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At least 1,207 records · Page 67

Ransomware Security Threat Modeling for Photovoltaic Systems

Ransomware attacks are one of the most dangerous cyber-attacks which can disrupt the operation of photovoltaic (PV) systems and incur an enormous economic loss. This paper introduces a ransomware security threat modeling method that identifies potential vulnerabilities, threats, and impacts of ransomware attacks targeting a PV system. Here, the security threat modeling consists of three steps: 1) system identification, 2) threat modeling that finds existing vulnerabilities, 3) attack modeling that designs attack profiles to succeed ransomware attacks, and 4) penetration testing that performs authorized cyber-attacks and analyzes impacts of the ransomware attack profiles using a real-time hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) PV system security testbed.

attack modeling↗

Draft Methodology for Cybersecurity Analysis for Adoption of Wireless Technology in Nuclear Power Plants

The report is delivered as DOE-NE Cybersecurity Program Milestone M2CT-22IN1104014-Industry cybersecurity guidance adoption status. The milestone is specifically to document the process and the status of the efforts towards developing guidance in support of industry’s adoption of wireless communication technologies. To transform the operation of nuclear power plants, including domestic light-water reactors, advanced reactors, microreactors, and fission battery, for grid and non-grid applications, secure and resilient wireless capabilities are required. In addition, to realize new operational concepts such as autonomous operation and remote monitoring, advanced sensor, and instrumentation, wireless technology is essential. However, industry implementation is low, and there is no technical basis for how to understand and address potential risks for wireless communications for critical plant functions. A methodology with a technical basis for implementing secure wireless communication is crucial. This wireless adoption methodology is intended to assist a licensee in identifying an appropriate technological approach for securing wireless communications in nuclear power plant. However, this methodology does not provide guidance for addressing wireless design criteria or for addressing all the cybersecurity commitments in licensees’ cybersecurity plans (CSPs) including addressing security impact analysis that a licensee must perform before an update to a Critical Digital Asset (CDA). This methodology guides a licensee through a process of evaluating a proposed wireless implementation and drafting a plant change notification for an example use case. The example is a generic/nonproprietary version of the first test case of the methodology, which, if successfully implemented, is part of the consideration for protecting other functions’ use of wireless in a cybersecure manner.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Conceptual Evaluation for the Installation of Treatment Capability for Mixed Low Level Waste at the Nevada National Security Site

National Security Technologies, LLC, initiated an evaluation of treatment technologies that they would manage and operate as part of the mixed low-level waste (MLLW) disposal facilities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The NNSS Disposal Facility has been receiving radioactive waste from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex since the 1960s, and since 2005 the NNSS Disposal Facility has been receiving radioactive and MLLW for disposal only. In accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), all mixed waste must meet land disposal restrictions (LDRs) prior to disposal. Compliance with LDRs is attained through treatment of the waste to mitigate the characteristics of the listed waste hazard. Presently, most generators utilize commercial capacity for waste treatment prior to shipment to the NNSS Disposal Facility. The objectives of this evaluation are to provide a conceptual study of waste treatment needs (i.e., demand), identify potential waste treatment technologies to meet demand, and analyze implementation considerations for initiating MLLW treatment capacity at the NNSS Disposal Facility. A review of DOE complex waste generation forecast data indicates that current and future Departmental demand for mixed waste treatment capacity will remain steady and strong. Analysis and screening of over 30 treatment technologies narrowed the field of treatment technologies to four: • Macroencapsulation • Stabilization/microencapsulation • Sort and segregation • Bench-scale mercury amalgamation The analysis of treatment technologies also considered existing permits, current the NNSS Disposal Facility infrastructure such as utilities and procedures, and past experiences such as green-light and red-light lessons learned. A schedule duration estimate has been developed for permitting, design, and construction of onsite treatment capability at the NNSS Disposal Facility. Treatment capability can be ready in 20 months.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Geologic Assessment and Recommended New Well Locations to Improve the Area 25 Potable Water System, Nevada National Security Site

