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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1998

Reconstruction of the 1994 Pittsburgh Airplane Accident Using a Computer Simulation

On September 8, 1994, a Boeing 737-300 passenger airplane was on a downwind approach to the Pittsburgh International Airport at an altitude of 5000 feet above ground level (6000 feet MSL). While in a shallow left turn onto a downwind approach heading, the airplane crossed into the vortex trail of a Boeing 727 flying in the same approach pattern about 4 miles ahead. The B-737 airplane rolled and turned sharply to the left, exited the vortex wake and plunged into the ground. Weather was not a factor in the accident. The airplane was equipped with a 11+ channel digital Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a multiple channel Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Both recorders were recovered from the crash site and provided excellent data for the development of an accident scenario. Radar tracking of the two airplanes as well as the indicated air speed (IAS) perturbations clearly visible on the B-737 FDR recordings indicate that the upset was apparently initiated by the airplane's crossing into the wake of the B-727 flying ahead in the same traffic pattern. A 6 degree-of-freedom simulation program for the B-737 airplane using MATLAB and SIMULINK was constructed. The simulation was initialized at the stabilized flight conditions of the airplane about 13 seconds prior to its entry into the vortex trail of the B-727 airplane. By assuming a certain combination of control inputs, it was possible to produce a simulated motion that closely matched that recorded on the FDR.

Parks, Edwin K.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Reducing Aviation Weather-Related Accidents Through High-Fidelity Weather Information Distribution and Presentation

In February 1997, the US President announced a national goal to reduce the fatal accident rate for aviation by 80% within ten years. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration established the Aviation Safety Program to develop technologies needed to meet this aggressive goal. Because weather has been identified (is a causal factor in approximately 30% of all aviation accidents, a project was established for the development of technologies that will provide accurate, time and intuitive information to pilots, dispatchers, and air traffic controllers to enable the detection and avoidance of atmospheric hazards. This project addresses the weather information needs of general, corporate, regional, and transport aircraft operators. An overview and status of research and development efforts for high-fidelity weather information distribution and presentation is discussed with emphasis on weather information in the cockpit.

Stough, H. Paul, III↗
NASA NTRS2003

Proceedings of the Second NASA Aviation Safety Program Weather Accident Prevention Review

The Second NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) Weather Accident Prevention (WxAP) Annual Project Review held June 5-7, 2001, in Cleveland, Ohio, presented the NASA technical plans and accomplishments to the aviation community. NASA-developed technologies presented included an Aviation Weather Information System with associated digital communications links, electronic atmospheric reporting technologies, forward-looking turbulence warning systems, and turbulence mitigation procedures. The meeting provided feedback and insight from the aviation community of diverse backgrounds and assisted NASA in steering its plans in the direction needed to meet the national safety goal of 80-percent reduction of aircraft accidents by 2007. The proceedings of the review are enclosed.

Martzaklis, K. Gus↗
NASA NTRS2003

Unlocking the Mystery of Columbia's Tragic Accident Through Materials Characterization

The wing and underbelly reconstruction of Space Shuttle Columbia took place at the Shuttle Landing Facility Hangar after the accident which destroyed STS-107. Fragments were placed on a grid according to their original location on the orbiter. Some Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels of the left wing leading edge and other parts from both leading edges were recovered and incorporated into the reconstruction. The recovered parts were tracked on a database according to a number and also tracked on a map of the orbiter. This viewgraph presentation describes the process of failure analysis undertaken by the Materials and Processes (M&P) Problem Resolution Team. The team started with factual observations about the accident, and identified highest level questions for it to answer in order to understand where on the orbiter failure occured, what component(s) failed, and what was the sequence of events. The finding of Columbia's MADS/OEX data recorder shifted the focus of the team's analysis to the left wing leading edge damage. The team placed particular attention on slag deposits on some of the RCC panels. The presentation lists analysis techniques, and lower level questions for the team to answer.

