hot cells do however introduce their own challenges. This paper examines the difficulties introduced by lack of direct sight and describes solutions to overcome them. (authors)

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How to Handle the Conflict between Safety and Security - 18564

The purpose of safety and security for nuclear activities are the same. They are both necessary measures to protect people and the environment from radioactive material. There are many measures that enhance both the safety and the security but there are also measures serving one area that are in direct conflict with the other. How information is handled is maybe the best example to demonstrate this conflict between interests. In the security field, information is handled on a need-to-know basis, preventing valuable details to fall into hands of antagonists, terrorists etc. The safety culture, on the contrary, is based on knowledge and transparency and it encourages the sharing of information and experience to improve the safety. There is little guidance on how to manage the conflicts between safety and security for a transport system moving nuclear fuel and radioactive waste and especially when there are conflicts between different legislation areas, for example the Act on Nuclear Activities and Safety of Life at Sea. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, SKB, transports all Swedish spent fuel and operational waste from the Nuclear Power Plants to the central storage facilities in Sweden. To manage the transport system, SKB owns a fleet of packages, road vehicles and an INF 3 ship. For the shipments of nuclear material, the security focus has increased rapidly over the years after the 9/11 attack, followed by regulatory requirements on enhanced security. SKB is currently running a project to further strengthen the transport security, an activity that requires a careful balance between safety and security. This paper describes the methods used and the challenges experienced trying to manage the conflicts between safety and security for the Swedish nuclear transport system. (authors)

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Feedback from Reactor Internals Segmentation Projects in Europe - 19141

Westinghouse has accumulated significant know-how in the reactor dismantling activities. The approach to internals segmentation and packaging has been continuously enhanced by incorporating lessons learned and best practices into each successive project. Building on the most recent successful experience at Jose Cabrera in Spain, Westinghouse has won several major awards with 13 reactors currently under contract at Chooz A (France), Barsebaeck 1-2 (Sweden), Bohunice V1 (two units in Slovakia), Neckarwestheim I, Philippsburg 1, and more recently at Unterweser, Grafenrheinfeld, Grohnde, Isar 1, Isar 2, Brokdorf (Germany). The primary challenges of a segmentation and packaging project are to separate the highly activated materials from the less-activated materials and package them into appropriate containers for disposal. The choice of the optimum cutting technology is important for a successful project implementation and depends on some specific constraints like disposal costs, project schedule, available work areas or safety. The selected technology for all recent Westinghouse projects is mechanical cutting with different types of designed cutting equipment (hydraulic shears, band saw, disc saw). All segmentation tools are remotely controlled due to the high radiation levels and ALARA and personal safety is the number one priority during the challenging site work. Training on mock-ups in the Westinghouse facility before going to the site is a very important step in order to optimize all procedures and thereby maximize the efficiency on site in order to finalize the project on time or before. The work covers the segmentation of reactor internals but also, in some cases, some replaced components during plant operation that were stored in the spent fuel pool. The cutting equipment proved to be reliable and flexible which is very valuable for the execution of such a challenging project. The Barsebaeck Unit 2 site work has been finished end of October 2017 and its lessons learned are taken into consideration for future activities. Site work is currently on-going simultaneously at Chooz A, Barsebaeck 1, Neckarwestheim I and Philippsburg 1. This paper will provide an overview of all these on-going segmentation projects and will focus on feedback from the first projects executed on site. (authors)

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Panel Session 24B: Records, Knowledge, and Memory for Radioactive Waste Repositories: Generational Equity Focus

This panel focused on the latest thoughts, ideas, and methodologies being explored throughout the world on how to communicate with future generations regarding nuclear waste disposal. Scientists determined many years ago that geological disposal in a repository was the preferred solution for nuclear waste disposal given the longevity concerns of the waste(s). Future generations must be informed through records, memory keeping and permanent markers to ensure they are aware of, and knowledgeable of, the dangers associated with nuclear waste isolated from the biosphere. Panelists with presentations: You Want to Drill Where? Human Intrusion Messaging Considerations (Thomas Peake, Jonathan Major); Ethical Reflections on the Basic Reasons for RK and M Measures (Carl-Reinhold Brakenhielm); NEA Activities on Information, Data and Knowledge Management (Rebecca Tadesse); Records, Knowledge and Memory (RK and M) Across Generations: Recent Activities and Progress in Sweden (Claudio Pescatore)

