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At least 127 records · Page 7

Measurements of plutonium, 237 Np, and 137 Cs in the BCR 482 lichen reference material

Select anthropogenic radionuclides were measured in lichen reference material, BCR 482. This material was originally collected in Axalp, Switzerland in 1991 and is composed of the epiphytic lichen Pseudevernia furfuracea . Samples from three separate bottles of BCR 482 were analyzed for uranium, neptunium, and plutonium isotopes by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and analyzed for cesium-137 by gamma-ray spectrometry. The isotopic composition of the radionuclides measured in BCR 482 suggests contributions from both global fallout resulting from historical nuclear weapons testing and more volatile materials released following the Chernobyl accident.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Information technology and innovative drainage management practices for selenium load reduction from irrigated agriculture to provide stakeholder assurances and meet contaminant mass loading policy objectives

Many perceive the implementation of environmental regulatory policy, especially concerning non-point source pollution from irrigated agriculture, as being less efficient in the United States than in many other countries. This is partly a result of the stakeholder involvement process but is also a reflection of the inability to make effective use of Environmental Decision Support Systems (EDSS) to facilitate technical information exchange with stakeholders and to provide a forum for innovative ideas for controlling non-point source pollutant loading. This paper describes one of the success stories where a standardized Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) methodology was modified to better suit regulation of a trace element in agricultural subsurface drainage and information technology was developed to help guide stakeholders, provide assurances to the public and encourage innovation while improving compliance with State water quality objectives. The geographic focus of the paper is the western San Joaquin Valley where, in 1985, evapoconcentration of selenium in agricultural subsurface drainage water, diverted into large ponds within a federal wildlife refuge, caused teratogenecity in waterfowl embryos and in other sensitive wildlife species. The fallout from this environmental disaster was a concerted attempt by State and Federal water agencies to regulate non-point source loads of the trace element selenium. The complexity of selenium hydrogeochemistry, the difficulty and expense of selenium concentration monitoring and political discord between agricultural and environmental interests created challenges to the regulation process. Innovative policy and institutional constructs, supported by environmental monitoring and the web-based data management and dissemination systems, provided essential decision support, created opportunities for adaptive management and ultimately contributed to project success. The paper provides a retrospective on the contentious planning process and offers suggestions as to how the technical and institutional issues could have been resolved faster through early adoption of some of the core principles of sound EDSS design.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Empirical evidence that mean soil contaminant concentration is not a conservative indicator of external exposure to wildlife

Adequate information on external exposure is often a limiting factor in ecological risk assessments because of a lack of exposure data for free-ranging animals as they interact with a heterogeneous distribution of contaminants. Instead, most wildlife exposure data are estimated from model simulations. However, empirical exposure data are rarely available to verify model results, or to test fundamental assumptions inherent in exposure assessments. We used novel, GPS-coupled radiation dosimeters on reindeer (Rangifer tarandus) to quantify their external exposure for five months in a Chernobyl fallout affected mountainous area of Norway. The exposure data were then used to test a fundamental assumption in screening-level risk assessments: Mean soil contaminant concentrations can be used to conservatively estimate chronic external exposures to representative animals. External exposure and GPS coordinates were obtained hourly and compared to model simulations of exposure based on airborne surveys of 137 Cs soil contamination. Our objectives were to determine 1) if modelled dose estimates based on mean 137 Cs soil concentrations were conservative, and 2) if modelled dose estimates could be improved by adjusting for spatial–temporal heterogeneity of contaminants using 137 Cs concentrations within reindeers’ GPS-defined home ranges and core areas. We found that external exposure modelled from mean soil contaminant concentrations underestimated exposure by 70% compared to empirical measurements from GPS-dosimeter collars worn on individual animals. Using area-weighted mean contaminant levels within the animals’ home range improved the model estimates, but still underestimated the field dosimeter data by 53%. The best estimate of external exposure was obtained when high-use areas within their home range, along with spatial heterogeneity of the contaminant, was accounted for by using area-weighted mean soil contaminant levels within GPS-derived core areas. Accounting for temporal use of core areas within animals’ home range provided a 24% improvement. Here, a comparison of our analyses to similar work performed on Chernobyl wolves found the two studies concur that risk assessors should be cautious in relying on the paradigm of using averaged soil contaminant levels to provide conservative estimates of external exposure to representative individuals. Results of modelled external exposure based on mean soil contaminant concentrations could misguide assessors and cause inappropriate management decisions.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Effects of incomplete residential histories on studies of environmental exposure with application to childhood leukaemia and background radiation

