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The User Guide for the ComPro Database

An extensive database of glass composition and durability data has been compiled at Savannah River National Laboratory to support the development of nuclear waste glasses. This database is referred to as the Glass Composition-Properties Database (ComPro). The ComPro Database, Revision 3, contains 14,134 total rows of data and 125 columns of composition, durability, as defined by the Product Consistency Test, and other fabrication and characterization information, if available, for each glass. Of the 14,134 total rows, 8,484 rows have been classified as “Model” data and 5,650 rows have been classified as “Non-Model” data. An integral supplement to the ComPro database is the User Guide. The User Guide was developed as a tool to aid the End User in a more effective use of the ComPro database. The User Guide provides a road-map of the specific datasets that comprise the ComPro database (both “Model” and “Non-Model” data) as well as a technical basis for the terminology and definitions the End User will encounter. In this report, a general description of the format and information contained in the User Guide is provided. In addition, specific terminology used in the User Guide is also discussed.

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Knowledge Management in the Field of Nuclear Energy - How to Bridge the Gap between Retiring Workforce and Next Generations - 17101

The current phase-out decision of the German Federal Government and the 'Energiewende' - resulting from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident in 2011 - changed the nuclear market significantly. Together with the change in political and social attitude towards nuclear energy since 2002 it has contributed to a decline in technical expertise. This as well as the generation change in the nuclear technology lead to the risk of losing accumulated knowledge and experience which still are essential for the future - not only in Germany but in other countries - even though the focus in Germany will shift from operating to decommissioning, dismantling and radioactive waste management. A long-term strategy in order to preserve technical expertise to solve the forthcoming tasks in Germany was required. This strategy should include e.g. the implementation of technical programs not only for internal training of the staff but also for authorities. Together with authorities TUV NORD developed individual training concepts for a broad range of customers to preserve a transfer of know-how with the state-of-the-art in science and technology and even support international projects, especially in countries with less experience in the nuclear fields. Additionally, special data bases were developed in order to ensure the accessibility of long-term nuclear data storage. Furthermore technical conferences in different fields like decommissioning and radioactive waste disposal were established as an opportunity for knowledge exchange. Based on given examples it is being demonstrated how technical expertise can be preserved even though the field of nuclear energy in Germany has changed. (authors)

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Accelerating the disposition of transuranic waste from LANL - 9495

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was established during World War II with a single mission -- to design and build an atomic bomb. In the 65 years since, nuclear weapons physics, design and engineering have been the Laboratory's primary and sustaining mission. Experimental and process operations -- and associated cleanout and upgrade activities -- have generated a significant inventory of transuranic (TRU) waste that is stored at LANL's Technical Area 54, Material Disposal Area G (MDA G). When the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) opened its doors in 1999, LANL's TRU inventory totaled about 10,200 m{sup 3}, with a plutonium 239-equivalent curie (PE Ci) content of approximately 250,000 curies. By December 2008, a total of about 2,300 m3 (61,000 PE Ci) had been shipped to WIPP from LANL. This has resulted in a net reduction of about 1,000 m{sup 3} of TRU inventory over that time frame. This paper presents progress in dispositioning legacy and newly-generated transuranic waste (TRU) from ongoing missions at the LANL. The plans for, and lessons learned, in dispositioning several hundred high-activity TRU waste drums are reviewed. This waste population was one of the highest risks at LANL. Technical challenges in disposition of the high-activity drums are presented. These provide a preview of challenges to be addressed in dispositioning the remaining 6,800 m{sup 3} of TRU stored above ground and 2,400 m{sup 3} of TRU waste that is 'retrievably' stored below-grade. LANL is using subcontractors for much of this work and has formed a strong partnership with WIPP and its contractor to address this cleanup challenge.

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DOE EM Sponsored Research on Long-Term Dry Storage of Aluminum Clad SNF

This PowerPoint presentation describes and discusses DOE EM and INL lead studies on addressing potential technical issues associated with long-term dry storage of aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel. This same presentation was made to the US Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board in Nov 2019.

