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At least 1,207 records · Page 67

Embracing the Cloud for Better Cyber Security

The future of cyber security is inextricably tied to the future of computing. Organizational needs and economic factors will drive computing outcomes. Cyber security researchers and practitioners must recognize the path of computing evolution and position themselves to influence the process to incorporate security as an inherent property. The best way to predict future computing trends is to look at recent developments and their motivations. Organizations are moving towards outsourcing their data storage, computation, and even user desktop environments. This trend toward cloud computing has a direct impact on cyber security: rather than securing user machines, preventing malware access, and managing removable media, a cloud-based security scheme must focus on enabling secure communication with remote systems. This change in approach will have profound implications for cyber security research efforts. In this work, we highlight existing and emerging technologies and the limitations of cloud computing systems. We then discuss the cyber security efforts that would support these applications. Finally, we discuss the implications of these computing architecture changes, in particular with respect to malware and social engineering.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Defining a Use Case for ADMS Testbed: Data Quality Requirements for ADMS Deployment

Advanced distribution management systems (ADMS) provide a suite of tools to meet the needs of a modern grid: increased reliability and power quality, improved resiliency and security, reduced costs, and enhanced customer participation. A critical challenge that utilities face with adoption of ADMS is the quality of models and data that the ADMS uses for making control decisions. Data quality has a two-fold impact on ADMS adoption: 1. Data quality improvement might constitute up to 25% of ADMS deployment costs. 2. The accuracy of data and models used by the ADMS affects the utility's ability to meet its operational objectives. Thus, quantifying the data quality requirements and its impact on performance is critical to reducing the overall cost of deployment, enabling increased adoption and ensuring that the ADMS performs as specified. This paper offers the motivation, methodology, and evaluation strategy to fill this critical gap.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Security of Classic PN-Spreading Codes for Hybrid DS/FH Spread-Spectrum Systems

Hybrid direct sequence/frequency hopping (DS/FH) spread-spectrum communication systems have recently received considerable interest in commercial applications in addition to their use in military communications because they accommodate high data rates with high link integrity, even in the presence of significant multipath effects and interfering signals. The security of hybrid DS/FH systems strongly depends on the choice of PN-spreading code employed. In this paper, we examine the security, in terms of unicity distance, of linear maximal-length, Gold, and Kasami PN-spreading codes for DS, FH, and hybrid DS/FH spread-spectrum systems without additional encryption methods. The unicity distance is a measure of the minimum amount of ciphertext required by an eavesdropper to uniquely determine the specific key used in a cryptosystem and hence break the cipher. Numerical results are presented to compare the security of the considered PN-spreading codes under known-ciphertext attacks.

direct sequence↗

Evaluating lightweight unsupervised online IDS for masquerade attacks in CAN

Vehicular controller area networks (CANs) are susceptible to masquerade attacks by malicious adversaries. In masquerade attacks, adversaries silence a targeted ID and then send malicious frames with forged content at the expected timing of benign frames. As masquerade attacks could seriously harm vehicle functionality and are the stealthiest attacks to detect in CAN, recent work has devoted attention to compare frameworks for detecting masquerade attacks in CAN. However, most existing works report offline evaluations using CAN logs already collected using simulations that do not comply with the domain’s real-time constraints. Here we contribute to advance the state of the art by presenting a comparative evaluation of four different non-deep learning (DL)-based unsupervised online intrusion detection systems (IDS) for masquerade attacks in CAN. Our approach differs from existing comparative evaluations in that we analyze the effect of controlling streaming data conditions in a sliding window setting. In doing so, we use realistic masquerade attacks being replayed from the ROAD dataset. We show that although evaluated IDS are not effective at detecting every attack type, the method that relies on detecting changes in the hierarchical structure of clusters of time series produces the best results at the expense of higher computational overhead. We discuss limitations, open challenges, and how the evaluated methods can be used for practical unsupervised online CAN IDS for masquerade attacks.