Highlights: • Residential exposures are most important for many environmental carcinogens. • Direct measurement in all occupied homes is the gold standard but may be impractical. • About half of cases of childhood cancer have not moved between birth and diagnosis. • Most house movements are short-range; exposures in successive houses are correlated. • Analyses using exposure estimation from a single address are informative. When evaluating environmental exposures, residential exposures are often most relevant. In most countries, it is impossible to establish full residential histories. In recent publications, childhood leukaemia and background radiation have been studied with and without full residential histories. This paper investigates the consequences of lacking such full data. Data from a nationwide Finnish Case-Control study of Childhood Leukaemia and gamma rays were analysed. This included 1093 children diagnosed with leukaemia in Finland in 1990–2011. Each case was matched by gender and year of birth to three controls. Full residential histories were available. The dose estimates were based on outdoor background radiation measurements. The indoor dose rates were obtained with a dwelling type specific conversion coefficient and the individual time-weighted mean red bone marrow dose rates were calculated using age-specific indoor occupancy and the age and gender of the child. Radiation from Chernobyl fallout was included and a 2-year latency period assumed. The median separation between successive dwellings was 3.4 km and median difference in red bone marrow dose 2.9 nSv/h. The Pearson correlation between the indoor red bone marrow dose rates of successive dwellings was 0.62 (95% CI 0.60, 0.64). The odds ratio for a 10 nSv/h increase in dose rate with full residential histories was 1.01 (95% CI 0.97, 1.05). Similar odds ratios were calculated with dose rates based on only the first dwelling (1.02, 95% CI 0.99, 1.05) and only the last dwelling (1.00, 95% CI 0.98, 1.03) and for subjects who had lived only in a single dwelling (1.05, 95% CI 0.98, 1.10). Knowledge of full residential histories would always be the option of choice. However, due to the strong correlation between exposure estimates in successive dwellings and the uncertainty about the most relevant exposure period, estimation of overall exposure level from a single address is also informative. Error in dose estimation is likely to cause some degree of classical measurement error resulting in bias towards the null.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Constraining the behavior of gallium isotopes during evaporation at extreme temperatures

Renewed interest in gallium isotope systematics has stemmed from the fact that Ga is moderately volatile and is hypothesized to undergo kinetic fractionation during evaporation. In this work, we present the first Ga isotope data from terrestrial volatile depleted samples including a suite of experimentally heated rhyolitic soils, fallout melt glass, and splash-form tektites from the Australasian strewn field (hereafter termed australite tektites). The Ga in these samples is isotopically heavy compared to Ga in terrestrial basalts and estimates for the composition of the bulk silicate Earth (BSE). For each sample suite the isotopic fractionation of Ga scales with the degree of Ga depletion, consistent with isotopic fractionation caused by evaporation.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

137 Cs Activities and 135 Cs/ 137 Cs Isotopic Ratios from Soils at Idaho National Laboratory: A Case Study for Contaminant Source Attribution in the Vicinity of Nuclear Facilities