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Zirconium and fission product management in the ALSEP process

Solvent extraction systems that combine neutral donor extractants and acidic extractants are being investigated to provide a single process solvent for separating Am and Cm from acidic high-level liquid waste, including their separation from the trivalent lanthanides. This approach of combining extractants is collectively referred to as the Actinide-Lanthanide Separation (ALSEP) process. Managing Zr and other fission products is one of the critical factors in developing the ALSEP process. In this work, a strategy has been developed in which Zr(IV) is extracted into the process solvent, then it is stripped from the solvent after the actinides have been selectively stripped. The ALSEP solvent contains a bifunctional neutral donor extractant that extracts the minor actinides and the trivalent lanthanides (Ln) from nitric acid media. In this work, two such extractants were considered: N,N,N',N'- tetraoctyl-diglycolamide (TODGA) and N,N,N',N'-tetra(2- ethylhexyl)diglycolamide (T2EHDGA). Molybdenum is strongly extracted into ALSEP solvents. Scrubbing the solvent with a citrate buffer before the actinide stripping step effectively removes Mo. Distribution ratios for Ru and Fe are low for extraction from HNO{sub 3}, so these components can easily be routed to the high-level waste raffinate. (authors)

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FUSRAP Data Management and Information Transitions - 19459

The Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) was created in the mid-1970's to clean up radiological contamination resulting from early development of nuclear weapons. The US Department of Energy (US DOE) was responsible for FUSRAP until October 1997, when Congress transferred administration and execution of FUSRAP site cleanup to the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Currently, the US DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) determines the eligibility of a site for referral to USACE. USACE determines whether the site is included in FUSRAP for cleanup, conducts remedial actions, and transfers sites back to LM for long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). LM and USACE established the Data Management Working Group (DMWG) to (1) establish a common understanding of US DOE and USACE district-specific data, records practices, and requirements as they apply to FUSRAP programmatic documents for site transition and transfer; (2) establish methods to ensure accurate data transfer; and (3) develop a timeline for data and records transfer. These methods will ensure continuity of stewardship while transitioning from cleanup to LTS and M and beyond as more FUSRAP sites transfer from USACE to LM. The DMWG has met monthly and the meetings are attended by a wide range of LM and USACE project managers and subject matter experts. Discussion topics have addressed site records management, including data needs and uses; transfer and posting of Administrative Record and Permanent Record files for public accessibility; and management of legal and classified files. There have been a number of group successes, including the following: - Establishment of a common understanding of data and records practices and requirements as the sites transition and transfer from USACE to LM; - Development of effective lines of communication between USACE and LM concerning data management for transition; - Establishment of a cohesive approach to data management between the two agencies. (authors)

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An Approach for Validating Actinide and Fission Product Burnup Credit Criticality Safety Analyses: Criticality (k eff ) Predictions

One of the most important remaining challenges associated with expanded implementation of burnup credit in the United States is the validation of depletion and criticality calculations used in the safety evaluation—in particular, the availability and use of applicable measured data to support validation, especially for fission products (FPs). Applicants and regulatory reviewers have been constrained by both a scarcity of data and a lack of clear technical basis or approach for use of the data. In this study, this paper describes a validation approach for commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) criticality safety (k eff ) evaluations based on best-available data and methods and applies the approach for representative SNF storage and transport configurations/conditions to demonstrate its usage and applicability, as well as to provide reference bias results. The criticality validation approach utilizes not only available laboratory critical experiment (LCE) data from the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments and the French Haut Taux de Combustion program to support validation of the principal actinides but also calculated sensitivities, nuclear data uncertainties, and limited available FP LCE data to predict and verify individual biases for relevant minor actinides and FPs. The results demonstrate that (a) sufficient critical experiment data exist to adequately validate k eff calculations via conventional validation approaches for the primary actinides, (b) sensitivity-based critical experiment selection is more appropriate for generating accurate application model bias and uncertainty, and (c) calculated sensitivities and nuclear data uncertainties can be used for generating conservative estimates of bias for minor actinides and FPs. Results based on the SCALE 6.1 and the ENDF/B-VII.0 cross-section libraries indicate that a conservative estimate of the bias for the minor actinides and FPs is 1.5% of their worth within the application model. Finally, this paper provides a detailed description of the approach and its technical bases, describes the application of the approach for representative pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor safety analysis models, and provides reference bias results based on the prerelease SCALE 6.1 code package and ENDF/B-VII nuclear cross-section data.

