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At least 127 records · Page 7

DETAILED DESIGN OF AN EPITHERMAL/INTERMEDIATE CRITICAL EXPERIMENT USING THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES CRITICAL FACILITY

Nuclear criticality safety evaluations commonly take credit for neutron-absorbing materials. The normal practice for validating the calculational process to develop safety limits and margins of safety is to compare the safety case models with calculations of various critical experiments of a similar composition. Because there is a lack of critical experiments with various relevant neutron-absorbing materials mixed with fissile material, a new approach is being developed. This new approach uses small amounts of these credited materials in a critical assembly and assesses their worth and neutron energy spectral characteristics using absorption reaction rates. This approach is proposed as a new method for nuclear data validation. The assessment will involve measured central reactivity worth in a critical or near-critical assembly and subsequent comparison with calculated values from Monte Carlo computer analyses. Additionally, four configurations are proposed which replace fuel rods in the driver region with absorber rods. These configurations will allow for examination of the effects of the material in a more thermalized spectrum experiment selection in these scenarios. This paper presents some case studies examining the impact of these changes on some hypothetical safety analysis systems.This paper documents the detailed design portion of the critical experiment design process, focusing on development of a capability to test epithermal/ intermediate energy cross sections for materials using the 7uPCX critical experiment facility. Tantalum is specified as the test material to be examined.

Clarity, Justin↗

Technical Review Report for the Model 9975-96 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (S-SARP-G-00003, Revision 0, January 2008)

This Technical Review Report (TRR) documents the review, performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Staff, at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), on the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Model 9975, Revision 0, dated January 2008 (S-SARP-G-00003, the SARP). The review includes an evaluation of the SARP, with respect to the requirements specified in 10 CFR 71, and in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1. The Model 9975-96 Package is a 35-gallon drum package design that has evolved from a family of packages designed by DOE contractors at the Savannah River Site. Earlier package designs, i.e., the Model 9965, the Model 9966, the Model 9967, and the Model 9968 Packagings, were originally designed and certified in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, updated package designs that incorporated design features consistent with the then newer safety requirements were proposed. The updated package designs at the time were the Model 9972, the Model 9973, the Model 9974, and the Model 9975 Packagings, respectively. The Model 9975 Package was certified by the Packaging Certification Program, under the Office of Safety Management and Operations. The safety analysis of the Model 9975-85 Packaging is documented in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Model 9975, B(M)F-85, Revision 0, dated December 2003. The Model 9975-85 Package is certified by DOE Certificate of Compliance (CoC) package identification number, USA/9975/B(M)F-85, for the transportation of Type B quantities of uranium metal/oxide, {sup 238}Pu heat sources, plutonium/uranium metals, plutonium/uranium oxides, plutonium composites, plutonium/tantalum composites, {sup 238}Pu oxide/beryllium metal.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

Safety Analysis and Technical Basis for Establing an Interim Burnup Limit for Mark-V and Mark-VA Fuel Subassemblies in EBR-II

This document describes the technical basis and safety analysis for introduction of the Mark-V and Mark-VA fuel subassemblies into the core of EBR-II. An interim burnup limit of 10 at. % is specified for the Mark-V and Mark-VA fuel pins in driver subassemblies. As more information on fuel pin lifetime and hexcan behavior is gathered a final burnup limit will be sought.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packagings – Model 9979 Type AF Shipping Package

This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) documents the performance of the Department of Energy (DOE) Model USA/9979/AF-96 shipping package and compliance with the regulatory safety requirements of Title 10 and Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The SARP is prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1D. The Model 9979 Type A Fissile shipping package replaces the Department of Transportation (DOT) UN1A2 Specification Packaging. Formerly, the UN1A2 was authorized under Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 173.417 (2004) for transport of Type A quantities of fissile material over public highways. In accordance with the Federal Register, final rule making issued on January 26, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a joint effort with the Department of Transportation, initiated a planned phase out of multiple Specification Packagings from 49 CFR 173, the UN1A2 being one. The rulemaking mandated, by law, removal of these specification packagings from service no later than September 30, 2008. The 9979 is a Performance Packaging and replaces the UN1A2 Specification Packaging. The Packaging Technology and Transportation Engineering (PT&TE) organization of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the Design Authority and Design Agency for the 9979.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Software Safety Progress in NASA

