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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

5G Open Core Hardware

This project aimed to develop an experimentation platform for 5G using commercially available software, firmware and hardware that is being used to standup experimental 5G Stand Alone (5G SA) networks. The commercially available systems are not natively set up for experimentation design and this work would develop a system capable of performing experimentation. This platform will need to be easily reconfigurable for each experiment, capture all configurations across key equipment before running an experiment, record and store the data during an experiment and be able to recall settings and data from prior experiments while being able to emulate and replay prior experiments. The project began in the process of creating this platform.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Comparison of Response Times for the Thermo ASP-2S1/NRD and Ludlum 30-7B Neutron Instruments

Health Physics Services (HPS) received feedback from a customer service survey regarding the difference in response times between the Thermo ASP-2S1/NRD (Thermo) and Ludlum Model 30-7B (Ludlum). In response to the feedback, tests were performed in the field and duplicated in a laboratory to evaluate and compare each instrument’s response time to reach an applied exposure. The results of the tests showed that optimizing its screen refresh rate by updating the Ludlum’s firmware improves response time, making it more comparable to the Thermo.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Highly Segmented Silicon Strip Detectors for Radiation Detection (LDRD Final Report)

Large area highly segmented silicon strip detectors were investigated for use in applied radiation detection applications. Two ASIC-based readout electronics solutions were tested for compatibility. During the analysis, it was determined that significant computational resources and highly specialized firmware are required to reconstruct the data into a meaningful data stream for generalized spectroscopic performance. Future investment in the technology and careful choice of readout ASIC is expected to demonstrate relevance in measuring high activity samples.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

ASIC Scoping Study Final Report

This report documents the results and findings of a one-year scoping study investigating multichannel readout application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) for interfacing to, and processing data from, silicon photomultiplier (SiPM) arrays. We document ASIC desired and required specifications for four applications supporting national security mission areas: neutron radiography, associated particle imaging, and two versions of kinematic neutron imaging cameras. While each application has a few unique requirements that stress capability, there is generally good agreement among most. Two recently developed ASIC devices were evaluated in a system-like configuration by interfacing these to scintillator crystals exposed to gamma and neutron sources. The 64-channel ORNL device delivered functional capability while meeting most mission requirements for neutron radiography. The Nalu Scientific device, a 32-channel full waveform digitizer, did not demonstrate reliable neutron / gamma separation but it is unclear if this was an ASIC issue or problems with test setup or firmware. A literature survey of other commercial and academic ASICs was undertaken to with the conclusion that existing devices do not meet all requirements.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Precision Neutrino Oscillation Physics with the Daya Bay and DUNE Experiments

The team supported by this grant made significant contributions to the final results of the Daya Bay Reactor Antineutrino Experiment. This experiment utilized eight identically designed antineutrino detectors positioned at varying distances from six 2.9 GW th nuclear reactors to precisely measure the oscillation parameters that govern antineutrino disappearance at short (<2 km) baselines. Our group played a leading role in the calibration and data quality efforts, both of which have been crucial for all final results. Additionally, we co-led the development of an independent measurement of the neutrino mixing angle θ 13 and the atmospheric mass splitting using a sample of antineutrinos identified via neutron capture on hydrogen. Lastly, we laid the groundwork for a search for seasonal modulation in Daya Bay’s measured muon flux using the final dataset, a result expected to be published soon. Simultaneously, our team ramped up its participation in the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE). This experiment will employ a powerful neutrino beam from Fermilab in Illinois directed to the Homestake mine in South Dakota to address some of the most pressing questions in neutrino physics, including the ordering of neutrino masses and whether neutrinos violate the CP symmetry. Our work focused on the development of the pixelated and modularized Liquid Argon Time-Projection Chamber technology that is being prepared for DUNE’s Near Detector. Our group took responsibility for the development, testing, and maintenance of the firmware for the control boards of the detector’s charge readout system and played an active role in analyzing data produced by the very first fully integrated prototypes.