Radiometric and mass spectrometric analyses of Cs contamination in the environment can reveal the location of Cs emission sources, release mechanisms, modes of transport, prediction of future contamination migration, and attribution of contamination to specific generator(s) and/or process(es). The Subsurface Disposal Area (SDA) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) represents a complicated case study for demonstrating the current capabilities and limitations to environmental Cs analyses. 137 Cs distribution patterns, 135 Cs/ 137 Cs isotope ratios, known Cs chemistry at this site, and historical records enable narrowing the list of possible emission sources and release events to a single source and event, with the SDA identified as the emission source and flood transport of material from within Pit 9 and Trench 48 as the primary release event. These data combined allow refining the possible number of waste generators from dozens to a single generator, with INL on-site research and reactor programs identified as the most likely waste generator. A discussion on the ultimate limitations to the information that 135 Cs/ 137 Cs ratios alone can provide is presented and includes (1) uncertainties in the exact date of the fission event and (2) possibility of mixing between different Cs source terms (including nuclear weapons fallout and a source of interest).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Radioecologycal study of {sup 239/240}Pu in Bangka Island and Muria Peninsula: Determination of {sup 239/240}Pu in marine sediment and seawater as part of baseline data collecting for sitting of candidates of first Indonesia NPP

Radioisotope Pu-239/240 are alpha emitting nuclides important indicators of radioactive contamination of the marine environment. Global fallout is the main source of plutonium in the marine environment. There are very limited study on {sup 239/240}Pu in Indonesia coastal environments. The data of this radioisotopes is needed for baseline data of nuclear power plant (NPP) site candidates both in Bangka Island and Muria Peninsula. Bottom sediments play an important role in radioecological studies of the marine environment because a large proportion of radioactive substances entering the sea is adsorbed over time onto suspended particulate matter and deposited in sediments. Plutonium is particle reactive and deposited in marine sediment. Radioisotope {sup 239/240}Pu was determinated by alpha spectrometry after radiochemical procedure that was performed in both water and marine sediment from Bangka Island and Muria Peninsula. The sediment baseline of concentration {sup 239/240}Pu in Bangka Island and Muria Peninsula were range from 0.013 to 0.021 Bq.kg{sup −1} and 0.018 to 0.024 Bq.kg{sup −1} respectively. The water baseline concentration this isotope were range from 2.73 to 4.05 mBq.m{sup −3} and 2.98 to 4.50 mBq.m{sup −3}.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Disaggregating measurement uncertainty from population variability and Bayesian treatment of uncensored results

In making low-level radioactivity measurements of populations, it is commonly observed that a substantial portion of net results are negative. Furthermore, the observed variance of the measurement results arises from a combination of measurement uncertainty and population variability. This paper presents a method for disaggregating measurement uncertainty from population variability to produce a probability density function (PDF) of possibly true results. To do this, simple, justifiable, and reasonable assumptions are made about the relationship of the measurements to the measurands (the 'true values'). The measurements are assumed to be unbiased, that is, that their average value is the average of the measurands. Using traditional estimates of each measurement's uncertainty to disaggregate population variability from measurement uncertainty, a PDF of measurands for the population is produced. Then, using Bayes's theorem, the same assumptions, and all the data from the population of individuals, a prior PDF is computed for each individual's measurand. These PDFs are non-negative, and their average is equal to the average of the measurement results for the population. The uncertainty in these Bayesian posterior PDFs is all Berkson with no remaining classical component. The methods are applied to baseline bioassay data from the Hanford site. The data include 90Sr urinalysis measurements on 128 people, 137Cs in vivo measurements on 5,337 people, and 239Pu urinalysis measurements on 3,270 people. The method produces excellent results for the 90Sr and 137Cs measurements, since there are nonzero concentrations of these global fallout radionuclides in people who have not been occupationally exposed. The method does not work for the 239Pu measurements in non-occupationally exposed people because the population average is essentially zero.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Radiation Doses to Members of the U.S. Population from Ubiquitous Radionuclides in the Body: Part 1, Autopsy and In Vivo Data