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Knowledge Management Initiatives Used to Maintain Regulatory Expertise in Transportation and Storage of Radioactive Materials - 12177

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established in 1974 with the mission to license and regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials for commercial, industrial, academic, and medical uses in order to protect public health and safety, and the environment, and promote the common defense and security. Currently, approximately half (∼49%) of the workforce at the NRC has been with the Agency for less than six years. As part of the Agency's mission, the NRC has partial responsibility for the oversight of the transportation and storage of radioactive materials. The NRC has experienced a significant level of expertise leaving the Agency due to staff attrition. Factors that contribute to this attrition include retirement of the experienced nuclear workforce and mobility of staff within or outside the Agency. Several knowledge management (KM) initiatives have been implemented within the Agency, with one of them including the formation of a Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation (SFST) KM team. The team, which was formed in the fall of 2008, facilitates capturing, transferring, and documenting regulatory knowledge for staff to effectively perform their safety oversight of transportation and storage of radioactive materials, regulated under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 71 and Part 72. In terms of KM, the SFST goal is to share critical information among the staff to reduce the impact from staff's mobility and attrition. KM strategies in place to achieve this goal are: (1) development of communities of practice (CoP) (SFST Qualification Journal and the Packaging and Storing Radioactive Material) in the on-line NRC Knowledge Center (NKC); (2) implementation of a SFST seminar program where the seminars are recorded and placed in the Agency's repository, Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS); (3) meeting of technical discipline group programs to share knowledge within specialty areas; (4) development of written guidance to capture 'administrative and technical' knowledge (e.g., office instructions (OIs), generic communications (e.g., bulletins, generic letters, regulatory issue summary), standard review plans (SRPs), interim staff guidance (ISGs)); (5) use of mentoring strategies for experienced staff to train new staff members; (6) use of Microsoft SharePoint portals in capturing, transferring, and documenting knowledge for staff across the Division from Division management and administrative assistants to the project managers, inspectors, and technical reviewers; and (7) development and implementation of a Division KM Plan. A discussion and description of the successes and challenges of implementing these KM strategies at the NRC/SFST will be provided. (authors)

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The Role of the Sellafield Ltd Centres of Expertise in Engaging with the Science, Environment and Technology Supply Chain and University Sector to Support Site Operations and Decommissioning in the UK Nuclear Industry - 13018

The development and maintenance of the broad range of the highly technical skills required for safe and successful management of nuclear sites is of vital importance during routine operations, decommissioning and waste treatment activities.. In order to maintain a core team of technical experts, across all of the disciplines required for these tasks, the approach which has been taken by the Sellafield Ltd has been the formation of twenty five Centres of Expertise (CoE), each covering key aspects of the technical skills required for nuclear site operations. Links with the Specialist University Departments: The CoE leads are also responsible for establishing formal links with university departments with specialist skills and facilities relevant to their CoE areas. The objective of these links is to allow these very specialist capabilities within the university sector to be more effectively utilized by the nuclear industry, which benefits both sectors. In addition to the utilization of specialist skills, the university links are providing an important introduction to the nuclear industry for students and researchers. This is designed to develop the pipeline of potential staff, who will be required in the future by both the academic and industrial sectors. (authors)

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Accelerated Aging Humidity Chamber for Nuclear Grade HEPA Filter Media