2x2 Demonstrator↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment and Coordination of EVSE Cybersecurity Standards

Cybersecurity certification programs for Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) are fragmented due to no single certification covering all aspects of the device and additionally the existence of multiple programs and under different levels of regulation. These devices are also confronted by the intricate assembly of product software, firmware, and hardware. Devices contain both logical and physical interfaces. These multifaceted devices have vulnerabilities at many levels and interconnect with other potentially vulnerable systems including the electric vehicle, the cloud where data and payment information are stored, and the electric grid and electric grid equipment including utilities. Of the EVSE certification programs that are found, none are directly for the cybersecurity of EVSE. Many standards are for safety, specifically battery safety, some are cybersecurity standards for other types of equipment and can be modeled for EVSE. In specific, ISA/IEC 62443 is found to be significantly in line with EVSE security needs and will be used in future testing to certify EVSE and help guide the project to demonstrate where gaps exist, where strengths lie in the standard and how this can be used to lead the certification efforts in harmonizing EVSE cybersecurity standards. In addition, there are multiple efforts that are currently seeking to build EVSE standards or revise existing standards to address gaps. This effort is seeking to establish a cybersecurity program for EVSE that will inform customers and help increase the level of security across products and state EVSE procurements to achieve consistency across different jurisdictions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Overview and Commentary on Applying the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Process to Photovoltaic System Devices

The rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly inverters, has introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten both local operations as well as the broader electrical grid’s stability. PV inverters, integrated into critical energy infrastructure are potential targets for cyber attacks due to vulnerabilities in firmware, remote access systems, and communication protocols. The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides a framework for identifying, reporting, and addressing these vulnerabilities in a transparent and collaborative manner. This report outlines the CVD process as it applies to PV systems, detailing the roles of key stakeholders, such as manufacturers, grid operators, and security researchers. The report also highlights specific challenges in managing vulnerabilities for new and legacy PV systems, which includes those introduced by insecure communications and third-party supply chain components. By adhering to the CVD process, the PV industry can mitigate cybersecurity risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and maintain consumer trust, while safeguarding the operational resilience of the energy grid. Ultimately, the effective coordination of vulnerability management is crucial for securing the future of PV systems within the critical electric grid infrastructure landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

FY25 Mid-Year Report: FNCL Enhancements Implementation

During the first half of FY25 the FNCL team has made consistent progress toward the completion of our project goals. The FNCL prototype panel design has been successfully applied to a fully instrumented 3-panel system which is actively under construction. The FNCL Demonstrator System contains solid scintillators instrumented with SiPMs, which operate on an updated CAEN digitizer, requires no high-voltage, and has a smaller overall footprint. The onboard software will include the LLNL-developed GMM-PSD signal processing. Later this year the system will be experimentally tested alongside the baseline FNCL instrument at LLNLs ISSA facility. In addition to a full systems test, the performance of a DD generator for active interrogation measurements compared to the standard AmLi source will be established for both systems. The data collected at the ISSA facility will be used to experimentally validate the FNCL-Fast Isotopic Fuel Assay’s (FIFA) capability to measure U-235 loading and to predict gadolinium poison content with passive interrogation. The FNCL-FIFA modal was benchmarked with simulation-based data and a user-friendly GUI was added earlier this year. Three separate codes have been submitted to the LLNL ESW system for review prior to their transfers. These include the Predictive Modeling Response toolkit, GMM-PSD firmware beta version, and the FNCL-FIFA analysis package with GUI and user documentation.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

ORNL Package Testing Program Software Quality Assurance Plan

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Package Testing Program (PTP) uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software in performing data collection of thermal test results for package designs that contain radioactive materials. Specifically, this software is used to collect temperature data from the furnace, packages, and ambient air to prepare and execute the thermal test specified in 10 CFR 71.73, “Thermal Test.” This software quality assurance (SQA) plan sets forth the guidelines, standards, and procedures that shall be used to provide SQA for PTP software applications. This is a living document that will be maintained for the lifecycle of the PTP program. The SQA plan follows the requirements set forth in ORNL Standards Based Management System (SBMS): Information Technology; Subject Area: Software Quality Assurance. When applicable to the requirements as described in ORNL SBMS, Software Quality Assurance, the software shall be listed in the ORNL Software Registration System (SRS). Exemptions to this SBMS are COTS and firmware that are not modified; spreadsheet applications and personal productivity tools that do not have a utility or safety application, research applications, legacy software, system software, vendor-supplied software used to interface with the vendor’s services, software used within the organization to facilitate processing or management of information, and software developed for applications not specific to the US Department of Energy (DOE).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

COnfirmation using Gamma-ray Non-Imaging Zero-knowledge ANti-mask Time-encoding (COGNIZANT) Final Summary Report

In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Optimization and Commercialization of the Juvenile Eel/Lamprey Acoustic Transmitter and Micro-battery (CRADA 477)