This paper is part one of a three-part series investigating annual effective doses to residents of the United States from intakes of ubiquitous radionuclides, including radionuclides occurring naturally, radionuclides whose concentrations are technologically enhanced, and anthropogenic radionuclides. This series of papers explicitly excludes intakes from inhaling 222Rn, 220Rn, and their short-lived decay products; it also excludes intakes of radionuclides in occupational and medical settings. The goal of part one of this work was to review, summarize, and characterize all published and some unpublished data for U.S. residents on ubiquitous radionuclide concentrations in tissues and organs. Forty-five papers and reports were obtained and their data reviewed, and three data sets were obtained via private communication. The 45 radionuclides of interest are the 238U series (14 nuclides), the actinium series (headed by 235U; 11 nuclides), and the 232Th series (11 nuclides); primordial radionuclides 87Rb and 40 K; cosmogenic and fallout radionuclides 14C and 3H; and purely anthropogenic radionuclides 137Cs-137mBa, 129I, and 90Sr-90Y. Measurements judged to be relevant were available for only 15 of these radionuclides: 238U, 235U, 234U, 232Th, 230Th, 228Th, 228Ra, 226Ra, 210Pb, 210Po, 137Cs, 87Rb, 40K, 14C, and 3H. Recent and relevant measurements were not available for 129I and 90Sr-90Y. A total of 11,714 radionuclide concentration measurements were found in one or more tissues or organs from 14 States. Data on age, sex, geographic locations, height, and weight of subjects were available only sporadically. Too often authors did not provide meaningful values of uncertainty of measurements so that variability in data sets is confounded with measurement uncertainty. The following papers detail how these shortcomings are overcome to achieve the goals of the three-part series.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Radiation Doses to Members of the U.S. Population from Ubiquitous Radionuclides in the Body: Part 3, Results, Variability, and Uncertainty

This paper is part three of a three-part series investigating annual effective doses to residents of the United States from intakes of ubiquitous radionuclides, including radionuclides occurring naturally, radionuclides whose concentrations are technologically enhanced, and anthropogenic radionuclides. The radionuclides of interest are the 238U series (14 nuclides), the actinium series (headed by 235U; 11 nuclides), and the 232Th series (11 nuclides); primordial radionuclides 87Rb and 40K; cosmogenic and fallout radionuclides 14C and 3H; and purely anthropogenic radionuclides 137Cs-137mBa, 129I and 90Sr-90Y. This series of papers explicitly excludes intakes from inhaling 222Rn, 220Rn, and their short-lived decay products; it also excludes intakes of radionuclides in occupational and medical settings. Part one reviewed, summarized, characterized, and grouped all published and some unpublished data for U.S. residents on ubiquitous radionuclide concentrations in tissues and organs. Part two described the methods used to organize the data collected in part one and segregate it into the ages and genders defined by the study, imputed missing values from the existing data, apportioned activity in bone, and imputed activity in hollow organ contents and the remainder of the body. This paper estimates equivalent doses to target tissues from source regions and maps target tissues to lists of tissues with International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) tissue-weighting factors or to surrogate tissue regions when there is no direct match. Effective doses, using ICRP tissue-weighting factors recommended in 1977, 1990, and 2007, are then calculated, and an upper bound of variability of the effective dose is estimated by calculating the average coefficients of variation (CV), assuming all variance is due to variability. Most of the data were for adult males, whose average annual effective dose is estimated to be 337 μSv (CV = 0.65, geometric mean = 283 μSv, geometric standard deviation sG = 1.81) using 2007 ICRP tissue-weighting factors. This result is between the National Council on Radiation Protection & Measurements’ 1987 estimate of 390 μSv (using 1977 wTs) and its 2009 estimate of 285 μSv (using 2007 wTs) and is higher than the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation’s 2000 estimate of 310 μSv (using 1990 wTs). The methods and software developed for this project are sufficiently detailed and sufficiently general to be usable with autopsy data from any or all countries.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

