Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “THREAT”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,243 records · Page 69

C.9 Scribe NMAC Layer Video Development

This task incorporates NMAC insider threat principles and good practices into video format for aiding in training activities. It was labeled as Task C.9 under the FY24 Annex 1 for NA-211 SSM A&I Pillar. For activity development, the setting of a research and test reactor, RTR, was selected as the focus of this fiscal year. More specifically, a TRIGA reactor was selected for facility and reactor inspiration. FY 23/24 developed materials Research Reactor Facility Measures against the Insider Threat, LLNL-MI-839144, was used as a reference for selecting relevant, suggested mitigation measures to incorporate into the script and subsequent videos. Throughout the initial phases of development, discipline SMEs met with Scribe SMEs from Sandia National Laboratory to create the initial story arc and assess the limits of Scribe/Odin technologies available for the project. As a result, the decision for a two-fold deliverable was developed and utilized as the basis for script development efforts over the first half of the fiscal year.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safety in Artificial Intelligence: Challenges and Opportunities for the U.S. National Labs and Beyond

This report discusses the importance of the critical and underexplored topic of artificial intelligence (AI) safety, as highlighted during the “Strategy Alignment on AI Safety” workshop convened at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in April 2024. Through a summary of keynote talks, panel discussions, and breakout sessions, world-leading AI safety experts from academic, industry, national labs, and government agencies clearly agree on the need for and importance of large-scale investments for research and capabilities in AI safety. With the field innovating at unprecedented rates, there is increasing urgency to develop novel evaluation methodologies that allow full considerations of risks/threats of AI technologies in different domains. Quantitative metrics and effective methodologies that can evaluate and audit the “safeness” of how a given AI technology is trained, deployed, or regulated are, at best, nascent for certain scenarios or, more commonly, nonexistent. This maturation gap presents the possibility of serious threats to national security, and further inaction may have serious consequences. Additionally, the gap between the public’s and research community’s perceptions of AI risks/rewards is significant. While numerous voices from the AI community have expressed concern that the risks could be so high that future AI systems could inflict extinction-level damage to humanity if deployed incorrectly, the public largely is aware only of risk in low-impact scenarios. This discrepancy highlights the crucial need for researchers to articulate to governmental bodies what, why, and when various AI risks matter as part of motivating funding requests. Thus, the call to action for this community is to pursue AI safety as a “Big Science” project on a scale comparable to the Manhattan Project. High risks and high payoffs are on the table, but safe AI is a fast-moving target, and large-scale investments are needed to guide development of this technology in a responsible way. We highlight the need for a multilayered solution combining the development of new methods and algorithmic approaches to mitigate threats with an active participation of the government(s) in setting high industry standards and regulations based on state-of-the-art technology. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories have served as leading institutions for scientific innovation in the U.S. for more than 70 years. Drawing on their expertise in the AI community and their history of safeguarding critical and sensitive information, and as we look to the future, national labs are the best choice for evaluating and safeguarding AI technologies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Scalable Control Co-design for Resilient-by-Design Cyber Physical Systems

Critical infrastructure networks, such as power and transportation networks, are often modelled as cyber-physical systems. With ever increasing complexity of these systems, there is a need for newer and more relevant metrics and design tools that will co-optimize the physical system components and control policies to guarantee resilience against cyber and natural threats. To this end, a simulation-based control co-design computational framework that will concurrently determine the system and control parameters of a cyber-physical system to meet pre-specified resilience, operational and economic objectives has been developed. The capabilities of the developed co-design engine are demonstrated by designing the physical components and control parameters of a microgrid system that will meet its resiliency objectives when subjected to various cyber and physical threats.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Deep Cyber-Physical Situational Awareness for Energy Systems: A Secure Foundation for Next-Generation Energy Management

