Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Health Management”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,243 records · Page 69

Optimization of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site Closure Cover

The U.S. Department of Energy Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” requires that performance assessments demonstrate that releases of radionuclides to the environment are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Quantitative cost benefit analysis of radiation protection options is one component of the ALARA process. This report summarizes a quantitative cost benefit analysis of closure cover thickness for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada Test Site. The optimum cover thickness that maintains doses ALARA is shown to be the thickness with the minimum total closure cost. Total closure cost is the sum of cover construction cost and the health detriment cost. Cover construction cost is estimated based on detailed cost estimates for closure of the 92-acre Low-Level Waste Management Unit (LLWMU). The health detriment cost is calculated as the product of collective dose and a constant monetary value of health detriment in units of dollars per unit collective dose. Collective dose is the sum of all individual doses in an exposed population and has units of person-sievert (Sv). Five discrete cover thickness options ranging from 2.5 to 4.5 meters (m) (8.2 to 15 feet [ft]) are evaluated. The optimization was subject to the constraints that (1) options must meet all applicable regulatory requirements and that (2) individual doses be a small fraction of background radiation dose. Total closure cost is found to be a monotonically increasing function of cover thickness for the 92-ac LLWMU, the Northern Expansion Area, and the entire Area 5 RWMS. The cover construction cost is orders of magnitude greater than the health detriment cost. Two-thousand Latin hypercube sampling realizations of the relationship between total closure cost and cover thickness are generated. In every realization, the optimum cover thickness is 2.5 m (8.2 ft) for the 92-ac Low-Level Waste Management Unit, the Northern Expansion Area, and the entire Area 5 RWMS. The conclusions of the optimization are found to be insensitive to all input parameters, the monetary value of the health detriment over a range of values from $200,000 to $15,000,000 per person-Sv, and the period of integration of collective dose. A 2.5 m (8.2 ft) closure cover at the Area 5 RWMS can meet all applicable regulatory requirements and maintain radionuclide releases ALARA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Surface Water Protection: A Watershed Approach

This surface water protection plan (plan) provides an overview of the management efforts implemented at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) that support a watershed approach to protect surface water. This plan fulfills a requirement in the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 450.1A to demonstrate a watershed approach for surface water protection that protects the environment and public health. This plan describes the use of a watershed approach within which the Laboratory's current surface water management and protections efforts have been structured and coordinated. With more than 800 million acres of land in the U.S. under federal management and stewardship, a unified approach across agencies provides enhanced resource protection and cost-effectiveness. The DOE adopted, along with other federal agencies, the Unified Federal Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and Resource Management (UFP) with a goal to protect water quality and aquatic ecosystems on federal lands. This policy intends to prevent and/or reduce water pollution from federal activities while fostering a cost-effective watershed approach to federal land and resource management. The UFP also intends to enhance the implementation of existing laws (e.g., the Clean Water Act [CWA] and National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA]) and regulations. In addition, this provides an opportunity for the federal government to serve as a model for water quality stewardship using a watershed approach for federal land and resource activities that potentially impact surface water and its uses. As a federal land manager, the Laboratory is responsible for a small but important part of those 800 million acres of land. Diverse land uses are required to support the Laboratory's mission and provide an appropriate work environment for its staff. The Laboratory comprises two sites: its main site in Livermore, California, and the Experimental Test Site (Site 300), near Tracy, California. The main site is largely developed yet its surface water system encompasses two arroyos, an engineered detention basin (Lake Haussmann), storm channels, and wetlands. Conversely, the more rural Site 300 includes approximately 7,000 acres of largely undeveloped land with many natural tributaries, riparian habitats, and wetland areas. These wetlands include vernal pools, perennial seeps, and emergent wetlands. The watersheds within which the Laboratory's sites lie provide local and community ecological functions and services which require protection. These functions and services include water supply, flood attenuation, groundwater recharge, water quality improvement, wildlife and aquatic habitats, erosion control, and (downstream) recreational opportunities. The Laboratory employs a watershed approach to protect these surface water systems. The intent of this approach, presented in this document, is to provide an integrated effort to eliminate or minimize any adverse environmental impacts of the Laboratory's operations and enhance the attributes of these surface water systems, as possible and when reasonable, to protect their value to the community and watershed. The Laboratory's watershed approach to surface water protection will use the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Watershed Framework and guiding principles of geographic focus, scientifically based management and partnerships1 as a foundation. While the Laboratory's unique site characteristics result in objectives and priorities that may differ from other industrial sites, these underlying guiding principles provide a structure for surface water protection to ensure the Laboratory's role in environmental stewardship and as a community partner in watershed protection. The approach includes pollution prevention, continual environmental improvement, and supporting, as possible, community objectives (e.g., protection of the San Francisco Bay watershed).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Integrating the Social, Hydrological and Ecological Dimensions of Freshwater Health: The Freshwater Health Index