Corrective Action Unit 367 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): • 10-09-03, Mud Pit • 10-45-01, U-10h Crater (Sedan) • 10-45-02, Ess Crater Site • 10-45-03, Uncle Crater Site The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation of the corrective actions and site closure activities implemented at CAU 367. A corrective action of closure in place with use restrictions was completed at each of the three crater CASs (10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03); corrective actions were not required at CAS 10-09-03. In addition, a limited soil removal corrective action was conducted at the location of a potential source material release. Based on completion of these correction actions, no additional corrective action is required at CAU 367, and site closure is considered complete. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from February 2010 through March 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of non-test or other releases (e.g., migration in washes and potential source material). Based on the proximity of the Uncle, Ess, and Sedan craters, the impact of the Sedan test on the fallout deposited from the two earlier tests, and aerial radiological surveys, the CAU 367 investigation was designed to study the releases from the three crater CASs as one combined release (primary release). Corrective Action Site 10-09-03, Mud Pit, consists of two mud pits identified at CAU 367. The mud pits are considered non-test releases or other releases and were investigated independent of the three crater CASs. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 367 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. For the primary release, radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface or shallow subsurface soil outside the default contamination boundary. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within each of the three craters (Sedan, Ess, and Uncle) due to prompt injection of radionuclides from the tests. Based on the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each crater CAS. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. With regard to other releases, no contaminants of concern were identified at the mud pits or any of the other release locations, with one exception. Potential source material in the form of lead was found at one location. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at this location, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 367. • Corrective Action Unit 367 should be promoted from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NUclear EVacuation Analysis Code (NUEVAC) : a tool for evaluation of sheltering and evacuation responses following urban nuclear detonations.

The NUclear EVacuation Analysis Code (NUEVAC) has been developed by Sandia National Laboratories to support the analysis of shelter-evacuate (S-E) strategies following an urban nuclear detonation. This tool can model a range of behaviors, including complex evacuation timing and path selection, as well as various sheltering or mixed evacuation and sheltering strategies. The calculations are based on externally generated, high resolution fallout deposition and plume data. Scenario setup and calculation outputs make extensive use of graphics and interactive features. This software is designed primarily to produce quantitative evaluations of nuclear detonation response options. However, the outputs have also proven useful in the communication of technical insights concerning shelter-evacuate tradeoffs to urban planning or response personnel.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Workshop introduction

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has three subprograms that directly reduce the nuclear/radiological threat; Convert (Highly Enriched Uranium), Protect (Facilities), and Remove (Materials). The primary mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) falls under the 'Remove' subset. The purpose of this workshop is to provide a venue for joint-technical collaboration between the OSRP and the Nuclear Radiation Safety Service (NRSS). Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative and the Soviet equivalent both promoted the spread of the paradoxical (peaceful and harmful) properties of the atom. The focus of nonproliferation efforts has been rightly dedicated to fissile materials and the threat they pose. Continued emphasis on radioactive materials must also be encouraged. An unquantifiable threat still exists in the prolific quantity of sealed radioactive sources (sources) spread worldwide. It does not appear that the momentum of the evolution in the numerous beneficial applications of radioactive sources will subside in the near future. Numerous expert studies have demonstrated the potentially devastating economic and psychological impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or emitting device. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the material to the technical knowledge needed to develop and use it, is straightforward. There are many documented accounts worldwide of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. The burden of securing sealed sources often falls upon the source owner, who may not have a disposal pathway once the source reaches the end of its useful life. This disposal problem is exacerbated by some source owners not having the resources to safely and compliantly store them. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) data suggests that, in the US alone, there are tens of thousands of high-activity (IAEA Category I and II) sources in thousands of devices; and there are many more tens of thousands of smaller sources scattered among thousands of other NRC licensees. As a result of the ubiquitous nature and undeterminable number of current and legacy sources, even in developed countries they can be abandoned, disposed of in a haphazard manner, lost, stolen, and/or otherwise fallout of regulatory control. Supply and demand of sources, being market based, is more or less fluid. Normative security of radioactive sources exists, but varies in each country, and is loosely implemented through non-legally binding recommendations and standards provided by International Atomic Energy Agency technical documents and cooperation and through bilateral efforts such as this workshop where we share best-practices with one another. Much of the reason for the difficulty in securing sealed sources rests in the enormous need for their beneficial applications in the medical, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Alternative technologies to replace high-risk sources continue to be explored, but very few of these alternative solutions have reached the development stage for common usage and distribution. The beneficial uses of sources must be allowed to continue; however, to minimize the potential for their misuse, current controls and regulating mechanisms must be constantly evaluated to ensure the benefits gained outweigh potential risks. From a global perspective, an evaluation and modification of requirements over the entire life cycle of sources from their manufacture to their final disposition is required. The proper removal and disposal of vulnerable disused or orphan sources is essential to maintaining a safe operating environment. One of our goals in this workshop is to share our methodologies for recovering sources and learn how they differ or are similar to the challenges faced in recovering, storing, and disposing of sources in the Republic of Georgia . The suggestions we will make are flexible in allowing for the imperfect situations and capabilities we have all encountered in source recovery efforts. We have designed a table-top exercise specifically to address your concerns about the prevention and mitigation of contaminated facilities, soil, containers, and sources. Our discussion begins with an overview and video of the OSRP along with a brief on our projects ongoing international cooperation and activities. A presentation will be given by the NRSS illustrating the successes and challenges of source management in Georgia. A brief overview will be given of selected significant cases of the intentional misuse of sources. This will be followed by two comprehensive discussions focusing on the decontamination from the facility perspective down to the issues of container and source leakage. The second day will begin with the abovementioned table-top exercise on contamination control. On the third day, a second presentation from the NRSS will open up the session.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

