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At least 127 records · Page 7

Closing the Book on the WVDP Vitrification Facility - 18222

Demolition of the West Valley Demonstration Project's Vitrification Facility was initiated on September 11, 2017, approximately 21 years after the facility produced its first canister of vitrified high-level waste. In the center of the structure, the heavily-reinforced concrete Vitrification Cell operated for six years, safely immobilizing about 24 million curies of high-level radioactive waste in borosilicate glass. When the facility was shut down in 2002, it had achieved the highest operational availability of any vitrification facility in the world. It was the first facility in the United States to complete its vitrification mission and is now the first in the nation to undergo demolition. This paper summarizes the selection, design, operation, deactivation and demolition of this facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Mercury Recovery at Former Lithium Production Site at the Miramas in France - 18529

The former Lithium production facility located at Miramas in the South-East of France recently completed a 10-year program of process equipment removal, building demolition and soil remediation to recover mercury (Hg) that had been lost during operations at the site. After over 100 years ago chemical production, all production activities stopped in 2009, and immediately afterwards the clean-up project began. The main project focused on the demolition of all facilities and the decontamination of building materials and soil clean-up, with the goal of remediating the site for future industrial purposes. Prior to starting the decommissioning and clean-up work at the site a detailed site survey was conducted to identify the extent of the contamination of the site. After investigations into available technologies, the decision was made to install on-site treatment processes. This resulted in fewer residual environmental effects (trucking pollution, shipping containers, volume of materials, etc), a reduction in logistic complications, and, importantly, was cost effective compared to sending all untreated material to external processing facilities. This decision resulted in a need to optimize demolition waste management, while ensuring the highest clean-up and safety levels. A variety of treatment processes were investigated and compared and two technologies were finally selected and implemented. The first process was a 'thermal desorption unit (TDU),' which heated excavated soils and captured the vaporized mercury. The second was a washing process that was used to remove surface contamination. After the contaminated areas were excavated, materials were crushed, screened and sorted into different sizes, with each pile being routed to the appropriate process. The smaller-sized particles were treated in the TDU. A batch of around 12 MT was fed into a moisture evaporator and then into a mercury evaporator. The soils were then cooled, sampled to ensure no residual Hg contamination before being mixed with a binding agent, and returned to the excavation site. Larger materials with surface contamination were washed to remove the contamination. The liquid effluents were sent to a tank where the contaminated fines were removed, dried, pressed and sent for processing. If the washed, coarse materials failed to reach acceptable mercury levels, they were crushed again and sent to be treated in the TDU. The washing fluid was recycled for the next batch. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford nuclear reservation. Workers had to pass through metal detectors when they arrived at the plant and materials leaving the plant had to be scanned for security reasons. Whereas other high-security nuclear materials were shipped from the PFP to Savannah River, S.C. as part ofa Department of Energy (DOE) program to consolidate weapons-grade plutonium, it was determined that the SIF should remain onsite pending disposition to a national repository. Nevertheless, the SIF still requires a high level of security that the PFP complex has always provided. With the 60-year PFP mission of producing and storing plutonium concluded, the environmental cleanup plans for Hanford call for the demolition of the 63-building PFP complex. Consequently, if the SIF remained at PFP it not only would have interfered with the environmental cleanup plans, but would have required $100 million in facility upgrades to meet increased national security requirements imposed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A new smaller and more cost-effective area was needed to store this material, which led to the SIF Project. Once the SIF project was successfully completed and the SIF was safely removed from PFP, the existing Protected Area at PFP could be removed, and demolition could proceed more quickly without being encumbered by restrictive security requirements that an active Protected Area requires. The lightened PFP security level brought by safely removing and storing the SIF would also yield lowered costs for deactivation and demolition, as well as reduce overall life-cycle costs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Complex Brownfields Case Study—The Former Bannister Federal Complex, Kansas City, Missouri