This document provides the final report for the CYPRES project. The purpose is (1) to highlight and summarize its major accomplishments and (2) to provide guidance on how its outcomes have informed and can inform important additional research and technology transfer. The goal of CYPRES was the research, development, and demonstration of a security-oriented next generation cyber-physical EMS for electric power systems that detects malicious and abnormal events through the fusion of cyber and physical data. To achieve this, the CYPRES project team researched, developed, and built a prototype of the solution, referred to as the CYPRES EMS. The CYPRES EMS is a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that demonstrates the management of the energy system, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. As part of the capabilities of the CYPRES EMS, the team designed and developed a suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control that are inherently cyberaware. At its core, the project aimed to research, develop, and demonstrate a security-oriented next-generation cyber-physical Energy Management System (EMS) capable of detecting malicious and abnormal events through the innovative fusion of cyber and physical data. This approach represents a fundamental shift from traditional EMS, reimagining how critical infrastructure can be protected through unified cyber-aware and physics-aware secure data flow pipelines. The project’s cornerstone deliverable, the CYPRES EMS, serves as a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that revolutionizes the management of energy systems, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. This prototype implements a comprehensive suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control, all designed with inherent cyber awareness. The system’s architecture extends from end-devices in the field through to control center applications, establishing a secure and resilient control framework that addresses the challenges posed by diverse devices of unknown trustworthiness connecting to modern power systems. Through this innovative approach to deep cyber-physical situational awareness, the CYPRES project not only advances the state-of-the-art in energy infrastructure protection but also establishes a new paradigm for how EMS can be designed, deployed, and operated in an increasingly complex threat landscape. The findings and developments from this project provide crucial insights for stakeholders across the energy sector, offering a blueprint for enhancing the reliability and resilience of our nation’s critical energy infrastructure in the face of evolving cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

U.S. Domestic Molten Salt Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, economical, and effective physical protection systems (PPS). The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a molten salt reactor (MSR) and show how to effectively design a PPS with a reduced staffing headcount. Specifically, this work focuses on integrating PPS design features into a developed facility layout by making minor modifications to building structures. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D©, PathTrace©, and Blender©, were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic MSR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and responders were added into the model based on defending the hypothetical MSR facility against a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT). Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4–8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic MSRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for small modular reactors (SMRs). The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy for Los Alamos National Laboratory

In the 1984 martial arts drama film, The Karate Kid, a young Daniel LaRusso is unexpectedly placed in an adversarial environment unable to eYectively adapt to a series of new threats and limitations. Fortunately for the main character, once placed under the tutelage of a Mr. Miyagi, he finds resiliency not through the adoption of new tools, but a re-focused set of fundamentals. Much in the same way that Daniel learns waxing on and buYing oY car wax by hand has rewards for Karate, LANL is choosing the harder path of self-hosting Large Language Models (LLMs) for enterprise use instead of only relying on buying access to a hosted AI service like Azure’s OpenAI Application Programming Interface (API). We also are not willing to wait for software-as-a-service (SAAS) AI services to meet us where we need to be from a FedRAMP accreditation standpoint. Our operations regularly depend on access at CUI, UCNI, ITAR and other FIPS-199 moderate-impact data levels and hosting our own services gives us the right security and compliance posture to be useful across the broad range of our work at LANL. With the rise in threats to critical infrastructure, cloud service providers (CSPs), and supply chain attacks from both state and non-state actors, we are not placing the bet that SAAS hosted AI services will be available when we need them. Should a major event occur, we do not want our staY and operations left without a pathway for us to fix the problem and resume the use of AI tools.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Modularization of Small Modular Reactor Facilities: Physical Protection Recommendations

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. In consideration of the economic viability of small modular reactor (SMR) facilities, many designers and utilities are considering a modular approach to the construction and operation of these facilities. This modular approach considers building and operating a first unit; once the first reactor is in operation, construction will begin on a second reactor. This process would allow the vendor or utility to ensure production of energy and financial income while the second reactor is under construction. This project evaluates the feasibility of modular construction in terms of physical protection and identifies several recommendations for vendors and utilities considering this approach. To conduct this evaluation, a hypothetical three-unit SMR facility was developed, a physical protection system (PPS) was considered for the design, and a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT) was used to evaluate this PPS. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4-to-8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for SMRs considering modular construction. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DRE: Designing for Resilience through Emulation

Threats to cyber- and cyber-physical systems have continued to increase over the past decade. Now more than ever, it is vital that cyber-physical system stakeholders have the tools to deeply understand their systems and the threats they face. High-fidelity modeling capabilities are powerful tools to support system understanding and decision-making, but they currently lack scientifically rigorous experimentation practices and infrastructures. The purpose of the project Designing for Resilience through Emulation (DRE) was to bring together past research and existing tools into a new pipeline to improve our ability to quantitatively evaluate future cyber scenarios. DRE offers new integrated capabilities for large dataset collection, noise studies, sensitivity analysis, uncertainty quantification, and surrogate modeling using a cyber-physical system emulation environment. These new capabilities significantly improve our ability to establish the credibility of the answers derived from emulation environments, ultimately leading to better critical decision support.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Tactical Analysis for Calculating Contextual Risk at Boundaries: Summary of Laboratory Directed Research & Development Effort

