Pu distribution among mixed waste components at the Hanford legacy site, USA and implications to long-term migration
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SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Results for “radioactive waste”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Comparative structural investigations of nuclear waste glass alteration layers and sol-gel synthesized aerogels
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Source Term of Accidents Involving Vehicle Crashes and Fuel Fires
This calculation is to be used when developing accident analysis scenarios involving fuel fires at the WSF. The objectives of the calculation are to determine (1) the Source Term from releases of TRU waste involved in impacts, impacts with fuel fire, and fuel fire with no impact; and (2) the plume sensible heat from various sizes of gasoline pool fires.
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Source Term of Accidents Involving Aircraft Crashes and Fuel Fires
This calculation is to be used when developing accident analysis scenarios involving aircraft fuel fires at the Waste Storage Facility (WSF). The objectives of the calculation are to determine (1) the Source Term from releases of TRU waste involved in impacts, impacts with fuel fire, and fuel fire with no impact; and (2) the plume sensible heat from various sizes of gasoline pool fires.
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Vadose Zone Model for B Complex for Composite Analysis
The objectives of the vadose modeling for the updated Hanford Site composite analysis (CA) are to simulate the flow and transport of water and radionuclide releases from the surface to the water table and to provide radionuclide transfer rates for the plateau to river (P2R) model, version 8.3. Water additions include natural recharge and water discharged to the ground as a result of industrial processes associated with Hanford Site operations. Contaminant sources include radionuclides in water discharged to the ground during operations and radionuclides disposed “dry” in solid waste burial grounds or other means. The simulation time starts in 1943 and ends at 12070, which is 10,000 years after assumed Hanford Site closure in 2070. The scope of this ECF is to document the development and results of the B Complex vadose zone model. The B Complex model encompasses the region around single-shell tank farms 241-B, 241-BX, and 241-BY, and adjacent cribs, trenches, and burial grounds in the northwestern part of the 200 East Area. Sources of waste to this area were primarily from B Plant (221-B) and U Plant (221-U).
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Literature Review on the Impact of Thermolytic Hydrogen Generation Rate from the Next Generation Solvent
A literature review was undertaken to assess the thermolytic hydrogen generation potential of the Next Generation Solvent (NGS) system, which is planned to replace the Original Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Solvent at the Salt Waste Processing Facility. NGS uses a new extractant and suppressor and the same modifier and organic carrier solvent as the Original CSSX Solvent at different concentrations.
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SB14 Source Reduction Evaluation Review and Plan for the DOE California Sites
The Department of Energy (DOE) is the owner of multiple facilities in Northern California. The facilities include Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA) and SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC) among other sites. Through their operations, the facilities generate hazardous waste and, thereby, are subject to the requirements of Chapter 31 of the Title 22 California Code of Regulations, Waste Minimization. The Northern California sites are primarily research and development facilities in the areas relating to national security, high-energy physics, bioscience and the environment.
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Solidification of REDC Organics For Disposal As Solid Waste
The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) generates various liquid organic wastes from processing irradiated targets to recover heavy elements. In the past, these organics were discharged to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) liquid low-level waste (LLLW) system, along with the aqueous waste. Because of a reduction in aqueous LLLW from other ORNL generators and an increase in the radionuclide concentration, particularly 238 Pu, in the REDC organic waste stream, the organics can no longer be discharged to the LLLW system. The plan is to solidify the liquid organic waste for disposal as solid waste. Solidifying the organic liquids using PM-199 Organoclay ® would produce solid waste forms with no free liquid, which should qualify for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Granular Organoclay can be added to the organic waste solutions until there is a dry layer on top of the liquid and then allowed to cure for a few hours to produce a solid wasteform.
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Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in the GDSA Framework (FY2024)
The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign (SFWST) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is conducting research and development on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two priorities for SFWST are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, GDSA Framework, for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media.
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April 2025 Semiannual Composite Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) Results
The aqueous waste from the Salt Waste Processing Facility is sampled semiannually for transfers to the Saltstone Production Facility. Salt solution is treated at the Saltstone Production Facility and disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility. Per request of customer, X-TTR-Z-00027, Revision 0, one Saltstone Disposal Facility waste form was prepared at Savannah River National Laboratory using the Salt Waste Processing Facility Decontaminated Salt Solution and Z-area premix material for the April 2025 semiannual Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure sample. The sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash (referred to as the “Cement-Free grout sample”). Results from the technical report support Task 2: ‘Grout Leaching Analyses’ of the Task Technical Request prepared by Savannah River Mission Completion. At 43 days cured, the Saltstone sample was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure. The April 2025 semiannual Cement-Free grout sample met the South Carolina Code of Regulations for Hazardous Waste Management Regulations 61-79.261.24 and 61-79.268.48 requirements for a non-hazardous waste form with respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents, and met the Saltstone Production Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria that was in effect at the time of the sample collection at the Salt Waste Processing Facility.
