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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1992

Li/BCX (thionyl chloride) battery for the NASA AN/PRC-112 survival radio

As part of the NASA contingency planning related to aborting a launch after liftoff, an emergency radio is required for use by the crew when they return to Earth at some unplanned location. The power source for the radio must be able to satisfy the performance requirements for the radio's mission as well as be compatible with in-cabin storage in the space shuttle. The radio needs a base load power of about 1 W with capability to handle power spikes greater then 6.5 W. A slightly enlarged battery pack using the Li/BCX chemistry in C-size cells was developed that meets these power levels and extends the operational life of the radio by over a factor of four compared to its operation using a Li/SO2 cell battery pack. In addition, the cells meet the requirements for the Li/BCX cells used for extra-vehicular activities by the crew of the shuttle. One of the major qualifying tests is the ability of the cells to withstand exposure to high temperature (149 C) without leaking. Electrical performance and thermal abuse test data will be presented for the cells.

Ebel, Steven J.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Design of mission operations systems for scientific remote sensing

The present work describes the mission operations system (MOS) design process for remote-sensing missions. A MOS is defined as the system required to perform, monitor, and control an operation, encompassing personnel, hardware, software and/or documentation. Attention is given to telecommunications and remote-sensing instrumentation, MOS definition program phases and reviews, and MOS organization, management, and staffing. Also treated are the uplink and downlink processes, anomalies and contingency plans, the illustrative case of the MOS for the Magellan radar sensing mission, and a projection of future MOSs incorporating AI.

Wall, Stephen D.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board

The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether control mechanism and to prepare a detailed plan for hardware inspection, test, and analysis including any appropriate hardware disassembly.

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NASA NTRS1992

Verifying command sequences for satellite systems

We present a formal basis for the design of a Checker used in validating safe schedules and in selecting error recovery schedules for satellite control systems. This design includes a high-level specification of Checker behavior and properties (called flight rules) of safe schedules. Specifications are written in Timed Linear Logic (TLL). Validation of schedules is performed in terms of real-time telemetry and deduction system proof rules. Telemetry (state information for satellite subsystems) serves as input to the Checker. Detection of violation of a flight rule by the Checker results in the selection of a contingency plan (error recovery schedule). The Checker is illustrated in terms of the TOPEX/Poseidon Oceanographic Satellite System.

Peters, James F., III↗
NASA NTRS1993

SIMSAT: An object oriented architecture for real-time satellite simulation

Real-time satellite simulators are vital tools in the support of satellite missions. They are used in the testing of ground control systems, the training of operators, the validation of operational procedures, and the development of contingency plans. The simulators must provide high-fidelity modeling of the satellite, which requires detailed system information, much of which is not available until relatively near launch. The short time-scales and resulting high productivity required of such simulator developments culminates in the need for a reusable infrastructure which can be used as a basis for each simulator. This paper describes a major new simulation infrastructure package, the Software Infrastructure for Modelling Satellites (SIMSAT). It outlines the object oriented design methodology used, describes the resulting design, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages experienced in applying the methodology.

Williams, Adam P.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Emergency medical services

When NASA was established in 1958, it was known that space flight would require efforts beyond those of NASA to ensure the health and safety of our astronauts. On 10 Aug. 1958, a Secretary of Defense memorandum was signed that assigned the first Department of Defense (DOD) Manager to provide support to NASA for Project Mercury. This established a chain of command through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. The current charter is dated 19 Mar. 1986 and assigns the DOD Manager responsibilities to the Commander and Chief, US Space Command. The DOD Managers charter has many support areas and among them are recovery of astronauts and medical support. Today these efforts support the Space Shuttle and Space Station Programs. Briefly, the program works with each organization tasking the other through a requirements document. Level of care, communications, and recovery requirements are established; NASA and the DOD provide the capability to meet them. NASA is also responsible for the specialized training and equipment needed to meet these requirements. A Shuttle launch a KSC requires an Emergency Medical Services (EMS) coordinator on console to facilitate communications, ensure proper coverage, and coordinate with area hospitals. A contingent of NASA medical personnel are assembled to provide triage and medical support capabilities. The DOD provides medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters with surgeons and pararescue specialists (PJ's) or emergency medical technicians (EMT's). Each helicopter is equipped with at least one doctor and one PJ/EMT per astronaut crew member. Transoceanic abort landing (TAL) sites and end of mission (EOM) sites have similar structures, with TAL sites utilizing fixed wingg aircraft for MEDEVAC. The DOD also supports contingency planning for the support and return of crew members from the Space Station Freedom. Much of this support has been directed at the recovery of crew members following the landing of an Assured Crew Return Vehicle.