Degradation of freshwater ecosystems and the services they provide is a primary cause of increasing water insecurity, raising the need for integrated solutions to freshwater management. While methods for characterizing the multi-faceted challenges of managing freshwater ecosystems abound, they tend to emphasize either social or ecological dimensions and fall short of being truly integrative. This paper suggests that management for sustainability of freshwater systems needs to consider the linkages between human water uses, freshwater ecosystems and governance. We present a conceptualization of freshwater resources as part of an integrated social-ecological system and propose a set of corresponding indicators to monitor freshwater ecosystem health and to highlight priorities for management. We demonstrate an application of this new framework -the Freshwater Health Index (FHI) - in the Dongjiang River Basin in southern China, where stakeholders are addressing multiple and conflicting freshwater demands. By combining empirical and modeled datasets with surveys to gauge stakeholders' preferences and elicit expert information about governance mechanisms, the FHI helps stakeholders understand the status of freshwater ecosystems in their basin, how ecosystems are being manipulated to enhance or decrease water-related services, and how well the existing water re-source management regime is equipped to govern these dynamics over time. This framework helps to operationalize a truly integrated approach to water resource management by recognizing the interplay between governance, stakeholders, freshwater ecosystems and the services they provide

ecosystem services↗

A Guideline for the Management of Renal Stones in Astronauts

There are no specific guidelines for the management of renal stones in astronauts. Given the increased risk for bone loss, hypercalcuria, and stone formation due to microgravity, a clinical practice guideline is needed. Methods An extensive review of the literature and current aeromedical standards for the management of renal stones was done. The NASA Flight Medicine Clinic's electronic medical record and Longitudinal Survey of Astronaut Health were also reviewed. This information was used to create an algorithm for the management of renal stones in astronauts. Results Guidelines are proposed based on accepted standards of care, with consideration to the environment of spaceflight. In a usual medical setting, asymptomatic, small stones less than 7 mm are often observed over time. Given the constraints of schedule, and the risks to crew health and mission, this approach is too liberal. An upper limit of 3 mm stone diameter was adopted before requiring intervention, because this is the largest size that has a significant chance of spontaneous passage on its own. Other specific guidelines were also created. Discussion The spaceflight environment requires more aggressive treatment than would otherwise be found with the usual practice of medicine. A small stone can become a major problem because it may ultimately require medical evacuation from orbit. Thus renal stones are a significant mission threat and should be managed in a systematic way to mitigate risks to crew health and mission success.

Reyes, David↗

The New Face of Data Accessibility

Management of medical and research data at NASA's Johnson Space Center has been addressed with two separate, independent systems: the Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (formerly, The Longitudinal Study of Astronaut Health) (LSAH) and the Life Sciences Data Archive (LSDA). Project management for these has been autonomous with little or no cross-over of goals, objectives or strategy. The result has been limited debate and discussion regarding how contents from one repository might impact or guide the direction of the other. It is decidedly more efficient to use existing data and information than to re-generate them. Ensuring that both clinical and research data / information are accessible for review is a central concept to the decision to unify these repositories. In the past, research data from flight and ground analogs has been held in the LSDA and medical data held in the Electronic Medical Record or in console flight surgeon logs and records. There was little cross-pollination between medical and research findings and, as a result, applicable research was not being fully incorporated into clinical, in-flight practice. Conversely, findings by the console surgeon were not being picked up by the research community. The desired life cycle for risk mitigation was not being fully realized. The goal of unifying these repositories and processes is to provide a closely knit approach to handling medical and research data, which will not only engender discussion and debate but will also ensure that both categories of data and information are used to enhance the use of medical and research data to reduce risk and promote the understanding of space physiology, countermeasures and other mitigation strategies

Fitts, Mary A.↗

Long-Term Stewardship at a Former Uranium Mill Tailings Site in Riverton, Wyoming - 17090

