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The CanBikeCO Full Pilot: Long-Term Results and Analysis From an E-Bike Program in Colorado, USA

Personal micromobility devices like bicycles, e-bikes, and scooters are low- or zero-energy alternatives to single-occupancy vehicles. However, a lack of data has led to a dearth of data-driven research on personally owned e-bike usage. We present longitudinal findings from the CanBikeCO program, focused on e-bike adoption and use across demographics, trip characteristics, and geographies in the state of Colorado. CanBikeCO recorded travel survey data from low-income individuals provided with personal e-bikes by the Colorado Energy Office in six communities across Colorado from July 2021 to December 2022. The data were collected using a custom instance of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory OpenPATH platform, which combines passive data collection with semantic information such as trip mode and purpose labels. To our knowledge, there are no prior travel survey data on personally owned e-bikes with this range and scope. Insights from this unique dataset include: (i) work trips were 17% more likely than average trips to be taken on an e-bike, (ii) e-bikes were most often reported to replace cars (34% of e-bike trips) and other personal micromobility devices (22%), and (iii) participants favored walking for trips less than 1 mile, e-bikes for trips of 1-3 miles, and e-bikes, cars, or shared rides for trips of 3-20 miles. The data used to generate these results have been made available in the Transportation Secure Data Center. We find e-bike use is appealing across age groups and may be related to characteristics of land use, urban form, occupation, income, and car ownership. We conclude for this population that the energy demand added by e-bike use (induced demand and replacing non-motorized modes) is outweighed by the reduction in energy demand from replacement of single-occupancy vehicle trips with e-bike trips. Our findings suggest considerable potential for energy savings from personal e-bike ownership.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

A Novel and Cost Effective Approach to the Decommissioning and Decontamination of Legacy Glove Boxes - Minimizing TRU Waste and Maximizing LLW Waste - 13634

This paper describes the process of decommissioning two gloveboxes at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) that were employed for work with plutonium and other radioactive materials. The decommissioning process involved an initial phase of clearing tools and materials from the glove boxes and disconnecting them from the laboratory infrastructure. The removed materials, assessed as Transuranic (TRU) waste, were packaged into 55 gallon (200 litre) drums and prepared for ultimate disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) at Carlsbad New Mexico. The boxes were then sampled to determine the radioactive contents by means of smears that were counted with alpha and beta detectors to determine the residual surface contamination, especially in terms of alpha particle emitters that are an indicator of TRU activity. Paint chip samples were also collected and sent for laboratory analysis in order to ascertain the radioactive contamination contributing to the TRU activity as a fixed contamination. The investigations predicted that it may be feasible to reduce the residual surface contamination and render the glovebox structure low level waste (LLW) for disposal. In order to reduce the TRU activity a comprehensive decontamination process was initiated using chemical compounds that are particularly effective for lifting and dissolving radionuclides that adhere to the inner surfaces of the gloveboxes. The result of the decontamination process was a reduction in the TRU surface activity on the inner surfaces of the gloveboxes by four orders of magnitude in terms of disintegrations per unit area (DPA). The next phase of the process involved a comprehensive assay of the gloveboxes using a combination of passive neutron and gamma ray scintillation detectors and a shielded and collimated high purity Germanium (HPGe) gamma ray detector. The HPGe detector was used to obtain gamma ray spectra for a variety of measurement positions within the glovebox. The spectra were used to determine the TRU content of the boxes by assessing the activity of Am-241 (59 keV) and Pu-241 (414 keV). Using the data generated it was possible for qualified subject matter experts (SME) to assess that the gloveboxes could be consigned for disposition as LLW and not as TRU. Once this determination was assessed and accepted the gloveboxes were prepared for final disposition to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This preparation involved fixing any remaining radioactive contamination within the gloveboxes by filling them with a foam compound, prior to transportation. Once the remaining contamination was fixed the gloveboxes were removed from the laboratory and prepared for transported by road to NNSS. This successful glovebox decontamination and decommissioning process illustrates the means by which TRU waste generation has been minimized, LLW generation has been maximized, and risk has been effectively managed. The process minimizes the volume of TRU waste and reduced the decommissioning time with significant cost savings as the result. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Phasor Measurement Units Optimal Placement and Performance Limits for Fault Localization

