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NASA NTRS2006

Structural Requirements for the Space Propulsion Engine Systems

In January 2004, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was given a vision for Space Exploration by President Bush, setting our sight on a bold new path to go back to the Moon, then to Mars and beyond. As NASA gets ready to meet the vision set by President Bush, failures are not an option. Reliability of the propulsion engine systems will play an important role in establishing an overall safe and reliable operation of these new space systems. A new standard, NASA-STD-5012, Strength and Life Assessment for Space Propulsion System Engines, has been developed to provide structural requirements for assessment of the propulsion systems engine. This standard is a complement to the current NASA-wide standard NASA-STD-5001, Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, which excluded the requirement for the engine systems (rotatory structures) along with pressure vessels. As developed, this document builds on the heritage of the multiple industrial standards related to strength and life assessment of the structures. For assuring a safe and reliable operation of a product and/or mission, establishing a set of structural assessment requirements is a key ingredient. Hence, a concentrated effort was made to improve the requirements where there are known lessons learned during the design, test, and operation phases of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) and other engine development programs. Requirements delineated in this standard are also applicable for the reusable and/or human missions. It shall be noted that "reliability of a system cannot be tested and inspected but can only be achieved if it is first designed into a system." Hence, these strength and life assessment requirements for the space propulsion system engines shall be used along with other good engineering practices, requirements, and policies.

Aggarwal, Pravin K.↗

NASA NTRS2008

The Summer of Hydrogen

Ground crew veterans at Kennedy Space Center still talk about what they call "the summer of hydrogen"-the long, frustrating months in 1990 when the shuttle fleet was grounded by an elusive hydrogen leak that foiled our efforts to fill the orbiter's external fuel tank. Columbia (STS-35) was on Launch Pad A for a scheduled May 30 launch when we discovered the hydrogen leak during - tanking. The external fuel tank is loaded through the orbiter. Liquid hydrogen flows through a 17-inch umbilical between the orbiter and the tank. During fueling, we purge the aft fuselage with gaseous nitrogen to reduce the risk of fire, and we have a leak-detection system in the mobile launch platform, which samples (via tygon tubing) the atmosphere in and around the vehicle, drawing it down to a mass spectrometer that analyzes its composition. When we progressed to the stage of tanking where liquid hydrogen flows through the vehicle, the concentration of hydrogen approached four percent-the limit above which it would be dangerously flammable. We had a leak. We did everything we could think of to find it, and the contractor who supplied the flight hardware was there every day, working alongside us. We did tanking tests, which involved instrumenting the suspected leak sources, and cryo-loaded the external tank to try to isolate precisely where the leak originated. We switched out umbilicals; we replaced the seals between the umbilical and the orbiter. We inspected the seals microscopically and found no flaws. We replaced the recirculation pumps, and we found and replaced a damaged teflon seal in a main propulsion system detent cover, which holds the prevalve-the main valve supplying hydrogen to Space Shuttle Main Engine 3 -in the open position. The seal passed leak tests at ambient temperature but leaked when cryogenic temperatures were applied. We added new leak sensors-up to twenty at a time and tried to be methodical in our placements to narrow down the possible sources of the problem. We even switched orbiters, sending Columbia back to the Vehicle Assembly Building and bringing out Atlantis, scheduled to fly as STS-38. Two shuttles on their mobile launchers passing in the night was a majestic sight, but not one you want to see if you're trying to get an orbiter launched. None of this told us where the leak was, or if we were dealing with more than one leak source.

Weber, Philip↗

NASA NTRS2018

Understanding Risk Tolerance and Building an Effective Safety Culture

Estimates range from 65-90 percent of catastrophic mishaps are due to human error. NASA's human factors-related mishaps causes are estimated at approximately 75 percent. As much as we'd like to error-proof our work environment, even the most automated and complex technical endeavors require human interaction... and are vulnerable to human frailty. Industry and government are focusing not only on human factors integration into hazardous work environments, but also looking for practical approaches to cultivating a strong Safety Culture that diminishes risk. Industry and government organizations have recognized the value of monitoring leading indicators to identify potential risk vulnerabilities. NASA has adapted this approach to assess risk controls associated with hazardous, critical, and complex facilities. NASA's facility risk assessments integrate commercial loss control, OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) Process Safety, API (American Petroleum Institute) Performance Indicator Standard, and NASA Operational Readiness Inspection concepts to identify risk control vulnerabilities.

