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NASA NTRS2009

Characteristics of Whipple Shield Performance in the Shatter Regime

Between the onset of projectile fragmentation and the assumption of rear wall failure due to an impulsive load, multi-wall ballistic limit equations are linearly interpolated to provide reasonable yet conservative predictions of perforation thresholds with conveniently simple mathematics. Although low velocity and hypervelocity regime predictions are based on analytical expressions, there is no such scientific foundation for predictions in the intermediate (or shatter) regime. As the debris flux in low earth orbit (LEO) becomes increasingly dominated by manmade pollution, the profile of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk shifts continually towards lower velocities. For the International Space Station (ISS), encounter velocities below 7 km/s now constitute approximately 50% of the penetration risk. Considering that the transition velocity from shatter to hypervelocity impact regimes described by common ballistic limit equations (e.g. new non-optimum Whipple shield equation [1]) occurs at 7 km/s, 50% of station risk is now calculated based on failure limit equations with little analytical foundation. To investigate projectile and shield behavior for impact conditions leading to projectile fragmentation and melt, a series of hypervelocity impact tests have been performed on aluminum Whipple shields. In the experiments projectile diameter, bumper thickness, and shield spacing were kept constant, while rear wall thickness was adjusted to determine spallation and perforation limits at various impact velocities and angles. The results, shown in Figure 1 for normal and 45 impacts, demonstrated behavior that was not sufficiently described by the simplified linear interpolation of the NNO equation (also shown in Figure 1). Hopkins et al. [2] investigated the performance of a nominally-identical aluminum Whipple shield, identifying the effects of phase change in the shatter regime. The results (conceptually represented in Figure 2) were found to agree well with those obtained in this study at normal incidence, suggesting that shielding performance in the shatter regime could be well described by considering more complex phase conditions than currently implemented in most BLEs. Furthermore, evidence of these phase effects were found in the oblique test results, providing the basis for an empirical description of these effects that can be applied in MMOD risk assessment software. In this paper, results of the impact experiments are presented, and characteristics of target damage are evaluated. A comparison of intermediate velocity impact failure mechanisms in current BLEs are discussed and compared to the findings of the experimental study. Risk assessment calculations have been made on a simplified structure using currently implemented penetration equations and predicted limits from the experimental program, and the variation in perceived mission risk is discussed. It was found that ballistic limit curves that explicitly incorporated phase change effects within the intermediate regime lead to a decrease in predicted MMOD risk for ISS-representative orbits. When considered for all Whipple-based shielding configurations onboard the ISS, intermediate phase change effects could lead to significant variations in predicted mission risk.

Ryan, Shannon↗

NASA NTRS2009

Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Threats to NASA's Docking Seals: Initial Assessment and Methodology

The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) will be exposed to the Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) during missions to the International Space Station (ISS) and to the micrometeoroid environment during lunar missions. The CEV will be equipped with a docking system which enables it to connect to ISS and the lunar module known as Altair; this docking system includes a hatch that opens so crew and supplies can pass between the spacecrafts. This docking system is known as the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) and uses a silicone rubber seal to seal in cabin air. The rubber seal on LIDS presses against a metal flange on ISS (or Altair). All of these mating surfaces are exposed to the space environment prior to docking. The effects of atomic oxygen, ultraviolet and ionizing radiation, and MMOD have been estimated using ground based facilities. This work presents an initial methodology to predict meteoroid and orbital debris threats to candidate docking seals being considered for LIDS. The methodology integrates the results of ground based hypervelocity impacts on silicone rubber seals and aluminum sheets, risk assessments of the MMOD environment for a variety of mission scenarios, and candidate failure criteria. The experimental effort that addressed the effects of projectile incidence angle, speed, mass, and density, relations between projectile size and resulting crater size, and relations between crater size and the leak rate of candidate seals has culminated in a definition of the seal/flange failure criteria. The risk assessment performed with the BUMPER code used the failure criteria to determine the probability of failure of the seal/flange system and compared the risk to the allotted risk dictated by NASA's program requirements.

