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Electric grids around the world are undergoing rapid structural and operational change, making it more important than ever to understand evolving risks and improve grid resilience and security against natural and human disruptions. Through tailored technical assistance, NREL is working with partners to support the secure and resilient deployment of energy systems and address grid integration challenges.
The goal of this project is to identify and address cybersecurity gaps by developing a multi-layer multi-channel cyber-physical defense and survival mechanism for operating distribution networks with high penetration of solar / inverter-based resource (IBR) / distributed energy resource (DER). The proposed security enhancements are built upon the distributed framework and solution architecture for both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The technical solutions consist of two composite functionalities and six layers: proactive defense (vulnerability assessment, communication protection, and attack detection, as layers 1-3), and adaptive self-healing (attack-resilient control, adaptive recovery, and resilient survival, as layers 4-6). These layers, built on and extended from DHS CISA Cyber Framework, establish an integrated and robust cybersecurity framework for operating large-scale distribution networks.
Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.
Currently, nuclear power plant physical security systems are highly dependent on air-gaps as a protective measure against cyber-threats. Cyber-physical threats become more likely as advanced cyber-threat capabilities to jump air-gaps transition into common use. Defending against the emerging threat of cyber-enabled physical intrusions is poorly understood. The consequence of these cyber-physical attacks has no quantitative analysis method to inform risk-informed, performance-based cybersecurity approaches. By modifying the physical security simulation tool Dante, cyber-physical threat consequence was able to be analyzed on a notional facility. The results of this analysis are used to design a Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture (DCSA) for the physical security system to produce example resilience measures for this notional facility. A DCSA defines security levels to provide a graded approach for defending plant functions, and security zones for trusted communication between systems. This approach can be applied to real world systems to produce physical protection systems and response measures that are resilient to cyber-physical threats.
This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, and the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.
This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, and the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.
This report summarizes key findings from a collaborative technical study of residential, non-grid-tied vehicle-to-home (V2H) backup power systems in Commonwealth Edison’s (ComEd’s) service territory. The work integrates (1) a feeder-level technoeconomic analysis (TEA) using historical outage-event data and simulated electric-vehicle (EV) driving/charging profiles to estimate potential reliability and customer interruption-cost impacts under V2H and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) adoption scenarios; (2) controlled laboratory performance testing of a representative V2H backup ecosystem to characterize transfer-to-backup behavior, sustained power delivery, efficiency trends, and repeatable reliability limitations; and (3) a cybersecurity assessment aligned with NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 and ISO/SAE 21434 to evaluate interface-level risk drivers and identify program-relevant mitigations. Results indicate that V2H can provide measurable resilience value, but outcomes are strongly context dependent on outage patterns and the share of events that are “V2H-applicable.” Typical transfer-to-backup behavior clustered on the order of minutes, but rare long-delay edge cases were observed (including an event approaching 30 minutes) and should be treated as a reliability risk. High-power testing showed that peak-rated output is not necessarily continuously deliverable; stable operation may require operation below nameplate ratings and attention to thermal and installation constraints. The cybersecurity assessment highlights a broad attack surface spanning commissioning, home networks, embedded services, and cloud/OTA pathways, motivating minimum controls for secure onboarding, signed updates, patch cadence, and coordinated vulnerability response for any scaled deployment.
The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy has recommended a transition to secure-by-design methodologies in critical infrastructure. This paper presents the adoption of the National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy as initiated by the U.S. DOE’s CESER office, advocating for the integration of cybersecurity at the earliest stages of system design. The strategy targets design engineers responsible for energy infrastructure to embed CIE principles within the engineering lifecycle, thus enhancing cyber resilience. This paper discusses the expansion of secure-by-design concepts to cyber-physical systems, moving beyond traditional IT security to include engineering considerations that can mitigate cyber risks through design choices. The paper introduces Digital Risk Management, balancing traditional cybersecurity with CIE to reduce both likelihood and impact of cyber threats. A set of CIE starter questions derived from 12 core principles is detailed, aiding engineers to consider cybersecurity in their designs and highlights the importance of CIE in anticipating and reducing the impacts of cyber attacks, suggesting that such integration is essential for national security and infrastructure resilience.