Here, the performance limits of faults localization are investigated using synchrophasor data. The focus is on a non-trivial operating regime where the number of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) sensors available is insufficient to have full observability of the grid state. Proposed analysis uses the Kullback Leibler (KL) divergence between the distributions corresponding to different fault location hypotheses associated with the observation model. This analysis shows that the most likely locations are concentrated in clusters of buses more tightly connected to the actual fault site akin to graph communities. Consequently, a PMU placement strategy is derived that achieves a near-optimal resolution for localizing faults for a given number of sensors. The problem is also analyzed from the perspective of sampling a graph signal, and how the placement of the PMUs i.e. the spatial sampling pattern and the topological characteristic of the grid affect the ability to successfully localize faults. To highlight the superior performance of presented fault localization and placement algorithms, the proposed strategy is applied to a modified IEEE 34, IEEE-123 bus test cases and to data from a real distribution grid. Additionally, the detection of cyber-physical attacks is also examined where PMU data and relevant Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network traffic information are compared to determine if a network breach has affected the integrity of the system information and/or operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Improved determination of the atmospheric parameters of the pulsating sdB star Feige 48

As part of a multifaceted effort to better exploit the asteroseismological potential of the pulsating sdB star Feige 48, we present an improved spectroscopic analysis of that star based on new grids of NLTE, fully line-blanketed model atmospheres. To that end, we gathered four high signal-to-noise ratio time-averaged optical spectra of varying spectral resolutions from 1.0 Å to 8.7 Å, and we made use of the results of four independent studies to fix the abundances of the most important metals in the atmosphere of Feige 48. The mean atmospheric parameters we obtained from our four spectra of Feige 48 are: T {sub eff} = 29,850 ± 60 K, log g = 5.46 ± 0.01, and log N(He)/N(H) = –2.88 ± 0.02. We also modeled, for the first time, the He II line at 1640 Å from the STIS archive spectrum of the star, and with this line we found an effective temperature and a surface gravity that match well with the values obtained with the optical data. With some fine tuning of the abundances of the metals visible in the optical domain, we were able to achieve a very good agreement between our best available spectrum and our best-fitting synthetic one. Our derived atmospheric parameters for Feige 48 are in rather good agreement with previous estimates based on less sophisticated models. This underlines the relatively small effects of the NLTE approach combined with line blanketing in the atmosphere of this particular star, implying that the current estimates of the atmospheric parameters of Feige 48 are reliable and secure.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

AGR-2 Data Qualification Report for ATR Cycles 151B-2, 152A, 152B, 153A, 153B and 154A

This report documents the data qualification status of AGR-2 fuel irradiation experimental data from Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Cycles 152A, 152B, 153A, 153B, and 154A, as recorded in the Nuclear Data Management and Analysis System (NDMAS). The AGR-2 data streams addressed include thermocouple (TC) temperatures, sweep gas data (flow rate, pressure, and moisture content), and fission product monitoring system (FPMS) data for each of the six capsules in the experiment. A total of 13,400,520 every minute instantaneous TC and sweep gas data records were received and processed by NDMAS for this period. Of these data, 8,911,791 records (66.5% of the total) were determined to be Qualified based on NDMAS accuracy testing and data validity assessment. For temperature, there were 4,266,081 records (74% of the total TC data) that were Failed due to TC instrument failures. For sweep gas flows, there were 222,648 gas flow records (2.91% of the flow data) that were Failed. The inlet gas flow failures due to gas flow cross-talk and leakage problems that occurred after Cycle 150A were corrected by using the same gas mixture in all six capsules and the Leadout. For FPMS data, NDMAS received and processed preliminary release rate and release-to-birth rate ratio (R/B) data for three reactor cycles (Cycles 149B, 150B, and 151A) . This data consists of 45,983 release rate records and 45,235 R/B records for the 12 radionuclides reported. The qualification status of these FPMS data has been set to In Process until receipt of Quality Assurance-approved data generator reports. All of the above data have been processed and tested using a SAS®-based enterprise application software system, stored in a secure Structured Query Language database, made available on the NDMAS Web portal (http://ndmas.inl.gov), and approved by the INL STIM for release to both internal and appropriate external Very High Temperature Reactor Program participants.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Practical Applications of Cosmic Ray Science: Spacecraft, Aircraft, Ground-Based Computation and Control Systems, Exploration, and Human Health and Safety

