Refractory wettability and surface tension of several nuclear waste glass simulants
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Results for “radioactive waste”
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Nuclear Waste Attributes of SMRs Scheduled for Near-Term Deployment
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the nuclear waste attributes of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) scheduled for deployment within this decade using available data and established nuclear waste metrics, with the results compared to a reference large Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). The current fleet of commercial nuclear reactors in the U.S. is composed of 92 large Light Water Reactors (LWR) with an average electricity generating capacity of over 1,000 MWe each. These large LWRs built on-site in massive construction projects have been the mainstay of the industry for the last 50 years. However, new construction soon is expected to include several designs of smaller reactors primarily fabricated in factories and installed in the field in modules. Some of these SMRs will also be LWRs, while some will use other coolants such as liquid metals, molten salts or gases, and different types of fuels. The technologies and economics of SMRs have been the focus of many studies, but there has been only minimal information published on the amount of nuclear waste different types of SMRs are expected to generate and no reports focused on near-term-deployable designs. In this study, the nuclear waste attributes of three small reactors scheduled for near-term-deployment, VOYGR TM (from NuScale Power), Natrium TM ab (from TerraPower), and Xe-100 (from X-energy), were assessed by comparing nuclear waste metrics with those of a reference large Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).
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Annual status update for OWL
This report represents completion of milestone deliverable M2SF-23SN010309082 Annual Status Update for OWL due on November 30, 2022. It provides the status of fiscal year 2022 (FY2022) updates for the Online Waste Library (OWL).
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Hanford 200 West Area Flowsheet Data to Support Waste Treatment and Disposal Request for Proposal
This report documents the 200 West Area (200W) flowsheet supplemental data needed to support the Request for Proposal (RFP) to procure onsite and/or offsite treatment and disposal capabilities for West Area pretreated1 tank waste (PTW). The data provided in this document is based on the results of a 200W flowsheet model run evaluating single-shell tank (SST) retrievals for all S, SX, and U Farms, except for Tank S-112, which was retrieved in March of 2007 (HNF-EP-0182, Waste Tank Summary Report for Month End August 31, 2024). The evaluation also includes the waste inventory in double-shell tanks (DSTs) in SY Farm.
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NEVADA NATIONAL SECURITY SITE WASTE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS - VOLUME REPORT* FY 2025 - QUARTER THREE
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The distribution and selective decontamination of carbon-14 from nuclear graphite
This work investigates 14 C release behaviour from UK Magnox reactor sourced irradiated graphite under relatively low temperature oxidation conditions: a 1% oxygen in argon atmosphere at temperatures ranging from 600°C to 700°C, and durations from 4 to 120 hours. A method is used for construction of a detailed 14 C release profile with mass loss. The 14 C release profile is predictable between samples, and an empirical release profile is derived to predict releases to higher mass losses than in this work. An accelerated 14 C release rate at small mass losses is observed, indicative of a 14 C-enriched surface region with a depleting concentration gradient into the material, and the source terms and complexities associated with predicting where the 14 C arose from are discussed. Selective decontamination of a fraction of the 14 C is possible, with the limitation of a reducing efficiency with mass loss and time. This work demonstrates a method for determining the distribution of 14 C between near-surface regions and the bulk material in differing sources of irradiated graphite, and provides data in support of making an informed assessment for the adoption of low temperature thermal treatment and isotopic reduction of irradiated graphite wastes.
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Laser-Based Means for Accelerating Nuclear Decay Rate
This project aims to replicate and build upon a reported series of results whereby nuclear decay of unstable species has been accelerated under laser irradiation in the presence of resonantly excited plasmonic nanoparticles. Most theoretical investigations of this problem do not predict the enhancement to be significant. Further, alternate explanations for the observed decrease in signals associated with the supposedly destroyed species need to be examined. There are potentially substantial benefits from exploiting this effect to reduce the long-term radiological storage requirements of certain forms of nuclear waste. These benefits merit the confirmation or disproving of the effect.
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Hazardous Waste Management Progress Report [SB14]
The Department of Energy (DOE) is the owner and part operator of multiple facilities in Northern California. The facilities include those located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA) and SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC) among other sites. Through their operations, the facilities generate hazardous waste and, thereby, are subject to the requirements of Chapter 31 of the Title 22 California Code of Regulations, Waste Minimization. The Northern California sites are primarily research and development facilities in the areas relating to national security, high-energy physics, engineering, bioscience and environmental health and safety disciplines. As mentioned above these DOE facilities are primarily research and development facilities. The hazardous wastes generated may be associated with operations that range in size from small, bench scale R&D to major maintenance and operations waste streams. Therefore, even though this document breaks down the waste streams based on California Waste Codes (CWC), the quantities of waste within one waste code category could be from many different locations and dissimilar processes. Because of the nature of the work at the sites, it is not economically feasible to try to implement source reduction measures for every process that generates a portion of the waste stream. This document identifies the processes that generate the major portion of the waste within an identified major waste stream and reports on progress made toward source reduction. In accomplishing the mission, it is DOE’s goal to eliminate waste generation and emissions giving priority to those that may present the greatest risk to human health and the environment.