To meet the increasing demand for electricity and to have a more reliable and resilient electric grid against conventional and extreme events, grid modernization is more crucial now than ever before. This will require the development and deployment of devices that provide advanced communication capabilities. The overall efficiency, reliability, and resilience of the smart grid will be inextricably linked to the exchange of information between these devices. Unfortunately, the increased information flow will increase the potential attack surface and introduce new vulnerabilities. While a smarter grid will depend critically on information flow, these benefits will be accrued only if that information can be protected. Nowadays, information is secured in smart grids primarily through cryptography. However, with the increasing number of sophisticated attacks as well as the increasing computational power, the security of the “classical” cryptographic algorithms is threatened. Quantum information science offers solutions to this problem, specifically quantum key distribution (QKD), which provides a means for the generation and secure distribution of symmetric cryptographic keys. The security of QKD stems ultimately from the very nature of quantum physics. In this paper, we investigate the applicability of QKD to the various smart grid sectors and specific use cases. We have identified 18 smart grid use cases of interest for QKD suitability together with 7 QKD factors used for the assessment of the various use cases. For each use case, the impact to security of the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability is specified. In addition, the suitability of QKD is assessed for each use case with respect to multiple factors.
For individuals, businesses, and communities focused on building resilient electrical grid infrastructure, wind energy can provide an affordable, accessible, and compatible distributed energy resource option that also enhances the capabilities of local grid operations. The Microgrids, Infrastructure Resilience, and Advanced Controls Launchpad (MIRACL) project is a multi-year distributed wind research effort, driven through a partnership between four Department of Energy National Laboratories and industry to develop and improve the planning, design, and operation of wind-centered microgrids to complement solar, energy storage, and other distributed energy resources for grid-tied and isolated operation (U.S. Department of Energy, 2021). This report documents the application of methods developed through the initial three years of the MIRACL project to two real-world distributed wind reference systems. Specifically, the methods demonstrated in this report include 1) a market valuation framework to comprehensively value the services distributed wind can provide and 2) a resilience framework that enables stakeholders to characterize distribution system resilience and compare grid investment decisions from a resilience perspective. Additional methods mentioned in this report include distributed hybrid system design methods for grid resilience, advanced control co-simulation platforms, and power hardware-in-the-loop (PHIL) models. Preliminary results from these additional methods are presented in this report and will be demonstrated and/or applied to the reference systems in the coming year. The purpose of applying these methods to reference systems is to drive technology transfer of the theories, methodologies, and technologies developed under the MIRACL project and increase the number of referenceable case studies available to stakeholders interested in additional value-added capabilities of wind systems beyond bulk energy supply (i.e. kilowatt-hours).
The Broadband Automation for Distributed Grid Efficiency and Resilience (BADGER) project aligns with national strategic priorities for integrating emerging wireless technologies and advancing AI-driven security. As critical infrastructure modernizes toward increasingly software-defined and interconnected systems, the ability to leverage 5G/NextG networks and AI-enabled control becomes essential. This report outlines work at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) to develop a NextG-native security architecture powered by AI-RAN concepts and evaluate workflows that enable efficient and reliable architectures. Together, these efforts position the laboratory to accelerate innovation while directly supporting national security and resilience objectives.
