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Contributions of the SCK.CEN Academy to education and training in nuclear science and technology

Thanks to its thorough experience in the field of nuclear science and technology, its innovative research and the availability of large and unique nuclear installations, SCK.CEN is not only a renowned nuclear research institution, but also an important partner for nuclear education and training in Belgium as well as at international level. Within the SCK.CEN Academy, more than 60 years of nuclear expertise and experience gained from our different research projects is collected and transferred. In the interest of maintaining a competent workforce in industry, Healthcare, research, and policy, and of transferring nuclear knowledge and skills to the next generations, the SCK.CEN Academy takes it as its mission to: - provide guidance for students and early-stage researchers; - organize academic courses and customized training for professionals; - offer policy support with regard to education and training matters; - care for critical-intellectual capacities for society. Specifically in the domain of nuclear instrumentation the SCK.CEN Academy provides an opportunity to students at Bachelor, Master and PhD level to make use of the SCK.CEN infrastructure to support their thesis research or to perform an internship with the aim to improve and extend their knowledge and skills in a specific research or technical domain. Further, they can contribute to new findings in the field of nuclear instrumentation. The students are guided by our scientists, engineers and technicians who have years of experience in the relevant field. In addition, the SCK.CEN Academy contributes to traditional university education programs and delivers courses in several nuclear topics such as dosimetry. We also coordinate the Belgian Nuclear higher Engineering Network (BNEN), a one year (60 ECTS) master-after-master specialization in nuclear engineering in which 6 Belgian universities and SCK.CEN are involved. Beyond the contributions to academic education, we also provide several customized training programs tailored to the needs of the learners in terms of content, duration, level, language, location, etc. Complementary to the theoretical classes, ample attention is given to practical sessions and technical visits are foreseen which enable trainees to enrich and illustrate their acquired knowledge with the practice of real-life situations. In this poster presentation an overview will be given of the activities in the domains described above. Moreover it will be shown how these initiatives are embedded in the most recent European approaches to nuclear education and training via collaboration in several EU projects and networks. (authors)

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Projections of U. S. GHG Reductions from Nuclear Power New Capacity Based on Historic Levels of Investment

Historical rates of capital investment in nuclear plant construction was used as a guide to estimate the rate of future capacity introduction. The magnitude of nuclear capacity was then used to determine the effect on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from electrical production in the U.S. to 2050. Total capital investment in nuclear power plant construction for every U.S. nuclear unit from 1964 to 1990 were obtained and the total investment and divided by their construction period to provide a value for possible rate of investment. The total linear rate of capital expenditure over the entire period was determined as well as that for the period of peak construction from 1973 to 1985, $11.5 billion/y and $17.9 billion/y, respectively in 2004$. These were used with a variety of capital cost estimates for nuclear construction to obtain several scenarios for nuclear capacity additions. Total nuclear generation out to 2050 was calculated assuming current plants would be constrained by 60-year operating licenses (i.e., a single 20-year life extension). The effect on nuclear generating capacity was projected and the resultant impact on GHG emissions determined assuming nuclear would directly replace coal-fired generation. It was concluded that actually reductions in emissions would not be experienced until 2038, yet growth in emissions from electrical production would be slowed up through that point. Nuclear energy, therefore cannot have a dramatic short-term effect on emissions, as likely cannot any energy producing technology due to the significant time to introduce large-scale changes. Nuclear power, however, can have a major longer term impact on emissions, particularly under more favorable cost and investment conditions.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

Abstract: The proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Program, which is part of the President’s Advanced Energy Initiative, is intended to support a safe, secure, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the GNEP Program would promote technologies that support economic, sustained production of nuclear-generated electricity, while reducing the impacts associated with spent nuclear fuel disposal and reducing proliferation risks. The Department of Energy (DOE) proposed action envisions changing the United States nuclear energy fuel cycle from an open (or once-through) fuel cycle—in which nuclear fuel is used in a power plant one time and the resulting spent nuclear fuel is stored for eventual disposal in a geologic repository—to a closed fuel cycle in which spent nuclear fuel would be recycled to recover energy-bearing components for use in new nuclear fuel. At this time, DOE has no specific proposed actions for the international component of the GNEP Program. Rather, the United States, through the GNEP Program, is considering various initiatives to work cooperatively with other nations. Such initiatives include the development of grid-appropriate reactors and the development of reliable fuel services (to provide an assured supply of fresh nuclear fuel and assist with the management of the used fuel) for nations who agree to employ nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, such as electricity generation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Enhancing nuclear data validation analysis by using machine learning

