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NASA NTRS2012

Spinoff 2011

Topics include: Bioreactors Drive Advances in Tissue Engineering; Tooling Techniques Enhance Medical Imaging; Ventilator Technologies Sustain Critically Injured Patients; Protein Innovations Advance Drug Treatments, Skin Care; Mass Analyzers Facilitate Research on Addiction; Frameworks Coordinate Scientific Data Management; Cameras Improve Navigation for Pilots, Drivers; Integrated Design Tools Reduce Risk, Cost; Advisory Systems Save Time, Fuel for Airlines; Modeling Programs Increase Aircraft Design Safety; Fly-by-Wire Systems Enable Safer, More Efficient Flight; Modified Fittings Enhance Industrial Safety; Simulation Tools Model Icing for Aircraft Design; Information Systems Coordinate Emergency Management; Imaging Systems Provide Maps for U.S. Soldiers; High-Pressure Systems Suppress Fires in Seconds; Alloy-Enhanced Fans Maintain Fresh Air in Tunnels; Control Algorithms Charge Batteries Faster; Software Programs Derive Measurements from Photographs; Retrofits Convert Gas Vehicles into Hybrids; NASA Missions Inspire Online Video Games; Monitors Track Vital Signs for Fitness and Safety; Thermal Components Boost Performance of HVAC Systems; World Wind Tools Reveal Environmental Change; Analyzers Measure Greenhouse Gasses, Airborne Pollutants; Remediation Technologies Eliminate Contaminants; Receivers Gather Data for Climate, Weather Prediction; Coating Processes Boost Performance of Solar Cells; Analyzers Provide Water Security in Space and on Earth; Catalyst Substrates Remove Contaminants, Produce Fuel; Rocket Engine Innovations Advance Clean Energy; Technologies Render Views of Earth for Virtual Navigation; Content Platforms Meet Data Storage, Retrieval Needs; Tools Ensure Reliability of Critical Software; Electronic Handbooks Simplify Process Management; Software Innovations Speed Scientific Computing; Controller Chips Preserve Microprocessor Function; Nanotube Production Devices Expand Research Capabilities; Custom Machines Advance Composite Manufacturing; Polyimide Foams Offer Superior Insulation; Beam Steering Devices Reduce Payload Weight; Models Support Energy-Saving Microwave Technologies; Materials Advance Chemical Propulsion Technology; and High-Temperature Coatings Offer Energy Savings.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2011

Achieving Innovation and Affordability Through Standardization of Materials Development and Testing

The successful expansion of development, innovation, and production within the aeronautics industry during the 20th century was facilitated by collaboration of government agencies with the commercial aviation companies. One of the initial products conceived from the collaboration was the ANC-5 Bulletin, first published in 1937. The ANC-5 Bulletin had intended to standardize the requirements of various government agencies in the design of aircraft structure. The national space policy shift in priority for NASA with an emphasis on transferring the travel to low earth orbit to commercial space providers highlights an opportunity and a need for the national and global space industries. The same collaboration and standardization that is documented and maintained by the industry within MIL-HDBK-5 (MMPDS-01) and MIL-HBDK-17 (nonmetallic mechanical properties) can also be exploited to standardize the thermal performance properties, processing methods, test methods, and analytical methods for use in aircraft and spacecraft design and associated propulsion systems. In addition to the definition of thermal performance description and standardization, the standardization for test methods and analysis for extreme environments (high temperature, cryogenics, deep space radiation, etc) would also be highly valuable to the industry. Its subsequent revisions and conversion to MIL-HDBK-5 and then MMPDS-01 established and then expanded to contain standardized mechanical property design values and other related design information for metallic materials used in aircraft, missiles, and space vehicles. It also includes guidance on standardization of composition, processing, and analytical methods for presentation and inclusion into the handbook. This standardization enabled an expansion of the technologies to provide efficiency and reliability to the consumers. It can be established that many individual programs within the government agencies have been overcome with development costs generated from these nonstandard requirements. Without industry standardization and acceptance, the programs are driven to shoulder the costs of determining design requirements, performance criteria, and then material qualification and certification. A significant investment that the industry could make to both reduce individual program development costs and schedules while expanding commercial space flight capabilities would be to invest in standardizing material performance properties for high temperature, cryogenic, and deep space environments for both metallic and nonmetallic materials.