Through collaboration with partners under this CRADA, we continued to optimize the Eel/Lamprey Acoustic Transmitter (ELAT) of the Juvenile Salmon Acoustic Telemetry System (JSATS) to enhance its capability to track sensitive species and early life stages of fish with 3D and sub-meter accuracy. The transmitter firmware was improved to offer new functionalities, and the circuit design was revised to provide significantly more accurate frequency transmission. The transmitter's transducer was replaced with a shorter, more energy-efficient model. Additionally, the manufacturing processes for the transmitter and the microbattery used in it were improved. The outcomes of this work help advance understanding of migration timing and behaviors, habitat use, and survival rates of these species, supporting more informed management decisions for new and existing hydroelectric facilities and better designs for new hydropower systems that minimize or avoid environmental impacts.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Blueprint for DOE Quantum Supercomputing: Ensuring U.S. Leadership in the Quantum Decade

Quantum computing stands at the threshold of a transformative decade, where the field will evolve from small-scale demonstrations toward practical scientific computing at scale. This Blueprint identifies fault-tolerant quantum computers (FTQCs) as a viable, scalable, and broadly applicable path to achieving “quantum scientific utility,” defined as solving scientifically valuable problems beyond the reach of conventional, classical computers. This capability is expected to show scientific demonstrations in the late 2020s and to mature in the early-to-mid 2030s. This Blueprint outlines a strategy to prepare the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for FTQCs and their integration into the U.S. national scientific computing infrastructure. Its purpose is to identify the steps, milestones, and research directions necessary for DOE to enable initial deployment of FTQCs in 2028 as a scientific tool for the nation and mature this capability into the 2030s. DOE has a long history of supporting quantum information science and technology, contributing significantly to research advancements, training a quantum-ready workforce, and providing access to early small-scale quantum hardware. Given recent demonstrations of logical operations on error-corrected logical qubits and the advancement of commercial hardware roadmaps, DOE should begin preparations for large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computing deployment for DOE science missions. This Blueprint proposes that DOE focus on (1) deploying first-generation scientifically relevant quantum computers with at least 100 logical qubits and performing at least 10,000 to 100,000 hard logical operations in scientifically relevant calculations; (2) developing essential FTQC programming competencies, system software, and facility readiness; and (3) investing in cutting edge focused R&D that fosters breakthroughs in scientific applications, algorithms, and logical architectures needed to accelerate the advent of scientific utility. This effort will position DOE to transition to larger systems: production-scale quantum computers that comprise 1,000 to 10,000 logical qubits, perform 1 to 10 billion hard logical operations, and execute scientifically useful computations at scale. Achieving these goals will require DOE facilities to evolve with urgency to support scientific campaigns that integrate quantum and classical computing resources into efficient workflows, novel software and firmware environments for compiling and routing quantum programs on FTQC machines, and suitable infrastructure for quantum hardware. It will also require further development and optimization of scientific applications from the fields of materials science, quantum chemistry, and high-energy and nuclear physics. The Blueprint calls for transformative R&D and collective action to accelerate the advent of scientific quantum utility and bring it within reach by 2028.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Assessment Guide: A Technical Inspection and Hardening Guide for Devices in Power Grid Operations

This Equipment Assessment Guide, developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides a comprehensive framework designed to enhance the security of operational technology (OT) devices within power grid operations. The guide outlines essential steps for asset owners to conduct technical inspections and harden vulnerable hardware and firmware components commonly found in embedded systems. It focuses on components frequently targeted by cyber threats, offering valuable identification techniques for locating and recognizing critical components on devices. Additionally, the guide presents recommended secure configurations aimed at minimizing exposure and reinforcing defenses, along with impact analysis that highlights the potential consequences for grid operations if components are compromised. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this guide, asset owners can significantly enhance their cybersecurity posture, reduce the attack surface of field-deployed devices, and improve the resilience of grid services against emerging cyber threats.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

RF Digitizer for EIC LLRF

With the shutdown of Relativisitc Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC) in FY26, the former RHIC facility will be upgraded to the new Electron-Ion Collider (EIC). An RF Digitizer for the EIC LLRF system has been developed and tested on a RHIC 197 MHz cavity in Q2 2026 for a baseline per formance. Firmware and software has been developed and validated during the 197 MHz cavity test. Preliminary data from the cavity test shows phase noise performance signifi cantly better than the RHIC LLRF system.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Testing the Common Platform LLRF with a 197 MHz NCRF Cavity

The Common Platform is the hardware that will support the new LLRF platform to be used for the Electron-Ion Collider. The Common Platform features a carrier board that is used to interface with a variety of daughter for different applications. This paper details the testing that was done using the Common Platform and an RF Digitizer Daugther Board. Firstly, the firmware and software development is discussed followed by a description of the controls algorithms used in the testing. Then, testing and verification of the platform with a 197 MHz NCRF cavity is discussed. The paper concludes with results from the testing and the path forward.

42 ENGINEERING↗