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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Sampling and Analysis Plan for Investigation of Undeclared Nuclear Activities - 20104

The nuclear-centered energy policy in South Korea is moving towards a nuclear-free era. It also facilitates an action or progress on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) launched a new R and D project which attempts to verify nuclear activities via analyzing environmental samples. Environmental samples possibly contain significant radiological information relevant to past undeclared activities. In order to precisely verify them, it is essential to provide 1) the concrete information of target facilities, 2) appropriate methodologies and procedures, and 3) well-suited instrumentation and equipment corresponding to sample signatures. It is also important to provide scientific reliability or validity in any process such as sample collection, handling, transportation and laboratory analysis. Therefore, the information of nuclear facilities (fuel fabrication plant, graphite moderated reactor, reprocessing plant) in North Korea are reviewed in order to determine parameters for appropriate sampling methods representing a facility's characteristics. Secondly, a sampling procedure for radioactive elements is being developed based on international and domestic standards such as ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials), KS (Korean industrial Standards), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) manuals. The procedure contains some specific information including sampling process, sampling tools, amount of sample, sample identification, and other related information. Developing the qualified national guidelines is most important since sampling and analyzing results can be used as evidences of nuclear activities. The guideline developed through this work will clearly define various methodologies such as document verification, sampling procedures, collection methods, sample storage criteria, chain of custody, and transportation conditions. The final objective of this work is to establish the infrastructure and regulatory framework for assessment of nuclear activities, and provide a national guideline for sampling and analysis. This will bring confidence in the results and play a critical role in complete denuclearization progress in South Korea. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Thinking Globally about U.S. Extended Deterrence

In contrast to the Cold War bilateral global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the modern nuclear age features a more complex, multiplayer arena on the regional scale. With the exception of the U.S. and Russia, most major powers retain relatively small nuclear arsenals or technical hedge capabilities. The U.S., with strong interests and security partnerships in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, must navigate through long-standing rivalries and active conflicts while attempting to divine the intentions of less experienced nuclear decision makers in charge of weak domestic institutions. As a result, analysts and policymakers must think globally about U.S. extended deterrence. How have the requirements of extended deterrence and assurance changed? Are there important threads that connect each region? What should the U.S. do differently? To explore these questions, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research, in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Pacific Forum CSIS, held a workshop on “Thinking Globally about U.S. Extended Deterrence” in Washington, DC on November 2, 2015. The workshop brought together approximately 40 U.S. and foreign deterrence specialists and government officials, all attending in their private capacities. The participants joined a day of not-for-attribution discussions on the changing deterrence and assurance requirements, the threads that connect the regions, and U.S. strategy to deal with emerging challenges. The following is a summary of key takeaways.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

Domestic Constultancy Meeting on the IAEA's Regional Training Course (Project Summary)

A team of experts from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) partnered to revise the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities. This two-week course is a modified version of the three-week International Training Course (ITC) that is delivered on location at SNL. The last significant update to the IAEA Regional Training Course (RTC) RTC material was about 10 years ago. Prior revision efforts for two of the IAEA Materials and Facilities (MAFA) section courses, which were each one week in length, consisted of five consultancy meetings each with US DOE/NNSA personnel and international experts and held in Vienna, Austria. The level of effort anticipated to revise a two-week course was expected to double these previous efforts, which prompted development of an alternative approach to the revision process. The goal of the revision of the two-week course, labeled the RTC, was focused on the capability for delivery at any appropriate international location, most likely regionally by the IAEA.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

MITR Low-Enriched Uranium Conversion Fluid-Structure Interaction Preliminary Design Verification

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M 3 ) has developed and is pursuing an integrated approach to address the persistent threat posed by unintentional proliferation of nuclear materials. The NNSA M 3 approach reduces the risk of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium falling into the hands of non-state actors by minimizing the use of and, when possible, eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material around the world. In this geopolitical context, most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have completed or started a program of conversion from the use of HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel. Conversion of civilian research reactors from HEU to LEU, and the return of the HEU to the country of origin, are important components of the NNSA non-proliferation program. Worldwide, 71 reactors have been converted to the use of LEU fuel, and an additional 32 have been confirmed to be permanently shut down. The U.S., with 20 reactor conversions, is among the 39 countries on six continents where conversions have occurred. With recent conversions in Ghana and Nigeria, an important milestone was reached in completing conversion of all reactors on the continent of Africa to LEU fuel. Africa thus becomes the third continent to have completed conversion of all HEU reactors to LEU, following Australia and South America