VERTICAL MIGRATION OF RADIONUCLIDES IN THE VICINITY OF THE CHERNOBYL CONFINEMENT SHELTER

Studies on vertical migration of Chernobyl-origin radionuclides in the 5-km zone of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) in the area of the Red Forest experimental site were completed. Measurements were made by gamma spectrometric methods using high purity germanium (HPGe) detectors with beryllium windows. Alpha-emitting isotopes of plutonium were determined by the measurement of the x-rays from their uranium progeny. The presence of {sup 60}Co, {sup 134,137}Cs, {sup 154,155}Eu, and {sup 241}Am in all soil layers down to a depth of 30 cm was observed. The presence of {sup 137}Cs and {sup 241}Am were noted in the area containing automorphous soils to a depth of 60 cm. In addition, the upper soil layers at the test site were found to contain {sup 243}Am and {sup 243}Cm. Over the past ten years, the {sup 241}Am/{sup 137}Cs ratio in soil at the experimental site has increased by a factor of 3.4, nearly twice as much as would be predicted based solely on radioactive decay. This may be due to 'fresh' fallout emanating from the ChNPP Confinement Shelter.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Cesium Isotope Ratios as Indicators of Nuclear Power Plant Operations

There are multiple paths by which radioactive cesium can reach the effluent from reactor operations. The radioactive 135Cs/137Cs ratios are controlled by these paths. In an effort to better understand the origin of this radiation, these 135Cs/137Cs ratios in effluents from three power reactor sites have been measured in offsite samples. These ratios are different from global fallout by up to six fold and as such cannot have a significant component from this source. A cesium ratio for a sample collected outside of the plant boundary provides integration over the operating life of the reactor. A sample collected inside the plant at any given time can be much different from this lifetime ratio. The measured cesium ratios vary significantly for the three reactors and indicate that the multiple paths have widely varying levels of contributions. There are too many ways these isotopes can fractionate to be useful for quantitative evaluations of operating parameters in an offsite sample, although it may be possible to obtain limited qualitative information for an onsite sample.

