Modernization and Scalability Enhancements for Sub‐Nanosecond Accuracy Diagnostic Cross Timing for Use at Current and Future NNSS Testbeds
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97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Overview of the Scorpius Accelerator and the NNSS
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Scott, Evan R.↗
Genetic Diversity in Mitochondrial Cytochrome B Gene and Control Region Sequences of Gopherus agassizii from Nevada National Security Sites (NNSS)
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54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
ADVANCED RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL STAGING: THE ENHANCED STAGING PROGRAM AT NNSS
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Pulciano, Frank J. [Nevada National Security Site/↗
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Precipitation Depth-Duration-Frequency Analysis for the Nevada National Security Site and Surrounding Areas
Accurate precipitation frequency data are important for Environmental Management Soils Activities on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are important for environmental assessments performed for regulatory closure of Soils Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Sites, as well as engineering mitigation designs and post-closure monitoring strategies to assess and minimize potential contaminant migration from Soils CAU Sites. Although the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Atlas 14 (Bonnin et al., 2011) provides precipitation frequency data for the NNSS area, the NNSS-specific observed precipitation data were not consistent with the NOAA Atlas 14 predicted data. This is primarily due to the NOAA Atlas 14 products being produced from analyses without including the approximately 30 NNSS precipitation gage records, several of which approach or exceed 50 year of record. Therefore, a study of precipitation frequency that incorporated the NNSS precipitation gage records into the NOAA Atlas 14 dataset, was performed specifically for the NNSS to derive more accurate site-specific precipitation data products. Precipitation frequency information, such as the depth-duration-frequency (DDF) relationships, are required to generate synthetic standard design storm hydrographs and assess actual precipitation events. In this study, the actual long-term NNSS precipitation gage records, some of which are the longest gage records in southern and central Nevada, were analyzed to allow for more accurate precipitation DDF estimates to be developed for the NNSS. Gridded maps of precipitation frequency for the NNSS and surrounding areas were then produced.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2017
Report submitted to regulators (State of Nevada and EPA Region IV). Required to document compliance with 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since nuclear testing ended in 1992, radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2017, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 5.7% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2017 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the adjacent U.S. Air Force Nevada Test and Training Range; this individual received a dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.0000098 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.
07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions (Calendar Year 2018)
The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons.The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2018, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.1% to a maximum of 5.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2018 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the northern end of Amargosa Valley; this individual received a potential dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000008 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Repatriated Desert Bighorn Sheep Population on the Nevada National Security Site
Ecological studies have been conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) since the 1960s. Desert bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis nelsoni) were considered rare visitors on the NNSS, with only 9 recorded observations between 1963 and 2009, all of which were males. Females and young were not documented definitively until winter 2011, when several were killed by a radio-collared female mountain lion (Puma concolor). Following these observations, we initiated a study of desert bighorn sheep on the NNSS to better understand their movements/interactions with other populations, prevalence of disease, population size, origin, radionuclide burdens and potential radiological dose to humans that may consume harvested animals away from the NNSS. We captured and radio-collared 6 sheep (2 females, 4 males) in November 2015, and 15 (7 females, 8 males) in November 2016. We sampled blood for genetic and disease testing and collected nasal swabs for respiratory disease testing. Sheep from the NNSS spent most of their time around Shoshone Mountain, Fortymile Canyon, and Yucca Mountain but also moved to Bare Mountain, Thirsty Canyon, and Black Mountain. Females greatly expanded their core and overall home ranges during spring, whereas males expanded their home ranges during summer. Of 18 sheep sampled for disease, 12 showed an immune response to Mycoplasma ovipneumoniae, and 5 had the bacteria present. Genetic testing revealed that the ancestry of NNSS sheep is from the Bare Mountain (1991-1995, within 24 km of our study area), Specter Range (1990-1995, within 32 km of our study area), and Stonewall Mountain (1975-1983, within 72 km of our study area) reintroduced populations. Radionuclide burden in NNSS sheep was minimal with no significant difference from sheep captured on the Nevada Test and Training Range and northern Nevada. One marked adult male was legally harvested off the NNSS north of Bare Mountain. Finally, this recently colonized reproducing population of sheep on the NNSS warrants further monitoring, protection, and inclusion in resource management plans.
60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
2018 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Attachment A: Site Description
This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2018. Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
2019 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Attachment A: Site Description
This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2019. Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016, Attachment A: Site Description
This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016 (prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec], 2017). Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.
