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Inspecta Technical Report

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed Inspecta (International Nuclear Safeguards Personal Examination and Containment Tracking Assistant), an AI-powered smart digital assistant (SDA) equipped with robotic capabilities. This innovative tool aims to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and safety of international nuclear safeguards inspections. Inspecta is designed to assist inspectors on-site by supporting or automating tasks that are often mundane, hazardous, or prone to errors. In 2021, the development team established the specifications for Inspecta by thoroughly analyzing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents and consulting with former IAEA inspectors and subject matter experts. This process involved aligning in-field inspection tasks with existing commercial and open-source technologies, thereby creating a roadmap for the initial prototype of Inspecta and identifying areas requiring further research and development. From 2022 to 2025, the focus shifted to integrating a critical inspection activity—the examination of seals—into an early version of Inspecta. This phase has involved the development of both software and hardware capabilities essential for this task. This report outlines the advancements in Inspecta’s functionalities, particularly those that support the seal examination process.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Investigation of U content in J-swipe/PIC samples

This final report documents the results of an evaluation of the U content in J-swipes for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). J-swipes are manufactured with inked numbers (1–30) and U backgrounds that are considered consistent across different lots and manufacturing times. These characteristics make them ideal for use by IAEA inspectors for pre-inspection check samples to ensure inspectors are not cross-contaminating sites. However, recent work has found elevated U concentrations in the inked numbers compared with the J-swipe material. To determine whether the inked numbers correlate with the U backgrounds, triplicate U content measurements were made on Swipes 1, 2, 11, 22, and 28. Triplicates of each swipe were processed through the standard chemistry used by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Network of Analytical Laboratories team and analyzed for U content by isotope dilution via multicollector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Finally, samples were made by mass consisting of only ink areas and only cotton swipe material to determine the trace element differences between the cotton and the ink.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Safeguards; Evaluating Safeguards and Security Risks and Benefits for Advanced and Small Modular Reactor Deployments

Rapidly growing interest in advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) technologies presents challenges as well as opportunities for implementing international safeguards and security. A/SMR deployments are expected to be more numerous, more geographically dispersed, and more varied in their designs, placing new demands on the data systems and analytical tools used to support oversight (Alberti et al., 2023; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission et al., 2024). Because of this variability, the importance and reliance on data systems for A/SMR deployments is expected to be higher than for previous reactor generations. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) offer potential capabilities to address the high variability inherent in A/SMR technology. The beneficiaries of AI-assisted tools include facility operators, government regulators, IAEA inspectors, and A/SMR vendors. This report analyzes how AI/ML-assisted technologies can strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards and security measures. It also identifies AI-assisted tools to strengthen operator, facility, and regulator knowledge management practices and examines the potential risks AI/ML-based tools may introduce to IAEA safeguards and security efforts. It concludes with a set of hypothetical, standards-style requirements for AI/ML systems used in safeguards contexts, grounded in an inspector-centric view of system verification. Despite the potential benefits of AI/ML systems, understanding potential intentional and unintentional failure modes is critical for ensuring adequate protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Unique features of A/SMRs including sealed cores, remote and novel paradigms of operation, off-site reactor fabrication, novel fuel forms, and varied refueling requirements, introduce challenges for traditional safeguards technological approaches (Pensado et al., 2024; Federation of American Scientists, 2025). AI/ML systems deployed to address these challenges may introduce new risks requiring systematic evaluation rooted in both AI-specific risk frameworks, such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI RMF), and established cyber risk management standards such as NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023; NIST, 2012).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Audit Report on Management Controls over the Use of Service Contracts at the Office of River Protection