In this work, we demonstrate how machine learning (ML) techniques can be used as an auxiliary tool for nuclear data validation analysis. The output of the ML analysis can inform evaluators and validators on the quality, or lack thereof, of specific nuclear data and benchmark experiments with respect to simulating these experimental benchmark values. To this end, measured and simulated effective neutron multiplication factors, k eff , of 875 selected ICSBEP critical assemblies and the latter's sensitivities with respect to nuclear data as well as benchmarks' features (e.g., material nuclide, core geometry) are used as input for a random forest (RF) regression model. The RF is used to encode the complex inter-dependencies between thousands of nuclear data features (i.e., sensitivity profiles and aspects describing the measurements) and 875 simulated and experimental k eff values in order to understand what nuclear data features are most informative for predicting bias. The complexity of relationships and high-dimensional space is difficult-to-impossible to search fully using simply expert judgment. As a first proof-of-concept—step, it is demonstrated that this technique is able to correctly trace large discrepancies between simulated and experimental k eff back to fabricated shortcomings in nuclear data that were perturbed to simulated k eff values. In a second, real-case scenario, step, the RF algorithm is used to validate the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library in comparison to ENDF/B-VII.1 nuclear data. One case is showcased where the chosen ML algorithms highlighted nuclear data (the 19 F(n,inl) cross section from 0.4–0.9 MeV) that are shown to be problematic by comparing them to associated differential experimental data and nuclear data from other libraries. In addition to that, it is shown that the RF results point towards poor benchmark experiments and associated underestimated uncertainties (e.g., the PU-SOL-THERM-028 series). However, using the RF algorithm for validating nuclear data with respect to k eff is currently limited to pinpointing groups of questionable nuclear data due to the inherent correlations between features introduced by the nuclear data themselves and how k eff is simulated. Due to this, we recommend that the ML methods presented be used to augment—rather than replace—the expert knowledge of evaluators and validators.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Nuclear Fabrication Consortium

This report summarizes the activities undertaken by EWI while under contract from the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) for the management and operation of the Nuclear Fabrication Consortium (NFC). The NFC was established by EWI to independently develop, evaluate, and deploy fabrication approaches and data that support the re-establishment of the U.S. nuclear industry: ensuring that the supply chain will be competitive on a global stage, enabling more cost-effective and reliable nuclear power in a carbon constrained environment. The NFC provided a forum for member original equipment manufactures (OEM), fabricators, manufacturers, and materials suppliers to effectively engage with each other and rebuild the capacity of this supply chain by : Identifying and removing impediments to the implementation of new construction and fabrication techniques and approaches for nuclear equipment, including system components and nuclear plants. Providing and facilitating detailed scientific-based studies on new approaches and technologies that will have positive impacts on the cost of building of nuclear plants. Analyzing and disseminating information about future nuclear fabrication technologies and how they could impact the North American and the International Nuclear Marketplace. Facilitating dialog and initiate alignment among fabricators, owners, trade associations, and government agencies. Supporting industry in helping to create a larger qualified nuclear supplier network. Acting as an unbiased technology resource to evaluate, develop, and demonstrate new manufacturing technologies. Creating welder and inspector training programs to help enable the necessary workforce for the upcoming construction work. Serving as a focal point for technology, policy, and politically interested parties to share ideas and concepts associated with fabrication across the nuclear industry. The report the objectives and summaries of the Nuclear Fabrication Consortium projects. Full technical reports for each of the projects have been submitted as well.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the UNFSF. The framework for integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF will include 1) identification of applicable regulatory requirements, 2) selection of a common system that share dual safeguard and security functions, 3) development of functional design criteria and design requirements for the selected system, 4) identification and integration of the dual safeguards and security design requirements, and 5) assessment of the integration and potential benefit.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technologies to Reactors: Enabling Accelerated Deployment of Nuclear Energy Systems Workshop Report