A unique accelerated aging humidity chamber for simulating the natural aging process of nuclear grade high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter media is being designed, implemented, and tested. The nuclear industry currently lacks information regarding the shelf life and service life of HEPA filter media. The Department of Energy recommends disposing of HEPA filters 10 years after the manufacture date for filters operated under dry conditions. Studies have shown the tensile strength and water repellency of HEPA filter media diminish with age. The chamber's principal function is to sustain an elevated relative humidity condition for an extended duration specified by the Arrhenius aging model. To accomplish this, various design parameters were established: (1) consistently achieve uniform humidity conditions within the chamber to equally expose media sheets, (2) ensure the chamber is sufficiently sealed to mitigate the uncontrolled infiltration of air, (3) confidently secure the media sheets to avert the introduction of unnecessary stressing/creasing, (4) fabricate the chamber from clear polycarbonate material to allow inspection of the media sheets, (5) provide a safe and ergonomic design for personnel, (6) ensure the chamber design is replicable and relatively easy to fabricate/assemble. A humidity source, fan, PID controller, humidity and temperature transmitters, and data loggers are required for proper operation and control of the chamber. The humidity source must accommodate target values up to 95% relative humidity throughout the chamber. The three humidity and temperature transmitters are strategically spaced throughout the chamber to ensure uniform conditions. The 10 cubic feet per minute (CFM) fan selected intends to accomplish the desired air change rate inside the chamber of approximately 20 air changes per hour (ACH). The 2 plenums on the upper and lower portions of the chamber utilize a perforated design to uniformly distribute air, promote air mixing, and control the air velocity entering the chamber. Industrial blueprint hanging clamps are being retrofitted to be seated within the chamber drawers and firmly secure the nuclear grade filter media. The aged media will be evaluated using autopsy methodology, and the results obtained intend to help clarify the useful life of nuclear grade HEPA filters. Nuclear grade high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are defined as disposable, extended-media, dry-type filters with a rigid casing enclosing the full depth of the pleats and have a minimum particle removal efficiency of 99.97%. [1] - HEPA filters are constantly exposed to stressors and subsequently have been shown to degrade as the filter ages. Properties such as tensile strength and water repellency, along with others, are negatively impacted. [2] - Due to the scarcity of naturally aged HEPA filters available, it is crucial to develop accelerated aging methods which effectively mimic the natural degradation effects. - After accelerated aging, the filters are subject to testing in the Axial Flow Large Scale Test Stand (ALSTS) and other analysis techniques such as the same qualification tests performed directly after being manufactured. - Quality data is necessary for future decisions regarding the lifetime of nuclear grade HEPA filters. - The objective is to develop a prototype accelerated aging humidity chamber for nuclear grade HEPA filter media. The chamber should expose the media to commonly occurring stressors to expedite the degradation process caused by aging. PID yields reliable and reproducible results: - CFD model correlates well with actual performance; - Further analysis is needed to complete characterization; - Future work for the chamber is still to be completed. The data shown in Figure 5 and Table 1 indicate the system is functioning as designed. As can be determined from the system response evaluation in Table 1, the PID controller is yielding reliable and reproducible results at each set point. As the set point increases, the time constant and 20% settling time increase accordingly. From the results in Table 1, it stands to reason that the CFD model correlates well with the actual performance of the system. Each system response parameter for the 90%RH* CFD model is slightly lower than the parameters collected from the physical model tested at an equivalent set point. This is to be expected considering the inlet in the CFD model is a constant supply of water vapor, whereas the physical model uses a PID controller to monitor the amount of water vapor needed and reacts accordingly. More analysis is still to be done on the prototype chamber. A pressure test will be conducted in order to determine the hourly leak rate of the chamber. This test will involve constant air flow into the chamber until the desired pressure is reached. A uniformity test will also be conducted in order to ensure each filter medium is being exposed to equivalent relative humidity levels. This test will involve an array of humidity meters strategically oriented inside the chamber to record any possible gradients. Future work for the chamber includes dehumidification abilities, tests while fully loaded with filters, and temperature control. Once completed, the autopsy team at Institute of Clean Energy Technology will conduct necessary accelerated aging studies as needed.

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Decontamination and Decommissioning Program of a Radiopharmaceuticals Production Facility - 17103

On May 2012, Best Medical Belgium (BMB) S.A., a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products located on the nuclear site of Fleurus, was declared bankrupt. According to the Belgian law, ONDRAF/NIRAS (Belgian Radioactive Waste Management Agency) was entrusted with the clean-up and the decommissioning operations of the former BMB facilities, nowadays known as 'ONDRAF/NIRAS Site Fleurus' (ONSF). In June 2015, ONSF launched a Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) program, for which Tractebel supports the definition of the clean-up and decommissioning strategies; the drafting of the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) and License Application for decommissioning; and the follow-up of the clean-up and upcoming D and D works on site. Four nuclear buildings are part of the clean-up and D and D activities. One of them, Building 14 (B14), represents the most challenging task with the clean-up of highly contaminated areas and their further decommissioning up to greenfield. Beside its two cyclotrons successively used for the production of radioisotopes, this building features hot cells and glove boxes used for the purification of radioisotopes and the conditioning of the final pharmaceutical product. The present paper aims at presenting the development of the D and D program in terms of modifications of existing facilities to allow carrying out the clean-up and D and D activities and the management of dismantled radioactive materials in a safe, efficient and cost-effective way as well as in terms of strategic options to be developed for the FDP. To support the clean-up and D and D activities, several workshops have been designed in order to treat radioactive materials removed from the building rooms. Those workshops feature an input buffer storage area, a common output buffer storage area and installations for the treatment of radioactive materials and waste (handling devices, cutting means, decontamination means, free release measurements means, etc.). Some modifications to the existing auxiliary systems will be required in order to dispose of appropriate systems to operate those workshops in a safe way. Activated concrete structures will constitute the most important part of radioactive materials that will arise from the decommissioning activities. To limit the total decommissioning costs, and especially the costs associated to radioactive waste management, two strategies have been developed in order to manage a part of activated concrete as candidate for free release with a certain decay period or as candidate for conventional landfill. Both strategies will have to be further detailed and discussed with the competent Authorities to ensure they can actually be implemented. (authors)