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Tracing the HIV-1 subtype B mobility in Europe: a phylogeographic approach

The prevalence and the origin of HIV-1 subtype B, the most prevalent circulating clade among the long-term residents in Europe, have been studied extensively. However the spatial diffusion of the epidemic from the perspective of the virus has not previously been traced. In the current study we inferred the migration history of HIV-1 subtype B by way of a phylogeography of viral sequences sampled from 16 European countries and Israel. Migration events were inferred from viral phylogenies by character reconstruction using parsimony. With regard to the spatial dispersal of the HIV subtype B sequences across viral phylogenies, in most of the countries in Europe the epidemic was introduced by multiple sources and subsequently spread within local networks. Poland provides an exception where most of the infections were the result of a single point introduction. According to the significant migratory pathways, we show that there are considerable differences across Europe. Specifically, Greece, Portugal, Serbia and Spain, provide sources shedding HIV-1; Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, on the other hand, are migratory targets, while for Denmark, Germany, Italy, Israel, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK we inferred significant bidirectional migration. For Poland no significant migratory pathways were inferred. Subtype B phylogeographies provide a new insight about the geographical distribution of viral lineages, as well as the significant pathways of virus dispersal across Europe, suggesting that intervention strategies should also address tourists, travellers and migrants.

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Experiment Isotopic Data Compiled by the OECD/NEA Expert Group on Assay Data for Spent Nuclear Fuel

An essential component of computational modeling and simulation is the availability of well-qualified experimental benchmark data against which calculation systems can be validated and the bias and uncertainty associated with the codes and data can be evaluated. The validation process is extremely important for safety and licensing to demonstrate that adequate margins for uncertainty have been included in the calculations. For safety evaluations involving spent nuclear fuel, the isotopic compositions and resulting activities calculated using depletion and decay codes must be validated against experimental determinations of the spent fuel content. In this process the isotopic concentrations predicted by the codes should be compared with corresponding measurements of spent fuel made by destructive analysis as a fundamental part of any code performance evaluation. In recent years there has been growing international interest in acquiring high-quality assay data that can be used to validate code calculations, particularly for modern fuel designs and high burnup fuels and for a wider range of nuclides important to nuclear criticality safety, radiological safety assessments, and decay heat. Assay data are required to validate a broad range of reactor and fuel-cycle applications, including reactor core simulation, postulated severe accident analysis, spent fuel handling, spent fuel transportation and interim storage, reprocessing, nuclear safeguards, and final fuel repository evaluations. In some cases researchers working on depletion code development have noted a general lack of available assay measurements that can be used to benchmark and validate their code calculations for spent fuel compositions. This perception is due in part to the fact that data have been reported in diverse publications over many years, many experimental reports are difficult to access, and there has not been a concerted and funded effort to compile and consolidate available measurements that can be easily accessed by code developers and analysts for validation. In response to the increased interest in fuel isotopic measurements and needs for consolidation and documentation of available data, an Expert Group on Assay Data for Spent Nuclear Fuel (EGADSNF) was formed in 2007 as a working group of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS). Although the group was formed by the Expert Group on Burnup Credit to coordinate isotopic assay data activities and facilitate collaboration between countries developing or implementing burnup credit in their nuclear criticality safety methodologies, the group recognized the need and value of assay data for a broad range of spent fuel applications, and the EGADSNF includes members representing not only the WPNCS, but also members from the standing technical Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations and the Integration Group for the Safety Case of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee. Member countries currently active in the EGADSNF include Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The experimental database of spent fuel measurements maintained by the OECD/NEA is web-accessible. SFCOMPO (database of Spent Fuel Compositions) contains measured isotopic data, mostly for light water reactor (LWR) fuels, for about 250 fuel samples. This paper summarizes the status of SFCOMPO and current activities to expand and improve the database.

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