The Department of Energy's (Department) Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for the storage, treatment, and disposal of over 53 million gallons of highly radioactive waste from over 40 years of plutonium production at the Hanford Site. Because of the diversity, complexity, and large scope of its mission, coupled with its small staff, ORP told us that it has found it necessary to engage in service contracts to obtain consulting services, technical expertise, and support staff. Federal policy generally permits contractors to perform a wide range of support service activities, including, in most situations, the drafting of Government documents subject to the review and approval of Federal employees. Federal policy issued by the Office of Management and Budget, however, prohibits contractors from drafting agency responses to Congressional inquiries and reports issued by the Office of Inspector General and Government Accountability Office (GAO) because they are so closely related to the public interest and provide the appearance of private influence. To provide a majority of its needed services, ORP issued a Blanket Purchase Agreement to Project Assistance Corporation (PAC) in 2003. Through the Blanket Purchase Agreement, ORP acquired services in the areas of project management, risk assessment, program assessment, quality assurance, safety, cost and schedule estimating, budgeting and finance, and engineering. PAC has, in turn, subcontracted with various other firms to obtain some of the services needed by ORP. From 2005 to 2008, the total annual cost for the contract with PAC had grown from $4.7 million to $9.2 million. Because of the extent of the services provided and growing costs of the contract, we conducted this review to determine whether ORP appropriately administered its contract with the Project Assistance Corporation. Our review disclosed that, in some instances, ORP had not appropriately administered all work performed under the PAC contract. Specifically, ORP allowed PAC employees to perform work that was inherently governmental and created situations where a potential conflict of interest occurred. Specifically: (1) ORP assigned PAC employees responsibility for providing information and responses to Congressional inquiries and reports issued by the GAO and the Department of Energy's Office of Inspector General (OIG); and (2) PAC employees were also allowed to perform functions that created potential conflicts of interest. ORP permitted PAC employees, for example, to develop statements of work and approve funding of work to be performed under PAC's own contract. We concluded that these problems occurred, at least in part, because ORP had not established controls necessary to effectively administer the PAC contract. Federal procurement regulations recommended that agencies provide additional management controls over contractors whose work has the potential to influence the action of government officials. ORP, however, had not implemented the controls specifically recommended in Federal policy guidance for administering contracts, including: (1) Performing conflict of interest reviews; and (2) Separating contractor and Department employees either physically or organizationally. By not effectively administering its contract with PAC, ORP increased the risk that decisions based on work performed by the contractor may not have been made in the best interests of the Department. For example, ORP increased the risk that approved work would be unnecessary or too costly. As we also recently noted in our report on 'Management Challenges at the Department of Energy' (DOE/IG-0808, December 2008), contract administration issues such as those discussed in this report remain a significant vulnerability. Continued efforts to improve this area are vitally important since the risk that contractors receive payments for unallowable costs could also increase as the Department expands its contracting activities under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. To its credit, however, ORP has recognized that there are weaknesses in its oversight of the PAC contract and is in the process of taking certain corrective actions. ORP indicated that it had reassigned responsibility to a Federal employee for responding to Congressional requests, GAO reviews, and OIG reports, and, planned to physically separate PAC employees from their government counterparts. While positive, those actions do not sufficiently address the issues identified in our report. Accordingly, we have made several recommendations designed to strengthen internal controls over this area.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Audit Report on "Work for Others Performed by the Department of Energy for the Department of Defense"

