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At least 127 records · Page 7

Assessing the use of UAS-related terms in ASRS using Seed Topic Modeling

Context: The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary confidential aviation safety reporting system. The ASRS receives reports from pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants and other involved in aviation operations. The reports are de-identified and coded by ASRS expert safety analysts. The de-identified reports are then disseminated to the aviation community in a number of ways including entry into an online database. Augmenting the discovery of topics of user interest in this online database would therefore be beneficial to the community it serves. Aim: We propose and execute an experiment to assess the use of seed term topic modeling using the database narratives to identify UAS reports. The use of seed term topic modeling would enable users to identify groups of related narratives associated to a topic of their interest. Method: We use a newly curated field in ASRS reports which identify UAS from non-UAS reports in combination of different set of UAS related terms to assess if seed topic modeling can be used in ASRS.

LDA↗

Part 121 Taxi/Parked Ground Conflict Related Incidents

This presentation reviews voluntary safety reports received by NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System pertaining to Part 121 Taxi/Parked Ground Conflicts. Ground Conflict, Critical • Two or more aircraft (one may be airborne) in conflict, or an aircraft in conflict with a vehicle/person/object in which the reporter or other involved party took evasive action to avoid a collision, or a collision that almost occurred in cases where evasive action was not taken or possible. The evasive action can include an emergency go-around, veering on a taxiway/runway, rejected takeoff/abort, emergency braking, or an aircraft overflying another aircraft 50 feet or less.  Ground Conflict, Less Severe • Two or more aircraft (one may be airborne) in conflict, or an aircraft in conflict with a vehicle/person/object in which the reporter or other involved party may, or may not have taken precautionary avoidance action, and in which a collision hazard was not imminent.  Ground Event / Encounter – Aircraft • Actual physical contact with another aircraft when aircraft is on the ground. All Aircraft Involved in Incidents Conflicting Aircraft by Weight Classification Flight Conditions and Time (Quarter of Day) Contributing Factors and Human Factors (Event)

taxi↗

Early Warning: Development of Confidential Incident Reporting Systems

Accidents hardly ever happen without warning. The combination, or sequence, of failures and mistakes that cause an accident may indeed be unique but the individual failures and mistakes rarely are. In the USA in 1974 the crews on two different aircraft misunderstood the same aeronautical chart and descended towards their destination dangerously early towards a mountain. The first crew were in good weather conditions and could see the mountain and resolved their misinterpretation of the chart. The second crew six weeks later were not so lucky. In cloud they had no clues to point out their mistake nor the presence of the mountain. The resulting crash and the ensuing inquiry, which brought to light the previous incident, shocked the country but gave it the impetus to instigate a safety reporting system. This system eventually became the NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The programme collects incident reports from pilots, controllers, mechanics, cabin attendants and many others involved in aviation operations. By disseminating this safety information the ASRS has helped enormously to give US airlines and airspace the highest safety standards. Accident prevention is a goal sought by everyone in the aviation industry and establishing effective incident reporting programmes can go a long way toward achieving that goal. This article will describe the steps and issues required to establish an incident reporting system. The authors summarize the lessons learned from the ASRS, now in its twentieth year of operation and from the Confidential Human Factors Reporting (HER) Programme run by British Airways, an airline that is a recognized world leader in safety reporting and analysis. The differences between government and airline operation of confidential safety reporting systems will be addressed.

OLeary, Mike J.↗

Package Review Guide for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages (Revision 4)

This Package Review Guide (PRG) provides guidance for Department of Energy (DOE) review and approval of packages to transport fissile and Type B quantities of radioactive material. It fulfills, in part, the requirements of DOE Order 460.1D for the Headquarters Certifying Official to establish standards and to provide guidance for the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports for Packages (SARP). This Package Review Guide is intended for use by the United States Department of Energy Headquarters Certifying Official and their staff, DOE Secretarial offices, operations/field offices, and applicants for Department of Energy package approval. This Package Review Guide is generally organized at the chapter-level in a format similar to that recommended in United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 7.9. One notable exception is the addition of Chapter 9 Quality Assurance, which is not included as a separate chapter in Regulatory Guide 7.9. Within each chapter, this Package Review Guide addresses the technical and regulatory bases for the review, the manner in which the review is accomplished, and findings that are generally applicable for a package that meets the approval standards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Utilization of the LMP Methodology in Support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report

The Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) is a fast spectrum test reactor currently being developed in the United States under the direction of the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The VTR is utilizing a risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) approach for design support and authorization by the DOE, derived from recent efforts by the US industry led Licensing Modernization Project (LMP). This document contains an overview of the implementation of the LMP approach in support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report (CSDR). The work reported here is the result of studies supporting a VTR conceptual design, cost, and schedule estimate for DOE-NE to make a decision on procurement. As such, it is preliminary. The VTR RIPB authorization approach utilizes information from the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), coupled with deterministic analyses, to aid in decision-making regarding the identification and categorization of safety basis events (SBEs), the classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and the evaluation of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy. As part of initial reactor design efforts, a VTR conceptual design PRA was developed to support the RIPB process, which focused on at-power internal events, with scoping analyses for seismic and sodium fire hazards. In addition to supporting numerous design studies, preliminary results from the RIPB approach and the VTR conceptual design PRA were utilized as the basis of the VTR CSDR. The initial identification and categorization of SBEs, SSC classification, and DID evaluation were contained within the CSDR, which was submitted to DOE in 2019 as part of the CD-1 submittal package. Following review, DOE approved the CSDR in April 2020 and the CD-1 package in late 2020. Valuable experience was gained through the implementation of the RIPB approach for design and authorization during the VTR conceptual design phase, which is summarized in this document. To the extent possible, this experience has been shared with the advanced reactor industry, through publications and participation in licensing tabletops, in addition to informing DOE:NE advanced reactor regulatory development efforts. Furthermore, the approval of the CSDR by the DOE as part of CD-1 represents a significant milestone in the use of RIPB approaches for advanced reactor licensing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-33: Postflight edition

Space Transportation System 33 (STS-33) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and the factors that are not unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late to include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.

Hill, William C.↗

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-35: Postflight edition

Space Transportation System 35 (STS-35) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and factors that were unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late too include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.

Hill, William C.↗

Benchmarking MELCOR 1.8.2 for ITER Against Recent EVITA Results

A version of MELCOR 1.8.2 modified for use in ITER Preliminary Safety Report analyses was validated against recent data from the EVITA facility located in Cadarache, France. EVITA Test Series 7 was used for this study to verify MELCOR’s ability to predict the pressures, temperatures, cryoplate ice mass, and vaccum vessel (VV) condensate mass for test conditions in EVITA that include injections of steam, nitrogen, and water in to the EVITA VV after the walls had been heated to 165 ºC and the cryoplate had been cooled to -193 ºC. In general, the ability of MELCOR to predict the VV pressure and wall temperatures for the steam only and water only injection tests was very good. Predicted ice layer masses where larger than reported for the EVITA cryoplate, in particular for the steam only injection tests (~40% too high), and the predicted condensate masses were less that measured in EVITA. Both of these descrpancies can be explained by ice porosity. The modified MELCOR 1.8.2 over predicts the EVITA VV pressure for the co-injection tests (e.g., steam plus nitrogen, or water plus nitrogen injections) by almost a factor of two. Based on parametric runs that where made by increasing the predicted cryoplate condensation rate, it is believed that this pressure over prediction is a result of an under predicted cryoplate condensation rate. The particulars of this study are documented in this report as well as conclusions about the impact this study has regarding the use of this verions of MELCOR for consequence analyses for ITER safety reports.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-29, postflight edition

The topics covered include: (1) an STS-29 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-29 safety risk factors; (4) STS-27 flight anomalies; (5) STS-26 flight anomalies; and (6) the STS-29 official inflight anomaly report. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Source record↗

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-30, postflight edition

The topics covered include: (1) an STS-30 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-30 safety risk factors; (4) STS-29 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-27 inflight anomalies; and (6) the STS-30 official inflight anomaly report. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Finkel, Seymour I.↗

Mission Safety Evaluation Report for STS-32, Postflight Edition

The topics covered include: (1) an STS-32 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-32 safety risk factors; (4) STS-32 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-28 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-32 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Hill, William C.↗

Mission Safety Evaluation Report for STS-36, Postflight Edition

The topics covered include: (1) an STS-36 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-36 safety risk factors; (4) STS-32 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-34 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-36 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Hill, William C.↗

Mission Safety Evaluation Report for STS-43, Postflight Edition

Some of the topics covered include: (1) an STS-43 mission summary; (2) safety risks factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-43 safety risk factors; (4) STS-40 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-37 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-43 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Hill, William C.↗

NM 502 Road Safety Audit Report

The Texas A&M Transportation Institute (TTI) and the Los Alamos National Laboratory - Parking and Transportation Services (LANL) have been working in close collaboration to seek solutions for parking, traffic operations, traffic safety, and transit issues facing LANL. NM 502 is a main route for employee traffic entering the lab as well as traffic in and out of the Los Alamos Townsite. The section of roadway in the vicinity of Camino Entrada is of particular interest as it was the site of two very serious crashes involving the extended LANL family, and it is also the entry point onto NM 502 for Los Alamos County Operations to include the school district and transit vehicles.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