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At least 1,189 records · Page 66

Smart Grid Communications Security Project, U.S. Department of Energy

There were four groups that worked on this project in different areas related to Smart Girds and Security. They included faculty and students from electric computer and energy engineering, law, business and sociology. The results of the work are summarized in a verity of reports, papers and thesis. A major report to the Governor of Colorado’s energy office with contributions from all the groups working on this project is given bellow. Smart Grid Deployment in Colorado: Challenges and Opportunities, Report to Colorado Governor’s Energy Office and Colorado Smart Grid Task Force(2010) (Kevin Doran, Frank Barnes, and Puneet Pasrich, eds.) This report includes information on the state of the grid cyber security, privacy, energy storage and grid stability, workforce development, consumer behavior with respect to the smart grid and safety issues.

Barnes, Frank↗

Supply Security in Future Nuclear Fuel Markets

Previous PNNL work has shown the existing nuclear fuel markets to provide a high degree of supply security, including the ability to respond to supply disruptions that occur for technical and non-technical reasons. It is in the context of new reactor designs – that is, reactors likely to be licensed and market ready over the next several decades – that fuel supply security is most relevant. Whereas the fuel design and fabrication technology for existing reactors are well known, the construction of a new set of reactors could stress the ability of the existing market to provide adequate supply redundancy. This study shows this is unlikely to occur for at least thirty years, as most reactors likely to be built in the next three decades will be evolutions of current designs, with similar fuel designs to existing reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Securing America’s Future. Realizing the Potential of the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories

The Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories are national assets that have contributed profoundly to the Nation’s security, scientific leadership, and economic competitiveness. In recognition of the continuing and evolving threats to our security and the dramatic increase in global economic and scientific competition, the laboratories are and will continue to be vitally important. Yet, the contributions of the National Laboratories are not inevitable, nor have they realized their full potential. This final report of the Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the National Energy Laboratories recommends ways the laboratories could overcome challenges to more efficiently and effectively accomplish the work for which they are uniquely suited.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Security Hardened Cyber Components for Nuclear Power Plants: Phase I SBIR Final Technical Report

SpiralGen, Inc. built a proof-of-concept toolkit for enhancing the cyber security of nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure with high-assurance instrumentation and control code. The toolkit is based on technology from the DARPA High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) program, which has focused on applying the science of formal methods to the formidable set of problems involved in securing cyber physical systems. The primary challenges beyond HACMS in developing this toolkit were to make the new technology usable by control system engineers and compatible with the regulatory and commercial constraints of the nuclear power industry. The toolkit, packaged as a Simulink add-on, allows a system designer to assemble a high-assurance component from formally specified and proven blocks and generate provably correct control and monitor code for that subsystem.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nevada National Security Site Underground Radionuclide Inventory, 1951-1992: Accounting for Radionuclide Decay through September 30, 2012

This report is an update of report LA-13859-MS (Bowen et al., 2001). In that original report, the underground radionuclide inventory at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was decay corrected to September 23, 1992, the date of the last underground nuclear test at the NNSS. In this report, the inventory is updated to account for the decay of radionuclides over two additional decades (1992-2012) and revised tritium, fission product and actinide inventory figures and tables are presented. The maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides were also updated to Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) (CFR, 2013). Also, a number of minor errata found in the original publication were corrected. An inventory of radionuclides produced by 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NNSS by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 includes tritium, fission products, actinides, and activation products. The inventory presented in this report provides an estimate of radioactivity remaining underground at the NNSS after nuclear testing. The original test inventory is decayed to September 30, 2012, and predictions of inventory decay over the subsequent 1000 years are presented. For the purposes of summary and publication, the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory authors of this report subdivided the inventory into five areas corresponding to the principal geographic test centers at the NNSS. The five areas roughly correspond to Underground Test Area “Corrective Action Units” (CAUs) for remediation of groundwater. In addition, the inventory is further subdivided for the Yucca Flat region by tests where the working point depth is more than 328 feet (100 meters) above the water table and tests that were detonated below that level. Water levels used were those from the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (1997), now called the Nevada Field Office. Curie activities and atoms are reported as of September 30, 2012. This inventory is strictly a compilation of the residual radiologic inventory remaining from the underground nuclear tests conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 and does not include radioactivity from other types of nuclear testing (e.g., atmospheric, reactors, rocket engines). A companion classified report (Miller et al., 2002) contains test-specific data for each test performed at the NNSS. This work has been sponsored by the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1 ROTC-1