Abstract In November 2017, 225 acres (91 ha) of the former Bannister Federal Complex (BFC) in Kansas City, Missouri were transferred from the Federal Government to Bannister Transformation & Development, LLC (BTD), for demolition; environmental corrective measures; and preparation of the site for redevelopment. This presented a once‐in‐a‐lifetime opportunity to reconfigure groundwater remedies and address long‐standing soil contamination issues. The property included more than 40 previously‐identified Solid Waste Management Units, 3.9 million square feet (362,000 m 2 ) of buildings, subsurface utilities dating back to the 1940s, and an active groundwater containment system. Demolition of buildings and installation of an interim groundwater containment system began almost immediately after property transfer. In 2018, BTD substantially modified its project schedule to incorporate the construction of the first new buildings while demolition and remedial activities were ongoing. By October 2020, construction of the first new warehouse commenced while excavation and capping of contaminated soils, installation of a groundwater containment treatment systems, and abandonment of legacy utilities were still underway. Completion of this work, within the originally planned timeframe, was made possible by factors including up‐front multi‐year funding, early and ongoing engagement of regulators, an extended 3‐year due diligence program and planning stage, and establishment of well‐defined environmental targets. Both the soil and groundwater remedies were also designed with the flexibility needed to accommodate unknown conditions, changing schedules, and revisions to the regrading and redevelopment plans. This case study highlights key technical and management factors that led to the successful completion of this complex brownfields remediation project.

Water Resources↗

Cultural Resources Monitoring for the Rattlesnake Mountain Combined Community Communications Facility and Infrastructure Cleanup on the Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve, 600 Area, Hanford Site, Washington – HCRC# 2008-600-004

Since 1989, cleaning up the Hanford Site has been the primary mission of the U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL). One cleanup goal is footprint reduction on the Fitzner/Eberhardt Arid Lands Ecology Reserve (ALE). Footprint reduction includes a variety of activities such as the remediation of waste sites, demolition of abandoned buildings and infrastructure, and removal of equipment and miscellaneous debris items. Footprint reduction on the Rattlesnake Mountain ridgeline also included the construction of the Combined Community Communications Facility (CCCF), which combines all communication towers on Rattlesnake Mountain into a single facility. The proposed footprint reduction activities on ALE were covered in several previously completed cultural resources reviews. Two project areas are especially sensitive to cultural resources----the Rattlesnake Mountain ridgeline, a traditional cultural property (TCP), and Rattlesnake Spring, where several National Register-eligible sites are located. The first cultural resource review for this project found that footprint reduction activities would have an adverse effect on Laliik, the Rattlesnake Mountain TCP, by compromising its spiritual qualities and its visual and natural setting. Through consultation among representatives of DOE, the State Historic Preservation Office, and local tribal groups, a number of mitigation strategies were developed to resolve the adverse effects. These strategies focused on minimizing impacts during the construction and operation of the new CCCF and during demolition and cleanup activities. These stipulations were cemented in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), signed by the project stakeholders on July 30, 2009. The MOA required intermittent monitoring by qualified archaeologists during construction of the new communications facility and during demolition and removal of debris and infrastructure. Archaeologists with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory performed archaeological monitoring intermittently from August 12, 2009, through May 5, 2011. This report documents all archaeological monitoring conducted for the ALE footprint reduction project in accordance with stipulations outlined in the MOA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Pilot Scale Advanced Fogging Demonstration

Radiological contamination control is crucial during decommissioning and demolition (D&D) activities, as well as during modifications to existing radiological systems. It is well known that contamination, in some cases substantial contamination, is present throughout the exhaust ductwork in several older processing facilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, due to years of processing radioactive materials in areas served by closed ventilation systems. Accumulations of radioactive dust and lint – commonly found in laundry facilities, exhaust ventilation ducting, and exhaust stacks – present a specific contamination control issue. Particle suspension is more likely to occur during cleaning, modification, or demolition of these systems and during disposal site exhumation. In a recent demolition of large ventilation ducting (~10’ × 10’ cross section, ~100’ long) at Brookhaven National Laboratory, a spray coating was manually applied to the inside of the duct – requiring painters, dressed in anti-contamination clothing and an airline respirator system, to enter the duct.1 The advanced fogging technique offers an alternative method to mitigate these airborne contamination hazards with minimal personnel entry. Experiments in 2006 developed a useful fog solution using three different chemical constituents. Optimization of the fog recipe and use of commercially available equipment were identified as needs that had not been addressed. During 2012 development work it was noted that low concentrations of the components hampered coverage and drying in the United Kingdom’s National Nuclear Laboratory’s testing much more so than was evident in the 2006 tests. In fiscal year 2014 the Idaho National Laboratory undertook a systematic optimization of the fogging formulation and conducted a non-radioactive, pilot scale demonstration using commercially available fogging equipment. While not as sophisticated as the equipment used in earlier testing, the new approach is much less expensive and readily available for smaller scale operations. Pilot scale testing was important to validate new equipment of an appropriate scale, optimize the chemistry of the fogging solution, and to realize the conceptual approach.