Bray, M. H.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Developing a Habitat for Long Duration, Deep Space Missions

One possible next leap in human space exploration for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a mission to a near Earth asteroid (NEA). In order to achieve such an ambitious goal, a space habitat will need to accommodate a crew of four for the 380-day round trip. The Human Spaceflight Architecture Team (HAT) developed a conceptual design for such a habitat. The team identified activities that would be performed inside a long-duration, deep space habitat, and the capabilities needed to support such a mission. A list of seven functional activities/capabilities was developed: individual and group crew care, spacecraft and mission operations, subsystem equipment, logistics and resupply, and contingency operations. The volume for each activity was determined using NASA STD-3001 and the companion Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Although, the sum of these volumes produced an over-sized spacecraft, the team evaluated activity frequency and duration to identify functions that could share a common volume without conflict, reducing the total volume by 24%. After adding 10% for growth, the resulting functional pressurized volume was calculated to be a minimum of 268 cu m (9,464 cu ft) distributed over the functions. The work was validated through comparison to Mir, Skylab, the International Space Station (ISS), Bigelow Aerospace s proposed habitat module, and NASA s Trans-Hab concept. Using HIDH guidelines, the team developed an internal layout that (a) minimized the transit time between related crew stations, (b) accommodated expected levels of activity at each station, (c) isolated stations when necessary for health, safety, performance, and privacy, and (d) provided a safe, efficient, and comfortable work and living environment.

Rucker, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Factors Impacting Habitable Volume Requirements for Long Duration Missions

One possible next leap in human space exploration for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a mission to a near Earth asteroid (NEA). In order to achieve such an ambitious goal, a space habitat will need to accommodate a crew of four for the 380-day round trip. The Human Spaceflight Architecture Team (HAT) developed a conceptual design for such a habitat. The team identified activities that would be performed inside a long-duration, deep space habitat, and the capabilities needed to support such a mission. A list of seven functional activities/capabilities was developed: individual and group crew care, spacecraft and mission operations, subsystem equipment, logistics and resupply, and contingency operations. The volume for each activity was determined using NASA STD-3001 and the companion Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Although, the sum of these volumes produced an over-sized spacecraft, the team evaluated activity frequency and duration to identify functions that could share a common volume without conflict, reducing the total volume by 24%. After adding 10% for growth, the resulting functional pressurized volume was calculated to be a minimum of 268 m3 (9,464 ft3) distributed over the functions. The work was validated through comparison to Mir, Skylab, the International Space Station (ISS), Bigelow Aerospace s proposed habitat module, and NASA s Trans-Hab concept. Using HIDH guidelines, the team developed an internal layout that (a) minimized the transit time between related crew stations, (b) accommodated expected levels of activity at each station, (c) isolated stations when necessary for health, safety, performance, and privacy, and (d) provided a safe, efficient, and comfortable work and living environment.

Simon, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS2012

Tailoring Systems Engineering Processes in a Conceptual Design Environment: A Case Study at NASA Marshall Spaceflight Center's ACO

This paper provides an overview of Systems Engineering as it is applied in a conceptual design space systems department at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Marshall Spaceflight Center (MSFC) Advanced Concepts Office (ACO). Engineering work performed in the NASA MFSC's ACO is targeted toward the Exploratory Research and Concepts Development life cycle stages, as defined in the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) System Engineering Handbook. This paper addresses three ACO Systems Engineering tools that correspond to three INCOSE Technical Processes: Stakeholder Requirements Definition, Requirements Analysis, and Integration, as well as one Project Process Risk Management. These processes are used to facilitate, streamline, and manage systems engineering processes tailored for the earliest two life cycle stages, which is the environment in which ACO engineers work. The role of systems engineers and systems engineering as performed in ACO is explored in this paper. The need for tailoring Systems Engineering processes, tools, and products in the ever-changing engineering services ACO provides to its customers is addressed.