The Tactical Analysis for Calculating Contextual Risk at Boundaries (TACCRAB) tool is an innovative digital twin (DT) platform and automated risk algorithm designed to transform operational decision-making in structured screening environments, with an initial focus on Southern Border Land Ports of Entry (POEs). The invention provides integration points for advanced artificial intelligence, predictive modeling, and real-time data analysis to produce a comprehensive risk management tool that enables proactive, data-informed security strategies. The core inventive features of TACCRAB center on its unique risk algorithm, which dynamically calculates contextual risk by synthesizing historical data, near real-time streaming data from the checkpoints themselves, and AI-generated predictions. Unlike traditional risk assessment methods, TACCRAB utilizes a DT to provide comprehensive operational insights, allowing stakeholders to visualize, simulate, and optimize checkpoint configurations with unprecedented speed and contextual awareness. TACCRAB's key innovation lies in its ability to combine multiple complex inputs - including technology detection probabilities, resource availability, screening pathway characteristics, and threat actor behavioral patterns - into a unified risk calculation and update these inputs based on changing operational and environmental conditions. By leveraging a DT that continuously updates and learns from linked data, TACCRAB can suggest adaptive mitigation strategies that minimize risk while maintaining operational efficiency. Particularly novel is the platform's approach to decision support, which goes beyond static risk assessment. The DT provides dynamic metrics such as wait times, resource allocation effectiveness, and potential emerging threat scenarios, enabling users to view sophisticated, relevant what-if simulations and optimize checkpoint operations in near real-time. The system's architecture allows for generalized application across different screening environments, such as secure facilities, ports of entry, and soft targets, making it a versatile tool for security and operational management. The invention distinguishes itself through its comprehensive integration of predictive modeling, AI-driven pattern discovery, and user-friendly interface design. By combining these elements, TACCRAB transforms complex risk data into actionable insights, supporting decision-makers at various organizational levels - from booth agents making split-second screening decisions to checkpoint managers optimizing the day's resource allocation to strategic planners managing long-term investments.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Driver Identification Midyear Report

First, we create a profile for each authorized driver based on their existing driving data. We then train a machine learning model on the driving data from this profile, yielding an individualized model for each driver. Finally during a drive, we pass the Controller Area Network (CAN) data to the model and authen ticate the driver’s identity in real-time. This verification or lack thereof could be used to alert supervisors of threats to their drivers or transported materials. Deviations from their normal driving behavior could indicate high-risk situations, medical events, or even insider threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Versatile & Intelligent Biodetection via Environmental Sensing (VIBES)

Reactive health monitoring strategies during events like the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for predictive, threat-agnostic diagnostics that can detect both known diseases and novel chemical or biological threats. To address this, we investigated an optical biosensor as a breath volatile organic compound (VOC) analyzer, aiming to emulate biological olfaction. We assembled and validated the device with thin film metal coated substrate-based sensors. We immobilized small biological recognition elements on the substrates and delivered controlled concentrations of target VOCs. The sensor was irradiated with a visible laser and the sensor signal was recorded. We characterized the laser performance and tested 3 recognition elements for 2 VOCs with varying concentrations (1-100 ppm). We also evaluated enhancement of the signal using nanostructures on the metal film in comparison with planar film substrate. We demonstrated detecting ethanol reliably at concentrations as low as ~2 ppm along with preliminary detection of acetone (<100 ppm). We also found several unexpected factors that influence the sensor behavior that should be addressed to further refine the device’s performance. The nanostructures were, as expected, found to amplify the sensor signals. These findings demonstrate the feasibility of the optical bio-sensing modality for breath VOC monitoring at physiologically relevant levels. This positions LLNL to develop a low-cost, scalable, broad-spectrum health monitoring capability aligned with the Early Detection thrust of the Bioresilience Mission Focus Area and attract external funding.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Enhancing Biopreparedness through a Model System to Understand the Molecular Mechanisms that Lead to Pathogenesis and Disease Transmission: NW-BRaVE