deGroh, Henry C., III↗

NASA NTRS2009

Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Threats to NASA's Docking Seals: Initial Assessment and Methodology

deGroh, Henry C., III↗

NASA NTRS2009

Honeycomb vs. Foam: Evaluating a Potential Upgrade to ISS Module Shielding for Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris

The presence of a honeycomb core in a multi-wall shielding configuration for protection against micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle impacts at hypervelocity is generally considered to be detrimental as the cell walls act to restrict fragment cloud expansion, creating a more concentrated load on the shield rear wall. However, mission requirements often prevent the inclusion of a dedicated MMOD shield, and as such, structural honeycomb sandwich panels are amongst the most prevalent shield types. Open cell metallic foams are a relatively new material with novel mechanical and thermal properties that have shown promising results in preliminary hypervelocity impact shielding evaluations. In this study, an ISS-representative MMOD shielding configuration has been modified to evaluate the potential performance enhancement gained through the substitution of honeycomb for open cell foam. The baseline shielding configuration consists of a double mesh outer layer, two honeycomb sandwich panels, and an aluminum rear wall. In the modified configuration the two honeycomb cores are replaced by open-cell foam. To compensate for the heavier core material, facesheets have been removed from the second sandwich panel in the modified configuration. A total of 19 tests on the double layer honeycomb and double layer foam configurations are reported. For comparable mechanical and thermal performance, the foam modifications were shown to provide a 15% improvement in critical projectile diameter at low velocities (i.e. 3 km/s) and a 3% increase at high velocities (i.e. 7 km/s) for normal impact. With increasing obliquity, the performance enhancement was predicted to increase, up to a 29% improvement at 60 (low velocity). Ballistic limit equations have been developed for the new configuration, and consider the mass of each individual shield component in order to maintain validity in the event of minor configuration modifications. Previously identified weaknesses of open cell foams for hypervelocity impact shielding such as large projectile diameters, low velocities, and high degrees of impact obliquity have all been investigated, and found to be negligible for the double-layer configuration.

Ryan, Shannon↗

NASA NTRS2011

Summary of the Workshop to Identify Gaps and Possible Directions for NASA's Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Programs

The panels presented at the workshop in the following order: 1. Panel on NASA Meteoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Programs, 2. Panel on NASA Mission Operators, 3. Panel on the Role of NASA s MMOD Programs and Their Relationship to Other Federal Agencies, 4. Panel on MMOD and the Commercial Industry Perspective, and 5. Panel on Orbital Debris Retrieval and Removal.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2014

Human Exploration Science Office (KX) Overview

The Human Exploration Science Office supports human spaceflight, conducts research, and develops technology in the areas of space orbital debris, hypervelocity impact technology, image science and analysis, remote sensing, imagery integration, and human and robotic exploration science. NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) resides in the Human Exploration Science Office. ODPO provides leadership in orbital debris research and the development of national and international space policy on orbital debris. The office is recognized internationally for its measurement and modeling of the debris environment. It takes the lead in developing technical consensus across U.S. agencies and other space agencies on debris mitigation measures to protect users of the orbital environment. The Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) project evaluates the risks to spacecraft posed by micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD). HVIT facilities at JSC and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) use light gas guns, diagnostic tools, and high-speed imagery to quantify the response of spacecraft materials to MMOD impacts. Impact tests, with debris environment data provided by ODPO, are used by HVIT to predict risks to NASA and commercial spacecraft. HVIT directly serves NASA crew safety with MMOD risk assessments for each crewed mission and research into advanced shielding design for future missions. The Image Science and Analysis Group (ISAG) supports the International Space Station (ISS) and commercial spaceflight through the design of imagery acquisition schemes (ground- and vehicle-based) and imagery analyses for vehicle performance assessments and mission anomaly resolution. ISAG assists the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Program in the development of camera systems for the Orion spacecraft that will serve as data sources for flight test objectives that lead to crewed missions. The multi-center Imagery Integration Team is led by the Human Exploration Science Office and provides expertise in the application of engineering imagery to spaceflight. The team links NASA programs and private industry with imagery capabilities developed and honed through decades of human spaceflight, including imagery integration, imaging assets, imagery data management, and photogrammetric analysis. The team is currently supporting several NASA programs, including commercial demonstration missions. The Earth Science and Remote Sensing Team is responsible for integrating the scientific use of Earth-observation assets onboard the ISS, which consist of externally mounted sensors and crew photography capabilities. This team facilitates collaboration on remote sensing and participates in research with academic organizations and other Government agencies, not only in conjunction with ISS science, but also for planetary exploration and regional environmental/geological studies. Human exploration science focuses on science strategies for future human exploration missions to the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and beyond. This function provides communication and coordination between the science community and mission planners. ARES scientists support the operation of robotic missions (i.e., Mars Exploration Rovers and the Mars Science Laboratory), contribute to the interpretation of returned mission data, and translate robotic mission technologies and techniques to human spaceflight.