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Brigham City Hydro Generation Project

Brigham City owns and operates its own municipal power system which currently includes several hydroelectric facilities. This project was to update the efficiency and capacity of current hydro production due to increased water flow demands that could pass through existing generation facilities. During 2006-2012, this project completed efficiency evaluation as it related to its main objective by completing a feasibility study, undergoing necessary City Council approvals and required federal environmental reviews. As a result of Phase 1 of the project, a feasibility study was conducted to determine feasibility of hydro and solar portions of the original proposal. The results indicated that the existing Hydro plant which was constructed in the 1960’s was running at approximately 77% efficiency or less. Brigham City proposes that the efficiency calculations be refined to determine the economic feasibility of improving or replacing the existing equipment with new high efficiency equipment design specifically for the site. Brigham City completed the Feasibility Assessment of this project, and determined that the Upper Hydro that supplies the main culinary water to the city was feasible to continue with. Brigham City Council provided their approval of feasibility assessment’s results. The Upper Hydro Project include removal of the existing powerhouse equipment and controls and demolition of a section of concrete encased penstock, replacement of penstock just upstream of the turbine inlet, turbine bypass, turbine shut-off and bypass valves, turbine and generator package, control equipment, assembly, start-up, commissioning, Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), and the replacement of a section of conductors to the step-up transformer. Brigham City increased the existing 575 KW turbine and generator with an 825 KW turbine and generator. Following the results of the feasibility assessment Brigham City pursued required environmental reviews with the DOE and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (USFWS) concurring with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) It was determined that Brigham City’s Upper Hydroelectric Power Plant upgrade would have no effect to federally listed or candidate species. However Brigham City has contributed a onetime lump sum towards Bonneville cutthroat trout conservation in the Northern Bonneville Geographic Management Unit with the intention to offset any impacts from the Upper Hydro Project needed to move forward with design and construction and is sufficient for NEPA compliance. No work was done in the river or river bank. During construction, the penstock was disconnected and water was diverted through and existing system around the powerhouse and back into the water system. The penstock, which is currently a 30-inch steel pipe, would be removed and replaced with a new section of 30-inch pipe. Brigham City worked with the DOE and was awarded a new modification and the permission to proceed with Phase III of our Hydro Project in Dec. 2013; with the exception to the modification of the award for the construction phase. Brigham City developed and issued a Request for Proposal for Engineer and Design vendor. Sunrise Engineering was selected for the Design and throughout the Construction Phase of the Upper Hydroelectric Power Plant. Brigham City conducted a Kickoff Meeting with Sunrise June 28, 2013 and received a Scope of Work Brigham City along with engineering firm sent out a RFP for Turbine, Generator and Equipment for Upper Hydro. We select Turbine/Generator Equipment from Canyon Industries located in Deming, WA. DOE awarded Brigham City a new modification and the permission to proceed with Phase III Construction of our Hydro Project. Brigham City Crews removed existing turbine/generator and old equipment alone with feeder wires coming into the building basically giving Caribou Construction an empty shell to begin demolition. Brigham City contracted with Caribou Construction from Jerome, Idaho for the Upper Power Plant construction. A kickoff meeting was June 24, 2014 and demolition was immediately started on building. Because of a delivery delay of Turbine, Generator and Equipment from Canyon Brigham City had to request another extension for the final date of completion. DOE awarded modification (.007) to Brigham City with a new completion date of August 1, 2015. The Turbine has had a few adjustments to help with efficiency; but the Generator had a slight vibration when generator got hot so Canyon Industries had U S Motor’s that manufactured the generator come to check out the issue. The other Equipment seems to be running normal. Brigham City, Sunrise Engineering and Canyon Industries met to determine what the vibration in the generator was and how to solve the issue Us Motor’s found some welds that failed: they have been repaired. U S Motor’s delivered the repaired generator Feb. 17, 2015. Canyon Industries arranged for a crane to installed generator in Power Plant. U S Motor’s balanced and wired generator. Plant Operators put the generator back on line. Canyon Industries returned and gave their approval to keep Hydro online. After Hydro was put back into operations it kept going off line because of overheating issues. Canyon Industries returned and replaced sensors and adjusted them to the proper settings for normal operations. Brigham City added additional steel screens to windows to increase air flow in Power Plant Building. After construction phase of the Upper Hydro Plant some landscaping has been restored around the building additional gravel brought in and leveled out and the road that was cut through for conduits to run wires. A retaining wall was installed to protect penstock. The Upper Hydro Plant is complete and in full operations. The final reimbursement was submitted.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Annual Stormwater Report for the Y-12 National Security Complex Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This is the eighth annual stormwater report prepared in accordance with the modified National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit issued to the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on April 1, 2014. This modified permit removed the authorization to augment flow in East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) and thus removed the requirement to sample this effluent in conjunction with other major outfalls on EFPC. The general condition of the site continues to improve. The repair of Outfall 014 is complete and sampling was performed in 2020 from the new Outfall 014 structure. This repair marks a significant improvement in the storm drain network infrastructure. There are several construction and demolition activities currently in progress at Y-12. These include the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility, the Mercury Treatment Facility on EFPC, the site-wide power grid upgrade, and the demolition of the Biology Complex. Current stormwater protections have proven effective in 2020; however, moving forward, these projects will present challenges for the protection of stormwater. Therefore, oversight of these activities, and all other construction and demolition projects, will continue to be a priority in 2021. Y-12 will continue to implement appropriate best management practices and reduce outside material storage areas where possible.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Stormwater Report for the Y-12 National Security Complex Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This is the ninth annual stormwater report prepared in accordance with the modified National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit issued to the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on April 1, 2014. This modified permit removed the authorization to augment flow in East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) and thus removed the requirement to sample this effluent in conjunction with other major outfalls on EFPC. There are several construction and demolition activities currently in progress at Y-12. These include the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), the Mercury Treatment Facility (MTF) on EFPC, the site-wide power grid upgrade, construction of an Emergency Operations Center, construction of a new Fire Station, Security Improvement Revitalization Program (SIRP), West End Protection Area Reduction (WEPAR) Project, and the demolition of the Biology Complex. Current stormwater protections have proven effective in 2021. However, moving forward, challenges to protect stormwater will continue from these projects. Therefore, oversight of these activities, and all other construction and demolition projects, will continue to be a priority in 2022. Y-12 will continue to implement appropriate Best Management Practices and reduce outside material storage areas where possible.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Damage Detection and Electrical Performance Impact of Flat-Flexible Circuits

