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122 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

System Analysis Modeling and Intermodal Transportation for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy is applying knowledge and understanding in the areas of systems level engineering, analysis, and decision making to better inform the waste management pathways for U.S. spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Currently there are 93 operating and 23 shutdown commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. SNF at most of these locations is being stored in spent fuel pools, dry storage, or both [1, 2]. This paper initially goes over the basics of the agent-based simulation tool known as the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) that has the capability to model interaction and movements of individual components or groups like casks, railcars etc. The next section covers some of the methods implemented in the Java Transportation Operations Model (JTOM) to facilitate the movement of assemblies, casks, railcars etc. and the various intermodal transfer options. This section also covers the current cask loading and intermodal transfer times implemented in NGSAM. The last section goes over the proposed values for intermodal transportation, and cask transfer/loading operations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Deep Learning Systems for Increased Safeguards Surveillance Review Productivity

Nuclear safeguards inspectors expend significant time and maintain intense focus in reviewing video surveillance for safeguards relevant events. To increase efficiency and reduce the time burden of safeguards inspectors performing surveillance data review, this paper presents a novel deep learning (DL) systems concept to integrate generalized DL models into the safeguards surveillance review workflow. The Agency is investigating several DL algorithms for object recognition, localization, tracking, and flagging relevant activities. The project team is working closely with nuclear safeguards inspectors to identify review use cases (based on specific safeguards objectives) and collect their associated requirements. We focused on CANDU and LWR Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and their associated dry storage areas as these present a particularly heavy burden on the inspector surveillance review process due to the number of these facilities under safeguards worldwide. Initial DL algorithm results on safeguards data are promising. Using a convolutional neural network, the team attained a mean average precision (mAP) of 92.9% identifying and localizing spent fuel (SF) casks from a 475 surveillance image dataset. Further, the team had initial success in training a recurrent neural network to identify reactor area activities in video clips, successfully indicating when SF casks enter or exit a pool. We discuss how such DL algorithms would be integrated into the Next Generation Surveillance Review (NGSR) software application. Another issue impacting review productivity is the long time inspectors may have to wait when running these algorithms in NGSR. We present a concept to pre-process remotely collected surveillance data with DL models as the data arrives to IAEA headquarters so that results are already available when starting a new review in NGSR. The proposed DL system concept shows a pathway and workflow for increasing an inspector’s surveillance review productivity by quickly and accurately identifying declared and undeclared safeguards relevant objects and activities in large quantities of surveillance imagery data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

An Experimental Feasibility Study on Applying Neutron Tomography to Encapsulated Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20050

Visual inspection makes easier to ensure the integrity and safety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) than any classical techniques. Various classical techniques have been applied but there are no reliable methods to qualitatively and quantitatively verify spent fuel in dry storage. Thus, the present authors have developed the prototype safeguards apparatus for dry storage employing the array of He-4 gas scintillation detectors (S670E, Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Switzerland), newly designed to simultaneously measure thermal and fast neutrons without any moderators. The S670E detector has a cylindrical shape with a diameter of 52 mm and active length of 600 mm (total length: 875 mm). The detector is filled by He-4 gas with an approximate pressure of 180 bar for fast neutron detection, and its inner wall is coated by Li-6 for thermal neutron detection. The scintillation lights generated via Li-6 nuclear reaction and elastic scattering are collected by 24 SiPMs linearly paired at the center of the detector. The detector delivers a TTL (Transistor-Transistor Logic) output for pulse readout and UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter) for device control. In order to assess feasibility of the apparatus, an experimental system has been designed, built, and optimized via computational studies. Cf-252 neutron sources and linearly arrayed detectors, working as a single detector, were occupied for this study due to the difficulties in working with SNF. The laboratory scale cask (diameter: 0.67 m, height: 1.5 m), minimized by a factor of 10 compared to the actual thickness of a commercial TN-32 cask, was also manufactured. The detector array was designed to rotate the lab-scale cask and obtain 36 image profiles at every 10 degrees. All profiles were aligned in single frame image called a sinogram, and the cross-sectional image was then fabricated by the inverse radon transform algorithm. These experiments have been repeated with different configurations and numbers of sources. Some gamma-ray sources were also measured with neutron sources in order to distinguish between neutron and gamma-ray pulses. Basically, a He-4 detector is designed to run on Linux OS so it is difficult to directly apply to Windows-based equipment widely used in S. Korea. Therefore, a new data acquisition board working on Windows OS was designed and built. The board mainly consists of FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) and SoC (System on Chip) for TTL pulse readout, sorting measured data, and transferring data to a user interface. In conclusion, the tomographic system at lab-scale has shown considerable potential to detect a partial or gross defect of encapsulated assemblies in dry storage. Next steps of this study will be to 1) repeatedly carry out experiments to demonstrate scientific reliability and validity, and 2) numerically integrate signals with weight factors to enhance the image quality since the suggested system based on passive interrogation method requires longer measurement time. Finally, the system will apply to a commercial dry storage phased out soon in S. Korea. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Code of Record: DOE Standard Canister (DOESC)

