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At least 1,207 records · Page 67
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Runtime Monitoring with R2U2 for Aircraft Systems with Neural Networks

R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit) is a hardware-supported tool and framework for real-time system monitoring and software health management of cyber-physical systems. During system operation, R2U2 continuously monitors properties about safety, performance, and security of the vehicle and its vital components and can perform diagnostic reasoning. Efficient observers for past-time and future-time Metric Temporal Logic, fast reasoners for Bayesian Networks, and model-based prognostics algorithms are key components of R2U2 and designed for minimal computational footprint. R2U2 has been implemented in software supporting ROS, NASA's cFS/cFE, and Simulink and as an FPGA configuration. The synergistic combination of monitors and observers in R2U2 makes it possible to design powerful models for system runtime monitoring, diagnostics, software health management, prognostics, and security monitoring. In this presentation, I will give a detailed overview of the R2U2 architecture and its features and will discuss the application of R2U2 for safety-monitoring of a neural-network based autonomous centerline tracking system (ACT) for autonomous aircraft.

Runtime Monitoring↗
DOE OSTI2020

Enhance indigenous agricultural systems to reduce migration

Changes in social and environmental conditions in the Western Highlands of Guatemala undermine food security and job opportunities. Here, we describe how targeted assistance can build upon traditional agricultural systems to increase adaptive capacity, improve nutrition, provide jobs and thereby reduce pressures to migrate.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Design of Stand-Alone Cryomodule based on Superconducting Quarter-Wave Resonator

Present superconducting accelerators require a central refrigeration system and piping to distribute liquid helium and nitrogen. Stand-alone cryocooler-based systems are of significant interest both to scientific and industrial customers, as they allow applications at facilities where no cryogenic equipment and expertise exists, where it is undesirable to develop additional cryogenic systems, or where a mobile system that can be transported between beamlines or facilities is required. The technical challenge of this approach is to minimize the heat losses to the liquid helium so that commercially available, self-contained cryocoolers are able to handle the thermal load. This paper presents an improved design for a stand-alone quarter-wave resonator (QWR) cryomodule a based on commercially available cryocoolers. This cryomodule has a particular application in the ATLAS intensity upgrade project where it will house a 72.75 MHz QWR for beam energy adjustments to experimental areas, where no helium cryogenic systems exist. The described cryomodule may also be the critical part of a turnkey system with application to material processing, semiconductor manufacturing, food irradiation and homeland security. The development of low heat loss peripheral components reduces cost and widens applicability of the system. We will discuss the cryomodule and RF coupler designs, including numerical thermal and structural analyses.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
NASA NTRS2022

The Mars 2020 Ground Data System Architecture

The Mars 2020 Mission’s primary objective is to collect 20 geographically unique samples during its prime mission of one and a quarter Martian years, or just over 2 Earth years. Mission planners determined the project needed to develop a system that would enable the operations team to analyze engineering and science data, make science decisions, select viable rover targets at a millimeter resolution and validate an uplink bundle for a car sized rover with more complex science instruments than any previous Mars surface mission. All this had to be done within a five hour time frame. Doing this with a small team would be a challenge, but this had to be accomplished by a large team of engineers and scientists located across North America and Europe. Achieving this level of operational efficiency was unheard of in the prime mission. In addition, the mission had another set of requirements that had nothing to do with surface operations; the Mars 2020 Ground Data System (GDS) was also expected to comply with a new set of security requirements to keep up with the ever changing cybersecurity landscape. The Mars 2020 Ground Data System (GDS) is a re-architected version of the Mars Science Laboratory GDS. The primary goal was to integrate the lessons learned from previous Mars surface missions, accommodate a set of new requirements and capabilities required to ensure mission success, and comply with a new set of cybersecurity controls. The new architecture includes several unique qualities including a data lake, language-agnostic system-wide event-based operations, containerization, automated deployment, network segmentation, infrastructure-as-code, API-driven interfaces, and the first Mars surface GDS to operate primarily in the cloud. The new architecture enabled greater access to the system’s data, tighter integration with the operations team, and a higher level of traceability. The availability of the data also enabled a new set of capabilities previously not possible on surface missions. These new capabilities include an autonomous data to information, pipeline for downlink analysis, horizontal scaling of science data processing capabilities, autonomous round trip data tracking of science and engineering data, integration of flight system state into the tactical planning cycle, high fidelity targeting utilizing kinematic data, and hierarchical image and 3d meshes data representations. This paper will introduce the requirements for the Mars 2020 Mission, the heritage architecture, and the rationale for the changes to achieve the new architecture. The paper will continue to describe the fundamental changes made to the GDS architecture, how these changes enabled a more tightly integrated GDS, and the new capabilities that were enabled by the new architecture. The paper will conclude with the lessons learned from the process of rearchitecting a heritage GDS system and from the first 200 days of operations supporting over 800 users from around the world.