Flat-flexible circuits or ‘flex circuits’ have varied applications in electronics and in explosive detonation systems. They pose advantages over conventional coaxial cables in their ability to fit into small mechanical envelopes and routings. A typical flex circuit is composed of a laminated assembly of multiple layers of conductor and dielectric materials. Copper, because of its high electrical conductivity, is one of the primary materials used in flex circuit conductors. The conductor must maintain structural integrity and electrical continuity when the flexible circuit is bent during processing or to fit an application envelope. Under some strain conditions a cable may have degraded electrical performance even though visible damage may not be evident. Dislocation density can increase by mechanisms such as dislocation forest hardening, where gliding dislocations in primary slip planes get pinned at obstacles and form Frank-Read sources. Dislocation density increases within the conductor layers may impact electrical resistivity but would not necessarily result in visible mechanical failure. In some detonation applications, such as for building implosion for demolition, the time for signal transmission and voltage used for firing detonators can be critical. If the resistance in a single flex cable within a building demolition array is too high, the resultant demolition shape may be asymmetric, leading to unplanned damage to nearby structures and potential hazards to public safety. This study will apply non-destructive evaluation techniques to evaluate the detectability of damage accumulation in flat, flexible copper-conductor cables and discuss potential implications to their practical use.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Area 6 Control Point: An Architectural Survey of the Area 6 Control Point, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) proposes to demolish five buildings and five accessory resources in the Area 6 Control Point at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The demolition and removal of the buildings and accessories constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. The buildings and accessories were recorded in Identification and Evaluation of 14 Architectural Resources Scheduled for Demolition, Area 6 Control Point and Vicinity, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2020). The report found that the five buildings were not individually eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) but were potentially eligible as contributing elements to an unrecorded Area 6 Control Point district. The report also found that the five accessory resources were not individually eligible for the NRHP but they contributed to other historic properties, including the contributing elements to the unrecorded district. Finally, the report found that the undertaking would result in an adverse effect to historic properties. The State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings regarding the eligibility of the buildings and structures in the Area of Potential Effect (APE) and that the undertaking would result in an adverse effect (Reed 2020). The NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, then developed the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-21NA25543 Between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Demolition of Fourteen Buildings and Structures in Area 6 of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, hereafter referred to as the MOA. The MOA stipulates that a district boundary be delineated with an accompanying boundary report and supporting photographs (Stipulation III.A) followed by an architectural survey of the potential historic district (Stipulation III.B). The SHPO reviewed and concurred with the proposed district boundary and accompanying boundary report and photographs (O’Neill et al. 2021) on August 23, 2021, in fulfillment of Stipulation III.A (Reed 2021). This architectural survey report has been prepared in accordance with Stipulation III.B. It includes an NRHP evaluation of the district, identifies contributing and non-contributing elements, and is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms. The NRHP evaluation concludes that the Area 6 Control Point is recommended eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criterion A at the national level as the location of the command center and various support facilities directly related to timing and firing operations for nuclear testing on the NNSS from 1951 to 1992. It is also recommended eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characteristics of a nuclear command center in the context of the Cold War and as a significant and distinguishable entity. There are a total of 29 primary resources within the district boundary. Of these, 28 are recommended as contributing elements to the Area 6 Control Point Historic District and one is recommended as non-contributing.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