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Advanced Fuels Campaign FY 2015 Accomplishments Report

The mission of the Advanced Fuels Campaign (AFC) is to perform research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) activities for advanced fuel forms (including cladding) to enhance the performance and safety of the nation’s current and future reactors; enhance proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel; effectively utilize nuclear energy resources; and address the longer-term waste management challenges. This report is a compilation of technical accomplishment summaries for FY-15. Emphasis is on advanced accident-tolerant LWR fuel systems, advanced transmutation fuels technologies, and capability development.

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Audit Report The Procurement of Safety Class/Safety-Significant Items at the Savannah River Site

The Department of Energy operates several nuclear facilities at its Savannah River Site, and several additional facilities are under construction. This includes the National Nuclear Security Administration's Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) which is designated to help maintain the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX Facility) is being constructed to manufacture commercial nuclear reactor fuel assemblies from weapon-grade plutonium oxide and depleted uranium. The Interim Salt Processing (ISP) project, managed by the Office of Environmental Management, will treat radioactive waste. The Department has committed to procuring products and services for nuclear-related activities that meet or exceed recognized quality assurance standards. Such standards help to ensure the safety and performance of these facilities. To that end, it issued Departmental Order 414.1C, Quality Assurance (QA Order). The QA Order requires the application of Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (NQA-1) for nuclear-related activities. The NQA-1 standard provides requirements and guidelines for the establishment and execution of quality assurance programs during the siting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. These requirements, promulgated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, must be applied to 'safety-class' and 'safety-significant' structures, systems and components (SSCs). Safety-class SSCs are defined as those necessary to prevent exposure off site and to protect the public. Safety-significant SSCs are those whose failure could irreversibly impact worker safety such as a fatality, serious injury, or significant radiological or chemical exposure. Due to the importance of protecting the public, workers, and environment, we initiated an audit to determine whether the Department of Energy procured safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that met NQA-1 standards at the Savannah River Site. Our review disclosed that the Department had procured and installed safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that did not meet NQA-1 quality standards. Specifically, we identified multiple instances in which critical components did not meet required quality and safety standards. For example: (1) Three structural components were procured and installed by the prime contractor at Savannah River during construction of the MOX Facility that did not meet the technical specifications for items relied on for safety. These substandard items necessitated costly and time consuming remedial action to, among other things, ensure that nonconforming materials and equipment would function within safety margins; (2) In six instances, items used in the construction of TEF failed to satisfy quality standards. In one of these situations, operating procedures had to be modified to ensure that the problem item did not compromise safety; and (3) Finally, at the ISP, one component that did not meet quality standards was procured. The failure of the item could have resulted in a spill of up to 15,000 gallons of high-level radioactive waste. Based on an extensive examination of relevant internal controls and procurement practices, we concluded that these failures were attributable to inadequate attention to quality assurance at Savannah River. Simply put, Departmental controls were not adequate to prevent and/or detect quality assurance problems. For example, Federal and prime contractor officials did not expressly require that subcontractors or lower-tiered vendors comply with quality assurance requirements. Additionally, management did not effectively communicate quality assurance concerns between the several Departmental program elements operating at Savannah River. The procurement and installation of these nonconforming components resulted in cost increases. For example, as of October 2008, the MOX Facility had incurred costs of more than $680,000 due to problems associated with the procurement of $11 million of nonconforming safety-class reinforcing steel. In general, the internal control weaknesses we discovered could have permitted, without detection, the procurement and installation of safety critical components that did not meet quality assurance standards. In a worst case scenario, undetected, nonconforming components could fail and injure workers or the public. In certain instances, the Department took steps to ensure that the prime contractors at Savannah River began action to remediate nonconforming components and to strengthen policies and procedures. Additionally, the Department took actions to ensure that critical components necessary for projects worked as designed by requiring that the prime contractor place personnel at manufacturers' locations. Further, the Department had suspended work with certain other manufacturers due to quality assurance problems.