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Packaging Demonstration seeks to develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE SNF for road-ready dry storage (RRDS); and establish the processes that will be used in a future production facility. The Packaging Demonstration will utilize the DOE Standard Canister (DOESC) for packaging select DOE-managed SNF types for interim storage, transportation and disposal as part of RRDS. Placing DOE-managed SNF into RRDS is part of the strategic framework for SNF on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. To comply with DOE, INL and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, this Code of Record establishes the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section III, Division 3 as the Code that will govern DOESC and internal support structure constructioni, with certain clarifications. This Code of Record establishes a rationale for proceeding without construction certification of the DOESC (i.e., “N-stamping) and the extent to which a Registered Professional Engineer is required for the DOE Spent Fuel Packaging Demonstration. Given the (i) standard industry practice to pursue independent licensure of commercial storage casks and transportation packages by the NRC in lieu of ASME certification and (ii) guidance provided by 10 CFR 830, DOESC construction activities need not be certified (i.e., “stamped”) to the ASME BPVC. However, additional quality assurance requirements will apply as outlined in this Code of Record.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Skyshine Calculations for a Large Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility with SCALE 6.2.3

The SCALE code system developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory includes state-of-the-art capabilities for radiation source term and radiation transport simulations that can be used in numerous applications, including dose rate analyses of complex consolidated interim storage facilities (CISFs). A licensed CISF could be used to store tens of thousands of tonnes of spent nuclear fuel discharged from commercial power reactors using various cask and storage pad designs. A CISF design must comply with the regulatory requirements provided in 10 CFR Part 72, including requirements related to annual dose limits applicable to real individuals located beyond the area controlled by the licensee. Therefore, calculating a dose to the public is a necessary part of the licensing process for the construction of a CISF. These calculations are very challenging because of the complexity of the CISF design and the low magnitude of dose rate at large distances from the facility. This paper describes detailed far-field dose rate calculations performed for a proposed CISF using MAVRIC, the Monte Carlo radiation shielding sequence in SCALE 6.2.3, with automated variance reduction based on discrete ordinates calculations. The method presented in this paper uses a detailed Monte Carlo radiation transport simulation in one step from source to dose rate. A series of independent simulations was made using the complete site geometry (all casks present), but with only one cask containing radiation sources to obtain the dose rate maps produced by each storage cask. The CISF dose rate map was obtained by adding the dose rate maps produced by the independent individual cask simulations. Ample volumes of air and soil extending beyond the location of interest for dose rate calculation were included in the calculation model to properly simulate important radiation attenuation and scattering events that affect far-field dose rates. Furthermore, a comprehensive sensitivity study is included in this paper to illustrate the importance of selecting appropriate air volume, mass density, and composition for CISF skyshine dose rate calculations. Dry soil and soil containing water were analyzed to determine their effects on groundshine radiation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

DOE SNF Packaging Demonstration Project: Worktable and Canister Loading Sleeve Design [Slides]

This presentation is a briefing for summer interns and others outside the project, to give them a summary of ongoing design activities. The DOE SNF Packaging Demonstration Project is an effort to develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for road ready dry storage (RRDS). The project is to remotely load and seal two types of DOE-managed SNF from the CPP-603 facility into DOE Standard Canisters, place the sealed DOE Standard Canisters into commercial vendor over-canisters (equivalent to commercial MPCs), seal and place the over-canisters into commercial vendor storage overpacks, and place the storage system (over-canister and storage overpack) onto the CPP-2707 cask pad.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modeling and Analysis for Spent Nuclear Fuel Seismic Testing

