Results for “List mode” — Page 7

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/remote manipulator system subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the results of the independent analysis of the EPD and C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control, and stow or guillotine and jettison two (one port and one starboard) RMSs. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem is subdivided into the four following functional divisions: Remote Manipulator Arm; Manipulator Deploy Control; Manipulator Latch Control; Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison; and Retention Arm Jettison. The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/RMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Robinson, W. W.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 5

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 5 contains detailed analysis and superseded analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1973

Thesaurus of terms for information on mechanics of structural failure

A Thesaurus of approximately 700 subject terms used to describe the six problem areas in the mechanics of structural failure is presented. The initial criteria for the selection of terms are their significance and frequency of use in the literature describing the mechanics of structural failure. The purpose of the Thesaurus is to provide the Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute a list of key works and identifiers that afford effective retrieval of information regarding failure modes and mechanisms for aerospace structures. The Thesaurus includes both a conventional listing of subject terms and a Key Words In Context (KWIC) listing.

Carpenter, J. L., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.

Saiidi, Mo J.↗

NASA NTRS1973

Computer Programs for Calculating and Plotting the Stability Characteristics of a Balloon Tethered in a Wind

Computer programs for calculating the stability characteristics of a balloon tethered in a steady wind are presented. Equilibrium conditions, characteristic roots, and modal ratios are calculated for a range of discrete values of velocity for a fixed tether-line length. Separate programs are used: (1) to calculate longitudinal stability characteristics, (2) to calculate lateral stability characteristics, (3) to plot the characteristic roots versus velocity, (4) to plot the characteristic roots in root-locus form, (5) to plot the longitudinal modes of motion, and (6) to plot the lateral modes for motion. The basic equations, program listings, and the input and output data for sample cases are presented, with a brief discussion of the overall operation and limitations. The programs are based on a linearized, stability-derivative type of analysis, including balloon aerodynamics, apparent mass, buoyancy effects, and static forces which result from the tether line.

Bennett, R. M.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Manual for obscuration code with space station applications

The Obscuration Code, referred to as SHADOW, is a user-oriented computer code to determine the case shadow of an antenna in a complex environment onto the far zone sphere. The surrounding structure can be composed of multiple composite cone frustums and multiply sided flat plates. These structural pieces are ideal for modeling space station configurations. The means of describing the geometry input is compatible with the NEC-BASIC Scattering Code. In addition, an interactive mode of operation has been provided for DEC VAX computers. The first part of this document is a user's manual designed to give a description of the method used to obtain the shadow map, to provide an overall view of the operation of the computer code, to instruct a user in how to model structures, and to give examples of inputs and outputs. The second part is a code manual that details how to set up the interactive and non-interactive modes of the code and provides a listing and brief description of each of the subroutines.

Marhefka, R. J.↗

NASA NTRS2002

A Study of Imaging Interferometer Simulators

Several new space science mission concepts under development at NASA-GSFC for astronomy are intended to carry out synthetic imaging using Michelson interferometers or direct (Fizeau) imaging with sparse apertures. Examples of these mission concepts include the Stellar Imager (SI), the Space Infrared Interferometric Telescope (SPIRIT), the Submillimeter Probe of the Evolution of Cosmic Structure (SPECS), and the Fourier-Kelvin Stellar Interferometer (FKSI). We have been developing computer-based simulators for these missions. These simulators are aimed at providing a quantitative evaluation of the imaging capabilities of the mission by modelling the performance on different realistic targets in terms of sensitivity, angular resolution, and dynamic range. Both Fizeau and Michelson modes of operation can be considered. Our work is based on adapting a computer simulator called imSIM, which was initially written for the Space Interferometer Mission in order to simulate the imaging mode of new missions such as those listed. In a recent GSFC-funded study we have successfully written a preliminary version of a simulator SISIM for the Stellar Imager and carried out some preliminary studies with it. In a separately funded study we have also been applying these methods to SPECS/SPIRIT.

Allen, Ronald J.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Study of the Imaging Capabilities of SPIRIT/SPECS Concept Interferometers

Several new space science mission concepts under development at NASA-GSFC for astronomy are intended to carry out synthetic imaging using Michelson interferometers or direct (Fizeau) imaging with sparse apertures. Examples of these mission concepts include the Stellar Imager (SI), the Space Infrared Interferometric Telescope (SPIRIT), the Submillimeter Probe of the Evolution of Cosmic Structure (SPECS), and the Fourier-Kelvin Stellar Interferometer (FKSI). We have been developing computer-based simulators for these missions. These simulators are aimed at providing a quantitative evaluation of the imaging capabilities of the mission by modeling the performance on different realistic targets in terms of sensitivity, angular resolution, and dynamic range. Both Fizeau and Michelson modes of operation can be considered. Our work is based on adapting a computer simulator called imSIM which was initially written for the Space Interferometer Mission in order to simulate the imaging mode of new missions such as those listed. This report covers the activities we have undertaken to provide a preliminary version of a simulator for the SPIRIT mission concept.