Mulqueen, John↗
NASA NTRS2012

An Elementary Overview of the Selection of Materials for Service in Oxygen-Enriched Environments

The process for selecting materials for use in oxygen or oxygen-enriched environments is one that continues to be investigated by many industries due to the importance to those industries of oxygen systems. There are several excellent resources available to assist oxygen systems design engineers and end-users, with the most comprehensive being ASTM MNL-36, Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems: Handbook for Design, Operation and Maintenance, 2nd Edition. ASTM also makes available several standards for oxygen systems. However, the ASTM publications are extremely detailed, and typically designed for professionals who already possess a working knowledge of oxygen systems. No notable resource exists, whether an ASTM or other organizational publication, which can be used to educate engineers or technicians who have no prior knowledge of the nuances of oxygen system design and safety. This paper will fill the void for information needed by organizations that design or operate oxygen systems. The information in this paper is not new information, but is a concise and easily understood summary of selecting materials for oxygen systems. This paper will serve well as an employee s first introduction to oxygen system materials selection, and probably the employee s first introduction to ASTM.

Davis, Samuel Eddie↗
NASA NTRS2012

Hazard Analysis for Pneumatic Flipper Suitport/Z-1 Manned Evaluation, Chamber B, Building 32

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to protect our personnel from injury and our equipment from damage. The purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Z1 Suit Port Test in Chamber B located in building 32, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments, and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment, and hardware. The goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel and/or damage facility equipment, flight hardware, property, or harm the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Validation of Helicopter Gear Condition Indicators Using Seeded Fault Tests

A "seeded fault test" in support of a rotorcraft condition based maintenance program (CBM), is an experiment in which a component is tested with a known fault while health monitoring data is collected. These tests are performed at operating conditions comparable to operating conditions the component would be exposed to while installed on the aircraft. Performance of seeded fault tests is one method used to provide evidence that a Health Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) can replace current maintenance practices required for aircraft airworthiness. Actual in-service experience of the HUMS detecting a component fault is another validation method. This paper will discuss a hybrid validation approach that combines in service-data with seeded fault tests. For this approach, existing in-service HUMS flight data from a naturally occurring component fault will be used to define a component seeded fault test. An example, using spiral bevel gears as the targeted component, will be presented. Since the U.S. Army has begun to develop standards for using seeded fault tests for HUMS validation, the hybrid approach will be mapped to the steps defined within their Aeronautical Design Standard Handbook for CBM. This paper will step through their defined processes, and identify additional steps that may be required when using component test rig fault tests to demonstrate helicopter CI performance. The discussion within this paper will provide the reader with a better appreciation for the challenges faced when defining a seeded fault test for HUMS validation.

Dempsey, Paula↗
NASA NTRS2013

Management Approach for NASA's Earth Venture-1 (EV-1) Airborne Science Investigations

The Earth System Science Pathfinder (ESSP) Program Office (PO) is responsible for programmatic management of National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Science Mission Directorate's (SMD) Earth Venture (EV) missions. EV is composed of both orbital and suborbital Earth science missions. The first of the Earth Venture missions is EV-1, which are Principal Investigator-led, temporally-sustained, suborbital (airborne) science investigations costcapped at $30M each over five years. Traditional orbital procedures, processes and standards used to manage previous ESSP missions, while effective, are disproportionally comprehensive for suborbital missions. Conversely, existing airborne practices are primarily intended for smaller, temporally shorter investigations, and traditionally managed directly by a program scientist as opposed to a program office such as ESSP. In 2010, ESSP crafted a management approach for the successful implementation of the EV-1 missions within the constructs of current governance models. NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements form the foundation of the approach for EV-1. Additionally, requirements from other existing NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs), systems engineering guidance and management handbooks were adapted to manage programmatic, technical, schedule, cost elements and risk. As the EV-1 missions are nearly at the end of their successful execution and project lifecycle and the submission deadline of the next mission proposals near, the ESSP PO is taking the lessons learned and updated the programmatic management approach for all future Earth Venture Suborbital (EVS) missions for an even more flexible and streamlined management approach.