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The main goal of the project is to develop an AI-based process layer cybersecurity suite for detection, isolation and mitigation of cyber-attack effects on operation of building energy management systems (BEMS). The following constituent key technologies were developed under the program towards fulfilling the program objectives: (1) developed a high fidelity BEMS testbed for generation of training data and validation of developed technologies; (2) developed a physics informed ML based attack detection and localization module (ADL) capable of detecting high impact stealthy attacks (HISA - attacks causing 30% energy utilization but no immediate visible impact otherwise) with 98% accuracy; (3) developed a methodology to determine ’representative days’ to limit the data required for training; (4) developed a virtual sensing system that can reconstruct affected sensors with 10% error for the same HISA set; (5) developed a resilient model predictive control system that can continue operation of the BEMS without jeopardizing stability for the HISA set; and (6) integrated and deployed all the constituent modules and demonstrated the efficacy of the technology in real-time in a hardware in loop simulation.
Extremely fast charging (XFC) has the potential to reduce the charging time of battery electric vehicles (BEV) to be equivalent to the filling time of internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV), thus eliminating one of the few advantages ICEV still poses for light- and heavy-duty vehicles. Enabling XFC will, however, require coordination and cooperation between the grid, charging stations, and the vehicles themselves, which leads to an inevitable increase in the attack surface for all systems combined. In securing the overall system, we must not only embrace traditional cybersecurity, which is chiefly concerned with communications and the operation of digital systems, but also cyber-physical systems security as the proper operation of XFC is critically dependent on systems’ abilities to know about (sense) and interact with (actuate) the physical world. The project team consists of academic and industry researchers with backgrounds in cybersecurity, cyber-physical systems security, learning in adversarial environments, transportation security, grid security and resilience, wireless power transfer, converter design, and battery management systems.
The integration of distributed energy resources(DERs) and expansion of complex network in the distribution grid requires an advanced distributed state estimator to monitor the grid health at micro-level. The distribution state estimator will improve the situational awareness and resiliency of distributed power system. This paper proposes a synchrophasors-based master state awareness (MSA) estimator to enhance the cybersecurity in distribution grid by providing a real-time estimation of system operating states to control center operators. In this paper, the proposed MSA estimator utilizes only phasor measurements, bus magnitudes and angles, from phasor measurement units (PMUs),deployed in local substations, to estimate the system states and also detects data integrity attacks, such as load tripping attack that disconnects the load. To validate the proof of concept, we implement the proposed methodology in cyber-physical testbed environment at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Electric Grid Security Testbed. Further, to address the “valley of death” and support technology commercialization, field demonstration is also performed at the Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex(CITRC) at the INL. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting load tripping attack and providing an accurate situational awareness through an alert visualization dashboard in real-time
The rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly inverters, has introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten both local operations as well as the broader electrical grid’s stability. PV inverters, integrated into critical energy infrastructure are potential targets for cyber attacks due to vulnerabilities in firmware, remote access systems, and communication protocols. The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides a framework for identifying, reporting, and addressing these vulnerabilities in a transparent and collaborative manner. This report outlines the CVD process as it applies to PV systems, detailing the roles of key stakeholders, such as manufacturers, grid operators, and security researchers. The report also highlights specific challenges in managing vulnerabilities for new and legacy PV systems, which includes those introduced by insecure communications and third-party supply chain components. By adhering to the CVD process, the PV industry can mitigate cybersecurity risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and maintain consumer trust, while safeguarding the operational resilience of the energy grid. Ultimately, the effective coordination of vulnerability management is crucial for securing the future of PV systems within the critical electric grid infrastructure landscape.
An Incident Response Plan (IRP) is a document that is created and maintained by an organization that provides guidance in the event of a cyber incident. The primary objectives of an IRP are to aid in the detection, response, and recovery from incidents, as well as to enhance preparation and preventative measures. An IRP should outline specific procedures at each stage of an incident, with the goal of minimizing asset damage, data leakage, and operational impact. By investing in a well-defined IRP, organizations can better manage and mitigate risks associated with cyber threats, ensuring business continuity and resilience. This poster summarizes incident response guidelines for wind energy, which faces unique cybersecurity and physical challenges.
Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. In surveying the current state-of-the-art across different but interconnected topics, we illustrate how aggregators can be power system participants that enhance grid security. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.