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At least 127 records · Page 7

Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in the GDSA Framework (FY2022)

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT) is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two high priorities for SFWST disposal R&D are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the SFWST Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, GDSA Framework, for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. GDSA Framework is supported by SFWST Campaign and its predecessor the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) campaign.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SFWST Disposal Research R&D 5-Year Plan (FY2023 Update)

This FY2023 report is the second update to the Disposal Research (DR) Research and Development (R&D) 5-year plan for the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign DR R&D activities. In the planning for FY2020 in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) NE-81 SFWST Campaign, the DOE requested development of a high-level summary plan for activities in the DR R&D program for the next five (5)-year period, with periodic updates to this summary plan. The DR R&D 5-year plan was provided to the DOE based initially on the FY2020 priorities and program structure (initial 2020 version of this 5-year plan) and provides a strategic summary guide to the work within the DR R&D technical areas (Control Accounts, CA), focusing on the highest priority technical thrusts. This 5-year plan is a living document (planned to be updated periodically) that provides review of SFWST R&D accomplishments (as seen on the 2021 revision of this 5-year plan), describes changes to technical R&D prioritization based on (a) progress in each technical area (including external technical understanding) with specific accomplishments and (b) any changes in SFWST Campaign objectives and/or funding levels (i.e., Program Direction). Updates to this 5-year plan include the DR R&D adjustments to high-priority knowledge gaps to be investigated in the near-term, as well as the updated longer-term DR R&D directions for the program activities. This plan fulfills the Milestone M2SF23SN010304083 in DR Work Package (WP) SF-23SN01030408 (GDSA - Framework Development – SNL).

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Modeling Activities Related to Waste Form Degradation: Progress Report

This report represents the milestone deliverable M4SF-22SN010309092 “Modeling Activities Related to Waste Form Degradation: Progress Report” that describes the progress of R&D activities of ongoing modeling investigations specifically on nuclear waste glass degradation, Density Functional Theory (DFT) studies on clarkeite structure and stability, and electrochemical model development of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). These activities are part of the Waste Form Testing, Modeling, and Performance work package at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). This work package is part of the “Inventory and Waste Form Characteristics and Performance” control account that includes various experimental and modeling activities on nuclear waste degradation conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), SNL, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).

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Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in the GDSA Framework (FY2025)

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign (SFWST) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is conducting research and development on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two priorities for SFWST are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, GDSA Framework, for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 associated with the GDSA Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods work package. This report fulfills the GDSA Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods work package (SF-25SN01030407) level 3 milestone, Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in GDSA Framework (FY2025) (M3SF-25SN010304072). This work was closely coordinated with the other Sandia National Laboratory GDSA work packages: the GDSA Framework Development work package (SF-25SN01030408), the GDSA Repository Systems Analysis work package (SF-25SN01030409), and the GDSA PFLOTRAN Development work package (SF-25SN01030410). This report builds on developments reported in previous GDSA Framework milestones, particularly M3SF-24SN010304072.

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Recommendations for a Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan for TRISO Fuel Fabrication Facilities Under NRC Regulations

A fundamental nuclear material control (FNMC) plan, which is required for all fuel fabrication facilities that are authorized to possess more than 1 effective kg of special nuclear material, describes how material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements will be met to comply with US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. Tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facilities are likely to have issues in meeting MC&A requirements because of the new processes and fuel types their work involves. This report provides recommendations for an FNMC plan specifically for a TRISO fuel fabrication facility under NRC regulations and includes a draft outline of an FNMC plan. This report was produced for the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program under the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies programs within the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy.

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Special Nuclear Geometric Modeling

This report is a summary of our summer interns project that focused on investigating the usefulness of the Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) into the Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) Measurements Team. The project's findings highlight the advantages of using GADRAS and demonstrate its value in improving the MC&A Measurements Team's analytical capabilities.

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Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in the GDSA Framework (FY2024)

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign (SFWST) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is conducting research and development on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two priorities for SFWST are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, GDSA Framework, for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media.