Note: This is the final public release version of PNNL-31671 Draft, which was previously released to the sponsor for review. The intent is the public release version will be PNNL-31671. There are no significant changes from the earlier draft version. This unlimited distribution report is the deliverable for M3SF-21PN010202014: Modeling and Analysis for Spent Nuclear Fuel Seismic Testing. This report summarizes the modeling, analysis, and test plan support completed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the spent nuclear fuel dry storage system seismic test plan through May of 2021. Test plan preparation is planned to continue until the seismic test is completed in July of 2022. This report covers preliminary structural dynamic model development and computer-aided design of test hardware. Based on preliminary modeling, the strongest earthquakes under consideration in this test program provide mechanical loading on the spent nuclear fuel that is comparable to the 30 cm cask drop scenario, although the loads do not appear to be strong enough to cause significant permanent deformation of the fuel assembly spacer grids. The potential for grid deformation during the test will be assessed when the proposed shake table motion becomes available. The weakest earthquakes considered in this test are expected to be comparable to the mechanical loads witnessed in the multimodal transportation test of 2017. The horizontal canister system is predicted to provide nearly-uniform loading condition on the fuel assemblies it contains, while the vertical cask system is predicted to cause non-uniform dynamic loads on the fuel assemblies. In the horizontal case, gravity keeps the fuel assemblies in contact with one basket wall surface unless the loads are strong enough to cause a separation. In the vertical case, the fuel assemblies are relatively long and slender, and seismic motion in the anticipated test range is predicted to cause the assemblies to lean, tilt, and impact the basket walls throughout the seismic event. These gap closures are a nonlinear force transmission condition, so the vertical system is expected to have more variation and variability than the horizontal system. While the horizontal system is expected to have a relatively more linear response than the vertical system, there is still the potential for nonlinear behavior in the horizontal system because the fuel assemblies are free to slide, bounce, and impact the basket walls if the seismic loads are strong enough. One major conclusion of this study is that the use of mixed fuel assemblies in the canister will be acceptable. There are differences in overall system response when the mass, center of gravity, or gaps are changed, but the changes in response are within the bounds of a system that contains completely homogeneous fuel assemblies. One important observation is that the loading for each individual fuel assembly within the vertical canister is expected to be different from that of the others because of nonlinearities in the system. The horizontal canister system is expected to have a more uniform and more predictable response than the vertical canister, making variations in fuel assembly characteristics easier to account for. One important recommendation that comes from this modeling work is to repeat some of the strongest shake tests at different angles, particularly for the vertical cask system. Modeling predicts that strong seismic motion will cause the fuel assemblies to close initial gaps and impact the fuel basket walls when the canister is in the vertical cask configuration. Each shake test will impose a pre-defined three-dimensional time history on the cask system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Using temperature and flow fields to detect gas leakage from canisters containing spent nuclear fuel: Applications to RAMM-TM

The multi-physics STAR-CCM+ code has been used to simulate the temperature and flow fields in canister gas leakage experiments conducted by using a 1/4.5-scale model storage cask. The simulations were conducted at Argonne National Laboratory’s Laboratory Computing Resource Center, utilizing high-performance computing resources. Development of STAR-CCM+ simulation models for the 1/4.5-scale model cask is described herein, followed by validation of the simulation results against experimental data. Canister depressurization and thermal response during gas leakage are discussed, along with analyses of the leakage path and allowable leakage rate. The insights gained from the STAR-CCM+ simulations and leakage analyses will help guide future experiments and actual industry applications of Argonne’s Remote Area Modular Monitoring system for canister surface temperature measurement (RAMM-TM) to enable effective aging management of spent fuel during extended dry storage, as well as help reduce risks to public safety and health and protect the environment.