KSC Headquarters Building Area SWMU 104 Soil Interim Measure Report for LOC 2D and LOC 2E Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This Interim Measure (IM) Report for Location of Concern (LOC) 2D and LOC 2E summarizes the activities associated with implementation of an IM to address soil and concrete contamination at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Headquarters Building Area (KHQA) located at KSC, Florida. KHQA has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 104 under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program. The IM consisted of excavating/removing residual polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination in soil and concrete from two separate areas, LOC 2D and LOC 2E, which were associated with electrical transformer locations. IM activities were conducted in accordance with the Interim Measure Work Plan (IMWP), Revision 1, for KHQA dated June 2018, which was approved by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection in a correspondence letter dated April 2016 and the United States Environmental Protection Agency in a correspondence letter dated August 2018. The objective of the IM was to remove all remaining contaminated media with total PCB concentrations greater than the State of Florida Residential Soil Cleanup Target Level (RSCTL) (0.5 milligrams per kilogram [mg/kg]). This cleanup goal meets unrestrictive re-use conditions in Florida, and is below federal regulations for PCB Bulk Remediation Waste Cleanup of 1 mg/kg for high occupancy, unrestricted use areas, as outlined in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 761.61(a). The timeline of the IM was coordinated with demolition of the former KSC Headquarters Building (demolished in 2021) in order to safely remove contaminated media after electrical equipment was de-energized and removed from the site. Excavation activities were conducted between January 10, 2022, and February 8, 2022, and included two waste streams for off-site disposal: (1) PCB-remediation waste greater than or equal to 50 mg/kg, and (2) PCB-remediation waste less than 50 mg/kg. A total of approximately 347 cubic yards (478 tons) of PCB-contaminated soil and concrete was initially removed from the LOC 2D and LOC 2E areas, as defined in the IMWP. An additional 4.35 tons of soil and concrete were removed based on verification sampling, which was conducted until the cleanup goal was achieved. The total area of excavation from both LOC 2D and LOC 2E was approximately 5,186 square feet (0.12 acres), and excavation depths ranged from 0.5 to 4.0 feet below land surface Excavated soils and concrete were stockpiled based on waste stream and subsequently transported and disposed of at Waste Connections of Osceola County, LLC – JED Landfill in St. Cloud, Florida (PCBs less than 50 mg/kg) or the Chemical Waste Management Landfill in Emelle, Alabama (PCBs greater than or equal to 50 mg/kg). Following excavation, clean backfill was brought to the site and provided to the Demolition Contractor to complete backfill and grading in conjunction with their final site restoration activities from building demolition. Post-IM groundwater sampling was conducted in May 2022 at three monitoring wells installed in April 2022 to confirm that PCBs did not leach into groundwater. These wells were installed where the highest PCB concentrations were detected at LOC 2D, LOC 2E, and from the Building Perimeter IM (previously completed in 2020). All PCB results in groundwater were non-detect. Volatile organic compounds were also analyzed based on potential past use of solvents in transformers with PCB-dielectric fluids and the potential release of dielectric fluids containing volatile organic compounds, and all results were non-detect. Based on completion of a successful IM at LOC 2D and LOC 2E, as well as previous remedial actions that have addressed other contamination at KHQA (SWMU 104), No Further Action without controls will be recommended for SWMU 104. NASA will submit separate Site Rehabilitation Completion Order request documentation for SWMU 104 to support an NFA without controls recommendation.