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2016

National technical nuclear forensics: U.S. approach to capability sustainment

In the event of a nuclear detonation in the United States (U.S.), the interdiction of a nuclear device, or the seizure of nuclear materials, there will be tremendous pressure to attribute the source of the material, establish responsibility, and ensure the prevention of another incident. Along with intelligence and law enforcement investigations, nuclear forensics is one of the three pillars supporting attribution. The field of nuclear forensics includes the collection, analysis, and evaluation of radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and debris after an event or interdiction. The nuclear forensics scientific workforce is situated primarily in national and defense laboratories, but in recent decades has experienced a decline in numbers. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has implemented an expertise development program in order to off-set these declines and sustain a workforce of educated and trained scientists skilled in areas needed for nuclear forensics. Since its inception in 2008, the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program (NNFEDP) addresses this challenge holistically, through support to undergraduate and graduate students, university faculty and programs, as well as post-doctoral researchers at national laboratories in fields which are directly relevant to nuclear forensics. In that time, the program has placed 44 Ph.D.'s directly into national laboratories and U.S. federal agencies, maintaining the technical expertise required to execute the Nation's nuclear forensics mission. In 2017, the NNFEDP will institute the new Nuclear Forensics Research Award that will foster collaborations between university students and faculty with national laboratory researchers to further support and reinforce the advancement of nuclear forensic science through joint efforts. This opportunity will increase participation in this exciting and critically important national security mission space and contribute to the sustained development of the nuclear forensics workforce. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Final Report: Non-Visible, Automated Target Acquisition and Tracking

The Roadside Tracker (RST) represents a new approach to radiation portal monitors. It uses a combination of gamma-ray and visible-light imaging to localize gamma-ray radiation sources to individual vehicles in free-flowing, multi-lane traffic. Deployed as two trailers that are parked on either side of the roadway (Fig. 1); the RST scans passing traffic with two large gamma-ray imagers, one mounted in each trailer. The system compensates for vehicle motion through the imager’s fields of view by using automated target acquisition and tracking (TAT) software applied to a stream of video images. Once a vehicle has left the field of view, the radiation image of that vehicle is analyzed for the presence of a source, and if one is found, an alarm is sounded. The gamma-ray image is presented to the operator together with the video image of the traffic stream when the vehicle was approximately closest to the system (Fig. 2). The offending vehicle is identified with a bounding box to distinguish it from other vehicles that might be present at the same time. The system was developed under a previous grant from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). This report documents work performed with follow-on funding from DNDO to further advance the development of the RST. Specifically, the primary thrust was to extend the performance envelope of the system by replacing the visible-light video cameras used by the TAT software with sensors that would allow operation at night and during inclement weather. In particular, it was desired to allow operation after dark without requiring external lighting. As part of this work, the system software was also upgraded to allow the use of 64-bit computers, the current generation operating system (OS), software development environment (Windows 7 vs. Windows XP, and current Visual Studio.Net), and improved software version controls (GIT vs. Source Safe.) With the upgraded performance allowed by new computers, and the additional memory available in a 64-bit OS, the system was able to handle greater traffic densities, and this also allowed addition of the ability to handle stop-and-go traffic.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2011

Lead Slowing-Down Spectrometry Time Spectral Analysis for Spent Fuel Assay: FY11 Status Report

Developing a method for the accurate, direct, and independent assay of the fissile isotopes in bulk materials (such as used fuel) from next-generation domestic nuclear fuel cycles is a goal of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle R&D, Material Protection and Control Technology (MPACT) Campaign. To meet this goal, MPACT supports a multi-institutional collaboration, of which PNNL is a part, to study the feasibility of Lead Slowing Down Spectroscopy (LSDS). This technique is an active nondestructive assay method that has the potential to provide independent, direct measurement of Pu and U isotopic masses in used fuel with an uncertainty considerably lower than the approximately 10% typical of today's confirmatory assay methods. This document is a progress report for FY2011 PNNL analysis and algorithm development. Progress made by PNNL in FY2011 continues to indicate the promise of LSDS analysis and algorithms applied to used fuel. PNNL developed an empirical model based on calibration of the LSDS to responses generated from well-characterized used fuel. The empirical model, which accounts for self-shielding effects using empirical basis vectors calculated from the singular value decomposition (SVD) of a matrix containing the true self-shielding functions of the used fuel assembly models. The potential for the direct and independent assay of the sum of the masses of 239Pu and 241Pu to within approximately 3% over a wide used fuel parameter space was demonstrated. Also, in FY2011, PNNL continued to develop an analytical model. Such efforts included the addition of six more non-fissile absorbers in the analytical shielding function and the non-uniformity of the neutron flux across the LSDS assay chamber. A hybrid analytical-empirical approach was developed to determine the mass of total Pu (sum of the masses of 239Pu, 240Pu, and 241Pu), which is an important quantity in safeguards. Results using this hybrid method were of approximately the same accuracy as the pure empirical approach. In addition, total Pu with much better accuracy with the hybrid approach than the pure analytical approach. In FY2012, PNNL will continue efforts to optimize its empirical model and minimize its reliance on calibration data. In addition, PNNL will continue to develop an analytical model, considering effects such as neutron-scattering in the fuel and cladding, as well as neutrons streaming through gaps between fuel pins in the fuel assembly.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Material Control & Accountancy for Molten Salt Reactors (FY2021 Report)

