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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Cradle-to-Grave: Assessment Methods for Hazardous Waste Management

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was passed to set up a framework for the proper management of waste. The 40CFR260-273 regulation established the regulatory framework to handle solid and hazardous waste, from the point of generation to its disposal; or cradle-to-grave management. Per these regulations, a hazardous waste generator is responsible for its waste from initial generation through its ultimate disposal and beyond. Nothing will relinquish a generator of this responsibility. There is no expiration date or time limit, and hiring a someone else to transport and dispose of waste does not transfer responsibility. If an incident occurs at any point during the life cycle of a waste, the generator can be held liable. The first step to compliance with RCRA is proper characterization of the waste. Waste may either be listed specifically or may show a characteristic as defined in the regulation: Is my waste hazardous? Why is it Hazardous? What should I do as a generator? Plan chemical use: - Create a chemical inventory for your research project. - Use existing chemicals if available instead of ordering new ones. - Brainstorm methods that will help to reduce toxicity and minimize waste. Waste Inventory: - Label all waste bottles with: ID no., What is it, Whose is it, Hazards, and Date. - Add waste containers into the inventory log. - Initiate/complete the container sheet to describe the waste. Satellite Areas: - Store waste in containers compatible with the waste with lids on tight. - Store waste containers properly and segregate them according to their specific hazards. - Use secondary containment for liquids. Store acids and bases separately; apart from cyanides or sulfides. Acids should never be put into steel containers. Water-reactive, strong acids such as organic acid halides, organic acid anhydrides, inorganic acid anhydrides, and strong acidic salts must be kept apart from both alkalis and water. Oxidizing agents must be kept apart from reducing agents and organic compounds. Water-reactive agents must be stored apart from water, aqueous solutions, and acids. Air-reactive materials must be packed in containers that are sealed off from the atmosphere. Explosive and shock-sensitive materials present risks that require special handling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Designing Remote Monitoring for Smart Manufacturing Facilities: Hazard Identification and Classification

This study investigates the process of hazard identification in complex manufacturing environments during the design phase, emphasizing the significance of the design process in developing designs that effectively mitigate hazards in contexts with numerous variables, such as a variety of machines, sensors, actuators, and agents. Through a mixed-methods approach, the objective of this work is to understand how the evolution of design outcomes across various stages might influence a designer’s ability to recognize both standard and novel hazards. To achieve this understanding, an experimental design task was conducted with six designers from a national lab specializing in manufacturing technologies. This approach combined qualitative and quantitative data analysis from a one-hour virtual session with participants. Findings suggest that the complexity of identifying hazards in a high-dimensional design space is challenging within a limited time frame and that the identification of hazards is significantly influenced by the stage of the design task and the initial design decisions, indicating the need for extended time and strategic initial planning in the design process to enhance hazard identification.

Ballestas, Caseysimone↗
DOE OSTI2011

NGNP SITE 2 HAZARDS ASSESSMENT

The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Project initiated at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) by the U.S. Department of Energy pursuant to the 2005 Energy Policy Act, is based on research and development activities supported by the Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Initiative. The principal objective of the NGNP Project is to support commercialization of the high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) technology. The HTGR is a helium-cooled and graphite-moderated reactor that can operate at temperatures much higher than those of conventional light water reactor (LWR) technologies. Accordingly, it can be applied in many industrial applications as a substitute for burning fossil fuels, such as natural gas, to generate process heat in addition to producing electricity, which is the principal application of current LWRs. Nuclear energy in the form of LWRs has been used in the U.S. and internationally principally for the generation of electricity. However, because the HTGR operates at higher temperatures than LWRs, it can be used to displace the use of fossil fuels in many industrial applications. It also provides a carbon emission-free energy supply. For example, the energy needs for the recovery and refining of petroleum, for the petrochemical industry and for production of transportation fuels and feedstocks using coal conversion processes require process heat provided at temperatures approaching 800 C. This temperature range is readily achieved by the HTGR technology. This report summarizes a site assessment authorized by INL under the NGNP Project to determine hazards and potential challenges that site owners and HTGR designers need to be aware of when developing the HTGR design for co-location at industrial facilities, and to evaluate the site for suitability considering certain site characteristics. The objectives of the NGNP site hazard assessments are to do an initial screening of representative sites in order to identify potential challenges and restraints to be addressed in design and licensing processes; assure the HTGR technology can be deployed at variety of sites for a range of applications; evaluate potential sites for potential hazards and describe some of the actions necessary to mitigate impacts of hazards; and, provide key insights that can inform the plant design process. The report presents a summary of the process methodology and the results of an assessment of hazards typical of a class of candidate sites for the potential deployment of HTGR reactor technology. The assessment considered health and safety, and other important siting characteristics to determine the potential impact of identified hazards and potential challenges presented by the location for this technology. A four reactor module nuclear plant (2000 to 2400 MW thermal), that co-generates steam, electricity for general use in the plant, and hot gas for use in a nearby chemical processing facility, to provide the requisite performance and reliability was assumed for the assessment.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2018