Canister gas leakage↗
DOE OSTI2020

BWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Acquisition and Testing to Support DOE-NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project

The Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) within the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) established the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) campaign to conduct research and development (R&D) activities related to the storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. The SFWST program was created within SFWD to address issues of extended or long-term SNF storage and transportation. Some near-term objectives of SFWST are to use a science-based, engineering-driven approach to: Support the enhancement of the technical bases to support the continued safe and secure dry storage of SNF for extended periods; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for retrieving SNF after extended dry storage; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for transporting high burnup (HBU) fuel and transporting low burnup fuel and HBU fuel after dry storage DOE-NE, in partnership with the Electric Power Research Institute, developed the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project to perform a large-scale demonstration and laboratory-scale testing of HBU pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels (exceeding 45 gigawatt-days per metric ton of uranium [GWd/MTU]). Under this project, 25 sister rods—which are rods that have the same design, power histories, and other characteristics—were removed from assemblies at the North Anna Nuclear Power Station and sent to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in January 2016. ORNL performed detailed nondestructive examination (NDE) on all 25 rods. The NDE consisted of visual examinations, gamma and neutron scanning, profilometry and rod length measurements, and eddy current examinations. After completing the NDE, 10 of the sister rods were delivered to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in a NAC International, Inc. legal-weight truck cask in September 2018 for destructive examination (DE). To date, SFWD work has focused on the PWR fuel that is part of the Sister Rod Test program. No boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel has been tested in the program, and the data needs that were identified for the PWR fuel have not been collected for BWR fuel. The goal to obtain six to nine BWR rods and test them at ORNL will support closing this important data gap. BWR fuel comprises approximately 56% of the total fuel assemblies currently in storage at nuclear power plants in the United States. BWR nuclear fuel and cladding designs and manufacturing are significantly different from PWRs. Differences include the following: BWR fuel pellets are larger than PWR pellets; Variations of Zircaloy-2 (including liners) are used instead of the Zircaloy-4 cladding materials used in PWRs; Clad manufacturing and stress-relief processes are different between PWRs and BWRs; The fuel rod dimensions are different because larger rod diameters and thicker cladding are used in BWRs; BWR fuel typically has lower internal rod pressures and sees vastly different operating conditions than PWR fuel (i.e., two-phase flow); BWR assemblies are “canned,” meaning each assembly is surrounded by a metal fuel channel; BWR cladding is often composed of an inner pure Zr liner that has widely different mechanical properties than the Zircaloy-2 alloy and exhibits a stronger affinity for hydrogen; The BWR SNF generally has more total hydrogen in the cladding/liner than typical PWR fuel; The construction of the PWR and BWR assemblies is vastly different; BWR rods are solidly attached to the assembly nozzles and experience a much different vibration and shock load than PWR rods, which are “floating” within a grid system attached to guide tubes, and the rods sit loosely on the bottom end plates. These numerous differences will affect the way the BWR SNF responds under dry storage preparation processes (e.g., vacuum drying) and during transportation. The results collected in the PWR experimental program must be compared with a subset of similar data collected on BWR SNF to establish a technical basis for whether the larger PWR database is sufficient to bound the BWR SNF end-of-life conditions as is currently assumed for several fuel/clad properties. Changes that occur in both fuel types at HBU could exacerbate any mechanical property differences. As the fuel burnup increases, several changes occur that might affect the performance of the fuel, cladding, and assembly hardware in storage and transportation. These changes include increased cladding corrosion layer thickness, increased cladding hydrogen content, increased cladding creep strains, increased fission gas release, and the formation of the HBU structure at the surface of the fuel pellets. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) limits the current maximum rod-averaged burnup to 62 GWd/MTU due to these changes and the lack of data at higher burnups.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

CISCC Countermeasures for Spent Fuel Canisters in Concrete Casks

Aging management of spent fuel is an important issue worldwide. Chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) of welded canisters is particularly important for concrete casks, where it occurs in response to a combination of environmental, material, and residual stress factors. In this paper, we introduce a countermeasure to prevent the occurrence of CISCC by adjusting the flow rate of the cooling air into the concrete cask so that the canister surface temperature does not decrease below 100°C, which is a conservative deliquesce temperature threshold for CISCC occurrence. The flow adjustment device was installed in a cask model, and two tests were conducted under the heat rate conditions corresponding to those of an actual canister. In the first test, the device was operated under a condition where the canister surface temperature was below 100°C to verify whether it could increase the canister surface temperature to above 100°C. In the second test, the heat rate was decreased from a state where the canister surface temperature was above 100°C, to verify whether the device could maintain the canister surface temperature above 100°C. Good results were obtained in both cases. However, in the case of a low decay heat rate of spent fuel after extended dry storage, the temperature of the canister surface may decrease below 100°C even if no air supply is provided. Therefore, in this case, it may be necessary to take measures such as blocking air outlets.