Loyd, David↗

NASA NTRS2011

Mission Operations Directorate - Success Legacy of the Space Shuttle Program (Overview of the Evolution and Success Stories from MOD During the Space Shuttle program)

In support of the Space Shuttle Program, as well as NASA's other human space flight programs, the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at the Johnson Space Center has become the world leader in human spaceflight operations. From the earliest programs - Mercury, Gemini, Apollo - through Skylab, Shuttle, ISS, and our Exploration initiatives, MOD and its predecessors have pioneered ops concepts and emphasized a history of mission leadership which has added value, maximized mission success, and built on continual improvement of the capabilities to become more efficient and effective. This paper provides specific examples that illustrate how MOD's focus on building and contributing value with diverse teams has been key to their successes both with the US space industry and the broader international community. This paper will discuss specific examples for the Plan, Train, Fly, and Facilities aspects within MOD. This paper also provides a discussion of the joint civil servant/contractor environment and the relative badge-less society within MOD. Several Shuttle mission related examples have also been included that encompass all of the aforementioned MOD elements and attributes, and are used to show significant MOD successes within the Shuttle Program. These examples include the STS-49 Intelsat recovery and repair, the (post-Columbia accident) TPS inspection process and the associated R-Bar Pitch Maneuver for ISS missions, and the STS-400 rescue mission preparation efforts for the Hubble Space Telescope repair mission. Since their beginning, MOD has consistently demonstrated their ability to evolve and respond to an ever changing environment, effectively prepare for the expected and successfully respond to the unexpected, and develop leaders, expertise, and a culture that has led to mission and Program success.

Azbell, Jim A.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Space Launch System Stands Ready on Doorstep of Maiden Voyage Launch and Progress Made to Future Missions

NASA and its partners made significant progress towards the Artemis I launch in 2022. The integrated Space Launch System (SLS)vehicleand Orion spacecraft were first rolled out of the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in March. SLS is a super heavy-lift vehicle to send large, strategic payloads to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. It isthebackbone of the Artemis human lunar exploration program. Rollout transported the vehicle to Launch Pad 39B for a series of tests, including the wet dress rehearsal (WDR). Multiple attempts were required to complete WDR, each building on the one before. Following the WDR campaign, NASA teams refined hardware and launch procedures, and the vehicle was prepared for its first launch attempt scheduled for August 29. Challenges with the weather and hardware resulted in a scrub on the 29th, and the second attempt was set for Sept. 3. A hydrogen leak on the tail service mast umbilical forced a scrub. NASA teams completed repairs and testing on the vehicle on Launch Pad 39B to preserve a launch attempt at the end of September. Managers chose to return the vehicle to the VAB to protect it fromthe threat of Hurricane Ian. Within the VAB, NASA further inspected and prepared SLS for selected November windows. In addition to progress to the Artemis I mission, significant progress was made on the Artemis II and Artemis III rockets. Progress was also made towards on the Block 1B and Block 2 variants, beginning on the fourth and ninth flight, respectively. Both variants will provide significant improvements in both launch mass and mission flexibility to multiple destinations. This paper will discuss Artemis I vehicle integration, testing, and available results from the launch campaign to date.

Bruce Askins↗

NASA NTRS2005

Vehicle Assembly Building Fire Mishap Investigation Report. Volume I of V

On January 13, 2005, at approximately 1355, smoke was noticed on the 4th floor of D Tower in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Subsequently, a 911 call was made, a fire alarm pull station was activated, and the VAB was evacuated. The source of the smoke was determined to be a fire on the Low Bay M/N section roof near the Launch Control Center (LCC) Crossover. Due to the high visibility of the mishap, the KSC Center Director appointed a Mishap Investigation Board. Damage to government property was limited to the roof and a small number of ceiling tiles that were damaged by the fire fighters during the response. At the time of the mishap, there were hazardous commodities in the VAB including Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) with open grain due to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) igniter inspections. The Board agrees with the SGS Fire Services' theory that large amounts of smoke concentrated in the VAB D Tower and moved downward into the cable tunnel. The Board determined the proximate cause of this incident to be torching. HRI was installing a torch applied roof membrane which resulted in the ignition of combustible materials under the membrane near a wooden roof expansion joint. The torch applied roofing method is a universally accepted safe industry practice when applied to non-combustible surfaces. The combination of an open flame torch and combustible materiaLs presents an increased level of risk even with skilled applicators. The addition of high winds to this combination results in a risk the Board thinks can not be adequately mitigated. An appropriate risk assessment and analysis must be performed on the proposed roofing method to be used on high visibility facilities which represent unique national assets even when using common industry practices for repair and modification. The Board identified three root causes which contributed to or created the proximate cause and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the mishap: 1. Combustible materials in existing roof system 2. Wind speed and direction 3. Inadequate fire watch technique. Two contributing factors were identified which may have contributed to the occurrence but, if eliminated or modified, would not have prevented the occurrence: 1. HRI rushed to dry in and seal the roof on January 13 because heavy rain was predicted for the next day 2. No guidance on torching in windy conditions A total of 17 significant observations were noted during this investigation, which could lead to another mishap, or increase the severity of a mishap, but were not contributing factors in this mishap.