137Cs↗

August 5, 1963-President Kennedy's Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow, Russia

On August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs marked the end of World War II and the beginning of the nuclear age. As tensions between East and West settled into a Cold War, scientists in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union conducted tests and developed more powerful nuclear weapons. In 1959, radioactive deposits were found in wheat and milk in the northern United States. As scientists and the public gradually became aware of the dangers of radioactive fallout, they began to raise their voices against nuclear testing. Leaders and diplomats of several countries sought to address the issue. In May 1955, the United Nations Disarmament Commission brought together the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on ending nuclear weapons testing. Conflict soon arose over inspections to verify underground testing. The Soviet Union feared that on-site inspections could lead to spying that might expose the Soviets' vastly exaggerated claims of the number of deliverable nuclear weapons. As negotiators struggled over differences, the Soviet Union and the United States suspended nuclear tests—a moratorium that lasted from November 1958 to September 1961. John F. Kennedy had supported ban on nuclear weapons testing since 1956. He believed a ban would prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, and took a strong stand on the issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. Once elected, President Kennedy pledged not to resume testing in the air and promised to pursue all diplomatic efforts for a test ban treaty before resuming underground testing. He envisioned the test ban as a first step to nuclear disarmament. President Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, just five weeks after the humiliating defeat of the US-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev took a hard line at the summit. He announced his intention to cut off Western access to Berlin and threatened war if the United States or its allies tried to stop him. Many US diplomats felt that Kennedy had not stood up to the Soviet premier at the summit and left Khrushchev with the impression that he was a weak leader. President Kennedy's political and military advisers feared that the Soviet Union had continued secret underground testing and made gains in nuclear technology. They pressured Kennedy to resume testing. And, according to a Gallup poll in July 1961, the public approved of testing by a margin of two-to-one. In August 1961, the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume atmospheric testing, and over the next three months it conducted 31 nuclear tests. It exploded the largest nuclear bomb in history—58 megatons—4,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In his commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963, Kennedy announced a new round of high-level arms negotiations with the Russians. He boldly called for an end to the Cold War. "If we cannot end our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity." The Soviet government broadcast a translation of the entire speech, and allowed it to be reprinted in the controlled Soviet press. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by US Secretary Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home—one day short of the 18th anniversary of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Over the next two months, President Kennedy convinced a fearful public and a divided Senate to support the treaty. The Senate approved the treaty on September 23, 1963, by an 80-19 margin. Kennedy signed the ratified treaty on October 7, 1963. The treaty: prohibited nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space allowed underground nuclear tests as long as no radioactive debris falls outside the boundaries of the nation conducting the test pledged signatories to work towards complete disarmament, an end to the armaments race, and an end to the contamination of the environment by radioactive substances. Thirty-three years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Signed by 71 nations, including those possessing nuclear weapons, the treaty prohibited all nuclear test explosions including those conducted underground. Though it was signed by President Bill Clinton, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Rapid Radiochemical Analyses in Support of Fukushima Nuclear Accident - 13196