Tools to Address Glare and Avian Flux Hazards from Solar Energy Systems

This report describes software tools that can be used to evaluate and mitigate potential glare and avian-flux hazards from photovoltaic and concentrating solar power (CSP) plants. Enhancements to the Solar Glare Hazard Analysis Tool (SGHAT) include new block-space receptor models, integration of PVWatts for energy prediction, and a 3D daily glare visualization feature. Tools and methods to evaluate avian-flux hazards at CSP plants with large heliostat fields are also discussed. Alternative heliostat standby aiming strategies were investigated to reduce the avian-flux hazard and minimize impacts to operational performance. Finally, helicopter flyovers were conducted at the National Solar Thermal Test Facility and at the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System to evaluate the alternative heliostat aiming strategies and to provide a basis for model validation. Results showed that the models generally overpredicted the measured results, but they were able to simulate the trends in irradiance values with distance. A heliostat up-aiming strategy is recommended to alleviate both glare and avian-flux hazards, but operational schemes are required to reduce the impact on heliostat slew times and plant performance. Future studies should consider the trade-offs and collective impacts on these three factors of glare, avian-flux hazards, and plant operations and performance.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2019

Illustration of Key Considerations Determining Hazardous Indoor Inhalation Exposures

Buildings can protect their occupants from outdoor hazards. In some cases, this protection can reduce hazardous exposures by an order of magnitude or more. The degree to which indoor exposures are reduced, relative to being outdoors, depends upon the specific building, hazardous material, and exposure pathway. This report illustrates how several key considerations interrelate to determine the building protection against indoor inhalation of outdoor airborne hazards. These considerations are the (1) outdoor plume duration, (2) loss of airborne material indoors, (3) rate at which outdoor and indoor air is exchanged, (4) importance of peak concentration to hazard toxicity, and (5) the time, after the outdoor plume has passed, that individuals exit (or ventilate) the building. This report focuses on “passive” building protection for inhalation exposures – the protection that buildings provide their occupants under normal operating conditions against outdoor inhalation hazards. With active measures, such as turning off building ventilation systems, building protection can be higher than the illustrative values shown here.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Work Plan for the Site-wide SSHAC Level 3 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis at INL

This work plan provides the overall framework, key activities, key tasks, and schedule for the execution of a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis will follow processes and procedures appropriate for the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 3 study provided in U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidance, NUREG-2213. The SSHAC Level 3 probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) is being conducted as an INL site-wide effort. The work plan was developed and revised by participants who will perform the SSHAC Level 3 PSHA. The work plan also includes the quality assurance requirements commensurate with American Society of Mechanical Engineers Nuclear Quality Assurance NQA 1 2008/2009 and 2011 Addendum for design nuclear facilities under the U.S. Department of Energy and U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The scope of the SSHAC Level 3 PSHA is designed to produce the mean-centered definition of the seismic hazard with the appropriate treatment of uncertainties supported by the associated technical justifications. The SSHAC Level 3 study will properly implement and completely document the activities of evaluation, integration, and documentation. The evaluation process will consider data, models, and methods proposed by the larger technical community that are relevant to the PSHA at INL. The integration process will build seismic-source and ground-motion characterization models that represent the center, body, and range of technically defensible interpretations, taking into consideration the outcomes of the evaluation process. Key tasks and activities—such as a project kickoff meeting, three workshops, four formal working meetings, and a briefing meeting with the Participatory Peer Review Panel—will occur for the seven-member technical integration teams to construct seismic-source and ground-motion-characterization models. Both preliminary and final hazard-input documents will be developed to perform sensitivity analyses and the final PSHA, respectively. The entire study will be thoroughly documented in draft and final reports. The Participatory Peer Review Panel will review the SSHAC Level 3 study from start to finish, including the draft and final INL Site-wide PSHA reports, so they can provide a closure letter documenting the study’s adherence to SSHAC processes and technical adequacy of the final products.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Hazards and Probabilistic Risk Assessments of Advanced Nuclear Reactors Coupled with Industrial Facilities