The US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) is responsible for maintaining protective public health and environmental conditions at former uranium mill tailings sites nationwide via long-term stewardship. One of these sites, a former uranium mill near Riverton, Wyoming, is within the boundary of the Wind River Indian Reservation and operated from 1958 to 1963. Tailings and contaminated material associated with mill operations were removed and transported to an offsite disposal cell in 1989. The remedial action was completed under Title I of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978. Milling operations, which included an unlined tailings impoundment and an unlined evaporation pond, contaminated the shallow groundwater, resulting in a down-gradient groundwater plume that discharges to the Little Wind River. A natural flushing compliance strategy was implemented in 1998. This strategy allows contaminants of concern to naturally flush from the groundwater, provided that contaminants flush below US Environmental Protection Agency maximum concentration limits within 100 years. As part of the compliance strategy, LM has implemented a groundwater monitoring program along with institutional controls that include the installation of an alternate water supply, continued sampling of private wells, and restrictions on well drilling and gravel pit construction. LM works closely with local stakeholders and community members to ensure that these institutional controls are in place and maintained. The Riverton site provides an interesting case study where contaminant remobilization due to river flooding prompted a reevaluation of the conceptual site model to verify if the current compliance strategy would remain protective of human health and the environment. Concentrations of groundwater contaminants, which include sulfate, molybdenum, and uranium, were transiently elevated following flooding of the Little Wind River in 2010 and 2016. These flood events provided the impetus to investigate other aspects of the hydrologic system, including the unsaturated zone, naturally reduced (sulfidic) zones, and evaporite deposits. New site conceptual models, field and laboratory studies, and numerical models are being developed to explain how biogeochemical sediment-water interactions contribute to plume persistence and flood-related increases in groundwater concentrations. Updated human health and ecological risk assessments are progressing to evaluate the risk to human health and the environment based on current site conditions. Groundwater concentrations may remain above US Environmental Protection Agency maximum concentration limits beyond the 100-year natural flushing regulatory time frame. LM in its capacity as a long-term steward continues to monitor the site to ensure protectiveness is maintained and to determine the feasibility of alternative compliance and remediation strategies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk-Based Information to Support the Evaluation of Management Options for Cesium and Strontium Capsules at the Hanford Site

Evaluations are under way to support U.S. Department of Energy decisions on how to manage cesium and strontium capsules currently in storage at the Hanford site. Health-based exposure limits for drinking water, oral toxicity data, and environmental fate information were combined in an initial evaluation to frame performance targets for managing chemicals and radionuclides that could leach from the capsules and migrate to groundwater over time. More than 50 relevant benchmarks were identified for 15 of the 17 contaminants in the study set. Of those multiple benchmarks, EPA limits for drinking water served as the main basis for the leachate performance targets. For the remaining two contaminants, stable cesium and zirconium, preliminary indicators were derived from a limited review of toxicity data. Thus, preliminary candidate concentrations were identified for the full study set to support the ongoing evaluation of capsule management options. In summary: In an earlier scoping study, three radionuclides and eight chemicals were identified as contaminants of interest for leachate from cesium and strontium capsules stored at the Hanford site. To frame management options for these capsules, it is assumed that contaminants will leach to groundwater and serve as a drinking water source in the long-term future. Before developing performance targets for the initial set of contaminants, a combined fate and toxicity evaluation was conducted to determine if any others should be added to account for decay or fate products and chemical toxicity. From this review, the list was expanded to produce a final study set of 17 contaminants. Established exposure limits and toxicity data were then reviewed and integrated to develop candidate health-based concentrations to frame performance targets for assessing options for long-term capsule management. This review of more than a dozen different benchmarks and toxicity sources translated to hundreds of individual data checks to support the identification of these target concentrations. In most cases, an EPA drinking water standard served as the key basis for the suggested target. Exceptions were warranted when the drinking water standard reflects dated information and more recent studies suggest a different concentration. Thus, for contaminants with older limits (such as Sr-90), the drinking water standard is identified and an alternate value is also provided that reflects more recent scientific knowledge. Although multiple limits or guidelines exist for most study chemicals, no benchmarks were found for stable cesium or zirconium. Thus, the preliminary target concentrations for these two metals were based on an initial limited review of toxicity data from the scientific literature. In conclusion, fate and toxicity information can be effectively integrated to develop target concentrations for managing contaminated materials at cleanup sites. These targets are simply intended to serve as guides, not as part of a formal compliance review process. For this reason, to the extent possible, it is useful to incorporate current health-based information relevant to the given application. For the Hanford application, it is expected that the preliminary targets will be refined to reflect evolving knowledge. That knowledge may extend from additional characterization of the capsules and their disposition options, and further context for setting-related conditions, to the refinement of benchmarks and underlying models, and further toxicity assessments. The overall goal is to support technical risk analyses for Hanford with current scientific knowledge and practice, to assure health protection into the long term. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Decontamination and Management of Human Remains Following Incidents of Hazardous Chemical Release