NASA has developed guidelines for development and analysis of safety-critical software. These guidelines have been documented in a Guidebook for Safety Critical Software Development and Analysis. The guidelines represent a practical 'how to' approach, to assist software developers and safety analysts in cost effective methods for software safety. They provide guidance in the implementation of the recent NASA Software Safety Standard NSS-1740.13 which was released as 'Interim' version in June 1994, scheduled for formal adoption late 1995. This paper is a survey of the methods in general use, resulting in the NASA guidelines for safety critical software development and analysis.

Radley, Charles F.↗

Hazard Analysis for the Mark III Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Used in One-g Operations

This Hazard Analysis document encompasses the Mark III Space Suit Assembly (SSA) and associated ancillary equipment. It has been prepared using JSC17773, "Preparing Hazard Analyses for JSC Ground Operation", as a guide. The purpose of this document is to present the potential hazards involved in ground (23 % maximum O2, One-g) operations of the Mark III and associated ancillary support equipment system. The hazards listed in this document are specific to suit operations only; each supporting facility (Bldg. 9, etc.) is responsible for test specific Hazard Analyses. A "hazard" is defined as any condition that has the potential for harming personnel or equipment. This analysis was performed to document the safety aspects associated with manned use of the Mark III for pressurized and unpressurized ambient, ground-based, One-g human testing. The hazards identified herein represent generic hazards inherent to all standard JSC test venues for nominal ground test configurations. Non-standard test venues or test specific configurations may warrant consideration of additional hazards analysis prior to test. The cognizant suit engineer is responsible for the safety of the astronaut/test subject, space suit, and suit support personnel. The test requester, for the test supported by the suit test engineer and suited subject, is responsible for overall safety and any necessary Test Readiness Reviews (TRR).

Mitchell, Kate↗

HFIR Dissolution Nuclear Criticality Analysis Information

H-Canyon Nuclear and Criticality Safety Engineering has completed development of the documentation necessary to complete the September 30, 2014, H-Canyon PBI milestone that states: Complete the analytical work to develop proposed HFIR Criticality Safety Limits associated with receipt and dissolving of HFIR material. Attached to this memorandum are the following: (1) Attachment 1- HFIR Dissolution Nuclear Criticality Analysis; (2) Attachment 2 - SCALE 5/KENO VI sample input As documented in Attachment 1, the safety of HFIR dissolution in H-Canyon has been evaluated. Due to the composition and geometry of the HFIR elements and the chemistry of the dissolution process, there are no credible criticality events associated with HFIR dissolution, with the exception of potential Pu polymerization. There are no mass, concentration, or soluble poison CSLs required for HFIR dissolution in H-Canyon. If SRNL, in the development of the HFIR flow sheet, determines that Pu polymerization is a credible event, a minimum nitric acid PPL and controls will be developed. However, there is no analysis or CSLs needed for this event. The boron in the borated stainless steel posts is not required, and, therefore, blackness testing is not required for criticality safety.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NEW APPROACH TO ADDRESSING GAS GENERATION IN RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING

Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARP) document why the transportation of radioactive material is safe in Type A(F) and Type B shipping containers. The content evaluation of certain actinide materials require that the gas generation characteristics be addressed. Most packages used to transport actinides impose extremely restrictive limits on moisture content and oxide stabilization to control or prevent flammable gas generation. These requirements prevent some users from using a shipping container even though the material to be shipped is fully compliant with the remaining content envelope including isotopic distribution. To avoid these restrictions, gas generation issues have to be addressed on a case by case basis rather than a one size fits all approach. In addition, SARP applicants and review groups may not have the knowledge and experience with actinide chemistry and other factors affecting gas generation, which facility experts in actinide material processing have obtained in the last sixty years. This paper will address a proposal to create a Gas Generation Evaluation Committee to evaluate gas generation issues associated with Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging material contents. The committee charter could include reviews of both SARP approved contents and new contents not previously evaluated in a SARP.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Calculation of Hazard Category 2/3 Threshold Quantities Using Contemporary Dosimetric Data