There is an increasing need to develop faster analytical methods for emergency response, including emergency soil and air filter samples [1, 2]. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) performed analyses on samples received from Japan in April, 2011 as part of a U.S. Department of Energy effort to provide assistance to the government of Japan, following the nuclear event at Fukushima Daiichi, resulting from the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011. Of particular concern was whether it was safe to plant rice in certain areas (prefectures) near Fukushima. The primary objectives of the sample collection, sample analysis, and data assessment teams were to evaluate personnel exposure hazards, identify the nuclear power plant radiological source term and plume deposition, and assist the government of Japan in assessing any environmental and agricultural impacts associated with the nuclear event. SRNL analyzed approximately 250 samples and reported approximately 500 analytical method determinations. Samples included soil from farmland surrounding the Fukushima reactors and air monitoring samples of national interest, including those collected at the U.S. Embassy and American military bases. Samples were analyzed for a wide range of radionuclides, including strontium-89, strontium-90, gamma-emitting radionuclides, and plutonium, uranium, americium and curium isotopes. Technical aspects of the rapid soil and air filter analyses will be described. The extent of radiostrontium contamination was a significant concern. For {sup 89,90}Sr analyses on soil samples, a rapid fusion technique using 1.5 gram soil aliquots to enable a Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) of <1 pCi {sup 89,90}Sr /g of soil was employed. This sequential technique has been published recently by this laboratory for actinides and radiostrontium in soil and vegetation [3, 4]. It consists of a rapid sodium hydroxide fusion, pre-concentration steps using iron hydroxide and calcium fluoride precipitations, followed by Sr-Resin separation and gas flow proportional counting. To achieve a lower detection limit for analysis of some of the Japanese soil samples, a 10 gram aliquot of soil was taken, acid-leached and processed with similar preconcentration chemistry. The MDA using this approach was ∼0.03 pCi/g (1.1 mBq/g)/, which is less than the 0.05-0.10 pCi/g {sup 90}Sr levels found in soil as a result of global fallout. The chemical yields observed for the Japanese soil samples was typically 75-80% and the laboratory control sample (LCS) and matrix spike (MS) results looked very good for this work Individual QC results were well within the ± 25% acceptable range and the average of these results does not show significant bias. Additional data for a radiostrontium in soil method for 50 gram samples will also be presented, which appears to be a significant step forward based on looking at the current literature, with higher chemical yields for even larger sample aliquots and lower MDA [5, 6, 7] Hou et al surveyed a wide range of separation methods for Pu in waters and environmental solid samples [8]. While there are many actinide methods in the scientific literature, few would be considered rapid due to the tedious and time-consuming steps involved. For actinide analyses in soil, a new rapid method for the determination of actinide isotopes in soil samples using both alpha spectrometry and inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry was employed. The new rapid soil method utilizes an acid leaching method, iron/titanium hydroxide precipitation, a lanthanum fluoride soil matrix removal step, and a rapid column separation process with TEVA Resin. The large soil matrix is removed easily and rapidly using these two simple precipitations with high chemical recoveries and effective removal of interferences. [9, 10] Vacuum box technology and rapid flow rates were used to reduce analytical time. Challenges associated with the mineral content in the volcanic soil will be discussed. Air filter samples were reported within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt using rapid techniques published previously. [11] The rapid reporting of high quality analytical data arranged through the U.S. Department of Energy Consequence Management Home Team was critical to allow the government of Japan to readily evaluate radiological impacts from the nuclear reactor incident to both personnel and the environment. SRNL employed unique rapid methods capability for radionuclides to support Japan that can also be applied to environmental, bioassay and waste management samples. New rapid radiochemical techniques for radionuclides in soil and other environmental matrices as well as some of the unique challenges associated with this work will be presented that can be used for application to environmental monitoring, environmental remediation, decommissioning and decontamination activities. (authors)

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Examining Current and Evolving Distribution of Contamination from the FDNPP Accident - 17020

Estimates as well as subsequent measurements of the radiation released following the events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011 place the incident as the second greatest nuclear event to have ever occurred - duly rated at the maximum of Level 7 on the INES Event Scale. The releases of radioactivity from the plant were detected worldwide, however the multi-reactor nature of the events at the FDNPP has complicated the understanding of the radionuclide release inventory and the subsequent distribution of the material. As a result of this highly-complex release scenario, it is important to understand the current and evolving state of contamination within the rapidly evolving, topographically extreme and frequently typhoon impacted environment on Japan's eastern coast. Existing systems rely either on high-altitude manned aircraft to perform such contamination surveys, correcting results to ground-level, or, on humans manually measuring the dose-rate on foot. In order to overcome the shortcomings of both methods, a low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has been developed at the University of Bristol and successfully deployed to the affected areas surrounding the FDNPP. In contrast to these other methods; the use of low-altitude UAVs provides a spatial resolution previously achievable only through the deployment of humans on the ground, with the potential for significant radiation exposure. This high-resolution monitoring allows for subsequent modelling to inform our understanding of the behaviour and long-term stability of the fallout material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