In this presentation a review of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) effects on microelectronic systems and human health and safety is given. The methods used to evaluate and mitigate unwanted cosmic ray effects in ground-based, atmospheric flight, and space flight environments are also reviewed. However not all GCR effects are undesirable. We will also briefly review how observation and analysis of GCR interactions with planetary atmospheres and surfaces and reveal important compositional and geophysical data on earth and elsewhere. About 1000 GCR particles enter every square meter of Earth’s upper atmosphere every second, roughly the same number striking every square meter of the International Space Station (ISS) and every other low- Earth orbit spacecraft. GCR particles are high energy ionized atomic nuclei (90% protons, 9% alpha particles, 1% heavier nuclei) traveling very close to the speed of light. The GCR particle flux is even higher in interplanetary space because the geomagnetic field provides some limited magnetic shielding. Collisions of GCR particles with atomic nuclei in planetary atmospheres and/or regolith as well as spacecraft materials produce nuclear reactions and energetic/highly penetrating secondary particle showers. Three twentieth century technology developments have driven an ongoing evolution of basic cosmic ray science into a set of practical engineering tools needed to design, test, and verify the safety and reliability of modern complex technological systems and assess effects on human health and safety effects. The key technology developments are: 1) high altitude commercial and military aircraft; 2) manned and unmanned spacecraft; and 3) increasingly complex and sensitive solid state micro-electronics systems. Space and geophysical exploration needs drove the development of the instruments and analytical tools needed to recover compositional and structural data from GCR induced nuclear reactions and secondary particle showers. Finally, the possible role of GCR secondary particle showers in addressing an important homeland security problem, finding nuclear contraband and weapons, will be briefly reviewed.

Koontz, Steve↗

Preliminary Results of Ancillary Safety Analyses Supporting TREAT LEU Conversion Activities

The Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT), located at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is a test facility designed to evaluate the performance of reactor fuels and materials under transient accident conditions. The facility, an air-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor designed to utilize fuel containing high-enriched uranium (HEU), has been in non-operational standby status since 1994. Currently, in support of the missions of the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program, a new core design is being developed for TREAT that will utilize low-enriched uranium (LEU). The primary objective of this conversion effort is to design an LEU core that is capable of meeting the performance characteristics of the existing HEU core. Minimal, if any, changes are anticipated for the supporting systems (e.g. reactor trip system, filtration/cooling system, etc.); therefore, the LEU core must also be able to function with the existing supporting systems, and must also satisfy acceptable safety limits. In support of the LEU conversion effort, a range of ancillary safety analyses are required to evaluate the LEU core operation relative to that of the existing facility. These analyses cover neutronics, shielding, and thermal hydraulic topics that have been identified as having the potential to have reduced safety margins due to conversion to LEU fuel, or are required to support the required safety analyses documentation. The majority of these ancillary tasks have been identified in [1] and [2]. The purpose of this report is to document the ancillary safety analyses that have been performed at Argonne National Laboratory during the early stages of the LEU design effort, and to describe ongoing and anticipated analyses. For all analyses presented in this report, methodologies are utilized that are consistent with, or improved from, those used in analyses for the HEU Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [3]. Depending on the availability of historical data derived from HEU TREAT operation, results calculated for the LEU core are compared to measurements obtained from HEU TREAT operation. While all analyses in this report are largely considered complete and have been reviewed for technical content, it is important to note that all topics will be revisited once the LEU design approaches its final stages of maturity. For most safety significant issues, it is expected that the analyses presented here will be bounding, but additional calculations will be performed as necessary to support safety analyses and safety documentation. It should also be noted that these analyses were completed as the LEU design evolved, and therefore utilized different LEU reference designs. Preliminary shielding, neutronic, and thermal hydraulic analyses have been completed and have generally demonstrated that the various LEU core designs will satisfy existing safety limits and standards also satisfied by the existing HEU core. These analyses include the assessment of the dose rate in the hodoscope room, near a loaded fuel transfer cask, above the fuel storage area, and near the HEPA filters. The potential change in the concentration of tramp uranium and change in neutron flux reaching instrumentation has also been assessed. Safety-significant thermal hydraulic items addressed in this report include thermally-induced mechanical distortion of the grid plate, and heating in the radial reflector.