Takeda, Hirofumi↗
DOE OSTI2022

THERMAL MODELING OF HANFORD LEAD CANISTER’S HEATER BENCH TESTS

A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model was built to simulate planned testing of heater assemblies for the Hanford Lead Canister (HLC) project. The HLC is a canister storage system that will contain heaters to simulate the decay heat of nuclear material and provide the canister storage system with environmental conditions equivalent to the operating conditions on a dry storage pad. The HLC will be equipped with long-term data collection and monitoring systems to provide an early warning of corrosion, pitting, cracking, or other signs of canister degradation that might threaten the integrity of the containment boundary over the potentially long term of dry storage. An important part of the HLC development is to confirm the function and ability of the electric heater assemblies that were specially designed to provide heating similar to the decay heat of nuclear material contained within the canister storage system. Heater bench testing is planned for early 2022 in a test configuration that does not include the canister. The goal of the bench testing is to verify that the heaters can replicate the decay heat of a canister with nuclear material and to validate the thermal models, which are critical to understanding the HLC’s thermal environment, including the local air flow within the canister storage system. Testing of the heater assemblies inside the canister system are planned in the future to validate canister level thermal models, and rigorous pre-deployment testing of the complete HLC cask and canister system is intended to be completed before the HLC is deployed in the 2025-2026 timeframe. This study presents the pre-test temperature predictions of the bench testing. A description of the heater assemblies and planned bench testing is presented. The model was developed with the commercial CFD code STAR-CCM+. An uncertainty analysis was run with the CFD model to determine the uncertainty in the temperature predictions and provide a range over which the predicted temperatures are expected to vary. The uncertainty analysis was performed by coupling STAR-CCM+ with the software Dakota, which provides advanced parametric analyses, including quantification of margins and uncertainty with computational models. This work is expected to provide insight into SNF canister behavior.

Suffield, Sarah R.↗
DOE OSTI2024

THERMAL MODELING OF HANFORD CESIUM AND STRONTIUM CANISTERS DURING SIMULATED LOADING

A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model was built to simulate planned testing of heater assemblies within a canister and overpack for the Hanford Lead Canister (HLC) project. The HLC is a canister storage system that will contain heaters to simulate the decay heat of nuclear material and provide the canister storage system with environmental conditions equivalent to the operating conditions on a dry storage pad. The HLC will be equipped with long-term data collection and monitoring systems to provide an early warning of corrosion, pitting, cracking, or other signs of canister degradation that might threaten the integrity of the containment boundary over the potentially long term of dry storage. An important part of the HLC development is to make pretest numerical predictions for the behavior of the heated canister during the simulated radiolytic decay heat testing, which simulates the dry storage system during loading operations. The simulated radiolytic decay heat test is planned for mid-2024 in a configuration that includes the heater assembly, overpack, and canister, but with the lids removed to allow loading cesium and strontium capsules into the canister. One of the goals of the test is to evaluate the thermal behavior of the canister and overpack assembly in the ambient air of the test facility, which will provide data critical to validating the thermal models and understanding how the HLC will perform as a system once deployed. To best approximate real-world conditions, the CFD model includes the full air volume of the mock-up truck bay the heated canister test will be performed in, enabling detailed investigation of how the heated canister affects airflow around it. Rigorous pre-deployment testing of the complete HLC cask and canister system is intended to be completed before the HLC is deployed in the 2028 timeframe. This study presents the pre-test temperature predictions of the simulated radiolytic decay heat test. A description of the heater assembly, canister, and overpack system is presented. The model was developed with the commercial CFD software STAR-CCM+. An uncertainty analysis was run with the CFD model to determine the uncertainty in the temperature predictions and provide a range over which the predicted temperatures are expected to vary. The uncertainty analysis was preformed by coupling STAR-CCM+ with the software Dakota, which provides advanced parametric analyses, including quantification of margins and uncertainty with computational models. This work is expected to provide insight into SNF canister behavior.