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SCDM in a Distributed Environment

The Software Configuration Management (SCM) of the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) Advanced Engineering Environment (AEE) products is performed in a distributed environment-meaning the activities performed during the project lifecycle are across numerous NASA Centers, facilities, organizations, colleges and industry. SCM is the glue that holds the project and products together-especially in a distributed environment. It identifies, controls, accounts, and verified the details of the products; the schedule of activities; the assigned responsibilities; and the required resources, including staff, tools, and computer facilities. Data/document management (DM) captures and conveys the SCM and project efforts. SCM and DM are integrally linked; hence, Software Configuration and Data Management (SCDM). This paper discusses one team's challenges in implementing SCDM in a distributed environment. The distributed nature of the project introduces new opportunities for moving SCDM to the next level of usefulness in today's high-tech development arena. The lessons learned from the implementation of distributed SCDM in support of the SLI AEE Project provide valuable information for future implementations of SCM and DM.

Crowley, Sandra L.↗

PREPARING FOR A SUCCESSFUL EVMS CERTIFICATION

The client, a government agency, requires its contractor to obtain an Earned Value Management System (EVMS) certification that meets the intent of ANSI/EIA-748-B, Earned Value Management Systems. The contractor has extensive experience with certification preparation, having completed two certifications within two years. Information from a previous EVMS certification and internal system surveillances are used to prepare for client-based EVMS certifications and bi-annual surveillances. The contractor also sent members of its group to assist other companies preparing for surveillances and certifications to perform 'Black Hat Reviews.' This paper is a lessons learned on preparing a team for EVMS certification. The information is also applicable for surveillances, since the contractor prepares its team for the surveillance in the same manner as the initial certification. Some of the areas covered include required documents, tracing the data through the systems, Control Account Manager (CAM) preparation, and system verification.

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Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may lead to more proliferation resistant and physically secure design features for SMRs.

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Development of MCNP Training Modules for Safeguards Practitioners [Abstract]

The Monte-Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software developed at LANL is the most widely used neutron transport code in the world. It is an essential tool for a variety of applications including detector development and design, nuclear fuel burnup simulation, criticality safety, and nondestructive assay system optimization. For this reason, it is indispensable within the safeguards and materials control & accountability (MC&A) communities. Multiple MCNP training courses have been created and taught over the last several decades by the MCNP development team at LANL, however there are no existing courses that cover specialized topics considered fundamental to NDA and safeguards models. To fill this gap, the MCNP team and Safeguards Science and Technology group at LANL have co-created a set of training modules customized to meet the specialized needs of the safeguards and MC&A communities. The basic modules cover concepts such as NDA system optimization, He-specific and other capture tallies, and tools for improved theoretical understanding. An advanced module was also created to cover topics including variance reduction for active interrogation simulations, use of the LANL MCNPTools post-processor, PTRAC (particle tracking) and list-mode data simulations, and fuel burnup simulations. The training modules teach to the latest and most state-of-the-art MCNP features and tools released by the development team at LANL and are intended to be taught jointly by the developers and safeguards experts. Ultimately, we hope that creation of these modules will serve to capture and convey the safeguards modeling and MCNP expertise at LANL, and that we will be able to share the modules more broadly with the MC&A and safeguards communities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Development and Quantification of UV-Visible and Laser Spectroscopic Techniques for Materials Accountability and Process Control

Ultraviolet-Visible Spectroscopy (UV-Visible) and Time Resolved Laser Fluorescence Spectroscopy (TRLFS) optical techniques can permit on-line, real-time analysis of the actinide elements in a solvent extraction process. UV-Visible and TRLFS techniques have been used for measuring the speciation and concentration of the actinides under laboratory conditions. These methods are easily adaptable to multiple sampling geometries, such as dip probes, fiber-optic sample cells, and flow-through cell geometries. To fully exploit these techniques for GNEP applications, the fundamental speciation of the target actinides and the resulting influence on 3 spectroscopic properties must be determined. Through this effort detection limits, process conditions, and speciation of key actinide components can be establish and utilized in a range of areas of interest to GNEP, especially in areas related to materials accountability and process control.