Calhoun, Tracy A.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Bumper 3 Update for IADC Protection Manual

The Bumper code has been the standard in use by NASA and contractors to perform meteoroid/debris risk assessments since 1990. It has undergone extensive revisions and updates [NASA JSC HITF website; Christiansen et al., 1992, 1997]. NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied BUMPER to risk assessments for Space Station, Shuttle, Mir, Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) space suits, and other spacecraft (e.g., LDEF, Iridium, TDRS, and Hubble Space Telescope). Bumper continues to be updated with changes in the ballistic limit equations describing failure threshold of various spacecraft components, as well as changes in the meteoroid and debris environment models. Significant efforts are expended to validate Bumper and benchmark it to other meteoroid/debris risk assessment codes. Bumper 3 is a refactored version of Bumper II. The structure of the code was extensively modified to improve maintenance, performance and flexibility. The architecture was changed to separate the frequently updated ballistic limit equations from the relatively stable common core functions of the program. These updates allow NASA to produce specific editions of the Bumper 3 that are tailored for specific customer requirements. The core consists of common code necessary to process the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment models, assess shadowing and calculate MMOD risk. The library of target response subroutines includes a board range of different types of MMOD shield ballistic limit equations as well as equations describing damage to various spacecraft subsystems or hardware (thermal protection materials, windows, radiators, solar arrays, cables, etc.). The core and library of ballistic response subroutines are maintained under configuration control. A change in the core will affect all editions of the code, whereas a change in one or more of the response subroutines will affect all editions of the code that contain the particular response subroutines which are modified. Note that the Bumper II program is no longer maintained or distributed by NASA.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Design Optimisation and Mass Saving of the Structure of the Orion-MPCV European Service Module

This paper presents an overview of the design optimisation measures that have been proposed and analysed in order to reduce the mass of the structure, including the MMOD (Micro-Meteoroid and Orbital Debris) protection system, of the ESM (European Service Module) for the “Orion” MPCV (Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle). Under an agreement between NASA and ESA, the NASA Orion MPCV for human space exploration missions will be powered by a European Service Module, based on the design and experience of the ATV (Automated Transfer Vehicle). The development and qualification of the European Service Module is managed and implemented by ESA. The ESM prime contractor and system design responsible is Airbus Defence and Space. Thales Alenia Space Italia is responsible for the design and integration of the ESM Structure and MMOD protection system in addition to the Thermal Control System and the Consumable Storage System. The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle is a pressurized, crewed spacecraft that transports up to four crew members from the Earth’s surface to a nearby destination or staging point. Orion then brings the crew members safely back to the Earth’s surface at the end of the mission. Orion provides all services necessary to support the crew members while on-board for short duration missions (up to 21 days) or until they are transferred to another orbiting habitat. The ESM supports the crew module from launch through separation prior to re-entry by providing: in-space propulsion capability for orbital transfer, attitude control, and high altitude ascent aborts; water and oxygen/nitrogen needed for a habitable environment; and electrical power generation. In addition, it maintains the temperature of the vehicle's systems and components and offers space for unpressurized cargo and scientific payloads. The ESM has been designed for the first 2 Lunar orbit missions, EM-1 (Exploration mission 1) is an un-crewed flight planned around mid-2020, and EM-2, the first crewed flight, is planned in 2022. At the time where the first ESM is about to be weighted, the predicted mass lies slightly above the initial requirement. For future builds, mass reduction of the Service Module has been considered necessary. This is being investigated, together with other design improvements, in order to consolidate the ESM design and increase possible future missions beyond the first two Orion MPCV missions. The mass saving study has introduced new optimised structural concepts, optimisation of the MMOD protection shields, and optimised redesign of parts for manufacturing through AM (Additive Manufacturing).

