A flexible OT testbed for evaluating on-device implementations of IEC-61850 GOOSE
Not Available
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Not Available
The Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) is an analytical tool designed to enhance the comprehension of adversarial activity in OT environments. BAM leverages both expert cybersecurity insights and historical data to characterize the likelihood of adversarial behavior given anomalous observable events.
This Equipment Self-Assessment Checklist is designed for asset owners and operators (AOOs) responsible for the deployment, operation, maintenance, or cybersecurity oversight of grid systems and digital energy technologies. It provides a structured inspection checklist for evaluating the security, integrity, and operational trustworthiness of equipment across substations, generation sites, distributed energy resources (DERs), and control environments.
The OT Emulation Data Broker system allows Simulink models to be connected to an emulated control system network. The package includes a Simulink S-Function that allows communication to the data broker via inter process communication; a data broker, which orchestrates communication between the emulated control system network and the simulation; an endpoint, which facilitates communication between the data broker and PLC's on the control network using ModBus/TCP; and an example PLC structured text files that work with OpenPLC, an open source emulated PLC. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-11479 O
SAND2021-11479 O The OT Emulation Data Broker system allows Simulink models to be connected to an emulated control system network. The package includes a Simulink S-Function that allows communication to the data broker via inter process communication; a data broker, which orchestrates communication between the emulated control system network and the simulation; an endpoint, which facilitates communication between the data broker and PLC's on the control network using ModBus/TCP; and an example PLC structured text files that work with OpenPLC, an open source emulated PLC. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.
A major effort at the NASA Lewis Research Center in recent years has been to develop electro-mechanical actuators (EMA's) to replace the hydraulic systems used for thrust vector control (TVC) on launch vehicles. This is an attempt ot overcome the inherent inefficiencies and costs associated with the existing hydraulic structures. General Dynamics Space Systems Division, under contract to NASA Lewis, is developing 18.6 kW (25 hp), 29.8 kW (40 hp), and 52.2 kW (70 hp) peak EMA systems to meet the power demands for TVC on a family of vehicles developed for the National Launch System. These systems utilize a pulse population modulated converter and field-oriented control scheme to obtain independent control of both the voltage and frequency. These techniques allow an induction motor to be operated at its maximum torque at all times. At NASA Lewis, we are building on this technology to develop our own in-house system capable of meeting the peak power requirements for an expendable launch vehicle (ELV) such as the Atlas. Our EMA will be capable of delivering 22.4 kW (30 hp) peak power with a nominal of 6.0 kW (8 hp). This system differs from the previous ones in two areas: (1) the use of advanced control methods, and (2) the incorporation of built-in-test. The advanced controls are essential for minimizing the controller size, while the built-in-test is necessary to enhance the system reliability and vehicle health monitoring. The ultimate goal of this program is to demonstrate an EMA which will be capable of self-test and easy integration into other projects. This paper will describe the effort underway at NASA Lewis to develop an EMA for an Atlas class ELV. An explanation will be given for each major technology block, and the status of each major technology block and the status of the overall program will be reported.
The High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of 3000 - 4000 fb -1 in its lifetime with peak instantaneous luminosities reaching about 5 - 7.5×10 34 cm -2 s -1 . During the Long Shutdown 3 period, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major changes, called Phase-2 upgrades, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC, including the replacement of the entire silicon tracker. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have high radiation tolerance, higher granularity, and the capability to handle higher data rates. Another key feature of the OT will be to provide tracking information to the Level-1 trigger, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made of modules that have two closely spaced sensors read out by the same electronics, which can correlate hits in the two sensors creating short track segments called ”stubs”. The stubs will be used for tracking at 40 MHz. In this contribution, the design of the CMS Phase-2 OT, the technological choices, and highlights of research and development activities are reported.
The High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of $3000-4000\;$fb$^{-1}$ after 10 years of operation with peak instantaneous luminosity reaching about $5-7.5\times10^{34}$cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$. During Long Shutdown 3, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major changes, called Phase-2 upgrades, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC. The current CMS silicon strip tracker has to be replaced with a new detector. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have high radiation tolerance, higher granularity and the capability to handle higher data rates. Another key feature of the OT will be to provide tracking information to the Level-1 trigger, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made out of modules which have two closely spaced sensors read out by front-end ASICs, which can correlate hits in the two sensors creating short track segments, called stubs. The stubs will be used for tracking in the L1 track finder. In this contribution, the design of the CMS Phase-2 OT, the technological choices and first results with prototype devices are reported.
he High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) is expected to deliver an integrated luminosity of $3000-4000$~fb$^{-1}$ after 10 years of operation with peak instantaneous luminosity reaching about $5-7.5\times10^{34}$cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$. During Long Shutdown 3, several components of the CMS detector will undergo major changes, called Phase-2 upgrade, to be able to operate in the challenging environment of the HL-LHC. The current CMS silicon strip tracker has to be replaced with a new detector. The Phase-2 Outer Tracker (OT) will have higher radiation tolerance, higher granularity, and the capability to handle higher data rates compared to the current system. Another key feature of the OT will be to provide tracking information to the Level-1 (L1) trigger, allowing trigger rates to be kept at a sustainable level without sacrificing physics potential. For this, the OT will be made out of modules with two closely spaced sensors read out by front-end ASICs, which can correlate hits in the two sensors creating short track segments called stubs. The stubs will be used for tracking in the L1 track finder. The modules come in two flavors: strip-strip (2S) and pixel-strip (PS), which contain different sensor configurations and multiple ASICs. In this contribution, the design of the CMS Phase-2 OT, the technological choices, and the quality assurance (QA) procedures used to ensure the functionality of the modules will be reported. The contribution will cover the first results with pre-production devices and the different aspects taken into account during the QA: from fulfilling the precision specification of the module assembly procedure to ensuring the proper communication between the different ASICs on the module. The module noise performance is also checked and the full module functionality is verified at different temperatures.
In the field of aeronautics and astronautics, a paradigm shift has been witnessed by those in academia, research and development, and private industry. Long development life cycles and the budgets to support such programs and projects has given way to aggressive task schedules and leaner resources to draw from all the while challenging assigned individuals to create and produce improved products of processes. however, this "faster, better, cheaper" concept cannot merely be applied to the design, development, and test of complex systems such as earth-orbiting of interplanetary robotic spacecraft. Full advantage is not possible without due consideration and application to mission operations planning and flight operations, Equally as important as the flight system, the mission operations system consisting of qualified personnel, ground hardware and software tools, and verified and validated operational processes, should also be regarded as a complex system requiring personnel to draw upon formal education, training, related experiences, and heuristic reasoning in engineering an effective and efficient system. Unquestionably, qualified personnel are the most important elements of a mission operations system. This paper examines the experiences of the Deep Space I Project, the first in a series of new technology in-flight validation missions sponsored by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), specifically, in developing a subsystems analysis and technology validation team comprised of former spacecraft development personnel. Human factor considerations are investigated from initial concept/vision formulation; through operational process development; personnel test and training; to initial uplink product development and test support. Emphasis has been placed on challenges and applied or recommended solutions, so as to provide opportunities for future programs and projects to address and disposition potential issues and concerns as early as possible to reap the benefits associated with learning from other's past experiences.
NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.