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Case Narrative for Analytical Results for Three Samples Associated with the Remote-Handled Transuranic Fuel Sample Waste Generated at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
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Tank 14H Preliminary Cease Waste Removal Sample Analyses
Savannah River Mission Completion Waste Removal and Tank Closure requested that Savannah River National Laboratory perform characterization analyses of Tank 14H in support of closure activities, specifically preliminary cease waste removal. This report provides important characterization of the prepared filtrate and air-dried solids in the January 2026 Tank 14H sample, HTF-14-26-1,2,3,4,5,6, for I-129, Tc-99, Cs-137, and Sr-90. The results reported here were utilized by SRMC to declare preliminary cease waste removal for Tank 14H.
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GPS-Based Gamma Survey for Characterizing and Decommissioning NORM Sites - 20389
Gamma survey techniques are an especially powerful decommissioning tool at naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) sites due to both the low cost to obtain data over a large spatial scale and the abundance of gamma emitters in the uranium and thorium decay series. Gamma surveys are executed by coupling a detector - most often a sodium iodide crystal - to a global positioning system (GPS), then reporting a location and gross gamma reading coincidentally to a data logger. Systems may be carried by workers or mounted to a car, all-terrain vehicle, or unmanned aerial system (UAS). The resulting data set provides a high-resolution but low precision map of the gamma radiation field over the area surveyed. Frequently this map is also correlated to soil concentrations of NORM radionuclides (most often, Ra-226) and/or exposure rate. Gamma survey parameters such as movement speed, transect spacing, and data logging frequency define the spatial resolution of the resulting surface, and can be optimized depending on the desired survey sensitivity. This paper examines gamma survey as a tool for decommissioning NORM sites and provides an overview of current gamma survey technology designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the decommissioning process. Topics to be discussed in the paper include: - An overview of gamma survey systems, and the utility of different delivery vehicles depending on desired cost, desired spatial resolution, and site topography. - The influence of physical detector characteristics on detection sensitivity and survey planning. - The tradeoff between high-resolution and large spatial extent, but inherently uncertain data, and low-resolution, low spatial extent, but highly certain data, as well as the specific utility of each of these types of data during NORM facility decommissioning. - Confounding variables that may limit the utility of gamma survey at some sites (e.g., radon gas and spatial heterogeneity / hot spots), and methods to plan for and control these conditions. Results show that the confounding variables, such as radon and data output can greatly influence the overall data quality associated with the decommissioning process. In addition, the use of real-time and aerial survey platforms provides a method for ensuring proper spatial extent of the data. When applied thoughtfully, gamma survey is a powerful tool for detecting NORM radionuclides in the environment and a cost-effective technique for identifying areas requiring remediation. However, entities performing or using gamma survey as a decommissioning tool must be aware of both its advantages and its limitations before basing remediation or regulatory action on gamma survey results. (authors)
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Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460
Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)
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Aerosol Measurement from Plasma Arc Torch Cuts on Various Metal for D and D Workers' Internal Dose Calculation - 20253
When dismantling a nuclear power plant, structures must be cut to reduce size. The cutting of radioactive material produces radioactive aerosols, which pose a health risk including radiation risk to site workers and the general public. However, due to a lack of research on the physical and chemical characteristics of aerosols produced in these processes, the calculation of internal dose in the event of an expected or unexpected accident is inaccurate. For the measurement of aerosols generated from cutting for internal dose calculations, we measured the number concentration distribution and nuclide distribution of aerosols from plasma arc cutting in a laboratory experimental setup, considering isokinetic sampling and automatic cutting. The results may suggest internal dose assessment without characteristics of radioactive aerosol has uncertainty and the possibility of being undervalued. (authors)
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The Nature and State of Groundwater Contamination at the Nevada National Security Site: What Have We Learned from Decades of Groundwater Analysis? - 20337