Anomaly detection↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 566 comprises Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-99-20, EMAD Compound, located within Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 566 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 566 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From October 2010 through May 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 566. Assessment of the data from collected soil samples, and from radiological and visual surveys of the site, indicates the FALs were exceeded for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and radioactivity. Corrective actions were implemented to remove the following: • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL at two locations • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL with lead shot • PCB-contaminated soil • Radiologically contaminated filters and equipment • Fuels, lubricants, engine coolants, and oils • Lead debris • Electrical and lighting components assumed to be potential source materials, including - fluorescent light bulbs - mercury switches (thermostats) - circuit boards - PCB-containing ballasts Closure of CAU 566 was achieved through a combination of removal activities and closure in place. Corrective actions to remove COCs, and known and assumed potential source materials, were implemented as was practical. The PCBs remaining at the site are bounded laterally, but not vertically, within CAS 25-99-20 based upon step-out sampling; the sources (e.g., PCB transformer oils, diesel fuel from locomotive reservoirs) have been removed; the practice of the application of PCB-containing oils for soil stabilization has ceased; and the COCs are not readily mobile in the environment. Closure in place is necessary, and future land use of the site will be restricted from intrusive activities. This will effectively eliminate inadvertent contact by humans with the contaminated media. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at CAS 25-99-20. • Closure in place of CAS 25-99-20. • A use restriction is required at CAU 566. • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 566. • Corrective Action Unit 566 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 106 is located in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises the five corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: •05-23-02, GMX Alpha Contaminated Area •05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able •05-45-01, Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton •05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area •05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 19, 2010, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 106. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 106 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. The CAU includes land areas impacted by the release of radionuclides from a weapons-effect tower test (CAS 05-45-01), a weapons-related airdrop test (CAS 05-23-05), “equation of state” experiments (CAS 05-23-02), and unknown support activities at two sites (CAS 05-45-04 and CAS 05-45-05). Surface-deposited radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose (TED) at sample plot locations to the dose-based final action level. The TED will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external doses. Results from the analysis of soil samples collected from sample plots will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample plot will be used to measure external radiological dose. The presence and nature of contamination from other types of releases (such as migration and excavation as well as any potential releases discovered during the investigation) will be evaluated using soil samples collected from the locations most likely containing contamination, if present. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the corrective action investigation for CAU 106 includes the following activities: •Conduct radiological surveys. •Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine internal dose rates and the presence of contaminants of concern. •If contaminants of concern are present, collect additional samples to define the extent of the contamination and determine the area where TED at the site exceeds final action levels (i.e., corrective action boundary). •Collect samples of investigation-derived waste, as needed, for waste management purposes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Inspection Report on "Internal Controls over Accountable Classified Removable Electronic Media at Oak Ridge National Laboratory"

The Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) conducts cutting edge scientific research. ORNL utilizes removable electronic media, such as computer hard drives, compact disks, data tapes, etc., to store vast amounts of classified information. Incidents involving breakdowns in controls over classified removable electronic media have been a continuous challenge for the Department. The loss of even one piece of such media can have serious national security implications. In 2004, the Department had a complex-wide 'stand-down' of all activities using classified removable electronic media, and such media containing Secret/Restricted Data or higher classified data was designated 'Accountable Classified Removable Electronic Media' (ACREM). As part of the stand-down, sites were required to conduct a 100 percent physical inventory of all ACREM; enter it all into accountability; and conduct security procedure reviews and training. Further, the Department implemented a series of controls, including conducting periodic inventories, utilizing tamper proof devices on ACREM safes, and appointing trained custodians to be responsible for the material. After performance testing and validation that the required accountability systems were in place, ACREM operations at ORNL were approved for restart on August 10, 2004. We conducted a review at ORNL and associated facilities to determine whether ACREM is managed, protected, and controlled consistent with applicable requirements. We found that: (1) Eight pieces of Secret/Restricted Data media had not been identified as ACREM and placed into a system of accountability. Consequently, the items were not subject to all required protections and controls, such as periodic accountability inventories, oversight by a trained custodian, or storage in a designated ACREM safe. (However, the items were secured in safes approved for classified material.) (2) Other required ACREM protections and controls were not implemented as follows: a tamper indicating device was not being used on an ACREM safe; records documenting when a certain safe was opened did not support that a purported inventory had been conducted; and a safe inventory had not been completed in a timely manner. (3) A Personal Digital Assistant and a thumb drive, both capable of recording or transmitting data, were stored in a security area without an analysis to identify vulnerabilities and compensatory measures having been conducted, as required. We also found that an ORNL Cooperative Research and Development Agreement partner had not disabled classified computer ports at the partner's site that were capable of writing classified information to external or removable media, as required. We made several recommendations designed to enhance the security of ACREM, security areas, and computers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