Brunett, A. J.↗

Safety Basis Compliant Flexible Operations [Capstone Project]

Compliant nuclear operations must be weighed against the radiological risk to the worker, public, and the environment. This project set out to look at one facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) and compare the risk with the operational restrictions associated with the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The hope was to identify controls that could be reduced or simplified while maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management. This would result in increasing facility operational flexibility and efficiency. Controls were identified to be simplified or eliminated based on risk. This identification was initially envisioned from the perspective of reanalysis of the accident and hazard analysis consequences. Additionally, it was envisioned that fire testing could show that the consequences of a fire are not as dramatic as analyzed. Specific facility controls were identified that cause operational inefficiencies. Based on data collection, two controls were identified for further evaluation. The first control was combustible loading within the waste storage buildings, and the second control is related to the seismic power cutoff switch. In evaluating the combustible loading control, the thought is that the fire suppression system (FSS) provides adequate protection and the combustible loading controls do not need elevation to a TSR control. The FSS, along with the Fire Protection Program, would provide protection to prevent a fire from impacting large amounts of stored waste material. The seismic switch was more of a challenge. When reviewing the facility operation, it was determined that the facility does not operate anywhere near the established material-at-risk (MAR – radioactive material) limits. By adjusting these limits, a reduced consequence could be achieved and hence, a significant risk reduction achieved. A new operating mode would be used to achieve this reduction. A reduced MAR limit was successfully used as a test case for snow removal during this project. This project expands on that trial case as related to combustible loading and the seismic power cutoff switch TSRs. This will increase the efficiency of operations with reduced TSR controls while reducing overall facility risk. This is a win-win situation for Triad National Security, LLC (Triad) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Due to schedule and budgetary constraints, not all envisioned work scope was accomplished. However, it is maintained in this report for future efforts.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Soils Activity Mobility Study: Methodology and Application