PCB↗

Environmentally-Friendly Fixatives with Embedded Intelligence for Dust Management at Contaminated Sites – 21266

Wind or rain can potentially spread loose hazardous contaminants from piles of rubble and soil waiting to be trucked to a landfill site for disposal. Water, which is plentiful near remediation sites, is the traditional dust suppressant during demolition, post-demolition sizing and encapsulation as well as soil trucking activities. However, water can mobilize the toxic metal contaminants in the soil into the ground water. Ground water is highly regulated and contaminant removal is costly. InnoSense LLC (ISL) is developing DustSafe™ as a cost-effective alternative to water for various decontamination & decommissioning (D&D) applications. It is a sprayable dust abatement solution designed to actively trap, remediate, and aid in visualizing hazardous materials while preventing their dispersion by wind, water or impact. Aside from application as a dust suppressant to trap airborne toxic and radiological hazards during demolition activities, with customization DustSafe can be used to locate/characterize and remediate hazards prior to D&D activities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC, Excess Facility Disposition Program - 17289

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), the management and operating contractor for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Pantex Plant (Pantex) in Amarillo, Texas, has developed an integrated strategy to address badly deteriorating excess facilities presenting risks to people, the environment, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) mission. The comprehensive, integrated Excess Facilities Disposition Program (EFDP) incorporates NNSA scope for excess facility risk reduction, preparation of facilities to be transferred to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) for demolition, and demolition of non-process contaminated facilities. The Program has been developed using the NNSA Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations (NA-50) Program Management Plan as a guide. The Program has undertaken actions to address the most immediate risks associated with CNS excess facilities. At Y-12, new foam roofs have been installed on Buildings 9201-5 (Alpha 5), 9204-4 (Beta 4), and 9206 to minimize further facility degradation. Tanks and dikes outside of Alpha 5 and Beta 4 are also being disconnected, drained, and filled with concrete. In addition, Beta 4 will be getting a new electrical system as its Manhattan Project-era system will be replaced by a temporary 'construction power' setup that will provide as-needed electricity to the building that is safer, more reliable, and will ease demolition activities in the future. The EFDP is also focusing on the basement of Alpha 5 and is planning to remove the water from the aging facility's flooded basement, which in some areas contains up to 54 inches of water. The EFDP is also planning several efforts to remove excess materials from Alpha 5 and Beta 4, de-inventory the Alpha 5 Mercury House System and numerous transformers, and de-inventory Beta 4 hydraulic pumps and systems. Efforts are also underway to deactivate and decommission non-process-contaminated facilities at Y-12 and at Pantex. The EFDP has prioritized the performance of work to reduce risk while at the same time supporting the preparation of process-contaminated Y-12 facilities for transfer to EM. The Program aligns with the EM goal to have the NNSA scope completed in Alpha 5 and Beta 4 by the end of FY 2020, and Building 9206 completed by the end of FY 2024. These dates and project sequencing will support the Y-12-related DOE EM cleanup initiatives. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Success of the River Corridor Closure Project - A Look at the Last 10 Years - 16105

Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) was selected by the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) to manage the River Corridor Closure Project (RCCP), a 10-year contract in which WCH will clean up 572 km{sup 2} (220 mi{sup 2}) of contaminated land at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. Since 2005, WCH has safely and efficiently performed field remediation and building demolition activities along the Columbia River corridor. To date, 99% of the buildings have been demolished and field remediation is 88% complete. These numbers represent work on 323 buildings and 571 waste sites, respectively. From a safety perspective, WCH has experienced an outstanding safety record with a total of 230 first aid cases, 47 recordable only cases, 2 restricted work day cases, and 7 lost work day cases. WCH exceeded 6 million hours worked without a lost time injury on September 30, 2015, for the second time in the contract period. The project has worked a total of 23,217,840 hours. WCH has experienced extensive successes over the last 10 years. These successes include, but are not limited to, explosive demolition, technological applications, and creative land restoration techniques. Efficiencies in work planning, execution, and subcontracting will also be shared. The photographs showing how the landscape has changed are impressive, as is some of the video captured during explosive demolition of a reactor stack in the 100-N Area of the Hanford Site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Managing Low-Level Waste at Dounreay - 16269

Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL) is the site licence company responsible for the clean-up and demolition of Britain's former centre of fast reactor research and development. The Dounreay site requires facilities to dispose of up to 175,000 cubic metres of low level waste (LLW) that has been and will continue to be generated during the decommissioning and restoration of the site. In May 2014, construction of two new vaults for the disposal of LLW at Dounreay was completed, including the necessary roads, infrastructures and services, followed by an encapsulation plant in September 2014. The vaults are located immediately to the northeast of the Dounreay licensed site, on NDA-owned land. The facilities are for disposal of the solid LLW generated at Dounreay and the adjacent Vulcan site only. In 2004, following consultation with stakeholders and members of the public, Dounreay issued the 'Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) Report' on the management of Dounreay LLW. This report assessed potential management options for LLW against a range of criteria, including technical, environmental, cost, health and safety issues. The study was conducted in line with best practice and involved consultation with a range of people, including the local community and organisations with an interest in radioactive waste management. The recommendations and conclusions from the study provided the basis for the 'Dounreay Solid LLW Overall Strategy', which was published in March 2005. A fundamental component of this strategy was the development of new below-ground disposal vaults for LLW at Dounreay. Siting the vaults on land at Dounreay avoids any need to transport the LLW away from Dounreay on public roads. Disposal at Dounreay therefore satisfies the proximity principle of managing the waste at source. Disposal at Dounreay is also consistent with UK Government Policy on LLW management, the Scottish Government's Radioactive Waste Management Policy and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's (NDA's) strategy on management of LLW from the UK nuclear industry. A planning application was initially lodged with the Highland Council in June 2006. The period for the determination of this application was extended to allow the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) sufficient time to assess fully the supporting Environmental Safety Case (ESC). The planning application was re-activated in May 2008, and planning permission was granted by Highland Council in April 2009. The planning permission included 26 conditions on DSRL, covering a wide range of environmental issues such as construction noise/dust, traffic, visual impact and also a condition to develop a community fund aimed at socio-economic development of the area around the Dounreay site. After undertaking the necessary detailed design work, construction of the phase one vaults commenced in November 2011 by principal contractor, Graham Construction. Work was undertaken on both vaults simultaneously, excavating around 243,000 m{sup 3} of rock. When excavation was complete, steel reinforcement was placed and concrete poured to construct the floor slabs. This was followed by the construction of the reinforced walls and then the installation of the steel support structure and materials that form the roof. Mechanical and electrical installation then followed, in parallel with the construction of the vault apron, ramps and access roads. A pumping system and control building was also constructed to remove groundwater from around the vaults to allow the vaults to be kept dry while they are being filled with waste. A layer of excavated material, approximately 3 m thick, was placed across the existing ground surface between the vaults and the coast, to ensure the water table lies well below the new ground surface after closure of the vaults, and that any future trace contaminated groundwater flows out to the sea rather than to the soil zone. This layer is referred to in project documents as the 'enhanced geosphere'. After disposals are completed and the vaults are closed, this layer will be joined to the capping over the vaults so that the ensemble merges visually with the surrounding landscape. The original vegetation and soil mix will be returned as far as is practicable. An encapsulation plant has been constructed to fill the LLW containers with grout prior to disposal in the vault, similar to the process used at the national Low-Level Waste Repository facility (LLWR), near Drigg in Cumbria. The plant has the capacity to grout up to four containers per day. The grout fills voids in the container and helps provide chemical conditions in the vault that limit the release of radionuclides in the far future, after the vault has been penetrated by groundwater. On April 24 2015, active commissioning began at the Encapsulation Plant and LLW Vaults. Half-height ISO containers packed with low level waste are currently being filled with grout and disposed of in the LLW Vault. Also packaged Demolition Low Level Waste (DLLW) is being processed and disposed of in the Demolition Low Level Waste Vault. To date over 2500 packages of DLLW and 70 containers LLW have been disposed of. Completion of construction and the start of operating the Phase One vaults and encapsulation plant are fundamental to the successful and efficient decommissioning of the Dounreay site, upon which many millions of pounds of investment and hundreds of jobs rely.