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Supplemental Information Regarding the Application for Remediation of the Flanged Tritium Waste Containers at Los Alamos National Laboratory

This letter is in response to the October 18, 2021 letter from David Gray, Acting Regional Administrator, to Mr. Theodore Wyka, Manager of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA). That letter requested additional information regarding the Application for remediation of the Flanged Tritium Waste Containers (FTWCs) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Technical Area 54, Area G. The Emissions Management Plan for the FTWC Venting Project is attached.

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Used Fuel Management System Architecture Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2012

In the 1990s the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) completed a number of system analyses investigating consolidated interim storage as a part of the waste management solution. These analyses are “dated” and do not reflect the present situation regarding at-reactor used nuclear fuel (UNF) management, alternatives for away from reactor management of used nuclear fuel, and alternatives for the ultimate disposal of UNF. The Blue Ribbon Commission for America’s Nuclear Future and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board have also pointed out the need for such analyses. The Used Fuel Management System Architecture Evaluation effort provides the DOE and others with information regarding the various alternatives for managing UNF generated by the current fleet of light water reactors operating in the U.S. The objectives are to: • Provide quantitative information with respect to a broad range of UNF management alternatives and considerations • Develop an integrated approach to evaluating storage, transportation, and disposal options, with emphasis on flexibility • Evaluate impacts of storage choices on UNF storage, handling, and disposal options • Identify alternative strategies and evaluate with respect to cost and flexibility • Consider a broad range of factors including repository emplacement capability, thermal constraints, repackaging needs, storage and transportation alternatives, and impacts on utility operations. In Fiscal Year 2012 system-level analyses of the overall interface between at-reactor, consolidated storage, and ultimate disposition along with the development of supporting logistic simulation tools were initiated. The objective of the Fiscal Year 2012 effort was two-fold: 1) develop methodologies, approaches, and tools (capability development), and 2) evaluate select UNF disposition scenarios (capability demonstration). The scenarios chosen for evaluation and the assumptions, inputs, and boundary conditions selected allowed for an initial set of analyses to gain insight regarding integrated system dynamics and an understanding of trends. This initial set of analyses also points to where additional system architecture analyses should focus.

Nutt, Mark↗

Initial Evaluation of Microreactor Disposition Options

The United States Department of Energy is supporting the U.S advanced reactor industry through funding, legislation and regulatory development to actively pursue several microreactor design concepts. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is strategically positioned to support demonstration of microreactor technology in the next three to five years. This report provides and initial evaluation of the disposition options for microreactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated as part of the microreactor technology demonstration program. Currently available information constitutes the basis for the options identified and discussions thereof. In the absence of detailed microreactor design information, assumptions were made to facilitate the identification of disposition options Particulars pertaining to any component of an identified disposition pathway are naturally highly microreactor design specific and in general such details are not provided. The diverse nature of potential microreactor SNF is reflected in the diverse nature of DOE owned SNF stored at INL. Therefore, it is anticipated that DOE currently stores and manages fuels that can serve as analogs for most microreactor fuel concepts. As such disposition options for microreactor SNF are expected to be much the same as that for these existing fuels. Two generic microreactor concepts have been selected for the purposes of this options assessment. The selected reactor concepts are a tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fueled high temperature gas reactor concept and a sodium/potassium bonded heat pipe reactor with uranium oxide fuel. Both concepts are assumed to be using high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the initial fuel composition. Interim storage, treatment and neutralization, material recovery, packaging and extended dry storage options are identified these reactors. The disposition options include existing INL facilities and capabilities and new facilities and capabilities developed as part of the microreactor program or as part of DOE's overall strategy for the eventual transfer of all SNF at INL to a permanent repository.