Nuclear energy provides almost 20% of the electric power in the United States, producing power with high availability while accounting for 63% of our carbon-free energy production. While we have the capacity to expand this clean power source within the United States, we have not built any advanced reactor plant designs in our rapidly evolving electricity generation market, where cost is a major driver. With construction cost and plant safety being major elements of cost for new nuclear, advanced reactor technologies could provide lower cost, safer, carbon-free, grid-resilient energy sources for the US electricity grid. When the current fleet of nuclear reactors was originally designed, many of today’s science and technology (S&T) advances were not available. Today these advances show great promise for transforming our national approach to nuclear reactor design. Other industries are capitalizing on rapid innovations in materials, manufacturing, sensors and control systems, and high-fidelity modeling and simulation (M&S), along with data analytics to provide lower costs in manufacturing and extended ranges of operations. In the nuclear industry, these innovations can translate into similar benefits as well as rapid design and qualification of advanced nuclear fuels. Effectively implementing these types of innovations could position American expert leadership to compete more fully in the international nuclear energy market. In July of 2018, the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy sponsored a workshop to address these possibilities: “Technologies to Reactors: Enabling Accelerated Deployment of Nuclear Energy Systems.” Workshop participants explored how modern and emerging S&T can be used to transform the approach to nuclear reactor design, licensing, and operation to accelerate deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems. More than 80 experts from federal agencies, academia, and industry participated in the workshop to develop consensus on priority technology directions (PTDs) and recommend technology and deployment initiatives to explore and demonstrate key benefits for the nuclear community.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Categorizing An Explosive Device by its Nuclear Signature (Rev. 1)

This report documents a study to eliminate ambiguity in identifying a very low-yield nuclear detonation in the early stages of the response to such an event. The ambiguity arises from the very similar explosive and radiation effects produced by three categories of explosive devices: An explosively driven radiological dispersal device (RDD) or an accidental explosion in which radiologic material is scattered by chemical explosives. A failed nuclear device in which nuclear material, such as uranium or plutonium, has been scattered by conventional explosives. A nuclear device that, in addition to scattering nuclear material, produced a very low-yield from nuclear fission. The study found that the properties of fission products provide a ready solution to the problem. The radiation dose rate from fission products that were produced in a nearly instantaneous “fission event” decreases extremely rapidly over the first eight hours after that event, whereas nuclear materials and common radiological materials produce an essentially constant dose rate. This contrast provides an unequivocal fission product signature. The measurements required to utilize this signature can be made by first responders with radiation detectors already in the field, on time scales of an hour, although later confirmation using more capable detectors, including spectroscopic capability, is advised. The process of categorizing an explosives-related incident, both pre- and post-detonation, can be represented as a Decision Tree. The Decision Tree illustrates the use of already-fielded radiation detectors to categorize incidents as likely to involve only conventional explosives, an explosively driven RDD, or a nuclear device. The identification of an explosion as a fission event is extremely important to evacuation planners. It has been shown that delayed evacuation after sheltering in place for up to 24 hours after a fission event has the potential to reduce radiation exposure to the affected public and responders by a factor of ten. Traditional evidence collection after a nuclear detonation is likely to be similarly delayed, as the value and urgency of collection efforts must be weighed against radiation and other hazardous exposure of the collectors. The evidence that survives the immediate effects of a nuclear detonation will, in many cases, still be available for collection once radiation levels have diminished to acceptable levels. Certain classes of evidence, notably information stored on digital media, may significantly degrade from exposure to post-detonation radiation fields. Technical nuclear forensics collections will be performed in all events with nuclear yield. Modification of the high-yield collection strategy may be necessary for a very low-yield device.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Analysis of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Data