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Decommissioning of the V1 Nuclear Power Plant Jaslovske Bohunice - 20270

The paper focuses on introducing the approach and method applied for decommissioning of the V1 nuclear power plant (further the 'V1 NPP') located in Jaslovske Bohunice in the Slovak Republic, to the conference participants. The Paper outlines activities and steps necessary to comply with the requirements contained in the decision of the Slovak government from 1999 regarding the early shutdown of the V1 NPP. The company responsible for the V1 NPP decommissioning is Jadrova a vyradovacia spolocnost, a.s., (further JAVYS) with the State as a sole shareholder. On the basis of the V1 NPP Decommissioning Conceptual Plan, out of four assessed options, JAVYS selected the immediate decommissioning option (the 'IDO') for the V1 NPP. On the basis of multi-criteria analysis, the IDO specified the approach of immediate and continuous dismantling of equipment followed by demolition of buildings and preparation of the site for its further potential use. The IDO also included the summary of technical, environmental, legislative information as well as the determination of assumed costs for decommissioning of the V1 NPP. Prior to commencement of the V1 NPP decommissioning, within the process of termination of operation, activities connected with de-fuelling, monitoring, processing of historical waste and, not to forget, the process of obtaining the license for the V1 NPP decommissioning were executed. JAVYS decided to divide the decommissioning process into two stages. In 2011, JAVYS obtained a license for the first stage of the V1 NPP decommissioning. Within this stage, dismantling of inactive equipment, demolitions of inactive buildings, monitoring of systems and preparatory works for the upcoming stage of decommissioning were implemented. In 2015, in line with the license for the 2. stage of the V1 NPP decommissioning, the activities of decontamination and dismantling of contaminated and active equipment as well as demolitions of remaining buildings began. In this stage radioactive waste (RAW) produced during the decommissioning is to be processed. After decontamination, the material fulfilling the free release criteria is to be released into the environment, the site is to be cleared from the scope of the Atomic Act and released from the surveillance of the national regulators. Future application of certain methods and techniques for decontamination and dismantling in similar environments might bring an added value to the operators. Paper includes a description of best practices for Nuclear Power Plant VVER type reactors decommissioning. Schedule comparison is given to show how the critical path of certain projects is being managed. Application of the International Standard for Decommissioning Costing (ISDC) methodology provides a uniform method which enables comparison of cost estimates to other nuclear facilities under decommissioning. The cost estimate for the V1 NPP decommissioning has been continuously updated based on more advanced and detailed information on the decommissioning activities and projects. Monitoring of progress of the V1 NPP decommissioning is performed via four key-performance indicators. The Earned Value Management (EVM) methodology is used for evaluating time and cost aspect of decommissioning activities while waste conditioning index is calculated by comparing the actually produced waste to planned values of waste for a respective monitored period. Radiological safety index is assessed by comparison of the personnel records on the individual yearly doses received by each respective employee to the boundary value. (authors)

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Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 113: Area 25 R-MAD Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 113: Area 25, Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility, Building 3110, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, DOE/NV--891-VOL I-Rev. 1, dated July 2003, provides details of demolition, waste disposal, and use restriction (UR) modification for Corrective Action Unit 113, Area 25 R-MAD Facility. Demolition was completed on July 15, 2010, when the last of the building debris was disposed. Final field activities were concluded on August 30, 2010, after all equipment was demobilized and UR signs were posted. This work was funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

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