This report provides a roadmap and tool kit for site specific risk assessments across a broad range of industrial customers co-located with advanced nuclear power plants (ANPP) that are not currently built and operating in the U.S. This report builds upon the body of work sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) Integrated Energy Systems Pathway that has produced industrial requirements studies and techno-economic assessments on the topics of feasibility of ANPP supported industrial processes. This report also leverages the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program that has presented hazards assessment and generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to light-water reactors (LWRs) co-located with hydrogen production facilities. Many of the hazard assessments and risk assessments performed for the LWRS report are agnostic to whether the nuclear reactor is an ANPP or were adapted to the ANPP focus. The report performs hazards assessments to include industrial facilities: an oil refinery, a methanol plant, a synthetic fuel (synfuel) plant, the production of synthetic gas (syngas) as part of the methanol and synfuel plants, wood pulp and paper mills, and hydrogen production. Hydrogen production facilities are assessed in depth through prior reports in the LWRS program and the results are leveraged in this report. All these facilities are specified through industrial process and requirements research performed by national laboratories, universities, and interaction with industry. Many of the processes used in this report are pre-conceptual designs to use for decarbonization of the current technology facilities. A process of failure modes and effects analysis (what can go wrong) and accidentology (what has historically gone wrong) was used to determine the hazards presented to the nuclear power plant by the addition of the HES and the industrial customer. Chemical properties of feedstocks and products are summarized as part of the hazards assessment. Example analysis procedures are provided for each of the hazard types identified. These deterministic analyses can be used to assess adherence to licensing criteria. They can also be used to meet other safety goals like protection of the public, workers, or industrial facility equipment. A modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) PRA only existing on paper was modeled and verified in modern PRA software. This will provide a tool for representative ANPP probabilistic analyses for future research.

10 SYNTHETIC FUELS↗
NASA NTRS1991

A hazard control system for robot manipulators

A robot for space applications will be required to complete a variety of tasks in an uncertain, harsh environment. This fact presents unusual and highly difficult challenges to ensuring the safety of astronauts and keeping the equipment they depend on from becoming damaged. The systematic approach being taken to control hazards that could result from introducing robotics technology in the space environment is described. First, system safety management and engineering principles, techniques, and requirements are discussed as they relate to Shuttle payload design and operation in general. The concepts of hazard, hazard category, and hazard control, as defined by the Shuttle payload safety requirements, is explained. Next, it is shown how these general safety management and engineering principles are being implemented on an actual project. An example is presented of a hazard control system for controlling one of the hazards identified for the Development Test Flight (DTF-1) of NASA's Flight Telerobotic Servicer, a teleoperated space robot. How these schemes can be applied to terrestrial robots is discussed as well. The same software monitoring and control approach will insure the safe operation of a slave manipulator under teleoperated or autonomous control in undersea, nuclear, or manufacturing applications where the manipulator is working in the vicinity of humans or critical hardware.

Carter, Ruth Chiang↗
NASA NTRS2001

Dealing with the Asteroid Impact Hazard

The small fraction of the asteroids with Earth-crossing or Earth-approaching orbits is of special interest to us because many will eventually impact our planet. The time-averaged impact flux as a function of projectile energy can be derived from lunar cratering statistics, although we have little information on the possible variability of this flux over time. The effects of impacts of various energies can be modeled, using data from historic impacts (such as the KT impactor 65 million years ago), nuclear explosive testing, and the observed 1994 bombardment of Jupiter by fragments of comet Shoemaker-Levy 9. It is of particular interest to find from such models that the terrestrial environment is highly vulnerable to perturbation from impacts, so that even such a small event as the KT impact (by a projectile roughly 15 km in diameter) can lead to a mass extinction. Combining the impact flux with estimates of environmental and ecological effects reveals that the greatest contemporary hazard is associated with impactors near one million megatons energy. The current impact hazard is significant relative to other natural hazards, and arguments can be developed to illuminate a variety of public policy issues. These include the relative risk of different impact scenarios and the associated costs and probability of success of countermeasures. It is generally agreed that the first step is to survey and catalogue the thousand-or-so Near Earth Asteroids (NEAs), and we review the status of the Spaceguard NEA Survey. We compare the efficiency of various ground and space-based approaches and consider the challenges of international coordination and the problems and opportunities associated with communicating the results with the press and the public. It is also important to reflect on how the impact hazard might be dealt with by both national governments and international decision-making bodies, and to anticipate ways of mitigating the danger if a NEA were located on an apparent Earth-impact trajectory. As the most extreme known example of a natural hazard with low probability but severe global consequences. the NEA impact hazard calls for the most careful consideration and planning.