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FY2020 Rotating Bed Reactor for Iodine Removal from WTP Melter Effluent to Support DFLAW Start-Up
In Performance Assessment (PA) of the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF), 129 I is a significant contributor to the risk. The 2017 IDF PA accounted for 0.22% of the total 129 I inventory in Hanford tank waste as residing in the solidified liquid waste from the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). However, recent estimates suggest that higher percentages of the iodine processed at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) may be present in the liquid waste routed to the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility (LERF) for eventual treatment at the ETF. In addition, a recent integrated melter test performed at the Vitreous State Laboratory (VSL) at The Catholic University of America (CUA) showed the possibility that a significant fraction (>50%) of the total iodine in the melter feed could be present in the aqueous waste stream destined for the ETF. This stream represents a combination of the Effluent Management Facility (EMF) evaporator overhead condensate and the liquid waste from the WTP off-gas caustic scrubber. Higher levels of 129 I in this stream could affect the LERF and ETF Hazard Categorizations as well as the acceptability of the solidified ETF liquid secondary waste brine for disposal at the IDF. Accordingly, there is a need to investigate and develop potential methods and processes to mitigate this risk. Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) tasked Atkins and VSL to perform development and testing work to evaluate potential methods for removal of iodine species from the waste stream routed to the LERF. In particular, the testing investigated the use of an Atkins-SpinIonic™ Rotating Bed Reactor (RBR) system as a potential alternative to conventional column-based ion exchange or absorption processes. The present report provides results obtained from testing with an RBR system for the removal of iodine from simulants of the projected WTP waste stream that discharges to the LERF.
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Insoluble Solids from Salt Dissolution: Characterization and Testing
Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has further characterized insoluble solids that were observed in a variable depth sample from a salt dissolution campaign in Tank 9H. The insoluble solids were determined to be predominately gibbsite, a mineral form of aluminum hydroxide. From a review of salt dissolution testing and field experience, SRNL provided a realistic estimate of 8 vol% for solids of this type is formed per volume of saltcake dissolved. This estimate was doubled to 16 vol% to account for dissolution test uncertainty and differences between in-tank settling and laboratory testing. Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) is currently assessing the solids formed during salt dissolution as slurried sludge for hydrogen retention and release, which is driving flammability controls during salt dissolution activities. SRMC has requested SRNL perform a gas retention and release study to better understand the impact of the insoluble solids on waste tank flammability, and to provide a more accurate estimate of their ability to retain and release flammable gases.
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Evaluation of Technology for Dry Retrieval of Tank Waste
The Hanford Roadmap report (NNLEMS-2022-00005) identified Dry Retrieval as an opportunity to make a significant impact on accelerating the Department of Energy-Environmental Management tank waste mission. Several commercially available technologies have been identified that hold the potential to enable Single Shell Tank retrieval without large infrastructure investments. The opportunity exists to leverage the technologies of the commercial mining, food, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries with advances in robotics for the tank waste retrieval mission.
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GDSA Repository Systems Analysis Investigations in FY 2023
This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package funded by the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD).
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Roadmap to Iodine and Mercury Abatement Materials Selection in Nuclear Waste Processing Off-Gas Streams
This work provides a guide for candidate mercury (Hg) and iodine-129 (129I) abatement material identification, screening, evaluation, technical gap identification, and bench-scale testing prioritization while also conceptualizing a materials deployment roadmap for implementation of new materials in the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility at Hanford in Richland, Washington, and elsewhere in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex for similar applications. The study was prompted by the need to replace the Kombisorb BAT-37 due to uncertainties in Hg and 129I capture performance and future availability for use in the WTP LAW Facility secondary off-gas system, specifically the Carbon Adsorber units. However, replacement of this material could also mitigate two other issues with Kombisorb BAT-37 (and its successor BAT II 37): (1) fire safety risk due to exothermic heat generated by adsorption reactions between the carbon material and Hg and (2) the risk of low retention of 129I in glass and subsequent downstream impacts on secondary liquid waste treatment at the Effluent Treatment Facility.