Abstract Objective: To provide specific procedural guidance and resources for identification, assessment, control, and mitigation of compounds that may contaminate human remains resulting from chemical attack or release. Design: A detailed technical, policy, and regulatory review is summarized. Setting: Guidance is suitable for civilian or military settings where human remains potentially contaminated with hazardous chemicals may be present. Settings would include sites of transportation accidents, natural disasters, terrorist or military operations, mortuary affairs or medical examiner processing and decontamination points, and similar. Patients, Participants: While recommended procedures have not been validated with actual human remains, guidance has been developed from data characterizing controlled experiments with fabrics, materiel, and laboratory animals. Main Outcome Measure(s): Presentation of logic and specific procedures for remains management, protection and decontamination of mortuary affairs personnel, as well as decision criteria for determining when remains are sufficiently decontaminated so as to pose no chemical health hazard. Results: Established procedures and existing equipment/materiel available for decontamination and verification provide appropriate and reasonable means to mitigate chemical hazards from remains. Extensive characterization of issues related to remains decontamination indicates that supra-lethal concentrations of liquid chemical warfare agent VX may prove difficult to decontaminate and verify in a timely fashion. Specialized personnel can and should be called upon to assist with monitoring necessary to clear decontaminated remains for transport and processing. Conclusions: Once appropriate decontamination and verification have been accomplished, normal procedures for remains processing and transport to the decedent s family and the continental United States can be followed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

State of battery health estimation based on swelling characteristics

There is disclosed an electrical device including a battery, and a battery management system. The battery management system includes a controller in electrical communication with a pressure sensor to monitor the state of health of the battery. The controller applies a method for determining the state of health that uses a non-electrical (mechanical) signal of force measurements combined with incremental capacity analysis to estimate the capacity fading and other health indicators of the battery with better precision than existing methods. The pressure sensor may provide the force measurement signal to the controller, which may determine which incremental capacity curve based on force to use for the particular battery. The controller then executes a program utilizing the data from the pressure sensor and the stored incremental capacity curves based on force to estimate the capacity fading and signal a user with the state of health percentage.

Stefanopoulou, Anna G.↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Group Capability Model

The Group Capability Model (GCM) is a software tool that allows an organization, from first line management to senior executive, to monitor and track the health (capability) of various groups in performing their contractual obligations. GCM calculates a Group Capability Index (GCI) by comparing actual head counts, certifications, and/or skills within a group. The model can also be used to simulate the effects of employee usage, training, and attrition on the GCI. A universal tool and common method was required due to the high risk of losing skills necessary to complete the Space Shuttle Program and meet the needs of the Constellation Program. During this transition from one space vehicle to another, the uncertainty among the critical skilled workforce is high and attrition has the potential to be unmanageable. GCM allows managers to establish requirements for their group in the form of head counts, certification requirements, or skills requirements. GCM then calculates a Group Capability Index (GCI), where a score of 1 indicates that the group is at the appropriate level; anything less than 1 indicates a potential for improvement. This shows the health of a group, both currently and over time. GCM accepts as input head count, certification needs, critical needs, competency needs, and competency critical needs. In addition, team members are categorized by years of experience, percentage of contribution, ex-members and their skills, availability, function, and in-work requirements. Outputs are several reports, including actual vs. required head count, actual vs. required certificates, CGI change over time (by month), and more. The program stores historical data for summary and historical reporting, which is done via an Excel spreadsheet that is color-coded to show health statistics at a glance. GCM has provided the Shuttle Ground Processing team with a quantifiable, repeatable approach to assessing and managing the skills in their organization. They now have a common frame of reference across NASA/contractor lines to communicate and mitigate any critical skills concerns.