This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. The Frenchman Flat CAU was the site of 10 underground nuclear tests, some of which have impacted groundwater near the tests. This work was performed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from the impacted groundwater

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 573 comprises the two corrective action sites (CASs): 05-23-02-GMX Alpha Contaminated Are-Closure in Place and 05-45-01-Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton- Clean Closure. The purpose of this CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 573 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action activities were performed at Hamilton from May 25 through June 30, 2016; and at GMX from May 25 to October 27, 2016, as set forth in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. Verification sample results were evaluated against data quality objective criteria developed by stakeholders that included representatives from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) during the corrective action alternative (CAA) meeting held on November 24, 2015. Radiological doses exceeding the final action level were assumed to be present within the high contamination areas associated with CAS 05-23-02, thus requiring corrective action. It was also assumed that radionuclides were present at levels that require corrective action within the soil/debris pile associated with CAS 05-45-01. During the CAU 573 CAA meeting, the CAA of closure in place with a use restriction (UR) was selected by the stakeholders as the preferred corrective action of the high contamination areas at CAS 05-23-02 (GMX), which contain high levels of removable contamination; and the CAA of clean closure was selected by the stakeholders as preferred corrective action for the debris pile at CAS 05-45-01 (Hamilton). The closure in place was accomplished by posting signs containing a warning label on the existing contamination area fence line; and recording the FFACO UR and administrative UR in the FFACO database, the NNSA/NFO CAU/CAS files, and the management and operating contractor Geographic Information Systems. The clean closure was accomplished by excavating the soil/debris pile, disposing of the contents at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex, and collecting verification samples. The corrective actions were implemented as stipulated in the CADD/CAP, and verification sample results confirm that the criteria for the completion of corrective actions have been met. Based on the implementation of these corrective actions, NNSA/NFO provides the following recommendations: No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 573; The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection should issue a Notice of Completion to NNSA/NFO for closure of CAU 573; CAU 573 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Redefining Maritime Security Threats in the Eastern Indian Ocean Region.

This occasional paper analyzes the general security issues and trends relating to maritime trafficking of radiological and nuclear material using small vessels, minor ports, and unchecked areas of coastline existing in the Eastern Indian Ocean Region today. By the Eastern Indian Ocean Region is meant the area starting from the tip of the Indian peninsula in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east. It lays focus on the potential sources of nuclear or radiological material that may be trafficked here. It further undertakes a study of the terrorist groups active in the region as well as the multinational or national interdiction organizations that have been created to counter maritime threats. It also seeks to discern the various technologies for detecting materials of concern available in the area. Finally, it ascertains possible methods and technologies to improve the maritime security system in the region.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Industrial Control Systems: Cyber Security Risk Candidate Methods Analysis