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Economy Act of 1932, the Department of Energy and its semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) provide research and technical assistance to other Federal agencies on a reimbursable, full cost recovery basis through the Work for Others (WFO) program. For the vast majority of WFO technical projects, Department Federal officials furnish administrative project oversight while the actual detailed scientific or technical work is completed by the Department's 'management and operating' contractors. These contractors are awarded a special contract type specifically created under the Federal Acquisition Regulation to manage and operate Department sites and facilities, including sophisticated laboratories and technical centers, on a government-owned, contractor-operated basis. With annual expenditures exceeding $1 billion, the Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the Department's largest WFO customers. Work performed for DoD at the Department's national laboratories and other facilities includes highly technical research in areas such as nuclear weapons systems, counter-terrorism, and in-theater troop support. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, required the Inspectors General of the DoD and the Department to review procurement methods to determine whether the Department complied with DoD procurement requirements and/or whether alternative procurement policies were in place. In response, we focused our review on projects performed by NNSA because it completes the vast majority (approximately $900 million in FY 2008) of the Department's work for DoD. As part of this effort, and, at the specific request of the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG), we identified the universe of WFO technical projects that received new funding in the fourth quarter of FY 2008 at NNSA sites. We independently reviewed a judgmental sample of 11 projects selected by the DoD OIG to meet the objectives of this audit. Our review revealed that NNSA managed DoD WFO technical projects in a manner consistent with requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the Department's implementing guidance, the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation. Because of the very nature of the Department's management and operating contracting model, WFO projects may not be technically compliant with DoD procurement regulations in certain instances. We found that NNSA did not let new contracts or task orders for the DoD WFO technical projects we reviewed and instead managed them under its existing internal control process as part of its management and operating contract structure. In one instance, we noted that the Department had, at DoD's request, supplemented its control structure to incorporate specific DoD procurement requirements. Senior Department of Energy procurement officials acknowledged that neither the Department nor NNSA modified their existing prime contracts to incorporate specific defense procurement requirements because such modifications would be inappropriate, costly, and inefficient. In short, they informed us that the Department had developed and implemented a series of controls designed to monitor overall contractor performance, including WFO technical projects. Department and NNSA officials noted, however, that they were willing to incorporate DoD specific requirements into work orders should DoD request and fund such efforts. Additional details regarding management of WFO technical projects are discussed in the body of this report.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

INFORMATION: Management Alert on the Department's Monitoring of the Weatherization Assistance Program in the State of Illinois

Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), the Department of Energy's Weatherization Assistance Program received $5 billion to improve the energy efficiency of homes owned or occupied by low income persons, reduce their total residential expenditures, and improve their health and safety. Since the Recovery Act was enacted in February 2009, the Department has awarded weatherization grants to every state, the District of Columbia and five territories. Because of the unprecedented level of funding and the risks associated with spending vast amounts of money in a relatively short period of time, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated a series of audits designed to evaluate the Program's internal control structures at both the Federal and state levels. As part of our work, we are in the process of reviewing Weatherization Program internal controls for the State of Illinois. We are also currently performing identical audits in the States of North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Under the Recovery Act and the Department's Program, the State of Illinois received $242 million to weatherize 26,933 homes. The State of Illinois awarded these funds to 35 local agencies responsible for determining recipients' eligibility, contracting for the installation of the weatherization work, and conducting final inspections to ensure that work on homes was done in accordance with requirements. Inspectors working for the local agencies are required to evaluate the quality of mechanical and architectural improvements, such as furnace installations and window caulking, and certify that the work performed meets established standards. Under a Department approved plan in place at the time of our review, state officials were required to evaluate the sufficiency of local agency monitoring controls and to inspect the work performed on at least five percent of the units weatherized with Department funds during the program year for each local agency. We identified significant internal control deficiencies in the management of the Weatherization Program in Illinois which require immediate attention. Specifically, our audit testing revealed significant problems with on-site monitoring and inspection of the Illinois Home Weatherization Assistance Program (Illinois). We noted that the Department had not fulfilled its requirement to perform monitoring visits at the State level. In addition, Illinois officials had not complied with the Department's requirements for inspecting weatherization work conducted by local agencies. Finally, we found that a weatherization inspection for one of the local agencies failed to detect substandard installation of energy saving materials. This case involved a furnace gas leak that could have resulted in serious injury to the occupants and material damage to the structure. This is an interim report and our audit work remains in progress.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