TrustDER: Trusted, Private and Scalable Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources

In this project, the Stanford and SLAC Teams have developed a Trusted, Private and Scalable platform for coordinating Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources (TrustDER). This is a layered system that ensures private, trusted and scalable coordination and monitoring of DERs. It accommodates a variety of resources, such as solar generation, gensets and loads, with a particular focus on battery systems-based resources, as they are a transformational technology experiencing fast growth in adoption by large critical facilities. The platform can be used as standalone or added to existing aggregation systems to enable trust, privacy and resilience. TrustDER consists of layers that address each of the shortcomings of the existing state of the art. Each layer in the platform can operate independently but provides information to the layers above it to enable a novel form of overall coordination architecture. The project consists of several tasks, with each task dedicated to the design of each layer. Task 2 Resource Virtualization defined a software abstraction layer for distributed energy resources (DERs). The goal of this abstraction was to simplify the implementation of algorithms utilizing cooperation of DERs resources in a variety of use cases. Task 3 is on Secure ID for Asset Authentication. Identity Management Systems (IDMS) are a foundational infrastructure for interactions between entities (organizations, users, devices, and services). Secure ID is blockchain-based a distributed identity management system allowing (1) identity provisioning, (2) authentication, (3) authorization, and (4) identity data sharing for IoT-enabled assets on the electricity grid. In this project, the SLAC team focused on designing and testing Keymaker, a protocol for authenticating device identity managed by Secure ID. Task 5 Private and Safe Integration is focused on the design and evaluation of a DER cooperation scheme which allows for the aggregation of DERs without impacting network reliability. The approach is designed based on realistic assumptions regarding data availability, communication infrastructure limitations, and privacy. Task 6 Scalable Distributed Privacy for Information explored how virtualized batteries could be managed privately. Specifically, it examined the case in which a principal provides a partitioned battery to multiple clients. Task 7 Use Cases was to ensure that this technology was applied in relevant situations and scenarios. Primarily, this means that virtualization needed to be employed in a manner that either improved flexibility, bolstered security or privacy, or decreased costs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Lawrence Livermore National Security CFO Processes Functional Management Assessment