Kight, Ira↗

NASA NTRS2005

Key Reliability Drivers of Liquid Propulsion Engines and A Reliability Model for Sensitivity Analysis

This paper is to address the in-flight reliability of a liquid propulsion engine system for a launch vehicle. We first establish a comprehensive list of system and sub-system reliability drivers for any liquid propulsion engine system. We then build a reliability model to parametrically analyze the impact of some reliability parameters. We present sensitivity analysis results for a selected subset of the key reliability drivers using the model. Reliability drivers identified include: number of engines for the liquid propulsion stage, single engine total reliability, engine operation duration, engine thrust size, reusability, engine de-rating or up-rating, engine-out design (including engine-out switching reliability, catastrophic fraction, preventable failure fraction, unnecessary shutdown fraction), propellant specific hazards, engine start and cutoff transient hazards, engine combustion cycles, vehicle and engine interface and interaction hazards, engine health management system, engine modification, engine ground start hold down with launch commit criteria, engine altitude start (1 in. start), Multiple altitude restart (less than 1 restart), component, subsystem and system design, manufacturing/ground operation support/pre and post flight check outs and inspection, extensiveness of the development program. We present some sensitivity analysis results for the following subset of the drivers: number of engines for the propulsion stage, single engine total reliability, engine operation duration, engine de-rating or up-rating requirements, engine-out design, catastrophic fraction, preventable failure fraction, unnecessary shutdown fraction, and engine health management system implementation (basic redlines and more advanced health management systems).

Huang, Zhao-Feng↗

NASA NTRS1990

Structural risk assessment and aircraft fleet maintenance

In the present analysis, deterministic flaw growth analysis is used to project the failure distributions from inspection data. Inspection data is reported for each critical point in the aircraft. The data will indicate either a crack of a specific size or no crack. The crack length may be either less than, equal to, or greater than critical size for that location. Non-critical length cracks are projected to failure using the crack growth characteristics for that location to find the life when it will be at critical length. Greater-than-critical length cracks are projected back to determine the life at failure, that is, when it was at critical length. The same process is used as in the case of a non-critical crack except that the projection goes the other direction. These points, along with the critical length cracks are used to determine the failure distribution. To be able to use data from different aircraft to build a common failure distribution, a consistent life variable must be used. Aircraft life varies with the severity of the usage; therefore the number of flight hours for a particular aircraft must be modified by its usage factor to obtain a normalized life which can be compared with that from other aircraft.

Smith, Herb, Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Ball bearing vibrations amplitude modeling and test comparisons

Bearings generate disturbances that, when combined with structural gains of a momentum wheel, contribute to induced vibration in the wheel. The frequencies generated by a ball bearing are defined by the bearing's geometry and defects. The amplitudes at these frequencies are dependent upon the actual geometry variations from perfection; therefore, a geometrically perfect bearing will produce no amplitudes at the kinematic frequencies that the design generates. Because perfect geometry can only be approached, emitted vibrations do occur. The most significant vibration is at the spin frequency and can be balanced out in the build process. Other frequencies' amplitudes, however, cannot be balanced out. Momentum wheels are usually the single largest source of vibrations in a spacecraft and can contribute to pointing inaccuracies if emitted vibrations ring the structure or are in the high-gain bandwidth of a sensitive pointing control loop. It is therefore important to be able to provide an a priori knowledge of possible amplitudes that are singular in source or are a result of interacting defects that do not reveal themselves in normal frequency prediction equations. This paper will describe the computer model that provides for the incorporation of bearing geometry errors and then develops an estimation of actual amplitudes and frequencies. Test results were correlated with the model. A momentum wheel was producing an unacceptable 74 Hz amplitude. The model was used to simulate geometry errors and proved successful in identifying a cause that was verified when the parts were inspected.