Shah, Sandeep↗
NASA NTRS2004

Experimental Aerothermodynamics In Support Of The Columbia Accident Investigation

The technical foundation for the most probable damage scenario reported in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's final report was largely derived from synergistic aerodynamic/aerothermodynamic wind tunnel measurements and inviscid predictions made at NASA Langley Research Center and later corroborated with engineering analysis, high fidelity numerical viscous simulations, and foam impact testing near the close of the investigation. This report provides an overview of the hypersonic aerothermodynamic wind tunnel program conducted at NASA Langley and illustrates how the ground-based heating measurements provided early insight that guided the direction and utilization of agency resources in support of the investigation. Global surface heat transfer mappings, surface streamline patterns, and shock shapes were measured on 0.0075 scale models of the Orbiter configuration with and without postulated damage to the thermal protection system. Test parametrics include angle of attack from 38 to 42 degs, sideslip angles of 38 to 42 degs, sideslip angles of plus or minus 1 deg, Reynolds numbers based upon model length from 0.05 x 10(exp 6) to 6.5 x 10(exp 6), and normal shock density ratios of 5 (Mach 6 Air) and 12 (Mach 6 CF4). The primary objective of the testing was to provide surface heating characteristics on scaled Orbiter models with outer mold line perturbations to simulate various forms of localized surface damage to the thermal protection system. Initial experimental testing conducted within two weeks of the accident simulated a broad spectrum of thermal protection system damage to the Orbiter windward surface and was used to refute several hypothesized forms of thermal protection system damage, which included gouges in the windward thermal protection system tiles, breaches through the wing new the main landing gear door, and protuberances along the wing leading edge that produced asymmetric boundary layer transition. As the forensic phase of the investigation developed and the condition of recovered debris was examined, increasing emphasis was placed on identifying wing leading edge damage (partially and fully missing reinforced carbon-carbon panels, and eventually holes in the wing leading edge with venting to the wing upper surface) that produced off-nominal heating trends consistent with extracted Orbiter flight recorder temperature data.

Horvath, Thomas J.↗
NASA NTRS2003

NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

NASA's space shuttle Columbia broke apart on February 1, 2003 as it returned to Earth from a 16-day science mission. All seven astronauts aboard were killed. NASA created the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman, to investigate the accident. The Board released its report (available at [http://www.caib.us]) on August 26, 2003, concluding that the tragedy was caused by technical and organizational failures. The CAIB report included 29 recommendations, 15 of which the Board specified must be completed before the shuttle returns to flight status. This report provides a brief synopsis of the Board's conclusions, recommendations, and observations. Further information on Columbia and issues for Congress are available in CRS Report RS21408. This report will not be updated.

Smith, Marcia S.↗
NASA NTRS2004

The Use of LS-DYNA in the Columbia Accident Investigation and Return to Flight Activities

During the launch of the Space Shuttle Columbia on January 16, 2003, foam originating from the external tank impacted the shuttle's left wing 81 seconds after lift-off. Then on February 1st, Space Shuttle Columbia broke-up during re-entry. In the weeks that followed, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board had formed various teams to investigate every aspect of the tragedy. One of these teams was the Impact Analysis Team, which was asked to investigate the foam impact on the wing leading edge. This paper will describe the approach and methodology used by the team to support the accident investigation, and more specifically the use of LS-DYNA for analyzing the foam impact event. Due to the success of the analytical predictions, the impact analysis team has also been asked to support Return to Flight activities. These activities will analyze a far broader range of impact events, but not with just foam and not only on the wing leading edge. The debris list has expanded and so have the possible impact locations. This paper will discuss the Return to Flight activities and the use of LS-DYNA to support them.

Gabrys, Jonathan↗
NASA NTRS2004

GRC Payload Hazard Assessment: Supporting the STS-107 Accident Investigation

A hazard assessment was conducted on the GRC managed payloads in support of a NASA Headquarters Code Q request to examine STS-107 payloads and determine if they were credible contributors to the Columbia accident. This assessment utilized each payload's Final Flight Safety Data Package for hazard identification. An applicability assessment was performed and most of the hazards were eliminated because they dealt with payload operations or crew interactions. A Fault Tree was developed for all the hazards deemed applicable and the safety verification documentation was reviewed for these applicable hazards. At the completion of this hazard assessment, it was concluded that none of the GRC managed payloads were credible contributors to the Columbia accident.