There is significant domestic and international interest, investment, and research and development momentum to pursue advanced nuclear reactor technologies. Molten salt reactor (MSR) concepts display the largest variability in fuel type and design features among the current advanced concepts. MSRs have been proposed with various core designs, sizes (power), and fuel cycles. Salt-fueled molten salt systems represent the only advanced reactor type with fuel that is not in a solid form during operation. These “liquid-fueled” MSRs are unique from perspectives of fuel fabrication, spent irradiated fuel and waste components, licensing, and material control and accountability (MC&A) including the potential of fissile material holdup. The liquid fuel salt is the defining distinction in comparison to other advanced reactors that propose TRI-structural ISOtropic particle fuel pebbles, various coolant options (e.g., molten salts or metals, high temperature gas), or small modular alternatives using solid fuel variants including both light water reactors and non-light water reactors. MSRs are appealing to the nuclear energy industry because of the diverse reactor characteristics they can support including various neutron energy spectra, fueling requirements, fuel cycles, and/or fuel utilization. However, because of the significant deviation and diversity of a salt-fueled system compared to traditional solid fuel light water-cooled reactors (LWRs), the history, regulatory licensing framework, modeling capabilities, and supporting engineering technology are either lacking or, in some cases, nonexistent. Therefore, the research community is actively supporting advanced MSR development on many of these fronts in particular to assist MSR vendors with licensing requirements. ORNL is leading the research and development of respective MC&A approaches for salt-fueled MSRs. This report summarizes the research performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) under the US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program to investigate safeguards and security by design concepts, licensing and regulatory considerations, and dynamic system-level modeling to understand radioisotope concentrations for salt-fueled MSRs. The report builds upon the previous research and literature, identifies the MC&A challenges inherent to a salt-fueled MSR, reviews current regulatory frameworks for LWRs and their applicability towards salt-fueled MSRs, summarizes the status and progress of an MSR dynamic modeling tool, and discusses a prospective MC&A approach based on the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR) model.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Scientific Justification for a U.S. Domestic High-Performance Reactor-Based Research Facility

The Basic Energy Science Advisory Committee (BESAC) was charged with forming a subcommittee to assess the scientific justification for a U.S. domestic high-performance reactor-based research facility in order to continue providing the U.S scientific community with leading neutron capabilities in support of DOE's missions in science, energy, environment, and national security. The assessment included consideration of current international plans and existing domestic facility infrastructure. The subcommittee held a series of meetings from August 19, 2019 to April 24, 2020 that included DOE senior officials, leaders of national and international neutron facilities (SNS, HFIR, NIST, ILL, FRM-II), chairs of the NAS and POPA HEU-LEU committees, and outside experts on important areas of science, technology, and industry where high flux nuclear reactor facilities make important contributions. Also included were tours of neutron facilities (SNS, HFIR, NIST, BR2 reactor, and the planned Jules Horowitz Reactor). This July 2020 (revised 10-28-2020) report describes scientific use cases, brief summaries of existing and planned neutron facilities in the US and Europe, a comprehensive review of HFIR, a comprehensive discussion of the current state of progress on HEU-LEU conversion, user information from NIST and ORNL, and three recommendations to DOE for moving forward.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2015

Enhancing International Radiation/Nuclear Detection Training Opportunities

The United States has worked domestically to develop and provide radiological and nuclear detection training and education initiatives aimed at interior law enforcement, but the international community has predominantly focused efforts at border and customs officials. The interior law enforcement officials of a State play a critical role in maintaining an effective national-level nuclear detection architecture. To meet this vital need, DNDO was funded by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to create and deliver a 1-week course at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary to inform interior law enforcement personnel of the overall mission, and to provide an understanding of how the participants can combat the threats of radiological and nuclear terrorism through detection efforts. Two courses, with approximately 20 students in each course, were delivered in fiscal year (FY) 2013, two were delivered in FY 2014 and FY 2015, and as of this report’s writing more are planned in FY 2016. However, while the ILEA courses produced measurable success, DNDO requested Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) research potential avenues to further increase the course impact. In a multi-phased approach, PNNL researched and analyzed several possible global training locations and venues, and other possible ways to increase the impact of the course using an agreed-to data-gathering format.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