Hightower, Richard A., III↗

NASA NTRS2000

Hardware Development Process for Human Research Facility Applications

The simple goal of the Human Research Facility (HRF) is to conduct human research experiments on the International Space Station (ISS) astronauts during long-duration missions. This is accomplished by providing integration and operation of the necessary hardware and software capabilities. A typical hardware development flow consists of five stages: functional inputs and requirements definition, market research, design life cycle through hardware delivery, crew training, and mission support. The purpose of this presentation is to guide the audience through the early hardware development process: requirement definition through selecting a development path. Specific HRF equipment is used to illustrate the hardware development paths. The source of hardware requirements is the science community and HRF program. The HRF Science Working Group, consisting of SCientists from various medical disciplines, defined a basic set of equipment with functional requirements. This established the performance requirements of the hardware. HRF program requirements focus on making the hardware safe and operational in a space environment. This includes structural, thermal, human factors, and material requirements. Science and HRF program requirements are defined in a hardware requirements document which includes verification methods. Once the hardware is fabricated, requirements are verified by inspection, test, analysis, or demonstration. All data is compiled and reviewed to certify the hardware for flight. Obviously, the basis for all hardware development activities is requirement definition. Full and complete requirement definition is ideal prior to initiating the hardware development. However, this is generally not the case, but the hardware team typically has functional inputs as a guide. The first step is for engineers to conduct market research based on the functional inputs provided by scientists. CommerCially available products are evaluated against the science requirements as well as modifications needed to meet program requirements. Options are consolidated and the hardware development team reaches a hardware development decision point. Within budget and schedule constraints, the team must decide whether or not to complete the hardware as an in-house, subcontract with vendor, or commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) development. An in-house development indicates NASA personnel or a contractor builds the hardware at a NASA site. A subcontract development is completed off-site by a commercial company. A COTS item is a vendor product available by ordering a specific part number. The team evaluates the pros and cons of each development path. For example, in-bouse developments utilize existing corporate knowledge regarding bow to build equipment for use in space. However, technical expertise would be required to fully understand the medical equipment capabilities, such as for an ultrasound system. It may require additional time and funding to gain the expertise that commercially exists. The major benefit of subcontracting a hardware development is the product is delivered as an end-item and commercial expertise is utilized. On the other hand, NASA has limited control over schedule delays. The final option of COTS or modified COTS equipment is a compromise between in-house and subcontracts. A vendor product may exist that meets all functional requirements but req uires in-house modifications for successful operation in a space environment. The HRF utilizes equipment developed using all of the paths described: inhouse, subcontract, and modified COTS.

Bauer, Liz↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Video Analysis for Surveillance of Spacecraft Parachute Systems

The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) has established a surveillance methodology to ensure the reliability of spacecraft parachute systems. The implemented methodology relies on an interconnected framework consisting of imagery analysis, hardware inspections, and vehicle data analysis. Imagery analysis serves as a foundation for these core activities which provide a robust approach to the surveillance of spacecraft parachute systems. As the surveillance framework has been developed, the role of imagery has become more prominent, and therefore imagery requirements have changed. To complete photogrammetric analysis, careful consideration must be made to the role of imagery, required data, imagery requirements, the analysis process, and mission planning. The role of imagery will drive the required data, which will in turn drive imagery requirements. Imagery requirements are likely to drive mission planning through consideration to camera selection and placement. If onboard imagery is required, the camera and data system must be implemented prior to launch. If external imagery is required, the photography package must be implemented such that it can be positioned for a return and free of potential debris fields. For these reasons, an integrated approach must be used to build an imagery package around the required analysis with careful coordination with mission planners.

parachutes↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Video Analysis for Surveillance of Spacecraft Parachute Systems

parachutes↗

NASA NTRS2014

Designing an Alternate Mission Operations Control Room

The Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) is a multi-project facility that is responsible for 24x7 real-time International Space Station (ISS) payload operations management, integration, and control and has the capability to support small satellite projects and will provide real-time support for SLS launches. The HOSC is a serviceoriented/ highly available operations center for ISS payloads-directly supporting science teams across the world responsible for the payloads. The HOSC is required to endure an annual 2-day power outage event for facility preventive maintenance and safety inspection of the core electro-mechanical systems. While complete system shut-downs are against the grain of a highly available sub-system, the entire facility must be powered down for a weekend for environmental and safety purposes. The consequence of this ground system outage is far reaching: any science performed on ISS during this outage weekend is lost. Engineering efforts were focused to maximize the ISS investment by engineering a suitable solution capable of continuing HOSC services while supporting safety requirements. The HOSC Power Outage Contingency (HPOC) System is a physically diversified compliment of systems capable of providing identified real-time services for the duration of a planned power outage condition from an alternate control room. HPOC was designed to maintain ISS payload operations for approximately three continuous days during planned HOSC power outages and support a local Payload Operations Team, International Partners, as well as remote users from the alternate control room located in another building. This paper presents the HPOC architecture and lessons learned during testing and the planned maiden operational commissioning. Additionally, this paper documents the necessity of an HPOC capability given the unplanned HOSC Facility power outage on April 27th, 2011, as a result of the tornado outbreak that damaged the electrical grid to such a degree that significantly inhibited the Tennessee Valley Authority's ability to transmit electricity throughout the North Alabama region.