Schoren, William R.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Recommendations for Injury Prevention in Transport Aviation Accidents

In 1996, a national objective was established to reduce the rate of fatal accidents in aviation. To assist in determining the best methods for improving aircraft crash survivability, a combined approach was used involving database research and the examination of case studies of transport aviation accidents. The results of the study include recommendations for maintaining occupiable space, enhancing occupant restraint, managing energy transferred to the occupant, improving egress, and increasing post-crash survival.

Grierson, Anita E.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Characterization of Space Shuttle External Tank Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials in Support of the Columbia Accident Investigation

NASA suffered the loss of the seven-member crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003 when the vehicle broke apart upon re-entry to the Earth's atmosphere. The final report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that the accident was caused by a launch ascent incident-a suitcase-sized chunk of insulating foam on the Shuttle's External Tank (ET) broke off, and moving at almost 500 mph, struck an area of the leading edge of the Shuttle s left wing. As a result, one or more of the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the wing leading edge were damaged. Upon re-entry, superheated air approaching 3,000 F breached the wing damage and caused the vehicle breakup and loss of crew. The large chunk of insulating foam that broke off during the Columbia launch was determined to come from the so-called bipod ramp area where the Shuttle s orbiter (containing crew) is attached to the ET. Underneath the foam in the bipod ramp area is a layer of TPS that is a cork-filled silicone rubber composite. In March 2003, the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama received cured samples of the foam and composite for testing from the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans, Louisiana. The MAF is where the Shuttle's ET is manufactured. The foam and composite TPS materials for the ET have been well characterized for mechanical property data at the super-cold temperatures of the liquid oxygen and hydrogen fuels used in the ET. However, modulus data on these materials is not as well characterized. The TA Instruments 2980 Dynamic Mechanical Analyzer (DMA) was used to determine the modulus of the two TPS materials over a range of -145 to 95 C in the dual cantilever bending mode. Multi-strain, fixed frequency DMA tests were followed by multi-frequency, fixed strain tests to determine the approximate bounds of linear viscoelastic behavior for the two materials. Additional information is included in the original extended abstract.

Wingard, Charles D.↗
NASA NTRS2005

A Technique for Showing Causal Arguments in Accident Reports

In the prototypical accident report, specific findings, particularly those related to causes and contributing factors, are usually written out explicitly and clearly. Also, the evidence upon which these findings are based is typically explained in detail. Often lacking, however, is any explicit discussion, description, or depiction of the arguments that connect the findings and the evidence. That is, the reports do not make clear why the investigators believe that the specific evidence they found necessarily leads to the particular findings they enumerated. This paper shows how graphical techniques can be used to depict relevant arguments supporting alternate positions on the causes of a complex road-traffic accident.

Holloway, C. M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

New Technologies for Weather Accident Prevention

Weather is a causal factor in thirty percent of all aviation accidents. Many of these accidents are due to a lack of weather situation awareness by pilots in flight. Improving the strategic and tactical weather information available and its presentation to pilots in flight can enhance weather situation awareness and enable avoidance of adverse conditions. This paper presents technologies for airborne detection, dissemination and display of weather information developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), industry and the research community. These technologies, currently in the initial stages of implementation by industry, will provide more precise and timely knowledge of the weather and enable pilots in flight to make decisions that result in safer and more efficient operations.

Stough, H. Paul, III↗
NASA NTRS2006

Characterization of Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials for Return-to-Flight following the Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