Micro-Meteroids and Orbital Debris Protection Syst↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Application of Stuffed Whipple Shield to Robotic Spacecraft

Protection of human life onboard the International Space Station (ISS) requires reinforced shielding of crewed modules to prevent penetration of micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD), while optimizing the necessary mass for that application. An efficient way to achieve that protection consists in combining metal plates with ceramic and Kevlar fabrics in critical areas, a configuration known as the “Stuffed Whipple Shield”. In robotic spacecraft, fuel tanks are particularly vulnerable to MMOD impacts due to their pressurized contents and thin walls. Risk assessment of the Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem (PACE) spacecraft using the Bumper3-Sat hypervelocity impact simulation tool demonstrated that the risk of propulsion tank damage due to MMOD particles coming from the ram direction (Launch Vehicle Adapter side) violated NASA requirements to limit the generation of orbital debris and threatened mission success. To mitigate the risk and achieve compliance, the basic configuration of the ISS Stuffed Whipple shield was scaled down and adapted to become a tank shield in the spacecraft ram direction. This paper will describe the adaptation of the ISS Stuffed Shield to a robotic spacecraft, while also comparing the effectiveness of the proposed shield design with more traditional single-wall and double-wall alternatives used in robotic spacecraft under similar conditions.

Ivonne M. Rodriguez↗

DOE OSTI2023

Remote Sensing Low Signal-to-Noise-Ratio Target Detection Enhancement

In real-time remote sensing application, frames of data are continuously flowing into the processing system. The capability of detecting objects of interest and tracking them as they move is crucial to many critical surveillance and monitoring missions. Detecting small objects using remote sensors is an ongoing, challenging problem. Since object(s) are located far away from the sensor, the target’s Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (SNR) is low. The Limit of Detection (LOD) for remote sensors is bounded by what is observable on each image frame. In this paper, we present a new method, a “Multi-frame Moving Object Detection System (MMODS)”, to detect small, low SNR objects that are beyond what a human can observe in a single video frame. This is demonstrated by using simulated data where our technology-detected objects are as small as one pixel with a targeted SNR, close to 1:1. We also demonstrate a similar improvement using live data collected with a remote camera. The MMODS technology fills a major technology gap in remote sensing surveillance applications for small target detection. Our method does not require prior knowledge about the environment, pre-labeled targets, or training data to effectively detect and track slow- and fast-moving targets, regardless of the size or the distance.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

NASA NTRS2024

Residual Strength of Hypervelocity Impacted Silica

Windows in the International Space Station (ISS) are subject to ongoing micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage. The reliability of the windows is ensured by monitoring of damage, life prediction, and measurement of the residual strength of man-made and natural hypervelocity impacted window materials. Information on the residual strength of man-made craters and MMOD craters harvested from space shuttle windows was used to estimate strength as a function of damage dimensions and thereby derive design allowables for U.S. and Russian fused silicas used in the ISS. An effect of impact angle is apparent, with 0° impacts exhibiting the lowest strength for Russian quartz-derived silica. The crater morphology for fused silica consists of a central pit, crush zone, shallow rings, and radial cracks dividing shallow, petal-like lateral cracks (petaloids). The morphology of alkaline glass differs from that of fused silica, with a more distinct pit and pulverized region, and bell-shaped and tail-like features below the pit.