Guillory, Anthony R.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management

The draft NASA Fault Management (FM) Handbook (2012) states that Fault Management (FM) is a "part of systems engineering", and that it "demands a system-level perspective" (NASAHDBK- 1002, 7). What, exactly, is the relationship between systems engineering and FM? To NASA, systems engineering (SE) is "the art and science of developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints" (NASA/SP-2007-6105, 3). Systems engineering starts with the elucidation and development of requirements, which set the goals that the system is to achieve. To achieve these goals, the systems engineer typically defines functions, and the functions in turn are the basis for design trades to determine the best means to perform the functions. System Health Management (SHM), by contrast, defines "the capabilities of a system that preserve the system's ability to function as intended" (Johnson et al., 2011, 3). Fault Management, in turn, is the operational subset of SHM, which detects current or future failures, and takes operational measures to prevent or respond to these failures. Failure, in turn, is the "unacceptable performance of intended function." (Johnson 2011, 605) Thus the relationship of SE to FM is that SE defines the functions and the design to perform those functions to meet system goals and requirements, while FM detects the inability to perform those functions and takes action. SHM and FM are in essence "the dark side" of SE. For every function to be performed (SE), there is the possibility that it is not successfully performed (SHM); FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this lack of success. We can also describe this in terms of goals: for every goal to be achieved, there is the possibility that it is not achieved; FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this inability to achieve the goal. This brief description of relationships between SE, SHM, and FM provide hints to a modeling approach to provide formal connectivity between the nominal (SE), and off-nominal (SHM and FM) aspects of functions and designs. This paper describes a formal modeling approach to the initial phases of the development process that integrates the nominal and off-nominal perspectives in a model that unites SE goals and functions of with the failure to achieve goals and functions (SHM/FM). This methodology and corresponding model, known as a Goal-Function Tree (GFT), provides a means to represent, decompose, and elaborate system goals and functions in a rigorous manner that connects directly to design through use of state variables that translate natural language requirements and goals into logical-physical state language. The state variable-based approach also provides the means to directly connect FM to the design, by specifying the range in which state variables must be controlled to achieve goals, and conversely, the failures that exist if system behavior go out-of-range. This in turn allows for the systems engineers and SHM/FM engineers to determine which state variables to monitor, and what action(s) to take should the system fail to achieve that goal. In sum, the GFT representation provides a unified approach to early-phase SE and FM development. This representation and methodology has been successfully developed and implemented using Systems Modeling Language (SysML) on the NASA Space Launch System (SLS) Program. It enabled early design trade studies of failure detection coverage to ensure complete detection coverage of all crew-threatening failures. The representation maps directly both to FM algorithm designs, and to failure scenario definitions needed for design analysis and testing. The GFT representation provided the basis for mapping of abort triggers into scenarios, both needed for initial, and successful quantitative analyses of abort effectiveness (detection and response to crew-threatening events).