The Mission Support and Test Services, LLC (MSTS) Geoscience Operations Group performed a hydrogeologic study of an area of interest in Area 25 at the request of the MSTS Enterprise Infrastructure Program to identify potential locations for a new water well to replace J-14 Water Well (J-14 WW). Based on limited subsurface hydrogeologic data for the area, geologists developed two options for construction of a new well. Option 1 is to construct the well within approximately 250 feet (ft) of J-14 WW, and Option 2 is to construct the well approximately 1,550 ft north of J-11 Water Well (J-11 WW). Option 1 may be preferred, as the hydrogeology is better understood adjacent to an existing well. A well drilled at the Option 2 location would not have to be as deep as that at the Option 1 location, but the hydrogeologic setting is more uncertain at this greater distance from a verified subsurface geologic data point.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Monitor and Control of the Deep-Space network via Secure Web

(view graph) NASA lead center for robotic space exploration. Operating division of Caltech/Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Current missions, Voyagers, Galileo, Pathfinder, Global Surveyor. Upcoming missions, Cassini, Mars and New Millennium.

Deep-Space Network communications NCP Data Managem↗

Secure Autonomous Automated Scheduling (SAAS)

This report describes network-centric operations, where a virtual mission operations center autonomously receives sensor triggers, and schedules space and ground assets using Internet-based technologies and service-oriented architectures. For proof-of-concept purposes, sensor triggers are received from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to determine targets for space-based sensors. The Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) Disaster Monitoring Constellation satellite, the UK-DMC, is used as the space-based sensor. The UK-DMC's availability is determined via machine-to-machine communications using SSTL's mission planning system. Access to/from the UK-DMC for tasking and sensor data is via SSTL's and Universal Space Network's (USN) ground assets. The availability and scheduling of USN's assets can also be performed autonomously via machine-to-machine communications. All communication, both on the ground and between ground and space, uses open Internet standards

Walke, Jon G.↗

Facilitation of Third-party Development of Advanced Algorithms for Explosive Detection Using Workshops and Grand Challenges

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has requirements for future explosive detection scanners that include dealing with a larger number of threats, higher probability of detection, lower false alarm rates and lower operating costs. One tactic that DHS is pursuing to achieve these requirements is to augment the capabilities of the established security vendors with third-party algorithm developers. The purposes of this presentation are to review DHS's objectives for involving third parties in the development of advanced algorithms and then to discuss how these objectives are achieved using workshops and grand challenges. Terrorists are still trying and they are getting more sophisticated. There is a need to increase the number of smart people working on homeland security. Augmenting capabilities and capacities of system vendors with third-parties is one tactic. Third parties can be accessed via workshops and grand challenges. Successes have been achieved to date. There are issues that need to be resolved to further increase third party involvement.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Cyber Resilience and Social Equity: Twin Pillars of a Sustainable Energy Future

This paper examines the intersection of security and accessibility within energy systems amidst the rise of grid modernization and digitization, especially considering the regulatory changes and the imperatives of inclusive energy strategies. It addresses the dual need for secure, resilient infrastructure and a commitment to mitigate energy poverty while maintaining equitable access to energy. Amid escalating cybersecurity and physical threats, the paper advocates for sustainable energy delivery systems that ensure robust defenses without compromising the goals of reducing energy poverty and ensuring energy security. This paper identifies the pressing need for Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and Secure-by-Design (SbD) principles, highlighting how these strategies can protect critical infrastructure and democratize access to secure energy, particularly for disadvantaged communities. The analysis underscores the challenges presented by the expansion of attack surfaces, interoperability requirements, and grid-edge analytics, offering innovative solutions that leverage advanced technologies and data-driven insights. Furthermore, this paper addresses the workforce development gap, emphasizing the necessity for public-private partnerships and vendor engagement in creating a skilled cybersecurity workforce. This paper has a dual focus on both the technological aspect of cybersecurity and the social dimension of equity within the context of sustainable energy development. It suggests a comprehensive examination of how these two critical elements interact and support the overarching goal of a sustainable energy future.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Integrated Solutions for Optimized Performance (ISOP) Final Technical Report