The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology and selection of input data utilized to calculate updated Hazard Category 2 and Hazard Category 3 Threshold Quantities (TQs) using contemporary dosimetric information. The calculation of the updated TQs will be considered for use in the revision to the Department of Energy (DOE) Technical Standard (STD-) 1027-92 Change Notice (CN)-1, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.” The updated TQs documented in this report complement an effort previously undertaken by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which in 2014 issued revised Supplemental Guidance documenting the calculation of updated TQs for approximately 100 radionuclides listed in DOE-STD-1027-92, CN-1. The calculations documented in this report complement the NNSA effort by expanding the set of radionuclides to more than 1,250 radionuclides with a published TQ. The development of this report was sponsored by the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Safety (AU-30) within the Associate Under Secretary for Environment, Health, Safety, and Security organization.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors

The document compiles in a single volume several verification and validation works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. Some works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced at the outset, and are not included in the document. PLTEMP has been used in conversion safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors that have been licensed and converted. A list of such reactors is given. Each chapter of the document deals with the verification or validation of a specific model. The model verification is usually done by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, or Mathematica calculation. The model validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a more validated code like the RELAP5 code.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of Mis-Steered Electron Beam in the NSLS-II Storage Ring

This note reports the analysis of the mis-steered electron in the NSLS-II storage ring for the determination of supplementary shielding. The potential angles and offsets of the mis-steered beam are calculated by implementing the cascaded parameter scan (CPS) along the beam-line. This method is originally developed for the top-off safety analysis, and has been well documented in ref. The basic idea of CPS is to combine the phase space images due to different magnet set-points into one superset, then re-populate virtual particles on a fine grid as the input of the downstream magnet scanning. The purpose of re-population in phase space is to avoid the redundant particle tracking calculation due to the multi-layer overlap of different magnet settings. A parallel python code of implementing the tracking study has been written, and benchmarked with other top-off safety simulators developed in SLAC and LBNL.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors, Volume 2

This is Volume 2 of a two-volume document that collects the verification and validation (V&V) works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. Volume 1 describes the V&V of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis. Volume 2 describes the V&V of developments and improvements since the release of PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3. Each chapter of the document focuses on verifying or validating a specific part of the software that calculates a particular phenomenon, e.g., channel flow calculation, coolant property calculation, heat transfer calculation, and flow instability calculation. Software verification is performed by comparing the code with a hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, Mathematica calculation, or MATLAB calculation. The software validation is achieved by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL V&V works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced in Volume 1 of the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors licensed and converted from highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. A list of such reactors is given in Volume 1 of the document.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Verification and validation of the PLTEMP/ANL code for thermal hydraulic analysis of experimental and test reactors

The document compiles in a single volume several verification and validation works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. Some works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced at the outset, and are not included in the document. PLTEMP has been used in conversion safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors that have been licensed and converted. A list of such reactors is given. Each chapter of the document deals with the verification or validation of a specific model. The model verification is usually done by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, or Mathematica calculation. The model validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a more validated code like the RELAP5 code.

Kalimullah, M.↗

Detect-and-Avoid Safety and Operational Suitability Analysis using an Electro-Optical/Infared Sensor Model

This report documents a closed-loop analysis of an DAA system using a Electro/Optical sensor model. Safety and operational suitability metrics are computed. Results show that the safety metrics are most sensitive to the angular rate accuracy of the intruder aircraft. Trade-off between safety and operationl suitability metrics is discussed. Results from this work directly inform the requirements of an electro/optical sensors for detect-and-avoid.

Detect-and-avoid↗