This report presents a three-level approach for estimation of sediment transport to provide an assessment of potential erosion risk for sites at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) that are posted for radiological purposes and where migration is suspected or known to occur due to storm runoff. Based on the assessed risk, the appropriate level of effort can be determined for analysis of radiological surveys, field experiments to quantify erosion and transport rates, and long-term monitoring. The method is demonstrated at contaminated sites, including Plutonium Valley, Shasta, Smoky, and T-1. The Pacific Southwest Interagency Committee (PSIAC) procedure is selected as the Level 1 analysis tool. The PSIAC method provides an estimation of the total annual sediment yield based on factors derived from the climatic and physical characteristics of a watershed. If the results indicate low risk, then further analysis is not warranted. If the Level 1 analysis indicates high risk or is deemed uncertain, a Level 2 analysis using the Modified Universal Soil Loss Equation (MUSLE) is proposed. In addition, if a sediment yield for a storm event rather than an annual sediment yield is needed, then the proposed Level 2 analysis should be performed. MUSLE only provides sheet and rill erosion estimates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center-Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) provides storm peak runoff rate and storm volumes, the inputs necessary for MUSLE. Channel Sediment Transport (CHAN-SED) I and II models are proposed for estimating sediment deposition or erosion in a channel reach from a storm event. These models require storm hydrograph associated sediment concentration and bed load particle size distribution data. When the Level 2 analysis indicates high risk for sediment yield and associated contaminant migration or when there is high uncertainty in the Level 2 results, the sites can be further evaluated with a Level 3 analysis using more complex and labor- and data-intensive methods. For the watersheds analyzed in this report using the Level 1 PSIAC method, the risk of erosion is low. The field reconnaissance surveys of these watersheds confirm the conclusion that the sediment yield of undisturbed areas at the NNSS would be low. The climate, geology, soils, ground cover, land use, and runoff potential are similar among these watersheds. There are no well-defined ephemeral channels except at the Smoky and Plutonium Valley sites. Topography seems to have the strongest influence on sediment yields, as sediment yields are higher on the steeper hill slopes. Lack of measured sediment yield data at the NNSS does not allow for a direct evaluation of the yield estimates by the PSIAC method. Level 2 MUSLE estimates in all the analyzed watersheds except Shasta are a small percentage of the estimates from PSIAC because MUSLE is not inclusive of channel erosion. This indicates that channel erosion dominates the total sediment yield in these watersheds. Annual sediment yields for these watersheds are estimated using the CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII channel sediment transport models. Both transport models give similar results and exceed the estimates obtained from PSIAC and MUSLE. It is recommended that the total watershed sediment yield of watersheds at the NNSS with flow channels be obtained by adding the washload estimate (rill and inter-rill erosion) from MUSLE to that obtained from channel transport models (bed load and suspended sediment). PSIAC will give comparable results if factor scores for channel erosion are revised towards the high erosion level. Application of the Level 3 process-based models to estimate sediment yields at the NNSS cannot be recommended at this time. Increased model complexity alone will not improve the certainty of the sediment yield estimates. Models must be calibrated against measured data before model results are accepted as certain. Because no measurements of sediment yields at the NNSS are available, model validation cannot be performed. This is also true for the models used in the Level 2 analyses presented in this study. The need to calibrate MUSLE to local conditions has been discussed. Likewise, the transport equations of CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII need to be calibrated against local data to assess their applicability under semi-arid conditions and for the ephemeral channels at the NNSS. Before these validations and calibration exercises can be undertaken, a long-term measured sediment yield data set must be developed. Development of long-term measured sediment yield data cannot be overemphasized. Long-term monitoring is essential for accurate characterization of watershed processes. It is recommended that a long-term monitoring program be set up to measure watershed erosion rates and channel sediment transport rates.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A priori precision estimation for neutron triples counting

The nondestructive assay of Plutonium bearing items for criticality, safety, security, safeguards, inventory balance, process control, waste management and compliance is often undertaken using correlated neutron counting. In particular Multiplicity Shift Register analysis allows one to extract autocorrelation parameters from the pulse train which can, within the framework of a simple interpretational model, be related to the effective {sup 240}Pu spontaneous fission mass present. The effective {sup 240}Pu mass is a weighted sum of the {sup 238}Pu, {sup 240}Pu and {sup 242}Pu masses so if the relative isotopic composition of the Pu can be established from the measured {sup 240}Pu effective mass one can estimate the total Pu mass and also the masses of the individual isotopes, example the fissile species {sup 239}Pu and {sup 241}Pu. In multiplicity counting three counting rates are obtained. These are the Singles, Doubles and Triples rates. The Singles rate is just the gross, totals or trigger rate. The Doubles and Triples rates are calculated from factorial moments of the observed signal triggered neutron multiplicity distributions following spontaneous fission in the item and can be thought of as the rate of observed coincident pairs and coincident triplets on the pulse train. Coincident events come about because the spontaneous fission and induced fission chains taking place in the item result in bursts of neutrons. These remain time correlated during the detection process and so retain information, through the burst size distribution, about the Pu content. In designing and assessing the performance of a detector system to meet a given goal it is necessary to make a priori estimates of the counting precision for all three kinds of rates. This is non-trivial because the counting does not obey the familiar rules of a Poissonian counting experiment because the pulse train has time correlated events on it and the train is sampled by event triggered gates that may overlap. For Singles and Doubles simple approximate analytical empirical rules for how to estimate the variance have been developed guided by theory and refined by experiment. However, for Triples no equivalent rules have been put forward and tested until now. In this work we propose an analytical expression, the CSH relation, for the variance on the Triples count and exercise it against experimental data gathered for Pu items measured in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Epithermal Neutron Multiplicity Counter (ENMC). Preliminary results are encouraging and reasonable agreement with observation, considered fit for scoping studies, is obtained. We have also looked at the behavior using Monte Carlo simulations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a SPARK Training Dataset