Olejarski, Michael↗

Requirements for Robust DERMS Control and Cyber Attack Scenarios

A Distribution Management System (DMS) is responsible for monitoring and maintaining the health of a distribution grid. Common DMS applications include fault location isolation and service restoration, on-line power flow (OLPF), volt/VAR optimization (VVO), and switch order management. These systems were developed primarily in the area of top-down, unidirectional power flow, with large centralized generating plants moving electricity through the transmission grid and into the distribution grid from and thence to consumers. The recent and ongoing addition of distributed energy resources (DER) to the grid, including rooftop and community solar and wind, means that power is now flowing into the distribution grid from the edge, which complicates the functioning of the DMS. To ameliorate this problem, DMS use distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to control DER such as solar inverters. DERMS comprise software management tools that allow management and near real-time control of an array of DER. DERMS control devices and grid services including smart inverters, capacitor banks, on-load tap changes, voltage regulators, and customer loads.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

A Proposed Geospatial Data Preservation Strategy for DOE's Office of Legacy Management

Identifying and planning preservation and curation activities associated with geospatial data will improve the ability of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) to support their core mission of protecting human health and the environment. This report documents the development LM's strategy for preserving and curating geospatial data within the context of LM's data-lifecycle-management framework. The strategy consists of preservation and curation elements, specific activities, and key enabling factors that ensure LM's geospatial data is maintained. Preservation elements enable the effective preservation of LM's geospatial data and recognizes that strategies need to be flexible to adapt to ongoing changes in scale, technology, and standards. Key enabling factors are intended to highlight critical data management responsibilities that must be addressed by LM to meet its preservation and curation objectives. A summary of best practices for geospatial data preservation is provided as part of the strategy.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

System Downtime Management at 12 GeV CEBAF

Jefferson Lab?s Accelerator Division uses two independent web based applications for Beam Time Accounting and System Downtime tracking. The Beam Time Accounting application acts as the accelerator time clock, while the Downtime Manager application monitors individual system performance. Accelerator system health is important to quantify in order to effectively and efficiently utilize limited resources for performance improvements. Jefferson Lab?s Accelerator Operability Group has historically tracked System Downtime by gathering failure data via Operator input. A recent overhaul of that process has been implemented which includes failure guidelines, a new web based application/reporting application, and Operator training. The new process was implemented at the start of CEBAF?s 12 GeV Commissioning to document system failures during commissioning, identify ?infant mortality? failures, and improve the Downtime Manager application prior to production running. This discussion will focus on the journey of implementing the modified system downtime process and the vision of future improvements for CEBAF operations.

Michaud, Randy↗

Integrated Safety Management System Description, Revision 9, PG470252

Personnel at Sandia National Laboratories (hereinafter referred to as Sandia) comply with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) P 450.4A, Chg 1, Integrated Safety Management Policy, and implement an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) to ensure safe operations. Sandia personnel integrate safety into management and work practices at all levels so that missions are accomplished while protecting Members of the Workforce, the public, and the environment. As a result, safety is effectively integrated into all facets of work planning and execution. Thus, the management of safety functions becomes an integral part of mission accomplishment and meets the requirements outlined in the DOE Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Work Planning and Execution clause incorporated into the Prime Contract. The DEAR 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Work Planning and Execution clause requires DOE contractors to manage and perform work in accordance with a documented Safety Management System that fulfills conditions of the DEAR clause, at a minimum. For purposes of this clause, safety encompasses environment, safety, and health, including pollution prevention and waste minimization.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrated Safety Management System Description (PG470252) (V.10)

Personnel at Sandia National Laboratories (hereinafter referred to as Sandia) comply with United States Department of Energy (DOE) Policy 450.4A, Chg 1, Integrated Safety Management Policy, and implement an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) to ensure safe operations. Sandia personnel integrate safety into management and work practices at all levels so missions are accomplished while protecting Members of the Workforce, the public, and the environment. As a result, safety is effectively integrated into all facets of work planning and execution. Thus the management of safety functions becomes an integral part of mission accomplishment and meets the requirements outlined in the DOE Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Work Planning and Execution, clause incorporated by reference into the Prime Contract. The DEAR 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Work Planning and Execution, clause requires DOE contractors to manage and perform work in accordance with a documented Safety Management System that fulfills conditions of the DEAR clause at a minimum. For purposes of this clause, safety encompasses environment, safety, and health (ES&H), including pollution prevention and waste minimization.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