Lopez-Roig, Reynaldo↗
DOE OSTI2025

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Standards, Certification, and Best Practices for DERs

Distributed energy resources (DERs) are becoming increasingly important to the electric grid, including solar energy systems. However, DERs also introduce new cybersecurity risks, including those posed by cloud computing. Standards harmonization is essential for ensuring that DERs are secure and can be safely integrated into the grid. This panel will discuss cyber standards harmonization for solar security. The panel will feature experts from the S2G Program, National Labs and Industry who will discuss the following topics: the cybersecurity risks and future benefits posed by ubiquitous solar energy systems, the development and implementation of cloud-based security solutions for DERs, including solar energy systems, the challenges and opportunities for harmonizing DER cybersecurity standards, and Cyber Informed Engineering and the solar security implementations The panel will also discuss the following specific initiatives: the S2G Program's DER Cybersecurity Framework, UL's DER Cybersecurity Certification Program, and IEEE 1547 Updates. The panel will conclude with a discussion of the future of standards harmonization for DER cybersecurity.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIMES THROUGH CONTINUOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES

As Member States plan, implement, and ultimately sustain their nuclear security regimes, human resource development supporting these regimes are paramount. Human resource development broadly includes programs addressing education, training, and knowledge management. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Implementing Guide, Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime, highlights the importance of national-level support for assigning resources that help ensure States are able to develop and retain sufficient human resources in the short, medium, and long term. Determining the resources needed to support education, training, and knowledge management is not an easy task, and knowledge management is a practice often overlooked when States plan for and allocate human resources for a nuclear security regime. The paper highlights the importance of implementing knowledge management practices as part of sustaining a nuclear security regime. Given the availability of secure web-based knowledge management tools, a nuclear security human resource development program should not depend solely on direct human interactions. To that end, the paper will offer an approach for planning and implementing a knowledge management system by using the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Knowledge Management Website as a case study. This example offers useful lessons learned for States considering or actively developing their own nuclear security knowledge management efforts and human resource development.

Tremonte, Matthew M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Ramping Up the Ramping Capability: India's Power System Transition

The Indian power system is going through a period of transformation with plans for renewable energy to be integrated at a large scale over the next decade. Increasing thrust is being given to flexible operation of existing generating resources. Ramping is one of the key attributes of flexibility. With implementation of national level security constrained economic dispatch (SCED), the national power system operator of India (POSOCO) has started to observe occasional constraints in ramping capability obtained from generators under SCED, which could get further aggravated with more variable renewable energy (VRE). This paper focuses on complexities of ramping and the challenges with high shares of renewables in the Indian context.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Security Assessment of an LBP16-Protocol-Based Computer Numerical Control Machine

Subtractive manufacturing systems, specifically, computer numerical control machines, have revolutionized the manufacturing industry. Computer numerical control machining is the preferred method for producing finished parts due to its efficiency, speed and suitability for high-volume production. Securing computer numerical control machines is a priority. Compromises or disruptions of these machines can result in significant downtime, loss of productivity and financial loss. This study examines the vulnerabilities and risks associated with computer numerical control machines, in particular, systems utilizing the LBP16 protocol for controller-machine communications. The study reveals that an adversary can execute cyber-physical attacks such as sabotage and denial of service. The potential security threats emphasize the importance of implementing robust security measures to mitigate the cyber risks to computer numerical control machines.

Forihat, Yahya [Virginia Commonwealth University, ↗
DOE OSTI2026

Integrating science for water security governance

Hydrological extremes are intensifying globally, increasing the complexity of decisions required to ensure water security. Advances in hydrological science, modeling, and data systems have expanded the technical frontier of water research, yet uptake of scientific insights in policy and management decisions remains limited. This persistent science–policy gap is not primarily a failure of knowledge generation or robustness, but an institutional challenge shaped by how scientific and governance systems are organized, coordinated, and connected to support the effective use of scientific knowledge. These challenges are particularly pronounced in multi-level and transboundary water governance, where decisions span jurisdictions and require coordination across institutional and political boundaries. We synthesize research at the science–policy interface and evidence from water security initiatives to show how institutional arrangements, scientific tool development, and research practices enable or constrain the sustained use of scientific knowledge in water-security governance processes. Building on these insights, we develop ‘shared decision infrastructure’ as a framing to describe how scientific knowledge is embedded within the institutional, relational, and procedural arrangements that connect science to decision-making processes over time. We translate this framing into a practical intervention roadmap centered on institutional design, tool translation, sustained co-production, and outcome-oriented evaluation to support the integration of science into ongoing governance processes. By positioning science as shared decision infrastructure, the roadmap clarifies how researchers can design scientific efforts that support more coordinated, accountable, and adaptive water security decisions amid deepening uncertainty.