In its first five years, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) sponsored more than 400 undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctoral students in internships and research positions (Wyse 2012). In the past seven years, the NGSI program has, and continues to produce a large body of scientific, technical, and policy work in targeted core safeguards capabilities and human capital development activities. Not only does the NGSI program carry out activities across multiple disciplines, but also across all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA locations in the United States. However, products are not readily shared among disciplines and across locations, nor are they archived in a comprehensive library. Rather, knowledge of NGSI-produced literature is localized to the researchers, clients, and internal laboratory/facility publication systems such as the Electronic Records and Information Capture Architecture (ERICA) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). There is also no incorporated way of analyzing existing NGSI literature to determine whether the larger NGSI program is achieving its core safeguards capabilities and activities. A complete library of NGSI literature could prove beneficial to a cohesive, sustainable, and more economical NGSI program. The Safeguards Platform for Automated Retrieval of Knowledge (SPARK) has been developed to be a knowledge storage, retrieval, and analysis capability to capture safeguards knowledge to exist beyond the lifespan of NGSI. During the development process, it was necessary to build a SPARK training dataset (a corpus of documents) for initial entry into the system and for demonstration purposes. We manipulated these data to gain new information about the breadth of NGSI publications, and they evaluated the science-policy interface at PNNL as a practical demonstration of SPARK’s intended analysis capability. The analysis demonstration sought to answer the question, “Who leads research and development at PNNL, scientists or policy researchers?” The analysis was inconclusive as to whether policy researchers or scientists are primary drivers for research at PNNL. However, the dataset development and analysis activity did demonstrate the utility and usability of the SPARK dataset. After the initiation of the NGSI program there is a clear increase in the number of publications of safeguards products. Employing the natural language analysis tool IN SPIRE™ showed the presence of vocation- and topic-specific vernacular within NGSI sub-topics. The methodology developed to define the scope of the dataset was useful in describing safeguards applications, but may be applicable for research on other topics beyond safeguards. The analysis emphasized the need for an expanded dataset to fully understand the scope of safeguards publications and research both nationally and internationally. As the SPARK dataset grows to include publications outside PNNL, topics crosscutting disciplines and DOE/NNSA locations should become more apparent. NGSI was established in 2008 to cultivate the next generation of safeguards professionals and support the development of core safeguards capabilities (NNSA 2012). Now a robust system to preserve and share institutional memory such as SPARK is needed to inspire and equip the next generation of safeguards experts, technologies, and policies.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Companion Assisted Software Based Remote Attestation in SCADA Networks

Critical infrastructure such as power generation and water distribution systems have become a priority target in cyber warfare because of their recent computerization and introduction to the internet. As a result, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system security has become a hot topic in academic and industrial research. Among these topics, Remote Attestation is a security method intended to detect the presence of fileless malware in remote devices as they continue to operate. This allows for the detection of malware in the absence of long-term storage artifacts before symptoms of compromise begin to appear. In general, a trusted device (the verifier) makes a request for evidence of innocence from the untrusted device (the prover). In software-based schemes, the verifier can then measure the delay between its request and the prover’s response. If this delay is greater than the known computational time of the evidence gathering algorithm performed by the prover, then evidence may have been forged. Multi-hop networks often introduce too much network jitter to allow accurate measurement of prover response time, which limits the effectiveness of software based Remote Attestation in a real-world setting. In this work, we introduce a companion device that the verifier can trust to perform a subset of attestation, thereby removing any network jitter. This device is a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that is physically connected to the prover. We provide a communication protocol between the verifier, prover, and companion. To evaluate our scheme, we simulate it in a common SCADA network environment under normal and heavy traffic loads. Our simulations are performed in the discrete event network simulator NS-3, and we perform statistical analysis over our results to show that our scheme allows for tight timing constraints to be placed on the prover such that the verifier can more easily determine the validity of the evidence that it receives.