The science of biopreparedness to counter biological threats hinges on understanding the fundamental principles and molecular mechanisms that lead to pathogenesis and disease transmission. Our vision to address this challenge is to create a powerful and user-friendly platform to elucidate the fundamental principles of how molecular interactions drive pathogen-host relationships and host shifts. We will enable groundbreaking discoveries by integrating a wide range of structural, genomics, proteomics, and other advanced omics measurements, along with evolutionary and artificial intelligence predictions. To make sure the system is applicable to real-world problems, we will develop it in the context of a tractable model system, the small, abundant, and accessible photosynthetic cyanobacteria and their constantly co-adapting viral pathogens, cyanophages. This model will maintain the system’s applicability to real-world problems and techniques, but the overall focus will be on elucidating general principles of detecting, assessing, and surveilling molecular interaction, adaptation, and coevolution that are system agnostic and therefore extensible to other viral-host interactions. Our overall objectives are to (1) identify the molecular complexes that comprise the cyanobacteria redox macromolecular subsystem and how they dynamically change with bacteriophage infection in situ, using cryo-electron tomography; (2) profile regulatory changes during infection using proteomics, multiomics, and experimental validation, and integrate the data with in situ structures; (3) use genomics and metagenomics to determine environmental and population factors across time scales that impact the interactions between marine cyanobacteria and their cyanophage parasites, predicting the evolutionary origins of in situ structural and functional interactions, convergence and coevolution; and (4) develop a data integration and transformation platform that facilitates the integration of in situ, proteomic, and evolutionary measurements of molecular interactions to surveil diverse hosts and parasites in various environmental contexts. These objectives address Focus Area 2 Reveal Molecular Interactions Across Biological Scales for Design of Targeted Interventions. Our powerful and user-friendly platform will enhance connections between the often-siloed fields of structure, molecular phenotype, and evolutionary genomics that are key to biopreparedness, but in need of integration (Figure 1). We will build an integrated navigation tool to facilitate the effective use of globally distributed experimental data for integrated analysis and predictive modeling. The project will develop, implement, and test a platform to assess host-pathogen molecular interactions, adaptation to hosts and host shifts, and coevolution between hosts and pathogens, successfully impacting the research community by revolutionizing abilities to study any host-pathogen interaction, encourage diverse community contributions, and gain fundamental insights into how proteins adapt to new contexts. This ability will be critical for designing early interventions to address future threats. We will build surveillance training capability, aiming for a fair and equitable response to future pandemics and biothreats.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Equipment Assessment Guide: A Technical Inspection and Hardening Guide for Devices in Power Grid Operations

This Equipment Assessment Guide, developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides a comprehensive framework designed to enhance the security of operational technology (OT) devices within power grid operations. The guide outlines essential steps for asset owners to conduct technical inspections and harden vulnerable hardware and firmware components commonly found in embedded systems. It focuses on components frequently targeted by cyber threats, offering valuable identification techniques for locating and recognizing critical components on devices. Additionally, the guide presents recommended secure configurations aimed at minimizing exposure and reinforcing defenses, along with impact analysis that highlights the potential consequences for grid operations if components are compromised. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this guide, asset owners can significantly enhance their cybersecurity posture, reduce the attack surface of field-deployed devices, and improve the resilience of grid services against emerging cyber threats.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy (Final Project Report)

This project establishes a Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy with the objective of designing and operating a cyber-physical testbed for wind energy farms (WEFs) that enables comprehensive cybersecurity research. The testbed incorporates a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system connected to turbine models via industrial-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs). It supports side-channel data acquisition, implementation and analysis of various cyberattack scenarios, and development of attack detection, mitigation, and best-practice guidance tailored to wind energy systems. During the project, the team expanded the number and fidelity of mathematical turbine models (MTMs), integrated these models with SCADA infrastructure, and deployed a scaled physical turbine and associated sensors. High-resolution operational and side-channel data streams were collected and used to refine machine-learning (ML)-based attack detection systems and to extend the WindCRAFT framework to multi-turbine threat scenarios. The project demonstrated a realistic, scalable environment for evaluating cyber threats, validated attack detection approaches using enriched datasets, and identified new multi-turbine and inter-turbine communication attack vectors. The resulting testbed, models, and security mechanisms provide a foundation for ongoing R&D and deployment of cyber-resilient offshore wind energy systems.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