Montgomery, Patty↗

NASA NTRS2014

Designing an Alternate Mission Operations Control Room

The Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) is a multi-project facility that is responsible for 24x7 real-time International Space Station (ISS) payload operations management, integration, and control and has the capability to support small satellite projects and will provide real-time support for SLS launches. The HOSC is a service-oriented/ highly available operations center for ISS payloads-directly supporting science teams across the world responsible for the payloads. The HOSC is required to endure an annual 2-day power outage event for facility preventive maintenance and safety inspection of the core electro-mechanical systems. While complete system shut-downs are against the grain of a highly available sub-system, the entire facility must be powered down for a weekend for environmental and safety purposes. The consequence of this ground system outage is far reaching: any science performed on ISS during this outage weekend is lost. Engineering efforts were focused to maximize the ISS investment by engineering a suitable solution capable of continuing HOSC services while supporting safety requirements. The HOSC Power Outage Contingency (HPOC) System is a physically diversified compliment of systems capable of providing identified real-time services for the duration of a planned power outage condition from an alternate control room. HPOC was designed to maintain ISS payload operations for approximately three continuous days during planned HOSC power outages and support a local Payload Operations Team, International Partners, as well as remote users from the alternate control room located in another building.

Montgomery, Patty↗

NASA NTRS2000

Internet Technology on Spacecraft

The Operating Missions as Nodes on the Internet (OMNI) project has shown that Internet technology works in space missions through a demonstration using the UoSAT-12 spacecraft. An Internet Protocol (IP) stack was installed on the orbiting UoSAT-12 spacecraft and tests were run to demonstrate Internet connectivity and measure performance. This also forms the basis for demonstrating subsequent scenarios. This approach provides capabilities heretofore either too expensive or simply not feasible such as reconfiguration on orbit. The OMNI project recognized the need to reduce the risk perceived by mission managers and did this with a multi-phase strategy. In the initial phase, the concepts were implemented in a prototype system that includes space similar components communicating over the TDRS (space network) and the terrestrial Internet. The demonstration system includes a simulated spacecraft with sample instruments. Over 25 demonstrations have been given to mission and project managers, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of Defense (DoD), contractor technologists and other decisions makers, This initial phase reached a high point with an OMNI demonstration given from a booth at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Inspection Day 99 exhibition. The proof to mission managers is provided during this second phase with year 2000 accomplishments: testing the use of Internet technologies onboard an actual spacecraft. This was done with a series of tests performed using the UoSAT-12 spacecraft. This spacecraft was reconfigured on orbit at very low cost. The total period between concept and the first tests was only 6 months! On board software was modified to add an IP stack to support basic IP communications. Also added was support for ping, traceroute and network timing protocol (NTP) tests. These tests show that basic Internet functionality can be used onboard spacecraft. The performance of data was measured to show no degradation from current approaches. The cost to implement is much less than current approaches due to the availability of highly reliable and standard Internet tools. Use of standard Internet applications onboard reduces the risk of obsolescence inherent in custom protocols due to extremely wide use across all domains. These basic building blocks provide the framework for building onboard software to support direct user communication with payloads including payload control. Other benefits are payload to payload communication from dissimilar spacecraft, constellations of spacecraft, and reconfigurability on orbit. This work is funded through contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC).

