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This slide presentation reviews the lessons learned from the Constellation Program (CxP) and identified several factors that contributed to the inability of the CxP to meet the cost and schedule commitments. The review includes a significant section on the context in which the CxP operated since new programs are likely to experience the same constraints.
This paper describes the design, testing, and lessons learned during the development of the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) Beam Steering Mechanism (BSM). The BSM is a 2 degree-of-freedom tip-tilt mechanism for the purpose of pointing a flat mirror to tightly control the co-alignment of the transmitted laser and the receiver telescope of the ATLAS instrument. The high resolution needs of the mission resulted in sub-arcsecond pointing and knowledge requirements, which have been met. Development of the methodology to verify performance required significant effort. The BSM will fly as part of the Ice, Cloud, and Elevation Satellite II Mission (ICESat II), which is scheduled to be launched in 2017. The ICESat II primary mission is to map the earth's surface topography for the determination of seasonal changes of ice sheet thickness and vegetation canopy thickness to establish long-term trends.
This paper describes the design, testing, and lessons learned during the development of the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) Beam Steering Mechanism (BSM). The BSM is a 2 degree-of-freedom tip-tilt mechanism for the purpose of pointing a flat mirror to tightly control the co-alignment of the transmitted laser and the receiver telescope of the ATLAS instrument. High resolution needs of the mission resulted in sub-arcsecond pointing and knowledge requirements, which have been met. Development of methodology to verify performance was a significant effortadvancement. The BSM will fly as part of the Ice, Cloud, and Elevation Satellite 2 Mission (ICESat 2), which is scheduled to be launched in 2017. The ICESat 2 primary mission is to map the earths surface topography for the determination of seasonal changes of ice sheet thickness as well as vegetation canopy thickness.
This paper describes the design, testing, and lessons learned during the development of the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) Beam Steering Mechanism (BSM). The BSM is a 2 degree-of-freedom tip-tilt mechanism for the purpose of pointing a flat mirror to tightly control the co-alignment of the transmitted laser and the receiver telescope of the ATLAS instrument. The high resolution needs of the mission resulted in sub-arcsecond pointing and knowledge requirements, which have been met. Development of the methodology to verify performance required significant effort. The BSM will fly as part of the Ice, Cloud, and Elevation Satellite II Mission (ICESat II), which is scheduled to be launched in 2017. The ICESat II primary mission is to map the Earth's surface topography for the determination of seasonal changes of ice sheet thickness and vegetation canopy thickness to establish long-term trends.
Overview - Goals of OVERFLOW GPU Port - Miniapps - Lessons Learned - Current Status - What is Coming
This paper provides an overview of Optical Payload for Lasercomm Science (OPALS) activities and lessons learned during mission operations. Activities described cover the periods of commissioning, prime, and extended mission operations, during which primary and secondary mission objectives were achieved for demonstrating space-to-ground optical communications. Lessons learned cover Mission Operations System topics in areas of: architecture verification and validation, staffing, mission support area, workstations, workstation tools, interfaces with support services, supporting ground stations, team training, procedures, flight software upgrades, post-processing tools, and public outreach.
Node 1 flew to the International Space Station (ISS) on Flight 2A during December 1998. To date the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has learned a lot of lessons from this module based on its history of approximately two years of acceptance testing on the ground and currently its twelve years on-orbit. This paper will provide an overview of the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) design of the Node 1 Temperature and Humidity Control (THC) subsystem and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for this subsystem and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for these subsystems based on problems prelaunch, problems encountered on-orbit, and operational problems/concerns. It is hoped that documenting these lessons learned from ISS will help in preventing them in future Programs. 1
Outline: Selected Historic Shuttle Operations Data; Shuttle Lessons Learned Recommendations for Lower Cost, Operationally Efficient Launch Vehicle Systems; Selected Expendable launch vehicle experiences; Past NASA Launch Vehicle Development Programs, Studies (1985 to present); Discussion: Suggested applications of NASA Lessons Learned to already-baselined contractor XS-1 Phase I concepts.
Over the course of four years, a team of aerospace engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Armstrong Flight Research Center completed four projects, each with the objective to research sonic boom signatures from a ground and building level perspective. The relatively compressed timeline of these projects resulted in the team amassing a large number of lessons learned. With each successive project, these lessons have been more relied upon and referenced. This report serves as a written record of the teams tribal knowledge capturing the relevant lessons learned and their importance for future projects.
Large-scale testing of aerospace structures is frequently the final step in a development project to validate the structural performance, and that step typically involves a large cost and time investment. To ensure that the testing provides the required data, avoiding errors that can result in an unsuccessful test and failure to meet objectives is critical. Five lessons learned are presented herein to provide insight to those conducting tests in order to help them avoid known pitfalls that may result in an unsuccessful test. Five large-scale tests are described, and include two composite wing tests, a composite hybrid-wing body center section test, a full-scale 27.5-ft diameter metallic barrel test, and an 8-ft diameter metallic barrel test. Problems identified during the testing and mitigation approaches to solve the problems are presented, then the lessons learned are identified and discussed.