The goal of this project was to demonstrate technical feasibility of an integrated approach for deep energy retrofits by packaging innovative technologies with smart communicating controls that represent the next generation of energy efficiency. The integrated solutions for optimized performance (ISOP) package integrates (i) advanced lighting and plug load controls; (ii) intelligent daylight harvesting through automated self-powered shades and window films; (iii) advanced HVAC controls sequences (ASHRAE Guideline (GDL) 36); and (iv) fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) and continuous commissioning (CCx) using advanced analytics. These technologies address energy use across multiple building end uses that represent more than 60% of the energy consumption in all commercial buildings. The project was structured to be implemented over three budget periods: Budget Period 1 scope included site selection, project design, site-specific customization of technology packages, procurement of technologies, initiation of installation of technologies, the development of a measurement and verification plan and collection of pre-retrofit data collection. The first year go/no-go decision was based on securing host sites representing 250,000 sq. ft. of occupied operational spaces, savings analysis, technology procurement and initiation of installation. Budget Period 2 planned to complete technology installations and initiate data collection of post-retrofit performance data. The second year go/no-go was to be the completion of technology installations and commissioning, metering and data collecting to support the requirements laid out in site specific M&V plans. Budget Period 3 planned to collect and analyze post-retrofit performance data and provide data and reporting to support energy efficiency rebate programs. After the team completed activities planned for Budget Period 1, the team reached a Go/No-Go Decision Point. At that point, TRC recommended that DOE discontinue the project without prejudice due to challenges with securing demonstration sites to meet the full 250,000 sf of occupied operational spaces and DOE concurred. In Budget Period 1, the TRC team developed criteria to recruit and evaluate potential demonstration host sites. TRC worked with Princeton University, the project demonstration partner, to identify buildings on their campus as potential candidates for the demonstration. Following the selection of demonstration sites, the TRC team customized energy technology packages according to the needs and characteristics of each site. TRC defined technology specifications, identified vendors, and conducted analysis to estimate energy and cost savings potential. The project team then developed schedules for technology procurement processes and scheduled for installation at all selected demonstration sites. The project team worked with Princeton University and DOE to develop an approach to verify energy savings achieved through measurement and verification (M&V) 2.0 methods. Princeton University initiated open bids to procure the necessary materials and installation contractors. Bid results came back higher than estimates due to a couple of factors – lack of familiarity of the bidders with the proposed technologies and lack of local trained installers to execute the installation of these new measures. Due to the higher bids, projects no longer met the internal cost-effectiveness criteria used by Princeton to proceed with procurement of the full suite of technologies as proposed in ISOP. Princeton had already procured parts of the ISOP package as part of a campus-wide initiative for FDD and lighting retrofits, but with the higher costs for other ISOP components, Princeton could no longer commit to the full ISOP package on the selected sites. Based on this, the team reached the Go/No-Go decision point, where they decided not to proceed with the project. Princeton is separately installing portions of the ISOP package where they individually meet Princeton’s payback criteria but on a different schedule than would have been needed for the DOE ISOP project. The team has learned several lessons from project progress in the first budget period. The team will utilize these lessons in future projects, as should any team which proceeds with a project around the ISOP technology. The first lesson is that more information about the proposed sites is required earlier in the process (perhaps even at the proposal stage) in order to have a successful demonstration. Technical details not evident earlier in the process (such as the TLED limitations for ALCS) can derail project execution. The second lesson is that pricing of emerging technologies is highly variable due to lack of familiarity of local installers and distributor with the proposed technologies as well as alternate bids using products they were more familiar with, but that cost more than the ones proposed by TRC. Finally, the last major lesson is that the host site’s internal project criteria is of critical importance. Based on these higher installed costs and lack of an informed installer base for the products proposed for this project, the project does not meet Princeton’s simple payback goals of five years.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Exponential Backoff and Its Security Implications for Safety-Critical OT Protocols over TCP/IP Networks

The convergence of Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) networks has become increasingly prevalent with the growth of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications. This shift, while enabling enhanced automation, remote monitoring, and data sharing, also introduces new challenges related to communication latency and cybersecurity. Oftentimes, legacy OT protocols were adapted to the TCP/IP stack without an extensive review of the ramifications to their robustness, performance, or safety objectives. To further accommodate the IT/OT convergence, protocol gateways were introduced to facilitate the migration from serial protocols to TCP/IP protocol stacks within modern IT/OT infrastructure. However, they often introduce additional vulnerabilities by exposing traditionally isolated protocols to external threats. This study investigates the security and reliability implications of migrating serial protocols to TCP/IP stacks and the impact of protocol gateways, utilizing two widely used OT protocols: Modbus TCP and DNP3. Our protocol analysis finds a significant safety-critical vulnerability resulting from this migration, and our subsequent tests clearly demonstrate its presence and impact. A multi-tiered testbed, consisting of both physical and emulated components, is used to evaluate protocol performance and the effects of device-specific implementation flaws. Through this analysis of specifications and behaviors during communication interruptions, we identify critical differences in fault handling and the impact on time-sensitive data delivery. The findings highlight how reliance on lower-level IT protocols can undermine OT system resilience, and they inform the development of mitigation strategies to enhance the robustness of industrial communication networks.