Morrison, David↗
NASA NTRS2004

GRC Payload Hazard Assessment: Supporting the STS-107 Accident Investigation

A hazard assessment was conducted on the GRC managed payloads in support of a NASA Headquarters Code Q request to examine STS-107 payloads and determine if they were credible contributors to the Columbia accident. This assessment utilized each payload's Final Flight Safety Data Package for hazard identification. An applicability assessment was performed and most of the hazards were eliminated because they dealt with payload operations or crew interactions. A Fault Tree was developed for all the hazards deemed applicable and the safety verification documentation was reviewed for these applicable hazards. At the completion of this hazard assessment, it was concluded that none of the GRC managed payloads were credible contributors to the Columbia accident.

Schoren, William R.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Coastal pollution hazards in southern California observed by SAR imagery: stormwater plumes, wastewater plumes, and natural hydrocarbon seeps

Stormwater runoff plumes, municipal wastewater plumes, and natural hydrocarbon seeps are important pollution hazards for the heavily populated Southern California Bight (SCB). Due to their small size, dynamic and episodic nature, these hazards are difficult to sample adequately using traditional in situ oceanographic methods. Complex coastal circulation and persistent cloud cover can further complicate detection and monitoring of these hazards. We use imagery from space-borne synthetic aperture radar (SAR), complemented by field measurements, to examine these hazards in the SCB. The hazards are detectable in SAR imagery because they deposit surfactants on the sea surface, smoothing capillary and small gravity waves to produce areas of reduced backscatter compared with the surrounding ocean. We suggest that high-resolution SAR, which obtains useful data regardless of darkness or cloud cover, could be an important observational tool for assessment and monitoring of coastal marine pollution hazards in the SCB and other urbanized coastal regions.

Water Movements↗
NASA NTRS2009

Hydrogen Hazards Assessment Protocol (HHAP): Approach and Methodology

This viewgraph presentation reviews the approach and methodology to develop a assessment protocol for hydrogen hazards. Included in the presentation are the reasons to perform hazards assessment, the types of hazard assessments that exist, an analysis of hydrogen hazards, specific information about the Hydrogen Hazards Assessment Protocol (HHAP). The assessment is specifically tailored for hydrogen behavior. The end product of the assesment is a compilation of hazard, mitigations and associated factors to facilitate decision making and achieve the best practice.

Woods, Stephen↗
NASA NTRS2015

Carbon Structure Hazard Control

Carbon composite structures are widely used in virtually all advanced technology industries for a multitude of applications. The high strength-to-weight ratio and resistance to aggressive service environments make them highly desirable. Automotive, aerospace, and petroleum industries extensively use, and will continue to use, this enabling technology. As a result of this broad range of use, field and test personnel are increasingly exposed to hazards associated with these structures. No single published document exists to address the hazards and make recommendations for the hazard controls required for the different exposure possibilities from damaged structures including airborne fibers, fly, and dust. The potential for personnel exposure varies depending on the application or manipulation of the structure. The effect of exposure to carbon hazards is not limited to personnel, protection of electronics and mechanical equipment must be considered as well. The various exposure opportunities defined in this document include pre-manufacturing fly and dust, the cured structure, manufacturing/machining, post-event cleanup, and post-event test and/or evaluation. Hazard control is defined as it is applicable or applied for the specific exposure opportunity. The carbon exposure hazard includes fly, dust, fiber (cured/uncured), and matrix vapor/thermal decomposition products. By using the recommendations in this document, a high level of confidence can be assured for the protection of personnel and equipment.