International space station,↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Preliminary Experimental Investigation of Multi-Shock Shield Performance Against Meteoritic Other Lithic Projectiles

The protection capabilities of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shields are invariably linked to the physical properties of the impactor. Regardless of the shield type, or bumper material employed, the general principles of purposefully designed multi-walled MMOD protection relies on the ability to disrupt, shock, melt, and/or vaporize the projectile before it interacts with a critical spacecraft component. Here, we begin to study the influence of projectile heterogeneity on the performance of multi-shock shields by conducting hypervelocity impact tests using meteorite and a variety of other rock-like (i.e., lithic) materials. Testing was conducted using a .17 caliber two-stage light-gas gun, launching cylindrical lithic projectiles between 5.66 and 7.06 km/s. Shield layups included three layers of Nextel and one layer of graphite composite as a rear wall, with each layer having a 35 mm standoff. After testing a comparison of rear wall and witness plate damage was made to separate tests conducted using spherical Al projectiles of similar mass. It was observed that the more heterogenous meteorite projectile gave rise to notably more damage to the witness plate than an Al projectile of equivalent mass, while the other, more homogeneous lithic projectiles, did not.

meteorite↗

NASA NTRS2005

Uncertainty Considerations for Ballistic Limit Equations

The overall risk for any spacecraft system is typically determined using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A PRA determines the overall risk associated with a particular mission by factoring in all known risks to the spacecraft during its mission. The threat to mission and human life posed by the micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment is one of the risks. NASA uses the BUMPER II program to provide point estimate predictions of MMOD risk for the Space Shuttle and the ISS. However, BUMPER II does not provide uncertainty bounds or confidence intervals for its predictions. In this paper, we present possible approaches through which uncertainty bounds can be developed for the various damage prediction and ballistic limit equations encoded within the Shuttle and Station versions of BUMPER II.

Schonberg, W. P.↗

NASA NTRS2005

NASA Ames Arc Jets and Range, Capabilities for Planetary Entry

NASA is pursuing innovative technologies and concepts as part of America's Vision for Space Exploration. The rapidly emerging field of nanotechnology has led to new concepts for multipurpose shields to prevent catastrophic loss of vehicles and crew against the triple threats of aeroheating during atmospheric entry, radiation (Solar and galactic cosmic rays) and Micrometorid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) strikes. One proposed concept is the Thermal Radiation Impact Protection System (TRIPS) using carbon nanotubes, hydrogenated carbon nanotubes, and ceramic coatings as a multi-use TPS. The Thermophysics Facilities Branch of the Space Technology Division at NASA Ames Research Center provides testing services for the development and validation of the present and future concepts being developed by NASA and national and International research firms. The Branch operates two key facilities - the Range Complex and the Arc Jets. The Ranges include both the Ames Vertical Gun Range (AVGR) and the Hypervelocity Free Flight (HFF) gas guns best suited for MMOD investigations. Test coupons can be installed in the AVGR or HFF and subjected to particle impacts from glass or metal particles from micron to _ inch (6.35-mm) diameters and at velocities from 5 to 8 kilometers per second. The facility can record high-speed data on film and provide damage assessment for analysis by the Principle Investigator or Ames personnel. Damaged articles can be installed in the Arc Jet facility for further testing to quantify the effects of damage on the heat shield s performance upon entry into atmospheric environments.

Fretter, Ernest F.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Hypervelocity Impact Evaluation of Metal Foam Core Sandwich Structures

A series of hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were conducted by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF) [1], building 267 (Houston, Texas) between January 2003 and December 2005 to test the HVI performance of metal foams, as compared to the metal honeycomb panels currently in service. The HITF testing was conducted at the NASA JSC White Sands Testing Facility (WSTF) at Las Cruces, New Mexico. Eric L. Christiansen, Ph.D., and NASA Lead for Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) Protection requested these hypervelocity impact tests as part of shielding research conducted for the JSC Center Director Discretionary Fund (CDDF) project. The structure tested is a metal foam sandwich structure; a metal foam core between two metal facesheets. Aluminum and Titanium metals were tested for foam sandwich and honeycomb sandwich structures. Aluminum honeycomb core material is currently used in Orbiter Vehicle (OV) radiator panels and in other places in space structures. It has many desirable characteristics and performs well by many measures, especially when normalized by density. Aluminum honeycomb does not perform well in Hypervelocity Impact (HVI) Testing. This is a concern, as honeycomb panels are often exposed to space environments, and take on the role of Micrometeoroid / Orbital Debris (MMOD) shielding. Therefore, information on possible replacement core materials which perform adequately in all necessary functions of the material would be useful. In this report, HVI data is gathered for these two core materials in certain configurations and compared to gain understanding of the metal foam HVI performance.