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The Impact of Increased Requirements for Verification Measurements of Category III and IV Receipts

As part of the regular nuclear material accounting and control process, sites that have accountable nuclear material regularly perform measurements of the material in their possession. The expectation for the type of measurements and their frequency is set out in Department of Energy (DOE) Order 474.2, and further detailed in each site’s respective material control and accountability (MC&A) plan and associated controlling documents. The measurements of interest in this report are those performed on external (between DOE sites) transfer receipts of Category III or IV accountable materials. In 2020, a revision of DOE Order 474.2 was proposed that would significantly increase the requirement that measurements be performed upon receipt of material, and further, that those measurements be quantitative verification (rather than qualitative confirmatory) measurements. A survey was performed of DOE sites to discuss the impact on their MC&A measurements program if more rigorous verification measurements requirements for Category III and IV receipts were implemented. An assessment of nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement instruments to meet those needs was also performed. Across the board, sites indicated that personnel and budget would cause the largest impact. Sites which are qualified as Category I/II indicated a reduced impact as these sites already have the measurement capabilities and some personnel but would require the acquisition of additional measurement systems. Category III/IV sites indicated a much larger impact as these sites generally have smaller MC&A programs. A few smaller sites stated a measurement program would need to be created to handle the demand. Calorimetry, quantitative gamma spectroscopy and neutron coincidence counting systems were identified as common systems that could meet the verification measurement requirements. The other, and perhaps larger issue is the need for calibration standards for the calorimetry and neutron coincidence counting systems. It is proposed that a comparative study be performed for ISOCS and ISOTOPICS, qualification of a COTS calorimetry system be performed, and development of an AWCC system that uses a neutron generator.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

International Training Course on Implementing State Systems of Accounting for and Control (SSAC) of Nuclear Material for States with Small Quantity Protocols (SQP): Course Overview and Objectives [Slides]

This course is hosted by Los Alamos National Laboratory on behalf of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in collaboration with the IAEA to support Member States in managing small quantities of nuclear and radioactive materials in a manner that is compliant with their international obligations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

MC&A System Effectiveness Tool (MSET) (Presentation 2)

MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material control and accountability (MC&A) system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MC&A functions defined based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. MSET analysis is based on performance of the entire MC&A system including defense-in-depth attributes and sensitivity analysis of changes in the system, both positive and negative. MSET analysis considers: accounting; containment; access control; surveillance capabilities of the system; and other interfaces with the physical protection systems that provide detection of an unauthorized action. MSET performs a system effectiveness calculation evaluation against a defined performance metric. MSET uses PRA techniques to analyze the MC&A system. MSET is a tool for evaluating the system effectiveness of MC&A systems during self-assessment or external inspection. MSET has been developed, tested, and benchmarked by the U.S. DOE. In collaboration with the U.S. DOE, Rosatom is developing a Russian version (MSET-R) planned for pilot implementation at select material balance areas in 2011. MSET has been shown to be an effective training and communication tool for MC&A.

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URANIUM ACCUMULATIONS IN CASTING OPERATIONS

In December 2017, unexpected accumulations of uranium were discovered in several locations throughout the casting process area at the Y-12 National Security Complex that subsequently placed casting operations on hold. The Y-12 uranium casting process takes place in enclosures and hoods, many of which are open to a large floor surface area that has limited visibility and access. At the time of discovery, there were no Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) analyses or limits for material accumulations in the casting processing areas. Due to changes in the operation of the casting process and invalid assumptions in the criticality safety evaluation, significant material accumulations were occurring inside the enclosures. The material accumulations were identified as a result of an extent of condition review from another process, and an occurrence report was filed. The NCS organization worked with Production and Operations personnel to identify additional areas of uranium accumulation in the casting area, which resulted in several iterations of cleaning and material collection. Following material recovery, a causal analysis was performed that identified several contributing factors that allowed the accumulations to go unnoticed. In order to resume operations, the criticality safety evaluation was revised to analyze and control uranium accumulations in the casting area. Additionally, improvements in nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) controls were required. Casting operations have since resumed with frequently required material collections, which have limited the amount of uranium material accumulation.

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