DNP3↗

Test & Measurement System Security in an IT World

Automated test and measurement systems are coming under increased cybersecurity scrutiny. Most of these systems fall under the “Operational Technology” designation, as defined by NIST, and often have unique requirements that conflict with enterprise security policy. These systems are typically not well understood by traditional enterprise IT personnel, which leaves them ill-supported or invalidated.▪This presentation attempts to help Test System owners recognize the security landscape, determine their unique system requirements and concerns, and negotiate a peer-level working arrangement with an existing IT department while maintaining a NIST-recommended level of autonomy and sovereignty.

automated test↗

INL Control System Situational Awareness Technology Annual Report 2012

The overall goal of this project is to develop an interoperable set of tools to provide a comprehensive, consistent implementation of cyber security and overall situational awareness of control and sensor network implementations. The operation and interoperability of these tools will fill voids in current technological offerings and address issues that remain an impediment to the security of control systems. This report provides an FY 2012 update on the Sophia, Mesh Mapper, Intelligent Cyber Sensor, and Data Fusion projects with respect to the year-two tasks and annual reporting requirements of the INL Control System Situational Awareness Technology report (July 2010).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Securing and Auto-Synchronizing Communication over Free-Space Optics Using Quantum Key Distribution and Chaotic Systems

Free-Space Optical (FSO) communication provides very large bandwidth, relatively low cost, low power, low mass of implementation, and improved security when compared to conventional Free-Space Radio-Frequency (FSRF) systems. In this paper, we demonstrate a communication protocol that demonstrates improved security and longer-range FSO communication, compared to existing FSO security techniques, such as N-slit interferometers. The protocol integrates chaotic communications with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) techniques. A Lorenz chaotic system, which is inherently secure and auto-synchronized, is utilized for secure data communications over a classical channel, while QKD is used to exchange crucial chaotic system parameters over a secure quantum channel. We also provide a concept of operations for a NASA mission combining chaotic communications and QKD operating synergistically in an end-to-end space communications link. The experimental simulation results and analysis are favorable towards our approach.

Chaotic Communication↗

LLNL Macroscopic Anisotropic Explosives Research at INL National Security Test Range - Test Results

A select team of 23 engineers, scientists, and explosives specialists from LLNL, LANL, INL, and Marine Raiders from Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) assembled during the second week of November at the INL National Security Test Range near Idaho Falls to investigate and demonstrate fundamental principles of explosives anisotropy. Today's explosives are isotropic in their detonation performance. That is, no matter what direction a detonation runs through bulk explosive, the performance is the same; whereas, anisotropic explosives exhibit different performance, depending on which direction the detonation wave moves through the explosive. The ANISO Team worked in subfreezing temperatures on the Snake River Plain, carrying out 55 experimental explosives shots in four days that lead to a clear understanding of the performance and behavior of an assembly of small, linerless, C4 shaped charges. These shots clearly demonstrated, for the first time, on a macroscopic scale, the principle of anisotropy in measured progression of the detonation through the explosive assembly. The outputs of nine piezo timing pins in the explosive assembly clearly showed detonation progressing through the assembly faster than nominal detonation velocity and moving slower than nominal detonation velocity in the opposite direction. Basic data from these experiments will be used to design and construct explosives assemblies that will be shot in the LLNL High Explosives Applications Facility's (HEAF). These experimental tests will provide refined basic data that will then be used by modelers to develop high explosives models. Computer simulations using these models will then be run to predict performance and design inhomogeneous, anisotropic bulk explosive charges that will be tested at LLNL.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Emergency Lighting