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Integrated Modeling and Monitoring Technologies for Environmental Resiliency in Nuclear Energy

Environmental concerns pose the biggest challenge for the development of the nuclear energy industry, often preventing or limiting the construction of new plants and radioactive waste disposal facilities. There are currently numerous sites in the world at which surface and groundwater are contaminated by nuclear weapon production and testing, as well as due to nuclear power plant accidents. Many of those sites remain unused or inhabited primarily due to public concern. Improving scientific and technical capabilities to develop environmental resiliency is critical not only to address existing contamination, but also to build public confidence and support for nuclear energy. One of the obstacles in remediation is to tackle a large volume of contaminated soil and groundwater with relatively low concentrations. Although many contaminant removal technologies have developed (e.g., pump-and-treat systems), they are often expensive and not cost-effective for low-concentration radionuclide contamination. Although soil removal is often the most effective, it produces a large amount of waste that has to be stored securely for a long period of time or treated at the special treatment facilities. Transporting a large amount of waste may also produce greenhouse gases and disrupt local communities. Recently, the concept of 'sustainable remediation' has been proposed to improve a remediation system as a whole, including the consideration of cost effectiveness, reduction of greenhouse emission, waste production and energy usage. Rather than just focusing on removing contaminants, the sustainable remediation highlights the use of passive remediation technologies to immobilize radionuclides along with the application of monitored natural attenuation and longer institutional control. However, such passive technologies and monitored natural attenuation require the increased burden of proof to ensure that those immobilized contaminants would not compromise the long-term public health. Although contaminant transport modeling and risk assessments are always performed, they sometimes fail due to the lack of understanding the contaminant transport proposes at the time of the risk assessment or due to some unexpected processes. Monitoring technologies are critical to ensure the long-term stability of such remediated sites, and also to address the public concerns. Recent advances in in situ sensor technologies and spatially-extensive mapping technologies (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, airborne mapping, geophysics) have improved monitoring of contamination over space and time. In addition to new sensing devices, data management and data analytics technologies have been expanded to manage and process large spatial and temporal datasets. Such technologies can be used to reduce monitoring cost significantly, and to facilitate long-term monitoring. In this study, we demonstrate our data analytics technologies for two nuclear-related contaminated sites: (1) air dose rate monitoring in Fukushima prefecture, and (2) groundwater monitoring at the Savannah River Site F-Area. We are developing the spatial and temporal data integration methodologies to integrate various spatially extensive data and time-series data for improving long-term monitoring. Such monitoring technologies and experiences at the existing contaminated sites can be transferred to build a better monitoring system for nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storages.

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CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF SIMULATED HIGH LEVEL WASTE GLASSES TO SUPPORT SULFATE SOLUBILITY MODELING

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM) is sponsoring an international, collaborative project to develop a fundamental model for sulfate solubility in nuclear waste glass. The solubility of sulfate has a significant impact on the achievable waste loading for nuclear waste forms both within the DOE complex and to some extent at U.K. sites. The development of enhanced borosilicate glass compositions with improved sulfate solubility will allow for higher waste loadings and accelerated cleanup missions. Much of the previous work on improving sulfate retention in waste glasses has been done on an empirical basis, making it difficult to apply the findings to future waste compositions despite the large number of glass systems studied. A more fundamental, rather than empirical, model of sulfate solubility in glass, under development at Sheffield Hallam University (SHU), could provide a solution to the issues of sulfate solubility. The model uses the normalized cation field strength index as a function of glass composition to predict sulfate capacity, and has shown early success for some glass systems. The objective of the current scope is to mature the sulfate solubility model to the point where it can be used to guide glass composition development for DOE waste vitrification efforts, allowing for enhanced waste loadings and waste throughput. A series of targeted glass compositions was selected to resolve data gaps in the current model. SHU fabricated these glasses and sent samples to the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for chemical composition analysis. SHU will use the resulting data to enhance the sulfate solubility model and resolve any deficiencies. In this report, SRNL provides chemical analyses for simulated waste glasses fabricated SHU in support of sulfate solubility model development. A review of the measured compositions revealed that there are issues with the B{sub 2}O{sub 3} and Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} concentrations missing their targeted values by a significant amount for several of the study glasses. SHU is reviewing the fabrication of these glasses and the chemicals used in batching them to identify the source of these issues. The measured sulfate concentrations were all below their targeted values. This is expected, as the targeted concentrations likely exceeded the solubility limit for sulfate in these glass compositions. Some volatilization of sulfate may also have occurred during fabrication of the glasses. Measurements of the other oxides in the study glasses were reasonably close to their targeted values

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