In recognition of their mission and in response to continuously evolving cyber threats against nuclear facilities, Department of Energy - Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is building the Nuclear Energy Cyber security Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D) Program, which includes a cyber risk management thrust. This report supports the cyber risk management thrust objective which is to deliver "Standardized methodologies for credible risk-based identification, evaluation and prioritization of digital components." In a previous task, the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) team presented evaluation criteria and a survey to review methods to determine the most suitable techniques. In this task we will identify and evaluate a series of candidate methodologies. In this report, 10 distinct methodologies are evaluated. The overall goal of this effort was to identify the current range of risk analysis techniques that were currently available, and how they could be applied, with an focus on industrial control systems (ICS). Overall, most of the techniques identified did fall into accepted risk analysis practices, though they generally addressed only one step of the multi-step risk management process. A few addressed multiple steps, but generally their treatment was superficial. This study revealed that the current state of security risk analysis in digital control systems was not comprehensive and did not support a science-based evaluation. The papers surveyed did use mathematical formulation to describe the addressed problems, and tied the models to some kind of experimental or experiential evidence as support. Most of the papers, however, did not use a rigorous approach to experimentally support the proposed models, nor did they have enough evidence supporting the efficacy of the models to statistically analyze model impact. Both of these issues stem from the difficulty and expense associated with collecting experimental data in this domain.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Underground Test Area October 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016 Quality Assurance Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (NNSA/NFO, 2015) and identifies the UGTA quality assurance (QA) activities from October 1, 2015, through December 31, 2016 (hereafter, called “the reporting period”). This expanded reporting period allows this report to be converted to a calendar-year (CY) reporting cycle. This change is being made to better align this report with the annual UGTA sampling and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) environmental reports. All UGTA organizations—U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program; Desert Research Institute (DRI); Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec); Navarro Research and Engineering, Inc. (Navarro); and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)—conducted QA activities in the reporting period. The activities included conducting oversight assessments for QAP compliance, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, reviewing technical work, and publishing documents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Underground Test Area Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Quality Assurance Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) and identifies the UGTA quality assurance (QA) activities from October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015 (fiscal year [FY] 2015). All UGTA organizations—U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO); Desert Research Institute (DRI); Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec); Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I); Navarro Engineering and Research Inc (Navarro); and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)—conducted QA activities in FY 2015. The activities included conducting oversight assessments for QAP compliance, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, and publishing documents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Input for the National TRU Program 5 Year Plan for National Nuclear Security Administration TRU Waste

On July 16, 2018, Los Alamos National Security (LANS) received a Corporate Board Data Call for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) site input to the National TRU Program 5 Year Plan from the Office of the National TRU Program. This report summarizes LANL input for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) TRU waste and captures the shipping needs to support the LANL mission. Information is included for the current waste inventory and projected generation rates. The site’s location, characteristics, role and mission are described. Additional information for consideration and pictures for inclusion are provided. A separate submittal will be prepared by N3B for LANL legacy TRU waste managed by N3B under contract to EM-LA.

, LANL↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2017

The National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Fields Office (NNSA/NFO) directs the facility management and program operations at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF), and Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis) in Nevada and directs selected operations at four sites outside of Nevada that include RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and the Special Technologies Laboratory in California. This report summarizes data and the compliance status of the NNSA/NFO environmental protection and monitoring programs for calendar year 2017 at the NNSS and at its two support facilities, the NLVF and RSL-Nellis. This report also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted by the Environmental Management Nevada Program Office at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual

This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). (Activities conducted under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management Nevada[(EM Nevada] may require additional approval authorities as described in the EM Nevada Prime Contractor’s implementation plan.) Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection.” This manual represents policies, guidelines, and best practices for implementing the DOE/NV/03624--0082, “Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program,” (NNSS RPP) according to the requirements of 10 CFR 835.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Preliminary Investigation for Corrective Action Unit 572: Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures, Corrective Action Site 25-33-05: Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), personnel—assisted by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), radiological control personnel—conducted a preliminary field investigation to obtain information about Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 572, Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures; Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance (ETSM) building. The ETSM building is located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The information learned from the investigation will reduce uncertainty about the nature and scope of potential releases and, therefore, reduce management risk associated with the planning and scheduling of future corrective action investigation activities. Site reconnaissance efforts for CAS 25-33-05 were conducted on June 18 and September 10–11, 2012. Detailed site conditions, building contents, potential waste streams, photographic documentation as well as radiological and chemical survey results are contained within this preliminary investigation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

5G Wireless Security

This slide pack is for a short 10 minute presentation on 5G Wireless Security. It summarizes the current challenges to secure wireless communications and what will be different with the advent of 5G. The talk ends with identification of research areas to address these challenges.

5G↗

Secure, Scalable Control and Communications for Distributed PV

An increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. These functions provide grid operators the nobs to support local and bulk power system operations with DER equipment, but the associated grid operator-to-DER communications networks must be deployed with appropriate cybersecurity features. In some situations, additional security features may prevent control system scalability or increase communication latencies and dropouts. These unintentional consequences of the security features would therefore hinder the ability of the grid operator to implement specific control algorithms. This project evaluated the tradeoffs between power system performance and cybersecurity metrics for several grid services.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