12-201800↗
Synthesis of Post-fire Monitoring Activities in the Great Basin Desert, Mojave Desert, and Transition Zones
In the deserts of the American Southwest, fire return intervals of centuries to millennia are being replaced by fire return intervals of decades. This increased burn frequency has implications for post-closure management and long-term stewardship for Soils Corrective Action Units (CAUs) and Corrective Action Sites (CASs) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Tonopah Test Range, and Nevada Test and Training Range for which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management-Nevada (EM-NV) is responsible. For many CAUs and CASs, where closure-in-place alternatives were implemented or are being considered, there is a chance that these sites could burn over while they still pose a risk to the environment or human health given the long half-lives of some of the radionuclide contaminants of concern (COCs) (Shafer et al., 2007; Shafer and Gomes, 2009). Although it would have been ideal to conduct a fire-related study at a radionuclide contaminated site on the NNSS to determine how contaminated soils are transported post-fire, it was more practical to examine fires in environments analogous to where Soils Activity CAUs and CASs exist. Therefore, a series of studies were initiated at three radiologically uncontaminated analog sites to better understand the possible effects of wildfire on erosion and sediment transport by wind and water should vegetation at contaminated sites burn at the NNSS. The studies took place at the sites of the Gleason Fire, a prescribed burn that occurred near Ely, Nevada, which is in the Great Basin ecoregion; the White Rock Fire that occurred near Mesquite, Nevada, which is in the Mojave Desert ecoregion; and the Jacob Fire that occurred near Hiko, Nevada, in the transitional zone between the Great Basin Desert and the Mojave Desert. Each site was representative of one of the three ecoregions found on the NNSS. Erosion and vegetation characteristics were measured multiple times post-fire on both burned and unburned test plots at these study sites to compare and monitor the effects of fire over time. However, at the Mojave Desert site, there was an additional burn from nearly 25 years ago that was also compared with the more recent burned areas from 2013. Also, the time elapsed after the fire and the time when sampling began differed among the ecoregions. For example, at the Great Basin site, samples were collected prior to the fire and less than one month after the fire, whereas data collected at the Mojave Desert site did not occur until 22 months after the fire. The differences between the sample measurements and the time that elapsed after the fire may contribute to the variability in the data and the interpretations of the data. Runoff and water erosion were quantified through a series of rainfall and runoff simulation tests in which controlled amounts of water were delivered to the soil surface. Runoff data were collected from different microhabitats (e.g., undercanopies, interspace soils, ridges, and drainage areas). The data showed soil hydrophobicity (i.e., water repellency) on the Great Basin site for up to 12 months after the fire. The soil structure remained changed and weaker on the burned areas compared with the unburned areas for the three-year study period. Although runoff data at both the Great Basin site and transition zone site were highly variable, the post-fire runoff potential did not generally increase at either location after three years of monitoring. Mojave runoff did not differ much between fire ages or between burned and unburned areas, possibly because of the amount of vegetation growing on all three surfaces and because the fire intensity was likely lower relative to other ecoregions due to the amount of space between plants. Additionally, the measurements conducted on the Mojave fire occurred several years after the fire had burned and not within several months of the burn, which may also account for the lack of differences in runoff between burned and unburned locations. Wind erosion was assessed and quantified with a Portable In-Situ Wind ERosion Lab (PI-SWERL) on both the burned and unburned soils of different microhabitats (e.g., ridges, drainages, interspaces between plants, and plant undercanopies). Estimates of emissions (e.g., particulate matter with aerodynamic diameters less than or equal to 10 micrometers, or PM10) at different wind speeds were collected and filter samples were analyzed for chemical composition. The measurements among the fires were similar and the results of the wind erosion measurements indicate that there were seasonal influences on many parameters, but the potential for PM10 windblown dust emissions was higher on burned areas compared with unburned areas. Among the burned areas, drainages produced the most dust emissions, whereas burned ridges were the least emissive. Emissions at the Mojave site and transition zone site were similar between burned and unburned areas approximately three years after the respective fires. Emissions remained much greater on burned soils at the Great Basin site. However, site selection may have also contributed to the differences of emissions among the three study locations. Post-fire vegetation responses were documented for three years following each fire in different microhabitats (e.g., ridge, drainage, undercanopy, and interspace) at the Great Basin and transition zone sites. In 2013, at the Mojave fire site, random permanent plots were established in newly burned areas, areas that burned approximately 25 years ago, and an unburned control area. At each fire site, the regeneration of native plant species dominated the burned areas, but invasive annual grasses were present at each fire site. During the course of each three-year study, the invasive annual grasses increased in density or percentage at both the Great Basin and transition fire sites but not at the Mojave site, where annual invasive grasses remained high throughout the study period. However, the chronosequence data from the Mojave site indicate a transition to different invasive grass species with time. The post-burn vegetation at all three ecoregions is still in the early stages of succession, and shrub size should increase over time and shrub density should decrease over time. However, the recovery of the plant communities to pre-burn compositions may not occur for decades or centuries, or may not occur because of changes in climate and the presence of invasive annual grasses. Results from the three study locations suggested that contaminated soils on the NNSS that experienced wildfire had the potential for soil erosion and transport of contaminated soils. Both wind and soil runoff studies indicated that locations in the Great Basin and transition zone ecoregions were more susceptible to erosion than the Mojave Desert ecoregion, but the highest levels of erosion occurred during the early portions of the study (the first 24 months) and the Mojave Desert was not measured until 22 months after the burn. Additionally, data from the Great Basin indicated deeper soils may increase susceptibility to wind erosion. Historically, the Great Basin and transition zone ecoregions burned more frequently than the Mojave Desert because of fuel abundance and connectivity—and they continue to burn more frequently, particularly after the introduction of invasive grasses (Davies and Nafus, 2013). However, both ecoregions and the transition zone have burned with extensive, high-severity fires when certain weather and fuel conditions are met. For example, the high abundance and productivity of annual grasses and forbs—which are usually produced by above average winter precipitation—combined with early spring and summer warm, dry conditions. Future climate scenarios predict increased temperatures, variable to reduced precipitation, and larger, more extreme wildfires throughout western North America. These predictions suggest that future fires on the NNSS could increase in frequency, intensity, and severity similar to their analog ecosystems throughout the Great Basin and Mojave Desert (Dennison et al., 2014; Abatzoglou andWilliams, 2016; Westerling, 2016).