Billica, Roger↗
NASA NTRS1998

Aerothermodynamics of the Mars Global Surveyor Spacecraft

The aerothermodynamics characteristics of the Mars Global Surveyor spacecraft are investigated and reported. These results have been used by the Mars Global Surveyor mission planners to design the aerobraking phase of the mission. Analytical and Direct Simulation Monte Carlo computer codes were used with a detailed, three dimensional model of the spacecraft to evaluate spacecraft aerobraking characteristics for flight in free molecular and transitional flow regimes. The spacecraft is found to be aerodynamically stable in aerobraking and planned contingency configurations. Aerodynamic forces, moments, and heating are found to be highly dependent on atmospheric density. Accommodation coefficient. is seen to strongly influence drag coefficient. Transitional flow effects are found to reduce overall solar panel heating. Attitude control thruster plumes are shown to interact with the freestream, diminishing the effectiveness of the attitude control system and even leading to thrust reversal. These plume-freestream interaction effects are found to be highly dependent on freestream density.

Shane, Russell W.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Lunar prospector mission design and trajectory support

The Lunar Prospector mission is the first dedicated NASA lunar mapping mission since the Apollo Orbiter program which was flown over 25 years ago. Competitively selected under the NASA Discovery Program, Lunar Prospector was launched on January 7, 1998 on the new Lockheed Martin Athena 2 launch vehicle. The mission design of Lunar Prospector is characterized by a direct minimum energy transfer trajectory to the moon with three scheduled orbit correction maneuvers to remove launch and cislunar injection errors prior to lunar insertion. At lunar encounter, a series of three lunar orbit insertion maneuvers and a small circularization burn were executed to achieve a 100 km altitude polar mapping orbit. This paper will present the design of the Lunar Prospector transfer, lunar insertion and mapping orbits, including maneuver and orbit determination strategies in the context of mission goals and constraints. Contingency plans for handling transfer orbit injection and lunar orbit insertion anomalies are also summarized. Actual flight operations results are discussed and compared to pre-launch support analysis.

Lozier, David↗
NASA NTRS1991

STS-37 Post-flight Crew Press Conference

This NASA Kennedy Space Center video release presents a continuation of the April 19, 1991 STS-37 post-flight crew press conference from Johnson Space Center (JSC). Part 2 of the conference continues the question and answer period of Part 1 with Steven R. Nagel, Commander, Kenneth D. Cameron, Pilot, Jerry L. Ross, Mission Specialist 1, Jay Apt, Mission Specialist 2, and Linda M. Godwin, Mission Specialist 3 fielding questions posed by scientific journalists from JSC and other NASA centers. Topics discussed include: the necessary Extravehicular Activity (EVA) to free the Gamma Ray Observatory high gain antenna, communication between Atlantis and space station MIR, HAM radio contacts with Earth, and EVA contingency planning. Part 1 of the press conference can be found in Report Number NONP-NASA-VT-2000013419.

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NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Training for Aviation Decision Making: The Naturalistic Decision Making Perspective

This paper describes the implications of a naturalistic decision making (NDM) perspective for training air crews to make flight-related decisions. The implications are based on two types of analyses: (a) identification of distinctive features that serve as a basis for classifying a diverse set of decision events actually encountered by flight crews, and (b) performance strategies that distinguished more from less effective crews flying full-mission simulators, as well as performance analyses from NTSB accident investigations. Six training recommendations are offered: (1) Because of the diversity of decision situations, crews need to be aware that different strategies may be appropriate for different problems; (2) Given that situation assessment is essential to making a good decision, it is important to train specific content knowledge needed to recognize critical conditions, to assess risks and available time, and to develop strategies to verify or diagnose the problem; (3) Tendencies to oversimplify problems may be overcome by training to evaluate options in terms of goals, constraints, consequences, and prevailing conditions; (4) In order to provide the time to gather information and consider options, it is essential to manage the situation, which includes managing crew workload, prioritizing tasks, contingency planning, buying time (e.g., requesting holding or vectors), and using low workload periods to prepare for high workload; (5) Evaluating resource requirements ("What do I need?") and capabilities ("'What do I have?" ) are essential to making good decisions. Using resources to meet requirements may involve the cabin crew, ATC, dispatchers, and maintenance personnel; (6) Given that decisions must often be made under high risk, time pressure, and workload, train under realistic flight conditions to promote the development of robust decision skills.