Yasensky, John↗

NASA NTRS2009

Hypervelocity Impacts on ISS Handrails and Evaluation of Alternative Materials to Prevent Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) Glove Damage During EVA

During post-flight processing of STS-116, damage to crewmember Robert Curbeam's Phase VI Glove Thermal Micrometeoroid Garment was discovered. This damage consisted of: loss of RTV-157 palm pads on the thumb area on the right glove, a 0.75 inch cut in the Vectran adjacent to the seam and thumb pad (single event cut), constituting the worst glove damage ever recorded for the U.S. space program. The underlying bladder and restraint were found not be damaged by this event. Evaluation of glove damage found that the outer Vectran fibers were sliced as a result of contact with a sharp edge or pinch point rather than general wear or abrasion (commonly observed on the RTV pads). Damage to gloves was also noted on STS-118 and STS-120. One potential source of EMU glove damages are sharp crater lips on external handrails, generated by micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts. In this paper, the results of a hypervelocity impact (HVI) test program on representative and actual ISS handrails are presented. These tests were performed in order to characterize impact damage profiles on ISS handrails and evaluate alternatives for limiting risk to future missions. It was determined that both penetrating and non-penetrating MMOD impacts on aluminum and steel ISS handrails are capable of generating protruding crater profiles which exceed the heights required for EMU glove abrasion risk by an order of magnitude. Testing demonstrated that flexible overwraps attached to the outside of existing handrails are capable of limiting contact between hazardous crater formations and crewmember gloves during extravehicular activity (EVA). Additionally, replacing metallic handrails with high strength, low ductility, fiber reinforced composite materials would limit the formation of protruding crater lips on new ISS modules.

Ryan, Shannon↗

NASA NTRS2009

Development and Evaluation of the Next Generation of Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Shields

Recent events such as the Chinese anti-satellite missile test in January 2007 and the collision between a Russian Cosmos satellite and US Iridium satellite in February 2009 are responsible for a rapid increase in the population of orbital debris in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Without active debris removal strategies the debris population in key orbits will continue to increase, requiring enhanced shielding capabilities to maintain allowable penetration risks. One of the more promising developments in recent years for meteoroid and orbital debris shielding (MMOD) is the application of open cell foams. Although shielding onboard the International Space Station is the most capable ever flown, the most proficient configuration (stuffed Whipple shield) requires an additional ~30% of the shielding mass for non-ballistic requirements (e.g. stiffeners, fasteners, etc.). Open cell foam structures provide similar mechanical performance to more traditional structural components such as honeycomb sandwich panels, as well as improved projectile fragmentation and melting as a result of repeated shocking by foam ligaments. In this paper, the preliminary results of an extensive hypervelocity impact test program on next generation MMOD shielding configurations incorporating open-cell metallic foams are reported.

Christiansen, E.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Investigation of Orbital Debris Impacts on Shuttle Radiator Panels

This paper documents the data collected from two hypervelocity micro-meteoroid orbital debris (MMOD) impact events where the shuttle payload bay door radiator sandwich panel was completely perforated. Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy-Dispersive x-ray Spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) analysis of impact residue provided evidence to identify the source of each impact. Impact site features that indicate projectile directionality are discussed, along with hypervelocity impact testing on representative samples conducted to simulate the impact event. The paper provides results of a study of impact risks for the size of particles that caused the MMOD damage and the regions of the orbiter vehicle that would be vulnerable to an equivalent projectile

Hyde, James L.↗