The six-month beta test of the NASA Access Mechanism (NAM) prototype was completed on June 30, 1993. This report documents the lessons learned from the use of this Graphical User Interface to NASA databases such as the NASA STI Database, outside databases, Internet resources, and peers in the NASA R&D community. Design decisions, such as the use of XWindows software, a client-server distributed architecture, and use of the NASA Science Internet, are explained. Users' reactions to the interface and suggestions for design changes are reported, as are the changes made by the software developers based on new technology for information discovery and retrieval. The lessons learned section also reports reactions from the public, both at demonstrations and in response to articles in the trade press and journals. Recommendations are included for future versions, such as a World Wide Web (WWW) and Mosaic based interface to heterogeneous databases, and NAM-Lite, a version which allows customization to include utilities provided locally at NASA Centers.
Large-scale testing of aerospace structures is frequently the final step in a development project to validate the structural performance, and that typically involves a large cost and time investment. In order to ensure that the testing provides the required data, avoiding errors that can result in an unsuccessful test and failure to meet objectives is critical. Presented herein are five lessons learned to provide insight to those conducting tests in order to help them avoid known pitfalls that may result in an unsuccessful test. Five subject large-scale tests are described, and include two composite wing tests, a composite hybrid-wing body center section test, a full-scale 27.5-ft diameter metallic barrel test, and an 8-ft diameter metallic barrel test. Problems identified during the testing and mitigation approaches to solve the problems are presented, then the lessons learned are summarized.
Large-scale testing of aerospace structures is frequently the final step in a development project to validate the structural performance, and that typically involves a large cost and time investment. In order to ensure that the testing provides the required data, avoiding errors that can result in an unsuccessful test and failure to meet objectives is critical. Presented herein are five lessons learned to provide insight to those conducting tests in order to help them avoid known pitfalls that may result in an unsuccessful test. Five subject large-scale tests are described, and include two composite wing tests, a composite hybrid-wing body center section test, a full-scale 27.5-ft diameter metallic barrel test, and an 8-ft diameter metallic barrel test. Problems identified during the testing and mitigation approaches to solve the problems are presented, then the lessons learned are summarized.
The Mars Program has recently been informed of the Planetary Protection Subcommittee (PPS) recommendation, which was endorsed by the NAC, concerning Mars Science Lab (MSL) lessons learned and knowledge capture. The Mars Program has not had an opportunity to consider any decisions specific to the PPS recommendation. Some of the activities recommended by the PPS would involve members of the MSL flight team who are focused on cruise, entry descent & landing, and early surface operations; those activities would have to wait. Members of the MSL planetary protection team at JPL are still available to support MSL lessons learned and knowledge capture; some of the specifically recommended activities have already begun. The Mars Program shares the PPS/NAC concerns about loss of potential information & expertise in planetary protection practice.
This report summarizes the highlights and results of a workshop held at NASA Ames Research Center in October 1992. The objective of the workshop was a thorough review of the lessons learned from past research on lift fans, and lift-fan aircraft, models, designs, and components. The scope included conceptual design studies, wind tunnel investigations, propulsion systems components, piloted simulation, flight of aircraft such as the SV-5A and SV-5B and a recent lift-fan aircraft development project. The report includes a brief summary of five technical presentations that addressed the subject The Lift-Fan Aircraft: Lessons Learned.
The Flight Dynamics Officer is responsible for trajectory maintenance of the Space Shuttle. This paper will cover high level operational considerations, methodology, procedures, and lessons learned involved in performing the functions of orbit and rendezvous Flight Dynamics Officer and leading the team of flight dynamics specialists during different phases of flight. The primary functions that will be address are: onboard state vector maintenance, ground ephemeris maintenance, calculation of ground and spacecraft acquisitions, collision avoidance, burn targeting for the primary mission, rendezvous, deorbit and contingencies, separation sequences, emergency deorbit preparation, mass properties coordination, payload deployment planning, coordination with the International Space Station, and coordination with worldwide trajectory customers. Each of these tasks require the Flight Dynamics Officer to have cognizance of the current trajectory state as well as the impact of future events on the trajectory plan in order to properly analyze and react to real-time changes. Additionally, considerations are made to prepare flexible alternative trajectory plans in the case timeline changes or a systems failure impact the primary plan. The evolution of the methodology, procedures, and techniques used by the Flight Dynamics Officer to perform these tasks will be discussed. Particular attention will be given to how specific Space Shuttle mission and training simulation experiences, particularly off-nominal or unexpected events such as shortened mission durations, tank failures, contingency deorbit, navigation errors, conjunctions, and unexpected payload deployments, have influenced the operational procedures and training for performing Space Shuttle flight dynamics operations over the history of the program. These lessons learned can then be extended to future vehicle trajectory operations.
An evaluation is given of the most important lessons learned concerning the Space Shuttle's Solid Rocket Motors with respect to flight safety, reuse requirements, system reliability, structural integrity, and hardware damage due to reentry, water impact, and retrieval. Within the major categories of flight safety, performance, and reuse/cost, priorities are identified for implementation of envisioned improvements; schedule and cost considerations are noted to have been substantially downgraded in favor of flight safety. The consequences of the primacy of flight safety are discussed in the areas of primary systems design, redundant systems, manufacturing and assembly processing, and launch constraints.
In this paper, lessons learned through the calibration of SIR-C data will be reviewed in the context of upcoming spaceborne, polarimetric SAR missions planned for launch later in this decade.