INFORMATION: Special Report on "Selected Department of Energy Program Efforts to Implement the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was enacted on February 17, 2009, to jumpstart the economy by creating or saving millions of jobs, spurring technological advances in health and science, and investing in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy received over $32.7 billion in Recovery Act funding for various science, energy, and environmental programs and initiatives. As of November 2009, the Department had obligated $18.3 billion of the Recovery Act funding, but only $1.4 billion had been spent. The Department's Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy, Environmental Management, Science, and Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability received the majority of funding allocated to the Department, about $32.3 billion. Obligating these funds by the end of Fiscal Year 2010, as required by the Recovery Act, and overseeing their effective use in succeeding years, represents a massive workload increase for the Department's programs. The effort to date has strained existing resources. As has been widely acknowledged, any effort to disburse massive additional funding and to expeditiously initiate and complete projects increases the risk of fraud, waste and abuse. It is, therefore, important for the Department's program offices to assess and mitigate these risks to the maximum extent practicable. In this light, we initiated this review as an initial step in the Office of Inspector General's charge to determine whether the Department's major program offices had developed an effective approach for identifying and mitigating risks related to achieving the goals and objectives of the Recovery Act. The Department's program offices included in our review identified risks and planned mitigation strategies that, if successfully implemented and executed, should help achieve the goals and objectives of the Recovery Act. While each office identified risks unique to its respective areas of responsibility, there were a number of risks shared in common. These included the mechanical and substantive requirements related to the award and distribution of funds; program and project performance monitoring; and, program and project execution activities. In particular, the offices self-identified common risks such as: (1) The inability to award and distribute funds in a timely manner to achieve the goals of the Recovery Act; (2) The sufficiency of monitoring procedures and resources to, among other things, prevent and detect fraud, waste and abuse throughout the performance period of financial assistance awards and contracts; and (3) The inherent cost, schedule and performance risks associated with first-of-a-kind, innovative research and demonstration projects. Our review confirmed that the Department had begun to implement a number of strategies designed to mitigate these and other program-specific risks. Our testing, however, identified challenges to the effective implementation of these mitigation strategies that need to be addressed if the Department is to meet the goals and objectives established by the Recovery Act. At the time of our review: (1) Program staffing resources, critical to the success of all other mitigation strategies, remained inadequate both in numbers and qualifications (certifications and training) for positions in procurement and acquisition, project management, and monitoring and oversight functions; (2) Performance measures for achieving Recovery Act goals such as distributing funds in an expeditious manner had not always been established and included in performance plans, and, in financial assistance and contract documents; and (3) Programs had not consistently demonstrated that previously reported deficiencies, identified through audits, inspections, investigations and other oversight activities, had been considered in designing mitigation strategies for the Recovery Act related risks. As we noted in our Special Report on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act at the Department of Energy (OAS-RA-09-01, March 2009) these sorts of deficiencies, which were described in the March 2009 report, had adversely impacted the success of earlier Departmental projects. We concluded that consideration of these previously encountered internal control weaknesses was essential if the Department was to avoid the same or similar problems in executing the Recovery Act programs/projects. During the course of our audit we identified other internal control weakness indicators. When brought to their attention by the Office of Inspector General audit staff, program officials acted promptly to address these problems by modifying or improving their risk mitigation strategies. For instance, we found that the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, responsible for $16.8 billion in Recovery Act program activities, took steps to strengthen its merit review process to avoid potential conflict of interest concerns.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F&W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F&W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F&W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF{sub 6} F&W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF{sub 6}. The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under plant operating conditions. The ultimate use of technologies tested on the engineering-scale test bed is to work with safeguards agencies to install them in operating plants (e.g., enrichment and fuel processing plants), thereby promoting new safeguards measures with minimal impact to operating plants. In addition, this system is useful in identifying features for new plants that can be incorporated as part of 'safeguards by design,' in which load cells and other monitoring technologies are specified to provide outputs for automated monitoring and inspector evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Performance and Costs of Ductless Heat Pumps in Marine-Climate High-Performance Homes Habitat for Humanity The Woods