Johnson, William A.↗

Exploitation of Geometric Occlusion and Covariance Spectroscopy in a Gamma Sensor Array

The National Security Technologies, LLC, Remote Sensing Laboratory has recently used an array of six small-footprint (1-inch diameter by 3-inch long) cylindrical crystals of thallium-doped sodium iodide scintillators to obtain angular information from discrete gamma ray–emitting point sources. Obtaining angular information in a near-field measurement for a field-deployed gamma sensor is a requirement for radiological emergency work. Three of the sensors sit at the vertices of a 2-inch isosceles triangle, while the other three sit on the circumference of a 3-inch-radius circle centered in this triangle. This configuration exploits occlusion of sensors, correlation from Compton scattering within a detector array, and covariance spectroscopy, a spectral coincidence technique. Careful placement and orientation of individual detectors with reference to other detectors in an array can provide improved angular resolution for determining the source position by occlusion mechanism. By evaluating the values of, and the uncertainties in, the photopeak areas, efficiencies, branching ratio, peak area correction factors, and the correlations between these quantities, one can determine the precise activity of a particular radioisotope from a mixture of radioisotopes that have overlapping photopeaks that are ordinarily hard to deconvolve. The spectral coincidence technique, often known as covariance spectroscopy, examines the correlations and fluctuations in data that contain valuable information about radiation sources, transport media, and detection systems. Covariance spectroscopy enhances radionuclide identification techniques, provides directional information, and makes weaker gamma-ray emission—normally undetectable by common spectroscopic analysis—detectable. A series of experimental results using the concept of covariance spectroscopy are presented.

occlusion, covariance spectroscopy, correlations, ↗

Periodic Verification of the Scaling Factor for Radwastes in Korean NPPs - 13294

According to the acceptance criteria for a low and intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW) listed in Notice No. 2012-53 of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), specific concentrations of radionuclides inside a drum has to be identified and quantified. In 5 years of effort, scaling factors were derived through destructive radiochemical analysis, and the dry active waste, spent resin, concentration bottom, spent filter, and sludge drums generated during 2004 ∼ 2008 were evaluated to identify radionuclide inventories. Eventually, only dry active waste among LILWs generated from Korean NPPs were first shipped to a permanent disposal facility on December 2010. For the LILWs generated after 2009, the radionuclides are being radiochemically quantified because the Notice clarifies that the certifications of the scaling factors should be verified biennially. During the operation of NPP, the radionuclides designated in the Notice are formed by neutron activation of primary coolant, reactor structural materials, corrosion products, and fission products released into primary coolant through defects or failures in fuel cladding. Eventually, since the radionuclides released into primary coolant are transported into the numerous auxiliary and support systems connected to primary system, the LILWs can be contaminated, and the radionuclides can have various concentration distributions. Thus, radioactive wastes, such as spent resin and dry active waste generated at various Korean NPP sites, were sampled at each site, and the activities of the regulated radionuclides present in the sample were determined using radiochemical methods. The scaling factors were driven on the basis of the activity ratios between a or β-emitting nuclides and γ-emitting nuclides. The resulting concentrations were directly compared with the established scaling factors' data using statistical methods. In conclusions, the established scaling factors were verified with a reliability of within 2σ, and the scaling factors will be applied for newly analyzed LILWs to evaluate the radionuclide inventories. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Learning to Count Grave Sites for Cemetery Observation Models With Satellite Imagery

Understanding how people occupy open spaces is important for research in support of population modeling, policy, national security, emergency response, and sustainability. For the past decade, there has been an increase in research toward capturing and reporting population dynamics and patterns of life at the building level and in some open public spaces such as cemeteries and parks. This is done through observation models developed from local sociocultural information acquired at various spatiotemporal scales to inform night, day, and episodic population occupancy estimates (people/1000 sq ft). Sociocultural information for cemeteries and parks is scarcely available and often collected manually. The process is not only marred by inconsistencies but is laborious and time consuming. In this study, we leverage convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and satellite imagery to derive grave site counts as proxy variables to support scalable and accurate sociocultural data required in a population observation model. Through a hybrid workflow (weak localization plus regression model), we characterize a large scale automation process to counting of grave sites. We evaluate and demonstrate the efficacy of proposed workflow using out-of-data set large satellite imagery and establish its broader impact on cemetery observation models.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Virtualization - A Key Cost Saver in NASA Multi-Mission Ground System Architecture