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Hydrothermal Alteration of Nuclear Melt Glass, Colloid Formation, and Plutonium Mobilization at the Nevada National Security Site, U.S.A.
Approximately 2.8 t of plutonium (Pu) has been deposited in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) subsurface as a result of underground nuclear testing. Most of this Pu is sequestered in nuclear melt glass. However, Pu migration has been observed and attributed to colloid facilitated transport. In this study, to identify the mechanisms controlling Pu mobilization, long-term (~3 year) laboratory nuclear melt glass alteration experiments were performed at 25 to 200 °C to mimic hydrothermal conditions in the vicinity of underground nuclear tests. The clay and zeolite colloids produced in these experiments are similar to those identified in NNSS groundwater. At 200 °C, maximum Pu and colloid concentrations of 30 Bq/L and 150 mg/L, respectively, were observed. However, much lower Pu and colloid concentrations were observed at 25 and 80 °C. These data suggest that Pu concentrations above the drinking water Maximum Contaminant Levels (0.56 Bq/L) may exist during early hydrothermal conditions in the vicinity of underground nuclear tests. However, formation of colloid-associated Pu will tend to decrease with time as nuclear test cavity temperatures decrease. Furthermore, median colloid concentrations in NNSS groundwater (1.8 mg/L) suggest that the high colloid and Pu concentrations observed in our 140 and 200 °C experiments are unlikely to persist in downgradient NNSS groundwater. In conclusion, while our experiments did not span all groundwater and nuclear melt glass conditions that may be present at the NNSS, our results are consistent with the documented low Pu concentrations in NNSS groundwater.
38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
Nevada National Security Site Underground Radionuclide Inventory, 1951-1992: Accounting for Radionuclide Decay through September 30, 2012
This report is an update of report LA-13859-MS (Bowen et al., 2001). In that original report, the underground radionuclide inventory at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was decay corrected to September 23, 1992, the date of the last underground nuclear test at the NNSS. In this report, the inventory is updated to account for the decay of radionuclides over two additional decades (1992-2012) and revised tritium, fission product and actinide inventory figures and tables are presented. The maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides were also updated to Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) (CFR, 2013). Also, a number of minor errata found in the original publication were corrected. An inventory of radionuclides produced by 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NNSS by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 includes tritium, fission products, actinides, and activation products. The inventory presented in this report provides an estimate of radioactivity remaining underground at the NNSS after nuclear testing. The original test inventory is decayed to September 30, 2012, and predictions of inventory decay over the subsequent 1000 years are presented. For the purposes of summary and publication, the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory authors of this report subdivided the inventory into five areas corresponding to the principal geographic test centers at the NNSS. The five areas roughly correspond to Underground Test Area “Corrective Action Units” (CAUs) for remediation of groundwater. In addition, the inventory is further subdivided for the Yucca Flat region by tests where the working point depth is more than 328 feet (100 meters) above the water table and tests that were detonated below that level. Water levels used were those from the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (1997), now called the Nevada Field Office. Curie activities and atoms are reported as of September 30, 2012. This inventory is strictly a compilation of the residual radiologic inventory remaining from the underground nuclear tests conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 and does not include radioactivity from other types of nuclear testing (e.g., atmospheric, reactors, rocket engines). A companion classified report (Miller et al., 2002) contains test-specific data for each test performed at the NNSS. This work has been sponsored by the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Summary 2016
This document is a summary of the full 2016 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/ NFO). This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the full NNSSER. NNSA/NFO prepares the NNSSER to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from potential nonradiological impacts. It is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. The NNSS is currently the nation’s unique site for ongoing national security–related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access as well as by lands that are open to public entry. In 2016, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), was the NNSS Management and Operations Contractor accountable for ensuring work was performed in compliance with environmental regulations. NNSS activities in 2016 continued to be diverse, with the primary goal to ensure that the existing U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons remains safe and reliable. Other activities included weapons of mass destruction first responder training; the controlled release of hazardous material at the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC); remediation of legacy contamination sites; characterization of waste destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or the Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho Falls, Idaho; disposal of low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste; and environmental research. Facilities and centers that support the National Security/Defense mission include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility (DAF), National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located in the DAF, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Facility, Dense Plasma Focus (DPF) Facility located in the Los Alamos Technical Facility (LATF), and the Radiological/ Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (RNCTEC). Facilities that support the Environmental Management mission include the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS), which has been in cold standby since 2006.
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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2017-Attachment A: Site Description
This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2017 . Included are subsections that This volume of the three-part report summarizes the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the Nevada National Security Site. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