The regulatory framework for remediating radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is based on a combination of characterization and modeling studies, monitoring, and institutional controls [1]. Currently, tritium is the largest contributor (∼90%) to the estimated 44.6 million-curie radionuclide inventory resulting from underground testing [2]. Because of its short half-life (12.32 years), its relative contribution reduces below 10% of the total radiologic inventory over the next 120 years as a result of radioactive decay. Although tritium levels are observed well above the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) in groundwater, other radionuclides are well below their MCLs except within the nuclear test near-field (nuclear test cavity and chimney) environment. In fact, most device-derived radionuclides are below their MCL in groundwater even in samples collected from this near-field environment. The distribution of radionuclides following the nuclear detonation greatly influences the availability of potential contaminants for groundwater transport. Tritium is initially distributed in the gas phase, later as tritiated water in steam, and finally as liquid water, and is available to groundwater transport away from the near-field environment. Other radionuclides that are mobile in groundwater are {sup 14}C, {sup 36}Cl, {sup 99}Tc, and {sup 129}I though their radiologic inventory is small when compared to tritium. Many radionuclides (e.g. U, Pu, Am) are incorporated to a significant extent into the melt glass at the bottom of the cavity and are accessible to groundwater primarily through the slow process of glass dissolution. These radionuclides are also adsorbed to the surfaces of the crushed rock within the cavity and chimney which limits their migration in groundwater. Although colloid facilitated transport of radionuclides at the NNSS has been observed [3], radionuclide concentrations decrease with time and migration distances due to desorption and colloid filtration processes. Current studies indicate that radionuclides associated with colloids are unlikely to migrate downgradient from NNSS underground nuclear tests at concentrations above the SDWA MCL [4][5]. The results of over 50 years of sampling, along with an understanding of these post detonation processes, indicate that tritium is the only contaminant of concern downgradient of testing and that even tritium will not exceed its MCL in groundwater after ∼120 years. Although other longer-lived radionuclides may continue to be released slowly from the near-field environment they will likely never reach levels exceeding their MCLs in groundwater downgradient of the NNSS. Groundwater monitoring will continue to verify these observations. (authors)
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Soil Desiccation Treatability Testing at BC Waste Disposal Cribs
During Hanford’s production period, low-level waste products generated from chemical processing of uranium fuel rods were discharged directly to the ground through a system of cribs and trenches located in the 200-BC-1 Operable Unit (OU). The site consists of 6 cribs and 20 trenches that received more than 117,000 m3 of radioactive liquid waste discharged to the soil. These unlined infiltration galleries held volumes of liquid waste while it seeped into the ground, with the understanding that the 100 m (330 ft) thick vadose zone in the area would effectively capture the effluent and prevent groundwater impacts. A conceptual model showing the operation of cribs and trenches is shown in Figure 1. Data show effluent from the 26 cribs and trenches containing about 410 curies of Technetium-99 (Tc-99) is primarily located between 30 m and 70 m (98 ft and 230 ft) depth (Corbin et al., 2005; Ward et al., 2004). Despite no evidence indicating that the contamination has reached the groundwater at BC cribs and trenches, the mobility of Tc-99 had been demonstrated in laboratory tests and was recognized as a threat to groundwater at the site. Using data from numerical models, laboratory analyses, field investigations, and information on historical discharges, the EPA and Ecology identified Tc-99 and U contamination of the vadose zone as a remediation priority. The U.S. DOE was notified by EPA and Ecology regarding risks associated with Tc-99 contamination in a letter requesting development of a strategy for improved methods to understand the nature and extent of vadose zone contamination, specifically Tc-99, and to develop remedial options for addressing such contamination. To develop the appropriate technology for characterizing, remediating, and monitoring the deep vadose zone Tc-99 contamination, the U.S. DOE worked with the EPA and Ecology to create a Treatability Test Plan under a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) for the Hanford 200 Areas. Under this RI/FS, it was determined that a treatability test for soil desiccation should be carried out as it was identified as a promising in-situ treatment technology for mitigating risks posed by Tc-99 contamination to the groundwater table. The BC Cribs and Trenches site was identified as a representative site for Tc-99 and U contamination and selected for the soil desiccation treatability test. In this chapter, we summarize the overlying regulatory framework of RI/FS and treatability tests and illustrate how development and experimentation supported the evaluation of selected remedies. We briefly discuss the RI/FS for the 200 Areas of the Hanford Site and focus on the soil desiccation treatability testing performed at the BC cribs and trenches site under the Deep Vadose Zone Treatability Test Plan for the Hanford Central Plateau (DVZ-TT). The DVZ-TT is one component of the remedial investigation/feasibility study for the Hanford 200 Areas and represents the underlying regulatory framework that drives site operations towards records of decision and site closure.
Mangel, Adam R.↗
Complex Waste Streams and Legacy Environmental Liabilities at Idaho National Laboratory
Overview of phased approach for development of alternate treatment options for legacy environmental liabilities and successes in support of eliminating liabilities now and in the future.
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