The scope of the Functional Management Assessment of the CFO included a review of the CFO Organizational Structure, including deployed financial services and the division of responsibilities and internal controls between CFO and other organizations that perform financial functions across the Laboratory. In addition, the assessment team solicited input from end users and reviewers. Three issues discussed are: ISSUE 1: Financial activities and cash transactions are occurring outside the CFO organization. Approximately $200M of non-purchase order spending occurs in seven areas outside CFO control (travel, relocation, special disbursements, IPO, legal, risk management, and freight). NIF financial services have not been integrated into the CFO organization and operate outside CFO control. Business risks--There is no single point of financial accountably; Currently within the CFO and Business and Operations organizations there is a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities for financial activities; Financial talent within the laboratory is fragmented; and Inefficiencies exist based on the current structure; An example of the above business risks associated with organizational structure can be observed in the process for reimbursement of relocation costs to employees. Currently, Human Resources and Travel both administer portions of an employee's relocation. Costs are reviewed for compliance with FAR travel guidelines and for compliance with the offer letter but there is no financial review for allowability of costs nor is there a single point where the total relocation costs are reviewed. Through the e-pay system the check is processed by the CFO organization but there is no review by that organization. ISSUE 2: Impact of involuntary separation on current and future activities. 3 risks are: (1) Loss of internal controls--with the upcoming involuntary reductions there will be a loss of personnel with institutional knowledge which will increase the risk of losing internal control on some processes. The organization needs to be cognizant of this risk and take measures to minimize financial risk and ensure on-going A-123 compliance. (2) Project Costing Implementation (PCI) delay--the implementation of PCI is key to achieving integration and reporting of financial data. Presently, business analysts spend half of their time collecting and compiling data and 94% of the labs financial management reports are created using spreadsheets. Currently, the PCI project is on schedule but the involuntary reductions may result in loss of support in this area. (3) Financial Performance Milestones not met--for FY-08 there are fixed, base and stretch financial performance milestones for the laboratory. With reductions in staff the risk of missing key milestones increases. ISSUE 3: Strategically growing the Work for Others (WFO) Portfolio. A key objective of the laboratory is to increase WFO. Greater reliance on WFO will result in additional funding sources and increase the number of control points and financial activities to be monitored thus increasing the level of financial complexity at the lab. The CFO organization should work now to improve controls and processes to accommodate these changes. In particular the following areas should be focused on: (1) Cost reporting needs to be streamlined; (2) Cost Transfer controls need to be increased; and (3) Timely monitoring and close out of contracts needs occur.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safe and Secure Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19063

Radioactive sources offer many benefits in medicine, industry and education but the lack of appropriate long-term management when they eventually become disused has led to accidents, in some cases with serious consequences, and increased their vulnerability for use in a malicious act. This lack is evident in the absence of clearly defined policy and strategy, responsibilities and resources to meet those responsibilities for safe, secure and sustainable management of disused sources. The strengthening of national legislative and regulatory infrastructures globally has led to major improvements in the protection and control of radioactive sources. Nevertheless, in many countries, radioactive sources were in use before such infrastructures had been developed or adequately strengthened and were therefore not under regulatory control. The paper presents some aspects from Egyptian experience related to safe and secure measures for management of Cs-137, Ra-226 and Co-60 sealed sources. Data relating to the disused radioactive sealed sources, DSRS inventory as well as the arrangements made in order to prepare for conditioning of sources is presented. The efforts made by technical staff and radiation protection team for all arrangements and details such as conditioning set-up, working area, leakage test, certified stainless capsules, radiation protection measures and sources characterization in addition to all security measures for stored DSRS are also presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 411: Double Tracks Plutonium Dispersion (Nellis), Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada (Rev. 0)

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 411, Double Tracks Plutonium Dispersion (Nellis). CAU 411 is located on the Nevada Test and Training Range and consists of a single corrective action site (CAS), NAFR-23-01, Pu Contaminated Soil. There is sufficient information and historical documentation from previous investigations and the 1996 interim corrective action to recommend closure of CAU 411 using the SAFER process. Based on existing data, the presumed corrective action for CAU 411 is clean closure. However, additional data will be obtained during a field investigation to document and verify the adequacy of existing information, and to determine whether the CAU 411 closure objectives have been achieved. This SAFER Plan provides the methodology to gather the necessary information for closing the CAU. The results of the field investigation will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval. The site will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on November 20, 2014, by representatives of NDEP, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine whether CAU 411 closure objectives have been achieved. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 411; Collect environmental samples from designated target populations to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information; If COCs are no longer present, establish clean closure as the corrective action; If COCs are present, the extent of contamination will be defined and further corrective actions will be evaluated with the stakeholders (NDEP, USAF); and Confirm the preferred closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Outside Of Normal Operating Conditions: Using Commercial Hardware In Space Computing Platforms For Ubiquitous Sensing

Over the past decade field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) have been useful in speeding up digital signal processing (DSP) algorithms, and FPGA implementations can be orders of magnitude faster than microprocessor implementations. As many national security satellites are DSP-oriented, many organizations have started using commercial FPGAs to process data closer to the sensor. Using commercial technology successfully in this environment has lead to new research into fault tolerance and resilience.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NARUC grid data sharing playbook