M whitney, Kristen [NASA Goddard Space Flight Cent↗
DOE OSTI2020

PMU and Communication Infrastructure Restoration for Post-Attack Observability Recovery of Power Grids

This paper is concerned about recovering the observability of cyber-physical power grids after massive cyber attacks, which helps to achieve the cyber-physical resilience of the grids. For recovering the observability of the grid, the measurability of the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and the connectivity of the communication network are needed to be restored. The PMU and communication infrastructure restoration problem is jointly formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) problem to minimize the observability loss of the grid over time after a cyber attack while considering the constraint of limited resources. The efficacy of the proposed optimal restoration strategy is verified by comparing with heuristic methods on the IEEE 57-bus system.

cyber security↗
NASA NTRS1978

Generalized environmental control and life support system computer program (G1894), phase 3

The work performed during Phase 3 of the Generalized Environmental Control Life Support System (ECLSS) Computer Program is reported. Phase 3 of this program covered the period from December 1977 to September 1978. The computerized simulation of the Shuttle Orbiter ECLSS was upgraded in the following areas: (1) the payload loop of the Shuttle simulation was completely recoded and checked out; (2) the Shuttle simulation water and freon loop initialization logic was simplified to permit easier program input for the user; (3) the computerized simulation was modified to accept the WASP subroutine, which is a subroutine to evaluate thermal properties of water and freon; (4) the 1108 operating system was upgraded by LEC; (5) the Shuttle simulation was modified to permit failure cases which simulate zero component flow values; and (6) the Shuttle SEPS version was modified and secure files were setup on the 1108 and 1110 systems to permit simulation runs to be made from remote terminals.

Mcenulty, R. E.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2021

Pulsar Based Timing for Grid Synchronization

Existing synchronization systems in the power grid, such as the global positioning system, are susceptible to temporary or permanent failures due to various unpredictable and uncontrollable factors such as cyber-attack and electromagnetic interferences, thus affecting the accuracy and reliability of generated timing signal. In this article, a pulsar astronomy-based timing system is proposed to provide an alternative synchronization signal. Further, this clock will offer significant security improvements to power grid applications, such as a wide-area monitoring system, which depends on a precise timing signal. The hardware and software frameworks are described in detail. First, a high-speed sampling hardware platform is designed to collect signals from radio telescopes. Then a periodic pulse extraction method with three steps is proposed to process the pulsar signal, including polyphase filterbanks, incoherent de-dispersion, and sliding window folding. Lastly, three experiments are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the frameworks. The generated pulsar timing pulse is presented, and the factors affecting its accuracy are also discussed. The analysis results demonstrate that the pulsar signals can provide high-accurate timing pulses for grid synchronization.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Empowering Critical Infrastructure Communication with Secure 5G Private Networks

With the transformational New Radio- Unlicensed (NR-U), 5G network can be operated with unlicensed and shared spectrum. Private 5G networks without any licensed bands, which are both highly expensive and usually available to only large commercial wireless providers, can now be used for a whole range of new applications including smart factories, warehouses, connected cars and drones. 5G’s support of a) massive machine type communication (mMTC) for a large number of connected devices with b) ultra-reliable low latency communication (URLLC) capability when needed, and c) up to 20 times higher data rate with enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) than previously available, enables new and powerful capabilities in a wireless network. While these capabilities are transformational, necessary security and reliability requirements have to be satisfied when used in critical infrastructure such as factories, power plants, water systems, ports, and other industrial facilities. 5G standards have introduced significant security improvement over 4G/LTE as well as mitigations for new attack surfaces created by changes in the 5G network. This talk will discuss these security improvements and whether they meet the security properties required for mission critical communication over wireless.

5G↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Trilevel Model for Segmentation of the Power Transmission Grid Cyber Network

Network segmentation of a power grid's communication system can make the grid more resilient to cyberattacks. Here we develop a novel trilevel programming model to optimally segment a grid communication system, taking into account the actions of an information technology (IT) administrator, attacker, and grid operator. The IT administrator is allowed to segment existing networks, and the attacker is given a budget to inflict damage on the grid by attacking the segmented communication system. Finally, the grid operator can redispatch the grid after the attack to minimize damage. The resulting problem is a trilevel interdiction problem that we solve using a branch and bound algorithm for bilevel problems. We demonstrate the benefits of optimal network segmentation through case studies on the 9-bus Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) system and the 30-bus IEEE system. These examples illustrate that network segmentation can significantly reduce the threat posed by a cyberattacker.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Engineering Against Digital Risk in CIP Applications: Cyber-Informed Engineering Use Cases

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This presentation discusses engineered controls of 7 categories and the CIE database of controls that provides clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Digital Twin Technology for Safety, Security, and Training in Spent Nuclear Fuel Handling

The increasing complexity of spent nuclear fuel handling requires significant resources to ensure safety, security, and personnel training. As nuclear facilities have continued to advance in scale and technology, the integration of digital tools has become indispensable. Among these tools, digital twins, which are virtual models of physical systems, are emerging as invaluable tools for enhancing safety protocols, security measures, and training in the nuclear sector. These models were conceptualized in the Industry 4.0 revolution. Digital twins can process data from physical systems in real time (by using sensors), include multiple code packages to enable simulations of different physics applications, and even implement artificial intelligence or machine learning techniques for advanced data processing. Despite the advantages that digital twins provide, challenges still exist regarding their widespread implementation. For instance, data used by a digital twin must be accurate to ensure that the digital twin is accurately tuned. Furthermore, if insecure digital twins are targeted by hackers, then they can pose serious risks to the security and safety of nuclear facilities.

Digital twins↗