Electricity generated using nuclear power accounted for 18.9% of all electricity consumed in the United States in 2021, putting it in third place behind natural gas (38%) and coal (22%) power plants. Nuclear power plants boast a significantly higher uptime or capacity factor—90% and above—compared to 49.1% for coal fired power plants and 56.6% for natural gas power plants. Renewable energy sources, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind electricity, have lower capacity factors: 24.9% and 36.3%, respectively. In addition, nuclear power is cleaner than both coal and natural gas fired power plants. With the passing of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, significant tax credits will be claimed by producers of hydrogen with well-to-gate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions below 0.45 kg CO 2e /kg H 2 . This has sparked interest in using clean sources of electricity, including nuclear power, to generate H 2 via water electrolysis. As uranium is a primary fuel for modern nuclear power plants, the upstream emissions from nuclear fuel production greatly impact the GHG emissions related to all nuclear power end use. Therefore, it is important to accurately determine the upstream emissions associated with the nuclear fuel cycle of nuclear power production in the United States. In this analysis, the nuclear fuel cycle was separated into distinct steps to allow better understanding of the chemical and energy inputs at each step of the fuel cycle. This also provides details of the GHG emissions at each step in the nuclear fuel cycle. The transportation distance for each step of the fuel cycle was updated to account for the locations of uranium processing facilities along the supply chain of the current U.S. nuclear power plants. Finally, all the updated values were incorporated into Argonne National Laboratory’s Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Technologies (GREET) model.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Economic and Nonproliferation Analysis Framework for Assessing Reliable Nuclear Fuel Service Arrangements

Nuclear power is now broadly recognized as an essential technology in national strategies to provide energy security while meeting carbon management goals. Yet a long standing conundrum remains: how to enable rapid growth in the global nuclear power infrastructure while controlling the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies that lie at the heart of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the latent proliferation risk posed by a broader horizontal spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology has been a primary goal of national nuclear supplier policies since the beginning of the nuclear power age. Attempts to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology have been the subject of numerous initiatives in the intervening decades sometimes taking the form of calls to develop fuel supply and service assurances to reduce market pull to increase the number of states with fuel cycle capabilities. A clear understanding of what characteristics of specific reliable nuclear fuel service (RNFS) and supply arrangements qualify them as 'attractive offers' is critical to the success of current and future efforts. At a minimum, RNFS arrangements should provide economic value to all participants and help reduce latent proliferation risks posed by the global expansion of nuclear power. In order to inform the technical debate and the development of policy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics and nonproliferation merits of alternative approaches to RNFS arrangements. This paper provides a brief overview of the economic analysis framework developed and applied to a model problem of current interest: full-service nuclear fuel leasing arrangements. Furthermore, this paper presents an extended outline of a proposed analysis approach to evaluate the non-proliferation merits of various RNFS alternatives.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Used Nuclear Fuel Management in Asia

Used fuel discharged from nuclear reactors are presently stored in wet pools or in dry cask at-reactor and/or away-from- reactor sites. Only a few countries reprocess their civilian used fuel, notably France, Russia, and UK. No country has yet operated a geologic repository to dispose of civilian used fuel or high-level radioactive wastes (HLW). As a result, the management and disposal of used fuel and HLW are viewed as the Achilles' heel of nuclear power. Figure 1 shows the used fuel inventory in the United States (US) and East Asian nuclear power programs. The inventory is estimated based on that in 2010 and the projected growth of nuclear power in these programs to 2020 and 2030. Figure 1 indicates that in 2010, the US had about 63,900 tons of used fuel from light-water reactors (LWR), more than the statutory limit of what was supposed to go into the now-abandoned Yucca Mountain Repository, and accounting for more than 33% of global used LWR fuel total. Currently, about 2,000 tons of used fuel are generated in the existing US LWRs annually. Russia had 25,100 tons of used fuel in 2010. Based on a modest growth of nuclear power, its used fuel inventory is expected to increase to about 31,800 and 38,000 tons by 2020 and 2030, respectively. The nuclear energy programs in East Asia (China, Japan, ROK, and Taiwan) account for 19% of global used LWR fuel inventory in 2010. China's used fuel inventory in 2010 was relatively small at 1,900 tons, but is expected to grow rapidly to {approx}12,400 and {approx}31,000 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively, based on its expanding nuclear power program (from the current installed capacity of 21.8 GW to {approx}60 and {approx}200 GW in 2020 and 2030, respectively). Besides PWRs, China also operates 2 Candu reactors which each produces roughly 8 times more used fuel in tons than a PWR of the same power. The used Candu fuel inventory would increase from 950 tons in 2010 to 2,850 and 4,750 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively. Used fuel in Japan, ROK, and Taiwan are US-obligated. Japan's future trends of used fuel inventory are uncertain due to the unknown numbers and timing of the currently-shutdown nuclear power plants that would be allowed for restart, and the uncertain future of Japan's reprocessing at Rokkasho. Under two scenario cases (a no-nuke/no-reprocessing and a 80%-nuke with reprocessing), the Japanese used fuel inventory could be capped from 2020 to 2030 to {approx}21,500 tons for the first case, and to {approx}22,500 tons for the second. The ROK's used PWR fuel inventory would increase from 4,900 tons in 2010 to about 8,800 and 14,000 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively. Its used Candu fuel inventory would also increase from 5,900 tons in 2010 to about 9,700 and 13,500 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively. The Taiwan used fuel inventory should be kept at current level as nuclear power is being phase out. Its growth should be modest from 3,000 tons in 2010 to about 4,300 and 5,000 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively even if the 4. nuclear power station would start and the operation of existing LWRs is extended. Used fuel inventory in other East Asian countries (DPRK, Vietnam, etc.) should be small, if any before 2030.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Overcoming Challenges to Nuclear-Maritime Applications