Carpenter-Graffy, Dina E.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Management of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Accident Corium and Severely Damaged Fuel Debris

The Three Mile Island, Unit Two (TMI-2) pressurized water reactor core melted down in 1979 due to an untimely combination of maintenance problems that led to a loss of feedwater, followed by a series of operational misunderstandings and errors. The melted core recovery process required development of a wide array of tools. After approximately three years of water management and other cleanup actions, the first views of the core revealed a much higher degree of damage than previously expected. Approximately 62 metric tons of the core had melted, leaving only 42 of the 177 fuel assemblies standing with a majority of rods intact. The core to be recovered was composed of loose debris and a solidified mass of formerly molten fuel. Robotic tools that had been designed for the task were of limited effectiveness due to the range of material types and phases. Over a period of several years, the central melt was broken up, primarily by use of a core-boring drill originally designed to acquire samples through the depth of the debris field. The broken pieces were loaded into specially designed debris canisters by use of long-handled pick-and-place tools and suctioned into baffled knockout canisters using an airlift vacuum system. A remotely operable underwater plasma arc torch was developed for removal of the lower core support structure to be able to retrieve the fuel pieces and secondary melt that had accumulated on the bottom reactor vessel head. Canister design played a central role in defining the initial retrieval process and later affected transportation, interim wet and its current interim dry storage. Due to concerns about the potential for radiolysis of residual water in the debris and other canister material, the canisters were fitted with hydrogen recombiner catalyst units to prevent a buildup of flammable gas and potential pressurization. To confirm the effectiveness of the recombiners during shipping, eight dewatered canisters were kept sealed for up to 205 days with periodic sampling of the headspace gas. The highest hydrogen value (9 vol%) was observed in a canister held for 147 days while the longest stored canister resulted in a 5% hydrogen concentration. The oxygen concentration never exceeded 0.5 %, and the primary backfill was >80% argon, meaning there was no flammability risk. Radiolytic hydrogen was also observed in wet pool storage, where the vented canisters discharged a portion of the water backfill as a result of gas production. The 344 canisters (268 fuel debris, 62 filter, and 12 knockout type) were dewatered, loaded in groups of seven into a double barrier shipping cask, and transported to the U.S. Department of Energy site in Idaho for 10 years of pool storage.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Damaged Fuel in the United States

Over the years of commercial nuclear power plant operations in the United States (U.S.), many fuel assemblies have lost the capability to perform all of their desired functions. These assemblies have lost the capability to be handled, stored, or transported to meet regulations resulting in them being classified as damaged fuel. The causes of these failed assemblies are diverse and plant-specific. The majority of these failed assemblies are contained in a damaged fuel can that will be used in conjunction with a storage and/or transportation system. The storage and transportation systems have a limit on how many slots can be filled with damaged fuel cans. A damaged fuel can is generally a stainless steel container that confines damaged SNF and is closed on its end by screened openings. These screened openings allow gaseous and liquid media to escape but minimize the dispersal of gross particulate material. Out of an abundance of caution a few reactors have loaded high burnup fuel into damaged fuel cans. Damaged fuel is not licensed for storage or transport in the U.S., because the regulations for storage and transport do not specify exactly how to classify damaged fuel. Instead the regulations license/certify packages that specify approved contents. Damaged fuel must be included in the approved contents to be a viable option. In many cases damaged SNF is encapsulated in a damaged fuel can to ensure it can confine gross fuel particles, debris, and or damaged assemblies to a known volume within a loaded cask. This damaged fuel can may then be utilized in the same way as an assembly in a storage and transportation design system. Some storage cask systems utilize top and bottom plugs to confine debris in damaged fuel. The most recent domestic documentation on damaged SNF was performed by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and used data from U.S. reactors concluding in June 30th 2013 to produce Form GC-859, “Nuclear Fuel Data Survey”. Based on this form there were 136,821 boiling water reactor (BWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies and 104,647 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF assemblies for a total of 241,468 SNF assemblies in the U.S. Out of these 241,468 SNF assemblies, 4,521 assemblies were classified as failed. Some assemblies were also disassembled and the fuel rods or pieces of fuel rods were combined together to make a consolidated assembly. A consolidated assembly may include damaged fuel, or it could have been consolidated as part of a demonstration project. The GC-859 data includes 2,550 consolidated assemblies containing between 0 and 264 whole fuel rods. These consolidated assemblies could be placed in single assembly canisters and stored in the spent fuel pool. For dry storage and transportation, a single assembly canister is generally placed in a damaged fuel can. In addition to the consolidated assemblies, 2,391 uncanistered fuel rod pieces exist, which were removed from 494 assemblies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