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Effect of Citrate on the Solubility of Uranium (VI) in WIPP Brine
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the only active deep geological repository in the United States for the disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste, located in the northern part of the Delaware Basin in southeastern New Mexico, approximately 26 miles east of Carlsbad. The repository is situated 2,150 feet (about 610 meters) underground within the Salado Formation, a thick layer of stable salt deposits. This unique geological formation provides a secure and long-term environment for isolating TRU waste, ensuring its safe containment for thousands of years.
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Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 West Area Burial Grounds
This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. All the trenches in these burial grounds except two have remained inactive since July 2004. The only active trenches that continue to receive low-level and mixed low-level waste are Trenches 31 and 34 that are located in the southern portion of the 218-W-5 Burial Ground. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2025, from October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025), waste was disposed in Trench 31 only.
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Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.
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In-situ Detection of Glovebox Glove Degradation Prior to Glove Failure; Effects on Safety, Waste, and Operational Costs - 20402
Glovebox glove pressure decay leak testing and analysis of the data can greatly improve glovebox safety, minimize Transuranic (TRU) glove waste, and minimize operational cost. It is well known, the weakest point of containment on a glovebox is the glove. Mitigating unplanned openings in gloves is critical to minimizing operational and safety costs in glovebox operations. Mitigating unplanned glove openings due to glove failures will be discussed in this paper. The lack of an engineered solution to determine a gloves operational life in nuclear operations, has lead to use of theoretical and manual subjective methods to determine the life and safety of a glovebox glove. Whether the glove is inspected visually prior to use, or gloves are changed regularly to theoretically avoid failure, both the operators PPE and the room are being exposed to contamination, or un-necessary amounts of TRU glove waste are being generated. Millions of dollars yearly in operational costs are spent on glove failures due to loss of production, incident analysis, regulatory audits, clean up, and paperwork. In a nuclear application, a glove failure could contaminate an operator and laboratory, shut down the operation for weeks, potentially create a regulatory audit, and potentially create a media frenzy; the damages to the organization can be astronomical. Elimination of glove failures is possible by tracking glove material degradation and setting limits to allow glove change when it becomes necessary, prior to glove failure. Analytical pressure decay leak testing allows the detection of material degradation, and in turn the ability to limit operational glove failures. A German based company called MK Versuchsanlagen, e.K., has developed an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System. The system, with its use of proprietary RFID and special software technology, is unique in its capabilities. The system is capable to perform highly accurate regular glove testing on any size glovebox line in minimal time. The system records and can analyze a tremendous amount of system data that in turn can determine, for example, a safe glove change time prior to a glove material failure. This paper will show how an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System can detect glove material degradation and help determine a safe change point prior to glove failure. Pressure decay curves of new gloves and recorded effects of accelerated aging on the glove over time will be shown. The use of this technology in nuclear facilities can greatly improve glovebox operational safety, minimize glovebox glove TRU waste, and save organizations tremendous costs in downtime, clean up, documentation, and potential regulatory review. (authors)
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Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, UMTRCA Title I Disposal Site 35 Years Postclosure (1985-2020) - 20288
The DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, Disposal Site is a former uranium ore-processing site located in the borough of Canonsburg and an important part of US history. For 46 years (1911-1957), the site processed ore, for vanadium, radium and then uranium. Soils and groundwater beneath the site were contaminated by the milling operations. The 15-hectare (37-acre) site is owned by the US government and managed by LM, which serves as the federal land manager and steward of cultural, historical, and natural resources at Cold War legacy sites that have been successfully cleaned up to remedial standards. In 1978 Congress directed DOE to remediate 22 inactive uranium-ore processing sites under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), in accordance with standards promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency in Title 40 CFR Part 192 (40 (CFR 192). Subpart B of 40 CFR 192 regulates the cleanup of contaminated groundwater at the processing sites. The radioactive materials were encapsulated in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved disposal cells, and the NRC general license for UMTRCA Title I sites is established in 10 CFR 40.27. Canonsburg was the first site to be remediated under UMTRCA. From 1983 to 1985, the Canonsburg site underwent cleanup under this US law that provides for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public. The site is unique in that it is one of only two UMTRCA Title I sites in the eastern half of the United States, the other site being the Burrell, Pennsylvania, Title I Disposal Site, a vicinity property to the Canonsburg site. It has been 35 years since the disposal cell at the Canonsburg site was completed. This paper discusses the many efforts that have been taken to maintain the site and presents some of the lessons learned concerning the long-term care of the site. The discussion includes but is not limited to the following: (1) Preserving site history so the community can better appreciate and understand the site. (2) Community outreach efforts, and the importance of maintaining transparency of environmental monitoring results with the community. (3) Pursuing reuse opportunities that offer the potential for improving the community. (4) Remaining engaged with the local community. (5) Remaining proactive in the long-term care of the site. (authors)
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