With science team budgets being slashed, and a lack of adequate facilities for science payload teams to operate their instruments, there is a strong need for innovative new ground systems that are able to provide necessary levels of capability processing power, system availability and redundancy while maintaining a small footprint in terms of physical space, power utilization and cooling.The ground system architecture being presented is based off of heritage from several other projects currently in development or operations at Goddard, but was designed and built specifically to meet the needs of the Science and Planetary Operations Control Center (SPOCC) as a low-cost payload command, control, planning and analysis operations center. However, this SPOCC architecture was designed to be generic enough to be re-used partially or in whole by other labs and missions (since its inception that has already happened in several cases!)The SPOCC architecture leverages a highly available VMware-based virtualization cluster with shared SAS Direct-Attached Storage (DAS) to provide an extremely high-performing, low-power-utilization and small-footprint compute environment that provides Virtual Machine resources shared among the various tenant missions in the SPOCC. The storage is also expandable, allowing future missions to chain up to 7 additional 2U chassis of storage at an extremely competitive cost if they require additional archive or virtual machine storage space.The software architecture provides a fully-redundant GMSEC-based message bus architecture based on the ActiveMQ middleware to track all health and safety status within the SPOCC ground system. All virtual machines utilize the GMSEC system agents to report system host health over the GMSEC bus, and spacecraft payload health is monitored using the Hammers Integrated Test and Operations System (ITOS) Galaxy Telemetry and Command (TC) system, which performs near-real-time limit checking and data processing on the downlinked data stream and injects messages into the GMSEC bus that are monitored to automatically page the on-call operator or Systems Administrator (SA) when an off-nominal condition is detected. This architecture, like the LTSP thin clients, are shared across all tenant missions.Other required IT security controls are implemented at the ground system level, including physical access controls, logical system-level authentication authorization management, auditing and reporting, network management and a NIST 800-53 FISMA-Moderate IT Security plan Risk Assessment Contingency Plan, helping multiple missions share the cost of compliance with agency-mandated directives.The SPOCC architecture provides science payload control centers and backup mission operations centers with a cost-effective, standardized approach to virtualizing and monitoring resources that were traditionally multiple racks full of physical machines. The increased agility in deploying new virtual systems and thin client workstations can provide significant savings in personnel costs for maintaining the ground system. The cost savings in procurement, power, rack footprint and cooling as well as the shared multi-mission design greatly reduces upfront cost for missions moving into the facility. Overall, the authors hope that this architecture will become a model for how future NASA operations centers are constructed!

Ground System Architecture↗

Quantitative Risk Analysis of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants using IRADIC Technology

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. In FY-2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems (IRADIC technology) was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the High Safety Significant Safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) develop an advanced risk assessment technology to support transition from analog to DI&C technologies for nuclear industry, (3) assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital HSSSR DI&C systems, (4) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the IRADIC technology is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify responding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level, (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks; thus, to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). In this report, an approach for performing software CCF analysis, given limited data, is developed and demonstrated using a case study of a highly redundant digital reactor trip system. Consequence analysis is also performed based on different accident scenarios. Results indicate that plant modernization including the improvement of HSSSR DI&C systems will make great benefits to plant safety by providing more safety margins to accident management. In addition, a novel approach is proposed in this report for the quantification of software hazards when sufficient operational and testing data available. The method incorporates software development quality as well as strong analysis techniques to identify and link software defects to potential failure modes. The approach includes both semantic and test-based analysis to detect failures that can exist in different stages of the software development life cycle. This method is applied to an advanced human system interface relevant to reactor trip safety developed from the APR 1400 design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