Rash, James↗

NASA NTRS2014

Ultrasonic Inspection to Quantify Failure Pathologies of Crimped Electrical Connections

Previous work has shown that ultrasonic inspection provides a means of assessing electrical crimp quality that ensures the electrical and mechanical integrity of an initial crimp before the installation process is completed. The amplitude change of a compressional ultrasonic wave propagating at right angles to the wire axis and through the junction of a crimp termination was shown to correlate with the results of destructive pull tests, which is a standard for assessing crimp wire junction quality. Of additional concern are crimps made at high speed assembly lines for wiring harnesses, which are used for critical applications, such as in aircraft. During high-speed assembly it is possible that many faulty crimps go undetected until long after assembly, and fail in service. The position and speed of the crimping jaw become factors as the high-speed crimp is formed. The work presented in this paper is designed to cover the more difficult and more subtle area of high-speed crimps by taking into account the rate change of the measurements. Building on the previous work, we present an analysis methodology, based on transmitted ultrasonic energy and timing of the first received pulse that is shown to correlate to the gauge of the crimp/ferrule combination and the position of the crimping jaw. Results demonstrating the detectability of a number of the crimp failure pathologies, such as missing strands, partially inserted wires and incomplete crimp compression, are presented. The ability of this technique to estimate crimp height, a mechanical measure of crimp quality, is discussed.

Cramer, K. Elliott↗

NASA NTRS2010

Modeling and Simulation of the ARES UPPER STAGE Transportation, Lifting, Stacking and Mating Operations Within the Vehicle Assembly Building at KSC

This viewgraph presentation describes the modeling and simulation of the Ares Upper Stage Transportation, lifting, stacking, and mating operations within the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). An aerial view of KSC Launch Shuttle Complex, two views of the Delmia process control layout, and an upper stage move subroutine and breakdown are shown. An overhead image of the VAB and the turning basin along with the Pegasus barge at the turning basin are also shown. This viewgraph presentation also shows the actual design and the removal of the mid-section spring tensioners, the removal of the AFT rear and forward tensioners tie downs, and removing the AFT hold down post and mount. US leaving the Pegasus Barge, the upper stage arriving at transfer aisle, upper stage receiving/inspection in transfer aisle, and an overhead view of upper stage receiving/inspection in transfer aisle are depicted. Five views of the actual connection of the cabling to the upper stage aft lifting hardware are shown. The upper stage transporter forward connector, two views of the rotation horizontal to vertical, the disconnection of the rear bolt ring cabling, the lowering of the upper stage to the inspection stand, disconnection of the rear bolt ring from the upper stage, the lifting of the upper stage and inspection of AFT fange, and the transfer of upper stage in an integrated stack are shown. Six views of the mating of the upper stage to the first stage are depicted. The preparation, inspection, and removal of the forward dome are shown. The upper stage mated on the integrated stack and crawler is also shown. This presentation concludes with A Rapid Upper Limb Assessment (RULA) utilizing male and female models for assessing risk factors to the upper extremities of human beings in an actual physical environment.

Kromis, Phillip A.↗

NASA NTRS2005

NSTAR Extended Life Test Discharge Chamber Flake Analysis

The Extended Life Test (ELT) of the NASA Solar Electric Propulsion Technology Readiness (NSTAR) ion thruster was concluded after 30,352 hours of operation. The ELT was conducted using the Deep Space 1 (DS1) back-up flight engine, a 30 cm diameter xenon ion thruster. Post-test inspection of the ELT engine revealed numerous contaminant flakes distributed over the bottom of the cylindrical section of the anode within the discharge chamber (DC). Extensive analyses were conducted to determine the source of the particles, which is critical to the understanding of degradation mechanisms of long life ion thruster operation. Analyses included: optical microscopy (OM) and particle length histograms, field emission scanning electron microscopy (FESEM) combined with energy dispersive spectroscopy (EDS), and atomic oxygen plasma exposure tests. Analyses of the particles indicate that the majority of the DC flakes consist of a layered structure, typically with either two or three layers. The flakes comprising two layers were typically found to have a molybdenum-rich (Mo-rich) layer on one side and a carbon-rich (C-rich) layer on the other side. The flakes comprising three layers were found to be sandwich-like structures with Mo-rich exterior layers and a C-rich interior layer. The presence of the C-rich layers indicates that these particles were produced by sputter deposition build-up on a surface external to the discharge chamber from ion sputter erosion of the graphite target in the test chamber. This contaminant layer became thick enough that particles spalled off, and then were electro-statically attracted into the ion thruster interior, where they were coated with Mo from internal sputter erosion of the screen grid and cathode components. Atomic oxygen tests provided evidence that the DC chamber flakes are composed of a significant fraction of carbon. Particle size histograms further indicated that the source of the particles was spalling of carbon flakes from downstream surfaces. Analyses of flakes taken from the downstream surface of the accelerator grid provided additional supportive information. The production of the downstream carbon flakes, and hence the potential problems associated with the flake particles in the ELT ion thruster engine is a facility induced effect and would not occur in the space environment.

deGroh, Kim K.↗