Orasanu, Judith↗
NASA NTRS1993

Airline Operations Aid

C Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS), a NASA-developed expert systems program, is used by American Airlines for three purposes: as a rapid prototyping tool; to develop production prototypes; and to develop production application. An example of the latter is CLIPS' use in "Hub S1AAshing," a knowledge based system that recommends contingency plans when severe schedule reductions must be made. Hub S1AAshing has replaced a manual, labor intensive process. It saves time and allows Operations Control Coordinators to handle more difficult situations. Because the system assimilates much of the information necessary to facilitate educated decision making, it minimizes negative impact in situations where it is impossible to operate all flights.

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NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 4

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it will be necessary to prepare for the receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but specific detailed protocols for the handling and testing of returned samples must still be developed. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and to develop the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened a series of workshops in 2000-2001. The overall objective of the Workshop Series was to produce a Draft Protocol by which returned martian sample materials can be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This report also provides a record of the proceedings of Workshop 4, the final Workshop of the Series, which was held in Arlington, Virginia, June 5-7, 2001. During Workshop 4, the sub-groups were provided with a draft of the protocol compiled in May 2001 from the work done at prior Workshops in the Series. Then eight sub-groups were formed to discuss the following assigned topics: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing Environmental and Health/Monitoring and Safety Issues Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft Protocol Draft Protocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts This report provides the first complete presentation of the Draft Protocol for Mars Sample Handling to meet planetary protection needs. This Draft Protocol, which was compiled from deliberations and recommendations from earlier Workshops in the Series, represents a consensus that emerged from the discussions of all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the five Workshops of the Series. These discussions converged on a conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific analytical requirements. Discussions also identified important issues requiring attention, as well as research and development needed for protocol implementation.

Race Margaret S.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Wild2 approach maneuver strategy used for Stardust spacecraft (extended abstract)

Stardust, NASA's first dedicated sample return mission to a comet, successfully flew through the comet dust around Wold2 on January 2, 2004. The spacecraft flew within 236 km of the comet, meeting the mission requirement of 250+/- 50 km on flyby distance. Stardust collected dust particles and took several images of the comet while flying close to Wild2. The spacecraft will return to earth with the comet samples on January 15, 2006. To accomplish the above objective, a large Deep Space Maneuver (DSM#) was implemented during June 17 and 18, 2003 and a series of Trajectory Correction Maneuvers (TCMs) were also implemented during the 30 days prior to encounter. Both maneuver design and executions were influenced by number of factors including the small body ephemeris uncertainty, predictability of small forces arising from 3-axis attitude limit cycling and spacecraft slews. Maneuver design processes, including contingency plans, and maneuver performance characteristics, are discussed in this paper.

dust↗
NASA NTRS2006

Journal of Air Transportation, Volume 11, No. 2

The following topics were covered: How Do Airlines Perceive That Strategic Alliances Affect Their Individual Branding?; Airline Choice for Domestic Flights in Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area: An Application of the Conditional Logit Model; Consequences of Feeder Delays for the Success of A380 Operations; Inside the Mechanics of Network Development: How Competition and Strategy Reorganize European Air Traffic; The Opportunities and Threats of Turning Airports into Hubs; Another Approach to Enhance Airline Safety: Using System Safety Tools; A Simulation Based Approach for Contingency Planning for Aircraft Turnaround Activities in Airline Hubs; and The Council on Aviation Accreditation: Part One- Historical Foundation.

Bowen, Brent↗
NASA NTRS2007

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. In recent years, NASA has implemented several techniques to reduce the risk to the Shuttle from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it's role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of the effectivity of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, Justin L.↗