The Washington State University (WSU) Energy Program's Building America (BA) team conducted a case study of a high-performance affordable housing community: The Woods (Figure 1). This BA effort is part of a larger-scale study of 30 homes funded from 2013-2016 by Tacoma Public Utilities (TPU) and the Bonneville Power Administration. The Woods is a Habitat for Humanity (HFH) community of homes certified by ENERGY STAR Homes Northwest (ESHNW); the community is in the marine climate of Tacoma/Pierce County, Washington. This research report builds on an earlier preliminary draft 2014 BA report and includes significant billing analysis and cost-effectiveness research from a collaborative and ongoing DHP research effort for TPU and the Bonneville Power Administration. This final BA report focuses on the results of field testing, modeling, and monitoring of ductless mini-split heat pump hybrid heating systems in seven homes built and first occupied at various times between September 2013 and October 2014. The report also provides WSU documentation of high-performance home observations, lessons learned, and stakeholder recommendations for builders of affordable high-performance housing. The research goal of the U.S. Department of Energy's BA research team Building America Partnership for Improved Residential Construction was to compare a ductless heat pump (DHP) hybrid system (DHP in common area/electric resistance [ER] in bedrooms) to an all-electric zonal ER system in high-performance single-family affordable housing. This effort included assessing the costs and benefits of a DHP/ER hybrid system located in the main living area to offset the primary heating demand of zonal ER heaters in the bedroom zones and comparing these findings to data from of new affordable single-family housing in Washington State. This report includes: (1) Measured indoor and outdoor temperatures and relative humidity (RH) in the homes. (2) Field testing results of heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning equipment; ventilation system airflows; building envelope tightness; lighting, appliance, and other input data required for preliminary Building Energy Optimization (BEopt) modeling; and ENERGY STAR field verification (3) BEopt modeling results compared to measured energy use. (4) A comparison of the space heat energy consumption of a DHP/ER hybrid heating system and a traditional zonal ER heating system installed in the same home. This comparison is made by implementing a series of weekly "flip-flop tests" (referred to here as "switchback" tests per TPU) to compare space heating, temperature, and RH in zonal ER heating mode with a DHP/ER mode as discussed in the Building America Test Plan (Lubliner 2010a). (5) Cost data from HFH and other sources related to building efficiency measures focusing on the DHP/ER hybrid heating system. (6) An evaluation of the thermal performance and cost benefit of DHP/ER hybrid heating systems in these high-performance homes employing life cycle cost analysis for energy code policy and monthly cash flow analysis of HFH homeowners. (7) Post-monitoring occupant survey results. The report also provides the following stakeholder findings and recommendations: (1) DHP single-head systems at The Woods are cost-effective to new homebuyers of these high-performance all-electric homes. (2) Stakeholder education is needed on design, inspection, and commissioning; documentation is needed for heat recovery ventilation (HRV) and from ENERGY STAR builders, verifiers, and inspectors to help ensure that the houses meet the goal of "build tight, ventilate right." (3) A code gap in inspection and enforcement was identified that should be addressed by: (3a) Improving the fire marshal's approach to sprinkler attic piping freeze protection; (3b) Improving the maintenance of ceiling insulation continuity; and (3c) Educating the local building inspector on attic insulation inspection concerns that allow for maximizing design improveme...

affordable housing↗

Supplemental Systems for Unattended UF6 Cylinder Monitoring

Cylinder assay and mass measurements, the mainstay of enrichment plant verification efforts have historically been performed by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors using portable equipment. For the sake of efficiency, accuracy, and timeliness, such equipment is being supplanted by unattended measurement stations. Ancillary systems must be employed with such stations to ensure that measured parameters are properly recorded, cylinders are positively identified, operations occur according to procedure, and no tampering takes place in the inspectors’ absence. Depending on the facility, it may prove feasible to track cylinders from the measurement vicinity to their storage locations using surveillance. This paper will provide a cursory description of the various subsystems associated with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Integrated Cylinder Verification Station and how inattention to the requirements of such systems could seriously diminish the capability of the integrated whole.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING USING LOCATION SPECIFIC AIR MONITORING IN BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