Patterson, Jonathan D.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management

The draft NASA Fault Management (FM) Handbook (2012) states that Fault Management (FM) is a "part of systems engineering", and that it "demands a system-level perspective" (NASAHDBK- 1002, 7). What, exactly, is the relationship between systems engineering and FM? To NASA, systems engineering (SE) is "the art and science of developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints" (NASA/SP-2007-6105, 3). Systems engineering starts with the elucidation and development of requirements, which set the goals that the system is to achieve. To achieve these goals, the systems engineer typically defines functions, and the functions in turn are the basis for design trades to determine the best means to perform the functions. System Health Management (SHM), by contrast, defines "the capabilities of a system that preserve the system's ability to function as intended" (Johnson et al., 2011, 3). Fault Management, in turn, is the operational subset of SHM, which detects current or future failures, and takes operational measures to prevent or respond to these failures. Failure, in turn, is the "unacceptable performance of intended function." (Johnson 2011, 605) Thus the relationship of SE to FM is that SE defines the functions and the design to perform those functions to meet system goals and requirements, while FM detects the inability to perform those functions and takes action. SHM and FM are in essence "the dark side" of SE. For every function to be performed (SE), there is the possibility that it is not successfully performed (SHM); FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this lack of success. We can also describe this in terms of goals: for every goal to be achieved, there is the possibility that it is not achieved; FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this inability to achieve the goal. This brief description of relationships between SE, SHM, and FM provide hints to a modeling approach to provide formal connectivity between the nominal (SE), and off-nominal (SHM and FM) aspects of functions and designs. This paper describes a formal modeling approach to the initial phases of the development process that integrates the nominal and off-nominal perspectives in a model that unites SE goals and functions of with the failure to achieve goals and functions (SHM/FM).

Johnson, Stephen B.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Comparison of Computational Approaches for Rapid Aerodynamic Assessment of Small UAVs

Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) methods were used to determine the basic aerodynamic, performance, and stability and control characteristics of the unmanned air vehicle (UAV), Kahu. Accurate and timely prediction of the aerodynamic characteristics of small UAVs is an essential part of military system acquisition and air-worthiness evaluations. The forces and moments of the UAV were predicted using a variety of analytical methods for a range of configurations and conditions. The methods included Navier Stokes (N-S) flow solvers (USM3D, Kestrel and Cobalt) that take days to set up and hours to converge on a single solution; potential flow methods (PMARC, LSAERO, and XFLR5) that take hours to set up and minutes to compute; empirical methods (Datcom) that involve table lookups and produce a solution quickly; and handbook calculations. A preliminary aerodynamic database can be developed very efficiently by using a combination of computational tools. The database can be generated with low-order and empirical methods in linear regions, then replacing or adjusting the data as predictions from higher order methods are obtained. A comparison of results from all the data sources as well as experimental data obtained from a wind-tunnel test will be shown and the methods will be evaluated on their utility during each portion of the flight envelope.

Shafer, Theresa C.↗
NASA NTRS2013

The DEEP2 Galaxy Redshift Survey: Design, Observations, Data Reduction, and Redshifts