2016 Billion-Ton Report: Advancing Domestic Resources for a Thriving Bioeconomy, Volume 2: Environmental Sustainability Effects of Select Scenarios from Volume 1

With the goal of understanding environmental effects of a growing bioeconomy, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), national laboratories, and U.S. Forest Service research laboratories, together with academic and industry collaborators, undertook a study to estimate environmental effects of potential biomass production scenarios in the United States, with an emphasis on agricultural and forest biomass. Potential effects investigated include changes in soil organic carbon (SOC), greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, water quality and quantity, air emissions, and biodiversity. Effects of altered land-management regimes were analyzed based on select county-level biomass-production scenarios for 2017 and 2040 taken from the 2016 Billion-Ton Report: Advancing Domestic Resources for a Thriving Bioeconomy (BT16), volume 1, which assumes that the land bases for agricultural and forestry would not change over time. The scenarios reflect constraints on biomass supply (e.g., excluded areas; implementation of management practices; and consideration of food, feed, forage, and fiber demands and exports) that intend to address sustainability concerns. Nonetheless, both beneficial and adverse environmental effects might be expected. To characterize these potential effects, this research sought to estimate where and under what modeled scenarios or conditions positive and negative environmental effects could occur nationwide. The report also includes a discussion of land-use change (LUC) (i.e., land management change) assumptions associated with the scenario transitions (but not including analysis of indirect LUC [ILUC]), analyses of climate sensitivity of feedstock productivity under a set of potential scenarios, and a qualitative environmental effects analysis of algae production under carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) co-location scenarios. Because BT16 biomass supplies are simulated independent of a defined end use, most analyses do not include benefits from displacing fossil fuels or other products, with the exception of including a few illustrative cases on potential reductions in GHG emissions and fossil energy consumption associated with using biomass supplies for fuel, power, heat, and chemicals. Most analyses in volume 2 show potential for a substantial increase in biomass production with minimal or negligible environmental effects under the biomass supply constraints assumed in BT16. Although corn ethanol has been shown to achieve GHG emissions improvements over fossil fuels, cellulosic biomass shows further improvements in certain environmental indicators covered in this report. The harvest of agricultural and forestry residues generally shows the smallest contributions to changes in certain environmental indicators investigated. The scenarios show national-level net SOC gains. When expanding the system boundary in illustrative cases that consider biomass end use, reductions in GHG emissions are estimated for scenarios in which biomass—rather than oil, coal, and natural gas—is used to produce fuel, power, heat, and chemicals. Analyses of water quality reveal that there could be tradeoffs between biomass productivity and some water quality indicators, but better outcomes for both biomass productivity and water quality can be achieved with selected conservation practices. Biodiversity analyses show possible habitat benefits to some species, with other species showing potential adverse effects that may require additional safeguards. Increasing productivity of algae can reduce GHG emissions and water consumption associated with producing algal biomass, though the effects of water consumption are likely of greater concern in some regions than in others. Moreover, the effects of climate change on potential biomass production show gains and losses in yield among feedstocks across the continental United States. Key research gaps and priorities include actions that can enhance benefits and reduce potential for negative effects of increased biomass production. The results from this report will help DOE, the bioenergy industry, and other institutions continue important discussions on environmental effects and will help chart a path toward a more environmentally sustainable bioeconomy.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Connecting Nuclear Security to International Frameworks on Gender and Security

The international community is slowly beginning to recognize the intersections between the law and policy on international security – particularly arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament – and the body of human rights law that addresses gender equality. Notably absent from this discussion is the field of nuclear security. Despite its historical underpinnings as an inherently domestic activity, nuclear security is thoroughly grounded in international treaty law. Yet, nuclear security is often overlooked in the international security context and has not been well situated with international instruments that address gender equality. We argue that gender equality in nuclear security should be understood as an important component of broader efforts to achieve equal opportunities for women in work and critical to ensuring women are included in conflict prevention efforts. Linking nuclear security to broader international efforts to increase gender equality in security and conflict prevention will provide a clearer structure and framework for gender equality initiatives in the nuclear security field. This is critically important given that estimates indicate that women comprise only twenty percent of the nuclear security workforce. Moreover, situating nuclear security in a broader international legal framework will simultaneously help states meet their gender equality commitments emanating from other instruments. This paper will first analyze the relationship between nuclear security and broader international security efforts, in particular arms control treaties and non-proliferation regimes. It will then survey the relevant international and regional frameworks for gender equality, particularly those that have applicability in the security context. This paper will next explore the relationship between nuclear security and these frameworks on gender. We find that some instruments provide support for gender equality initiatives in nuclear security because of their mandate to states to provide structural gender equality, and others are particularly relevant where they call for women's participation in conflict prevention. This paper concludes with recommendations to states that are concerned about the underrepresentation of women in nuclear security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Regulatory Considerations for Domestic Reprocessing Facility Physical Security