Yoder, Tommy↗
NASA NTRS2015

Flight Testing a Real-Time Hazard Detection System for Safe Lunar Landing on the Rocket-Powered Morpheus Vehicle

The Hazard Detection System (HDS) is a component of the ALHAT (Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology) sensor suite, which together provide a lander Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) system with the relevant measurements necessary to enable safe precision landing under any lighting conditions. The HDS consists of a stand-alone compute element (CE), an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), and a gimbaled flash LIDAR sensor that are used, in real-time, to generate a Digital Elevation Map (DEM) of the landing terrain, detect candidate safe landing sites for the vehicle through Hazard Detection (HD), and generate hazard-relative navigation (HRN) measurements used for safe precision landing. Following an extensive ground and helicopter test campaign, ALHAT was integrated onto the Morpheus rocket-powered terrestrial test vehicle in March 2014. Morpheus and ALHAT then performed five successful free flights at the simulated lunar hazard field constructed at the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) at Kennedy Space Center, for the first time testing the full system on a lunar-like approach geometry in a relevant dynamic environment. During these flights, the HDS successfully generated DEMs, correctly identified safe landing sites and provided HRN measurements to the vehicle, marking the first autonomous landing of a NASA rocket-powered vehicle in hazardous terrain. This paper provides a brief overview of the HDS architecture and describes its in-flight performance.

Avoidance↗
NASA NTRS2016

An Inertial Dual-State State Estimator for Precision Planetary Landing with Hazard Detection and Avoidance

The navigation filter architecture successfully deployed on the Morpheus flight vehicle is presented. The filter was developed as a key element of the NASA Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project and over the course of 15 free fights was integrated into the Morpheus vehicle, operations, and flight control loop. Flight testing completed by demonstrating autonomous hazard detection and avoidance, integration of an altimeter, surface relative velocity (velocimeter) and hazard relative navigation (HRN) measurements into the onboard dual-state inertial estimator Kalman flter software, and landing within 2 meters of the vertical testbed GPS-based navigation solution at the safe landing site target. Morpheus followed a trajectory that included an ascent phase followed by a partial descent-to-landing, although the proposed filter architecture is applicable to more general planetary precision entry, descent, and landings. The main new contribution is the incorporation of a sophisticated hazard relative navigation sensor-originally intended to locate safe landing sites-into the navigation system and employed as a navigation sensor. The formulation of a dual-state inertial extended Kalman filter was designed to address the precision planetary landing problem when viewed as a rendezvous problem with an intended landing site. For the required precision navigation system that is capable of navigating along a descent-to-landing trajectory to a precise landing, the impact of attitude errors on the translational state estimation are included in a fully integrated navigation structure in which translation state estimation is combined with attitude state estimation. The map tie errors are estimated as part of the process, thereby creating a dual-state filter implementation. Also, the filter is implemented using inertial states rather than states relative to the target. External measurements include altimeter, velocimeter, star camera, terrain relative navigation sensor, and a hazard relative navigation sensor providing information regarding hazards on a map generated on-the-fly.

Bishop, Robert H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Using Satellite Soil Moisture and Rainfall in the Landslide Hazard Assessment for Situational Awareness System

The Landslide Hazard Assessment for Situational Awareness system(LHASA)gives a global view of landslide hazard in nearly real time. Currently, it is being upgraded from version 1 to version 2, which entails improvements along several dimensions. These include the incorporation of new predictors, machine learning, and new event-based landslide inventories. As a result, LHASA version 2 substantially improves on the prior performanceand introduces a probabilistic element to the global landslide nowcast. Data from the soil moisture active-passive (SMAP) satellite has been assimilated into a globally consistent data product with a latency less than 3 days, known as SMAP Level 4. In LHASA, thesedata representthe antecedent conditions prior to landslide-triggering rainfall. In some cases, soil moisture may have accumulated over aperiod of many months. The model behind SMAP Level 4 also estimates the amount of snow on the ground, which is an important factor in some landslide events. LHASA also incorporates this information as an antecedent condition that modulates the response torainfall. Slope, lithology, and active faults were also used as predictor variables. These factors can have a strong influence on where landslides initiate.LHASA relies on precipitation estimates from the Global Precipitation Measurement mission to identify the locations where landslides are most probable. The low latency and consistent global coverage of these data make them ideal for real-time applications at continental to global scales. LHASA relies primarily on rainfall from the last 24 hours to spothazardous sites, which is rescaled by the local 99thpercentile rainfall.However, the multi-day latency of SMAP requires the use of a 2-day antecedent rainfall variable to represent the accumulation of rain between the antecedent soil moisture and current rainfall. LHASA merges these predictors with XGBoost, a commonly used machine-learning tool, relying on historical landslide inventories to develop the relationship between landslide occurrence and various risk factors. The resulting model relies heavily on current daily rainfall, but other factors also play an important role. LHASA outputsthe probability oflandslide occurrence ona grid of roughly one kilometer over all continents from 60 North to 60 South latitude. Evaluation over the period 2019-2020 showsthat LHASA version 2 doubles the accuracy of the global landslide nowcast without increasing the global false alarm rate. LHASA also identifies the areas where the human exposure to landslide hazard is most intense. Landslide hazard is divided into 4 levels: minimal, low, moderate, and high. Next, the number of persons and the length of major roads (primary and secondary roads)within each of these areas is calculated for every second-level administrative district (county). These results can be viewedthrough a web portal hosted at the Goddard Space Flight Center. In addition, users can download daily hazard and exposure data.LHASAversion 2uses machine learning and satellite data to identify areas of probable landslide hazard within hours of heavy rainfall. Itsglobal maps are significantly more accurate, and it now includes rapid estimates of exposed populations and infrastructure. In addition, a forecast mode will be implemented soon.