Since the introduction of safeguards strengthening measures approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (1992-1997), international nuclear safeguards inspectors have been able to utilize environmental sampling (ES) (e.g. deposited particulates, air, water, vegetation, sediments, soil and biota) in their safeguarding approaches at bulk uranium/plutonium handling facilities. Enhancements of environmental sampling techniques used by the IAEA in drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities will soon be able to take advantage of a recent step change improvement in the gathering and analysis of air samples at these facilities. Location specific air monitoring feasibility tests have been performed with excellent results in determining attribute and isotopic composition of chemical elements present in an actual test-bed sample. Isotopic analysis of collected particles from an Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) collection, was performed with the standard bulk sampling protocol used throughout the IAEA network of analytical laboratories (NWAL). The results yielded bulk isotopic values expected for the operations. Advanced designs of air monitoring instruments such as the ACE may be used in gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) to detect the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or enrichments not declared by a State. Researchers at Savannah River National Laboratory in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory are developing the next generation of ES equipment for air grab and constant samples that could become an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. Location specific air monitoring to be used to establish a baseline environmental signature of a particular facility employed for comparison of consistencies in declared operations will be described in this paper. Implementation of air monitoring will be contrasted against the use of smear ES when used during unannounced inspections, design information verification, limited frequency unannounced access, and complementary access visits at bulk handling facilities. Analysis of technical features required for tamper indication and resistance will demonstrate the viability of successful application of the system in taking ES within a bulk handling location. Further exploration of putting this technology into practice is planned to include mapping uranium enrichment facilities for the identification of optimal for installation of air monitoring devices.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Augmented reality: don't we all wish we lived in one?

From stereophonic, positional sound to high-definition imagery that is crisp and clean, high fidelity computer graphics enhance our view, insight, and intuition regarding our environments and conditions. Contemporary 3-D modeling tools offer an open architecture framework that enables integration with other technologically innovative arenas. One innovation of great interest is Augmented Reality, the merging of virtual, digital environments with physical, real-world environments creating a mixed reality where relevant data and information augments the real or actual experience in real-time by spatial or semantic context. Pairing 3-D virtual immersive models with a dynamic platform such as semi-autonomous robotics or personnel odometry systems to create a mixed reality offers a new and innovative design information verification inspection capability, evaluation accuracy, and information gathering capability for nuclear facilities. Our paper discusses the integration of two innovative technologies, 3-D visualizations with inertial positioning systems, and the resulting augmented reality offered to the human inspector. The discussion in the paper includes an exploration of human and non-human (surrogate) inspections of a nuclear facility, integrated safeguards knowledge within a synchronized virtual model operated, or worn, by a human inspector, and the anticipated benefits to safeguards evaluations of facility operations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections.

The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains at SNL for software and hardware testing. This paper will describe the capabilities of the new surveillance system, application and requirements, and the design approach.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Suggestions for better election security.

Summary of Common Security Mistakes: (1) Electronic voting machines that fundamentally lack security thought and features, including an ability to detect tampering or intrusion, or to be reliably locked or sealed; (2) Failure to disassemble, inspect, and thoroughly inspect (not just test) a sufficient number of voting machines before and after elections in order to detect hardware or software tampering; (3) Assuming that tamper - indicating seals will either be blatantly ripped/smashed open, or else there is no tampering. In reality, even amateurs can spoof most seals leaving (at most) subtle evidence; (4) Inadequate seal use protocols and training of seal installers and inspectors. Failure to show examples of blatantly and subtly attacked seals to seal inspectors; (5) Over confidence in use of a voter verified paper record (VVPR), a VVPR is an excellent security countermeasure, but it is not a silver bullet, especially for an election organization with poor overall security; (6) Little or no insider thr at mitigation; and (7) A poor security culture, including denial and no a priori procedures for dealing with security questions or concerns.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DEVELOPMENT OF A TAMPER RESISTANT/INDICATING AEROSOL COLLECTION SYSTEM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AT BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