This report is the fifth deliverable in a series of reports set forth by the Department of Energy (DOE), led by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), for the research award titled “Accelerating Commercial Maritime Demonstration Projects for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies.” The report highlights guidance to bridge the gaps between innovative nuclear technologies and their practical implementation in maritime environments. The previous reports discussed specific technical, economic and regulatory challenges that may be expected when developing and establishing advanced nuclear technologies for commercial maritime applications. This report supports the mission of the U.S. National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) to demonstrate projects with industry and acts as a resource for the various stakeholders associated with the development of novel applications for advanced reactors. The previous reports discuss the interest in nuclear technology applications for decarbonized energy and identify the potential demands in nuclear energy supply and price. The work in these reports supports the recently issued nuclear Executive Orders (EOs). Specifically, EO 14299, “Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security”, and EO 14300, “Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” by ensuring the rapid development, deployment, and use of advanced nuclear technologies; and increasing the deployment of new nuclear reactor technologies, such as Generation III+ and IV reactors, modular reactors, and microreactors to support America leading the commercialization of affordable and abundant nuclear energy.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Policy and Technical Issues Facing a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. Chapter 14

We report the largest obstacle to creating nuclear weapons, starting with the ones that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been to make sufficient quantities of fissile materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium – to sustain an explosive fission chain reaction.1 Recognition of this fact has, for more than fifty years, underpinned both the support for and the opposition to adoption of an international treaty banning at a minimum the production of more fissile materials for nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Women as a Force Multiplier for Bringing Nuclear Forensic Capabilities to the International Stage

In 2009, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009–2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling, bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the US Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next 6 years, a small team comprising a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercise documentation was developed in the 2009–2015 time frame, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Infrastructure development assistance modeling for nuclear power plant

The purpose of this paper is to develop a model, a general frame to be utilized in assisting newcomer countries to start a nuclear power program. A nuclear power plant project involves technical complexity and high level of investment with long duration. Considering newcomers are mostly developing countries that lack the national infrastructure, key infrastructure issues may constitute the principal constraints to the development of a nuclear power program. In this regard, it is important to provide guidance and support to set up an appropriate infrastructure when we help them with the first launch of nuclear power plant project. To date, as a sole nuclear power generation company, KHNP has been invited many times to mentor or assist newcomer countries for their successful start of a nuclear power program since Republic of Korea is an exemplary case of a developing country which began nuclear power program from scratch and became a major world nuclear energy country in a short period of time. Through hosting events organized to aid newcomer countries' initiation of nuclear power projects, difficulties have been recognized. Each event had different contents according to circumstances because they were held as an unstructured and one-off thing. By developing a general model, we can give more adequate and effective aid in an efficient way. In this paper, we created a model to identify necessary infrastructures at the right stage, which was mainly based on a case of Korea. Taking into account the assistance we received from foreign companies and our own efforts for technological self-reliance, we have developed a general time table and specified activities required to do at each stage. From a donor's perspective, we explored various ways to help nuclear infrastructure development including technical support programs, training courses, and participating in IAEA technical cooperation programs on a regular basis. If we further develop the model, the next task would be to make the model more sophisticated as a 'semi-tailored model' so that it can be applied to a certain country reflecting its unique conditions. In accordance with its degree of established infrastructure, we can adjust or modify the model. Despite lots of benefits of using this model, there remain limitations such as time and budget constraints. These problems, however, can be addressed by cooperating with international organization such as the IAEA and other companies that share the same goal of helping newcomer countries introduce nuclear power. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