During the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, it was determined that a large chunk of polyurethane insulating foam (= 1.67 lbs) on the External Tank (ET) came loose during Columbia's ascent on 2-1-03. The foam piece struck some of the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the leading edge of Columbia's left wing in the mid-wing area. This impact damaged Columbia to the extent that upon re-entry to Earth, superheGed air approaching 3,000 F caused the vehicle to break up, killing all seven astronauts on board. A paper after the Columbia Accident Investigation highlighted thermal analysis testing performed on External Tank TPS materials (1). These materials included BX-250 (now BX-265) rigid polyurethane foam and SLA-561 Super Lightweight Ablator (highly-filled silicone rubber). The large chunk of foam from Columbia originated fiom the left bipod ramp of the ET. The foam in this ramp area was hand-sprayed over the SLA material and various fittings, allowed to dry, and manually shaved into a ramp shape. In Return-to-Flight (RTF) efforts following Columbia, the decision was made to remove the foam in the bipod ramp areas. During RTF efforts, further thermal analysis testing was performed on BX-265 foam by DSC and DMA. Flat panels of foam about 2-in. thick were sprayed on ET tank material (aluminum alloys). The DSC testing showed that foam material very close to the metal substrate cured more slowly than bulk foam material. All of the foam used on the ET is considered fully cured about 21 days after it is sprayed. The RTF culminated in the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on 7-26-05. Although the flight was a success, there was another serious incident of foam loss fiom the ET during Shuttle ascent. This time, a rather large chunk of BX-265 foam (= 0.9 lbs) came loose from the liquid hydrogen (LH2) PAL ramp, although the foam did not strike the Shuttle Orbiter containing the crew. DMA testing was performed on foam samples taken fiom a simulated PAL ramp panel. It was found that the smooth rind on the foam facing the cable tray did significantly affect the properties of foam at the PAL ramp surface. The smooth rind increased the storage modulus E' of the foam as much as 20- 40% over a temperature range of -145 to 95 C. Because of foam loss fiom the PAL ramp, future Shuttle flights were grounded indefinitely to allow further testing to better understand foam properties. The decision was also made to remove foam from the LH2 PAL, ramp. Other RTF efforts prior to the launch of Discovery included

Wingard, Doug↗
NASA NTRS2008

The Role of Trust and Interaction in Global Positioning System Related Accidents

The Global Positioning System (GPS) uses a network of satellites to calculate the position of a receiver over time. This technology has revolutionized a wide range of safety-critical industries and leisure applications. These systems provide diverse benefits; supplementing the users existing navigation skills and reducing the uncertainty that often characterizes many route planning tasks. GPS applications can also help to reduce workload by automating tasks that would otherwise require finite cognitive and perceptual resources. However, the operation of these systems has been identified as a contributory factor in a range of recent accidents. Users often come to rely on GPS applications and, therefore, fail to notice when they develop faults or when errors occur in the other systems that use the data from these systems. Further accidents can stem from the over confidence that arises when users assume automated warnings will be issued when they stray from an intended route. Unless greater attention is paid to the role of trust and interaction in GPS applications then there is a danger that we will see an increasing number of these failures as positioning technologies become integral in the functioning of increasing numbers of applications.

Johnson, Chris W.↗
NASA NTRS2008

How Past Loss of Control Accidents May Inform Safety Cases for Advanced Control Systems on Commercial Aircraft

This paper describes five loss of control accidents involving commercial aircraft, and derives from those accidents three principles to consider when developing a potential safety case for an advanced flight control system for commercial aircraft. One, among the foundational evidence needed to support a safety case is the availability to the control system of accurate and timely information about the status and health of relevant systems and components. Two, an essential argument to be sustained in the safety case is that pilots are provided with adequate information about the control system to enable them to understand the capabilities that it provides. Three, another essential argument is that the advanced control system will not perform less safely than a good pilot.

Holloway, C. M.↗
NASA NTRS2010

An Accident Precursor Analysis Process Tailored for NASA Space Systems

Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) serves as the bridge between existing risk modeling activities, which are often based on historical or generic failure statistics, and system anomalies, which provide crucial information about the failure mechanisms that are actually operative in the system and which may differ in frequency or type from those in the various models. These discrepancies between the models (perceived risk) and the system (actual risk) provide the leading indication of an underappreciated risk. This paper presents an APA process developed specifically for NASA Earth-to-Orbit space systems. The purpose of the process is to identify and characterize potential sources of system risk as evidenced by anomalous events which, although not necessarily presenting an immediate safety impact, may indicate that an unknown or insufficiently understood risk-significant condition exists in the system. Such anomalous events are considered accident precursors because they signal the potential for severe consequences that may occur in the future, due to causes that are discernible from their occurrence today. Their early identification allows them to be integrated into the overall system risk model used to intbrm decisions relating to safety.

Groen, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA's Accident Precursor Analysis Process and the International Space Station

This viewgraph presentation reviews the implementation of Accident Precursor Analysis (APA), as well as the evaluation of In-Flight Investigations (IFI) and Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) data for the identification of unrecognized accident potentials on the International Space Station.

Groen, Frank↗