U.S. advanced non-light-water reactor vendors may pursue collocated on-site reprocessing activities. Therefore, these facilities are likely to possess formula quantities, or Category I quantities, of special nuclear material (SNM) during normal operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) has yet to formally establish a regulatory framework for commercial reprocessing. While Category I requirements would explicitly not apply in this circumstance under current regulatory requirements, regulatory certainty does not exist. A novel framework should be developed to ensure public health and safety while also risk-informing the physical security requirements. This report reviews the relevant background of related rulemaking activities and proposes risk-informed physical protection requirements to satisfy these objectives. Insights from NRC security-related rulemaking activities provide a substantial technical basis to approach potential establishment of physical security requirements for reprocessing facilities. If a licensee can provide justification that the material satisfies a sufficient self-protecting radiation dose threshold, the material may not be subject to theft or diversion requirements and only potential sabotage requirements would apply. Furthermore, if the material can be justified to be moderately dilute, a set of risk-informed requirements could provide adequate protection of public health and safety. A revised performance objective for prevention of theft of moderately dilute Category I SNM may be detection to allow prompt recovery by a local law enforcement agency. However, a significant caveat to the proposed categorization scheme is the unknown integration of radiological sabotage with requirements for the protection against theft. Future licensees should consult with the NRC regarding treatment of this regulatory topic. Additionally, the self-protecting radiation dose threshold (either the existing or a proposed future threshold) would need to be considered. An integrated approach may apply graded potential requirements for protection against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage currently applicable to commercial nuclear power plants and Category I SNM facilities defined within 10 CFR 73.1(a).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Drones for Decommissioning

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has responsibility for regulating the safe decommissioning of facilities and sites to meet the License Termination Rule in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Subpart E “Radiological Criteria for License Termination.” Decommissioning is performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, as part of license termination (§50.82) and release of the facility or site for unrestricted use (§50.83). The guidance currently demonstrates the minimum requirements and necessary conditions for conducting radiological surveys by a person carrying a radiation detector(s). The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) evaluated the use of an unoccupied aerial vehicle (UAV) to conduct radiological surveys that could be used in decommissioning to potentially reduce time, cost, and worker safety compared to current survey methods. The objective of this project was to evaluate the performance and limitations of a UAV to support a decommissioning radiological survey and compare it to a radiological survey conducted by a human. The primary research questions of interest evaluated were: 1. Did observed UAV paths differ from human paths and, if so, how much? 2. Did survey path deviation affect survey results and, if so, how? 3. Were radiological measurements from human and UAV surveys significantly different? To answer these research questions, an experimental field was set up at PNNL’s 3440 test track, and it included radiological sources commonly surveyed during decommissioning: cobalt-60 (Co-60), cesium-137 (Cs-137), and americium-241 (Am-241). Nine check sources (three each of Am-241, Cs-137, and Co-60) with activities ranging from 3.54 µCi to 39.34 µCi were set over a path that also included an area for measuring background radiation. An Aurelia X6 UAV coupled with a GPS and lidar unit was used to conduct the radiological surveys. UAV and human surveys were conducted using two different NaI(Tl) scintillation radiation detectors (2 in. × 2 in. Ludlum, Inc. and 2 in. × 0.04 in. Alpha Spectra, Inc.) at a travel velocity of approximately 0.2 m/s at a low (15–40 cm median altitude) or high (87–105 cm median altitude) survey altitude. Since the survey velocity and altitude parameters were atypical for normal UAV operations, testing was done prior to conducting the radiological surveys to establish airworthiness, evaluate the navigation system, and establish flight control. Human and UAV surveys were paired according to the detector type and altitude regime to compare the survey data. The results of this proof-of-concept research determined that the UAV and human surveys followed similar survey paths and detected the radiological sources with no significant statistical difference (in 33 out of 36 surveys). However, further research is needed prior to deploying UAVs for decommissioning surveys.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