In 2022, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) launched an initiative to support its members in addressing issues related to grid data sharing. The Grid Data Sharing Collaborative was funded by the DOE’s Office of Electricity and Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). NARUC invited programmatic, policy, technical, and cybersecurity subject matter experts from public utility commissions, utilities, non-governmental organizations, energy service companies, and DOE to join the two-year Grid Data Sharing Collaborative to help develop a flexible framework for states to use as a starting point when navigating complex decision-making inherent in grid data sharing. The framework took shape through a series of intensive workshops during which Collaborative participants explored illustrative use cases to identify data needs, articulate the benefits and risks of sharing such data, and assess the trade-offs. Along the way, participants offered suggestions for how the framework could be used in practice. The purpose of this playbook is to describe the elements of the Grid Data Sharing Framework and to begin supporting its implementation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

On-demand Overlay Networks for Large Scientific Data Transfers

Large scale scientific data transfers are central to scientific processes. Data from large experimental facilities have to be moved to local institutions for analysis or often data needs to be moved between local clusters and large supercomputing centers. In this paper, we propose and evaluate a network overlay architecture to enable highthroughput, on-demand, coordinated data transfers over wide-area networks. Our work leverages Phoebus and On-demand Secure Circuits and AdvanceReservation System (OSCARS) to provide high performance wide-area network connections. OSCARS enables dynamic provisioning of network paths with guaranteed bandwidth and Phoebus enables the coordination and effective utilization of the OSCARS network paths. Our evaluation shows that this approach leads to improved end-to-end data transfer throughput with minimal overheads. The achievedthroughput using our overlay was limited only by the ability of the end hosts to sink the data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Towards Distributed Memory Parallel Program Analysis

This paper presents a parallel attribute evaluation for distributed memory parallel computer architectures where previously only shared memory parallel support for this technique has been developed. Attribute evaluation is a part of how attribute grammars are used for program analysis within modern compilers. Within this work, we have extended ROSE, a open compiler infrastructure, with a distributed memory parallel attribute evaluation mechanism to support user defined global program analysis required for some forms of security analysis which can not be addressed by a file by file view of large scale applications. As a result, user defined security analyses may now run in parallel without the user having to specify the way data is communicated between processors. The automation of communication enables an extensible open-source parallel program analysis infrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Primer for the talk ""Outside of Normal Operating Conditions: Using Commercial Hardware in Space Computing Platforms for Ubiquitous Sensing

Over the past decade field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) have been useful in speeding up digital signal processing (DSP) algorithms, and FPGA implementations can be orders of magnitude faster than microprocessor implementations. As many commercial and national security satellites are DSP-oriented, many organizations have started using commercial FPGAs to process data closer to the sensor. Using commercial technology successfully in this environment has lead to new research into fault tolerance and resilience.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Corrective Action Investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit 546: Injection Well and Surface Releases, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 546 is located in Areas 6 and 9 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 546 is comprised of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: •06-23-02, U-6a/Russet Testing Area •09-20-01, Injection Well These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on November 8, 2007, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process has been used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 546.

Wickline, Alfred↗

Protecting Privacy of Shared Epidemiologic Data without Compromising Analysis Potential

Objective . Ensuring privacy of research subjects when epidemiologic data are shared with outside collaborators involves masking (modifying) the data, but overmasking can compromise utility (analysis potential). Methods of statistical disclosure control for protecting privacy may be impractical for individual researchers involved in small-scale collaborations. Methods . We investigated a simple approach based on measures of disclosure risk and analytical utility that are straightforward for epidemiologic researchers to derive. The method is illustrated using data from the Japanese Atomic-bomb Survivor population. Results . Masking by modest rounding did not adequately enhance security but rounding to remove several digits of relative accuracy effectively reduced the risk of identification without substantially reducing utility. Grouping or adding random noise led to noticeable bias. Conclusions . When sharing epidemiologic data, it is recommended that masking be performed using rounding. Specific treatment should be determined separately in individual situations after consideration of the disclosure risks and analysis needs.

Cologne, John↗