We describe the design and data analysis of the DEEP2 Galaxy Redshift Survey, the densest and largest high-precision redshift survey of galaxies at z approx. 1 completed to date. The survey was designed to conduct a comprehensive census of massive galaxies, their properties, environments, and large-scale structure down to absolute magnitude MB = −20 at z approx. 1 via approx.90 nights of observation on the Keck telescope. The survey covers an area of 2.8 Sq. deg divided into four separate fields observed to a limiting apparent magnitude of R(sub AB) = 24.1. Objects with z approx. < 0.7 are readily identifiable using BRI photometry and rejected in three of the four DEEP2 fields, allowing galaxies with z > 0.7 to be targeted approx. 2.5 times more efficiently than in a purely magnitude-limited sample. Approximately 60% of eligible targets are chosen for spectroscopy, yielding nearly 53,000 spectra and more than 38,000 reliable redshift measurements. Most of the targets that fail to yield secure redshifts are blue objects that lie beyond z approx. 1.45, where the [O ii] 3727 Ang. doublet lies in the infrared. The DEIMOS 1200 line mm(exp −1) grating used for the survey delivers high spectral resolution (R approx. 6000), accurate and secure redshifts, and unique internal kinematic information. Extensive ancillary data are available in the DEEP2 fields, particularly in the Extended Groth Strip, which has evolved into one of the richest multiwavelength regions on the sky. This paper is intended as a handbook for users of the DEEP2 Data Release 4, which includes all DEEP2 spectra and redshifts, as well as for the DEEP2 DEIMOS data reduction pipelines. Extensive details are provided on object selection, mask design, biases in target selection and redshift measurements, the spec2d two-dimensional data-reduction pipeline, the spec1d automated redshift pipeline, and the zspec visual redshift verification process, along with examples of instrumental signatures or other artifacts that in some cases remain after data reduction. Redshift errors and catastrophic failure rates are assessed through more than 2000 objects with duplicate observations. Sky subtraction is essentially photon-limited even under bright OH sky lines; we describe the strategies that permitted this, based on high image stability, accurate wavelength solutions, and powerful B-spline modeling methods. We also investigate the impact of targets that appear to be single objects in ground-based targeting imaging but prove to be composite in Hubble Space Telescope data; they constitute several percent of targets at z approx. 1, approaching approx. 5%-10% at z > 1.5. Summary data are given that demonstrate the superiority of DEEP2 over other deep high-precision redshift surveys at z approx. 1 in terms of redshift accuracy, sample number density, and amount of spectral information. We also provide an overview of the scientific highlights of the DEEP2 survey thus far.

Galaxy↗
NASA NTRS2014

Analyzing Risks and Vulnerabilities of Various Computer Systems and Undergoing Exploitation using Embedded Devices

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated, patched and secured state in a launch control system environment. Attacks on critical systems are becoming more and more relevant and frequent. Nation states are hacking into critical networks that might control electrical power grids or water dams as well as carrying out advanced persistent threat (APTs) attacks on government entities. NASA, as an organization, must protect its self from attacks from all different types of attackers with different motives. Although the International Space Station was created, there is still competition between the different space programs. With that in mind, NASA might get attacked and breached for various reasons such as espionage or sabotage. My project will provide a way for NASA to complete an in house penetration test which includes: asset discovery, vulnerability scans, exploit vulnerabilities and also provide forensic information to harden systems. Completing penetration testing is a part of the compliance requirements of the Federal Information Security Act (FISMA) and NASA NPR 2810.1 and related NASA Handbooks. This project is to demonstrate how in house penetration testing can be conducted that will satisfy all of the compliance requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as outlined in FISMA. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

Penetration Testing↗
NASA NTRS2014

Hazard Analysis for Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to prevent injury to personnel, and to prevent damage to facilities and equipment. The primary purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment and hardware. In fulfillment of the stated purposes, the goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel, damage the facility or its test systems or equipment, test articles, Government or personal property, or the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in Appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, "JSC Safety and Health Handbook" and JSC 17773 Rev D "Instructions for Preparation of Hazard Analysis for JSC Ground Operations".

Meginnis, Ian↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS2015

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most missions is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and spacecraft operations. FM is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. Generally, FM architecture, implementation, and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (V&V) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Annual Workshop titled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes" exposed this issue in terms of V&V for a representative set of architectures. NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) has provided funds to NASA IV&V to extend the work performed at the Workshop session in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). NASA IV&V will extract FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio and evaluate the data set, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This SARP initiative focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures and associated V&V/IV&V techniques provides a data set that can enable improved assurance that a system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the space community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research.

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS2015

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

The satellite systems Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and operations. This structure is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. These architecture, implementation and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (VV) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Annual Workshop titled VV of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes exposed these issues in terms of VV for a representative set of architectures. NASA's IVV is funded by NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to extend the work performed at the Workshop session. NASA IVV will extract FM architectures across the IVV portfolio and evaluate the data set for robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This work focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated VVIVV techniques provides a data set that can enable higher assurance that a satellite system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the satellite community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research including identification of FM architectures, visibility observations, and methods utilized for VVIVV.

Fault Management↗