Environmental sampling has become a key component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards approaches since its approval for use in 1996. Environmental sampling supports the IAEA's mission of drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities in a Nation State. Swipe sampling is the most commonly used method for the collection of environmental samples from bulk handling facilities. However, augmenting swipe samples with an air monitoring system, which could continuously draw samples from the environment of bulk handling facilities, could improve the possibility of the detection of undeclared activities. Continuous sampling offers the opportunity to collect airborne materials before they settle onto surfaces which can be decontaminated, taken into existing duct work, filtered by plant ventilation, or escape via alternate pathways (i.e. drains, doors). Researchers at the Savannah River National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been working to further develop an aerosol collection technology that could be installed at IAEA safeguarded bulk handling facilities. The addition of this technology may reduce the number of IAEA inspector visits required to effectively collect samples. The principal sample collection device is a patented Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) which utilizes electrostatic precipitation principles to deposit particulates onto selected substrates. Recent work has focused on comparing traditional swipe sampling to samples collected via an ACE system, and incorporating tamper resistant and tamper indicating (TRI) technologies into the ACE system. Development of a TRI-ACE system would allow collection of samples at uranium/plutonium bulk handling facilities in a manner that ensures sample integrity and could be an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. This work was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards

Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Overview and Policy Context of UF6 Cylinder Tracking Program

Thousands of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) move around the world from conversion plants to enrichment plants to fuel fabrication plants, and their contents could be very useful to a country intent on diverting uranium for clandestine use. Each of these large cylinders can contain close to a significant quantity of natural uranium (48Y cylinder) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) (30B cylinder) defined as 75 kg {sup 235}U which can be further clandestinely enriched to produce 1.5 to 2 significant quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) within weeks or months depending on the scale of the clandestine facility. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) kicked off a 5-year plan in April 2011 to investigate the concept of a unique identification system for UF{sub 6} cylinders and potentially to develop a cylinder tracking system that could be used by facility operators and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to design an integrated solution beneficial to both industry and inspectorates that would improve cylinder operations at the facilities and provide enhanced capabilities to deter and detect both diversion of low-enriched uranium and undeclared enriched uranium production. The 5-year plan consists of six separate incremental tasks: (1) define the problem and establish the requirements for a unique identification (UID) and monitoring system; (2) develop a concept of operations for the identification and monitoring system; (3) determine cylinder monitoring devices and technology; (4) develop a registry database to support proof-of-concept demonstration; (5) integrate that system for the demonstration; and (6) demonstrate proof-of-concept. Throughout NNSA's performance of the tasks outlined in this program, the multi-laboratory team emphasizes that extensive engagement with industry stakeholders, regulatory authorities and inspectorates is essential to its success.

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The Importance of Establishing and Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge during 21st Century Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities

During this century, the entire nuclear fuel cycle will expand and become increasingly more global, taxing both the resources and capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to maintain an effective Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) and its ability to provide timely detection of diversion. Uranium that currently is mined and milled in one country will be converted, enriched, and fabricated into fuel for reactors in an expanding set of new countries. This expansion will make it harder to guarantee that regional activities stay regional and that diversion detection is timely unless new and sustainable tools are developed to improve inspector effectiveness. To deal with this emerging reality, the IAEA must increase its use of unattended monitoring and employ new tools and methods that enhance CoK during all phases of the fuel cycle. This approach will help provide useful information to aid in detecting undeclared activities and create opportunities for timely and appropriate responses to events well before they enter phases of greater concern (e.g., enrichment). The systems that maintain CoK of safeguarded assets rely on containment and surveillance (C/S) technologies. The 21st century fuel cycle will require increased use of these technologies and systems, plus greater implementation of unattended systems that can securely collect data when inspectors are not present.

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