Thomas Stanley↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Uncovering Hazards Using a Multi-Objective Optimization to Explore the Faulty State-Space

Considering resilience when designing complex engineered systems is crucial to ensure the system is safe under unexpected hazardous scenarios. Traditional risk-based approaches, such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are useful for designing the system to mitigate hazardous scenarios that can be identified by the designer, but often require experience or prior knowledge of system failures to generate. More recently, researchers have developed simulation tools that enable the designer to model large sets of hazardous scenarios (driven by both internal faults and external factors) through simulation. While these tools enable a wider scope of fault modes to be evaluated (e.g., by injecting combined set of fault modes or injecting modes at different times), the resulting assessments (like FMEA) still require knowledge of the specific modes to be evaluated. However, failure to analyze a wide variety of fault scenarios can lead to an incomplete picture of the system resilience, especially to "surprise events'' which may be difficult for the designer to identify and predict beforehand. To overcome this challenge, previous work developed a fault sampling approach for resilience simulations which would procedurally-generate a wide variety of potential faults by systematically perturbing the health states of the system. While the resulting fault modes generated covered a much larger space hazards than would be otherwise considered (and identified many unique failure trajectories which would not have otherwise been identified), it also significantly increased the computational cost of the analysis and resulted in the simulation and analysis of a large set of essentially duplicate scenarios. Additionally, as the number of dimensions in the faulty state-space increases, the full elaboration of possible modes becomes computationally infeasible, justifying the use of a more targeted search. To resolve this limitation, this work proposes the use of a multiobjective optimization algorithm to search the health state space for potential fault modes that are both (1) hazardous and (2) unique. To solve this type of problem, this work proposes the use of a cooperative co-evolutionary algorithm. To demonstrate this approach, it will be applied to a model of an autonomous rover which uses line markings to navigate, focusing on potential hazards in the drive system which could cause the rover to crash. To determine the merit of the approach, it will further be compared with the previously-presented range elaboration approach and a random mode generation approach on the basis of computational efficiency and found modes.

Resilience↗
NASA NTRS2023

Probabilistic Hydrological Estimation of LandSlides (PHELS): Global Ensemble Landslide Hazard Modelling

In this study we present a model for the global Probabilistic Hydrological Estimation of LandSlides (PHELS). PHELS estimates the daily hazard of hydrologically triggered landslides at a coarse spatial resolution of 36 km, by combining landslide susceptibility (LSS) and (percentiles of) hydrological variable(s). The latter include daily rainfall, a 7-day antecedent rainfall index (ARI7) or root-zone soil moisture content (rzmc) as hydrological predictor variables, or the combination of rainfall and rzmc. The hazard estimates with any of these predictor variables have areas under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) above 0.68. The best performance was found with combined rainfall and rzmc predictors (AUC = 0.79), which resulted in the lowest number of missed alarms (especially during spring) and false alarms. Furthermore, PHELS provides hazard uncertainty estimates by generating ensemble simulations based on repeated sampling of LSS and the hydrological predictor variables. The estimated hazard uncertainty follows the behaviour of the input variable uncertainties, is about 13.6 % of the estimated hazard value on average across the globe and in time and is smallest for very low and very high hazard values.

Anne Felsberg↗