A lighting system originally developed for NASA's Apollo and Skylab manned spacecraft resulted in a industrial spinoff and creation of a whole new company to produce and market the product line. The company is UDEC Corp., Waltham, Mass. UDEC's "Multi-Mode" electronic lighting systems are designed for plant emergency and supplemental use, such as night lighting, "always-on" stairwell lights and illuminated exit signs. Their advantages stem from the qualities demanded for spacecraft installation: extremely high fight output with very low energy drain, compactness, light weight, and high reliability. The Multi-Mode system includes long-life fluorescent lamps operated by electronic circuitry, a sealed battery that needs no maintenance for 10 years, and a solid-state battery charger. A typical emergency installation consists of a master module with battery and an eight watt lamp, together with four remote "Satellight" modules powered by the master's battery. As a night lighting system for maintenance or I security, UDEC fixtures can bypass the battery and 1 operate on normal current at a fraction of the energy 1 demand of conventional night lighting. Industrial customers have realized savings of better than ninety percent with UDEC night lights. UDEC started as a basement industry in 1972 but the company has already sold more than 1,000 lighting systems to building operators.

Source record↗

Fukushima Media Involvement: Lessons Learned and Challenges - 13261

Only days after the Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster on March 11, 2011, the DOE's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, or PNNL, found itself in a maelstrom of media attention following its announcement of the detection of minute levels of radioactive material originating from the damaged reactors 4,500 miles away. Because PNNL develops state-of-the-art ultra-sensitive radionuclide detection and monitoring systems for national security applications, and has some of the equipment operating on its Richland campus, there was little surprise when one of these sophisticated systems led PNNL to be the first to detect measurable radionuclides in the United States. On Wednesday, March 16, 2011, that system detected minuscule levels of short-lived radioactive xenon, a telltale element derived from either weapons testing or a major reactor disruption. Immediately after the detection was announced, a flurry of inquiries nearly overwhelmed staff as governments, scientific organizations, the general public, and reporters struggled to understand and estimate what impacts this disaster might have on health and environment. Over the course of about three weeks, PNNL's News and Media Relations staff and its scientists and engineers responded to more than 100 requests for information, and engaged in dozens of personal interviews with international, national, regional, and local media. While many of the interviews and resulting stories were accurate and well done, not all communication went flawlessly. In the midst of chaos and confusion, which are part of any significant crisis, hiccoughs are sure to occur. Addressed here is 'the rest of the story'. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Federated Architecture for Secure and Transactive Distributed Energy Resource Management Solutions (FAST-DERMS)

This document provides system-level specifications for a federated architecture for secure and transactive distributed energy resource management solutions (FAST-DERMS), presents a solution, and describes operational concepts for the proposed solution. FAST-DERMS enables the provision of reliable, resilient, and secure transmission and distribution (T&D) grid services through the scalable aggregation and near-real-time management of utility-scale and small-scale distributed energy resources (DERs). We first present the principles and objectives of FAST-DERMS. Then, after discussing important system concepts, we present the specifications for FAST-DERMS and a solution that employs a distributed and federated control methodology in which the DERs connected to a single point of common coupling with the rest of the system, such as individual substations, are optimized coordinately to provide system-level grid services. FAST-DERMS aims to aggregate and coordinate the operations of DERs to support T&D grid operations. The key optimization and control component of this FAST-DERMS reference implementation is a flexible resource scheduler (FRS) that aggregates the DERs within a substation service area. These FRSs operate at the substation level and perform constrained economic dispatch of DERs, either directly or through a transactive market or aggregator, as shown in Figure ES-1. An FRS Coordinator at the distribution system operator (DSO) level aggregates distribution substations operated by FRSs and interfaces with the transmission system operator (TSO) to provide transmission services. FAST-DERMS also allows for the integration of the FRS Coordinator with an existing distribution utility management system that could be employed by the DSO to enhance distribution grid operations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Mars Relay Operations Service (MaROS): A Present Service Preparing for the Future

The Mars Relay Operations Service (MaROS) has been deployed by NASA's Mars Program Office and the Multimission Ground Systems and Services (MGSS) Project into mission operations to aid in the coordination of relay activities at Mars. This live system presents standardized interfaces and a centralized infrastructure to current and future participants in the Mars Relay Network for the purpose of reliably and securely exchanging and storing all relay-related planning and operations data. The initial development of this system leveraged over eight years of experience performing relay operations between the various spacecraft at Mars. Now, four years after its initial deployment, MaROS continues to undergo further refinement to better meet the needs of the Mars Relay Network. The most substantial, recent update was focused on providing capabilities needed by the Mars Science Laboratory project, which landed on Mars in August of 2012. This paper will describe the nature of that update and describe additional features being added to the system to better serve the needs of current and future Mars missions.

Gladden, Roy E.↗