Allen, Ronald J.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Engineering and Safety Partnership Enhances Safety of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP)

Project Management must use the risk assessment documents (RADs) as tools to support their decision making process. Therefore, these documents have to be initiated, developed, and evolved parallel to the life of the project. Technical preparation and safety compliance of these documents require a great deal of resources. Updating these documents after-the-fact not only requires substantial increase in resources - Project Cost -, but this task is also not useful and perhaps an unnecessary expense. Hazard Reports (HRs), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs), Critical Item Lists (CILs), Risk Management process are, among others, within this category. A positive action resulting from a strong partnership between interested parties is one way to get these documents and related processes and requirements, released and updated in useful time. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) at the Marshall Space Flight Center has implemented a process which is having positive results and gaining acceptance within the Agency. A hybrid Panel, with equal interest and responsibilities for the two larger organizations, Safety and Engineering, is the focal point of this process. Called the Marshall Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), its charter (Space Shuttle Program Directive 110 F, April 15, 2005), and its Operating Control Plan emphasizes the technical and safety responsibilities over the program risk documents: HRs; FMEA/CILs; Engineering Changes; anomalies/problem resolutions and corrective action implementations, and trend analysis. The MSERP has undertaken its responsibilities with objectivity, assertiveness, dedication, has operated with focus, and has shown significant results and promising perspectives. The MSERP has been deeply involved in propulsion systems and integration, real time technical issues and other relevant reviews, since its conception. These activities have transformed the propulsion MSERP in a truly participative and value added panel, making a difference for the safety of the Space Shuttle Vehicle, its crew, and personnel. Because of the MSERP's valuable contribution to the assessment of safety risk for the SSP, this paper also proposes an enhanced Panel concept that takes this successful partnership concept to a higher level of 'true partnership'. The proposed panel is aimed to be responsible for the review and assessment of all risk relative to Safety for new and future aerospace and related programs.

Duarte, Alberto↗

NASA NTRS1988

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for the Space Shuttle solid rocket motor

The recertification of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) and Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) has included an extensive rewriting of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The evolution of the groundrules and methodology used in the analysis is discussed and compared to standard FMEA techniques. Especially highlighted are aspects of the FMEA/CIL which are unique to the analysis of an SRM. The criticality category definitions are presented and the rationale for assigning criticality is presented. The various data required by the CIL and contribution of this data to the retention rationale is also presented. As an example, the FMEA and CIL for the SRM nozzle assembly is discussed in detail. This highlights some of the difficulties associated with the analysis of a system with the unique mission requirements of the Space Shuttle.

Russell, D. L.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): CIL issues resolution report, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. The NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed is believed to be technically accurate and complete. No assessment issues remain that has safety implications. Volume 1 contain worksheets for the following sybsystems: Landing and Deceleration Subsystem; Purge, Vent and Drain Subsystem; Active Thermal Control and Life Support Systems; Crew Equipment Subsystem; Instrumentation Subsystem; Data Processing Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem; Hydraulics and Water Spray Boiler Subsystem; and Mechanical Actuation Subsystem.

Urbanowicz, Kenneth J.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): CIL issues resolution report, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes And Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. Volume 2 contains the worksheets for the following subsystems: Nose Wheel Steering Subsystem; Remote Manipulator Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Subsystem; Extravehicular Mobility Unit Subsystem; Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Subsystem; Main Propulsion Subsystem; and Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) CIL issues resolution report, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment workshets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue rsolution and rationale. Volume 3 contains the worksheets for the Reaction Control Subsystem and the Communications and Tracking Subsystem.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2015

A Tool for Model-Based Generation of Scenario-driven Electric Power Load Profiles

Power consumption during all phases of spacecraft flight is of great interest to the aerospace community. As a result, significant analysis effort is exerted to understand the rates of electrical energy generation and consumption under many operational scenarios of the system. Previously, no standard tool existed for creating and maintaining a power equipment list (PEL) of spacecraft components that consume power, and no standard tool existed for generating power load profiles based on this PEL information during mission design phases. This paper presents the Scenario Power Load Analysis Tool (SPLAT) as a model-based systems engineering tool aiming to solve those problems. SPLAT is a plugin for MagicDraw (No Magic, Inc.) that aids in creating and maintaining a PEL, and also generates a power and temporal variable constraint set, in Maple language syntax, based on specified operational scenarios. The constraint set can be solved in Maple to show electric load profiles (i.e. power consumption from loads over time). SPLAT creates these load profiles from three modeled inputs: 1) a list of system components and their respective power modes, 2) a decomposition hierarchy of the system into these components, and 3) the specification of at least one scenario, which consists of temporal constraints on component power modes. In order to demonstrate how this information is represented in a system model, a notional example of a spacecraft planetary flyby is introduced. This example is also used to explain the overall functionality of SPLAT, and how this is used to generate electric power load profiles. Lastly, a cursory review of the usage of SPLAT on the Cold Atom Laboratory project is presented to show how the tool was used in an actual space hardware design application.

power load profile↗