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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Solutions for the Geologic Disposal of Dual-Purpose Canisters

Commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is accumulating at 72 sites across the U.S., at the rate of about 2,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU) per year. There are currently more than 2,700 dualpurpose canisters (DPCs) loaded with SNF, which are designed for storage and transportation but not disposal. If current storage practices continue, about half the eventual total U.S. SNF inventory will be in about 5,500 dry storage systems by 2035, with the entire inventory stored in 10,000 or more by 2060. The quantity of SNF in DPCs is now much greater than that anticipated in the past, leading the DOE to investigate the technical feasibility of direct disposal of SNF in DPCs. Studies in 2013-2015 concluded that the main technical challenges for disposal of SNF in DPCs are thermal management, handling and emplacement of large, heavy waste packages, and postclosure criticality control (Hardin et al. 2015). Of these, postclosure criticality control is the most challenging, and the R&D needed for this aspect of DPC direct disposal is the primary focus of this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors

The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA) issued back in 2008, along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SA). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed the prior PAs and SAs and has been tasked to update the facility’s PA. For operating the E-Area facility, a Waste Inventory Tracking System (e.g., WITS) is actively employed by waste generators where every radionuclide entering the facility (to be buried in one of its many disposal units) must be either directly or indirectly accounted for. Since there is a large number of radionuclides in existence (>3,000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP-107) has provided guidance on the subset of radionuclides requiring further assessment in landfills such as the E-Area LLWF. The ICRP-107 publication provides critical radiological information on 1,252 radionuclides of 97 elements. This database is the critical starting point for developing a consistent inventory limit system. The explicit measurement and tracking of all radionuclides are not necessary when process knowledge, burial history, and radiological aspects are factored into conservative groundwater and intruder screening processes. Across the DOE complex these screening processes have been historically performed using the methodology suggested by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) as presented in their original report (NCRP 1984) and then refined in a later report (NCRP 1996). In the recommended screening models employed within this report the traditional NCRP models are updated to better handle progeny and better reflect the known characteristics of E-Area. This improved screening process is referred to as the “NCRP-like” method. Various upgrades to the traditional NCRP methodology have been used by others (e.g., NRC funded effort by Kennedy and Strenge 1992). The more detailed models by Kennedy and Strenge (1992) were considered in this effort and are compared to the results from the more traditional NCRP-like models. The groundwater and inadvertent intruder screening analyses presented in this report start with this 1,252 radionuclide list and reduces it down to more manageable lists that are applicable to the various disposal unit types contained within E-Area. In order to reduce this starting list, some level of exposure risk must be considered acceptable. Historically, a dose (or concentration level) has been compared with a screening criterion set to 1% of a performance measure (e.g., a beta-gamma dose not to exceed the 4 mrem/yr beta-gamma performance measure x 0.01 = 0.04 mrem/yr). Thus, if a radionuclide produced a bounding or screening-level dose (or concentrations) less than the screening criterion, it could be safely removed from further consideration. Several tiers of screening and bounding level analyses have been considered in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Characterization of the β-Phrase Region of the SAS Compressor Bed 1 Material (LANA10)

Isotherm data have been acquired and analyzed on the SAS Compressor Bed 1 material in order to define a method to set the initial bed Q/M value when freshly filled after inventory. β-phase data from eleven protium and two deuterium isotherms have been combined to determine a method for calculating the bed Q/M value given a β-phase equilibrium pressure at temperature. This method is a two-step method; first, the plateau pressure is calculated based on the isotope used and the temperature of the bed, and second, the measured equilibrium pressure is divided by the computed plateau pressure to obtain the reduced pressure, which is then inserted into the β-phase equation to calculate the bed’s Q/M value. Error sources and effects are discussed, with the conclusion that the ‘true’ reduced isotherm has been determined in the β-phase which will allow virgin bed inventory to be determined to ~3-4% accuracy.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of Hydrogen Generation in High Burnup Demonstration Dry Storage Cask

This report provides a best-estimate evaluation of residual water content (post-dry out) in the High Burnup (HBU) LWR Spent Fuel Demonstration project TN-32 cask, and evaluates the radiolysis of the residual free water, and the physisorbed and chemisorbed waters on the surfaces of the fuel and cask internal contents. The evaluation of radiolytic breakdown of those waters with gamma radiation causing the generation of hydrogen gas (H 2 ) is made using available literature data and models. This evaluation is part of the overall materials performance evaluation of the SNF-in-canister system, and is part of the technical bases for their continued safe dry storage. The TN-32 cask contents included 32 HBU LWR spent fuel assemblies each with 264 fuel rods clad in zirconium alloys, aluminum neutron absorber components, and aluminum and stainless steel structural components. The residual free and surface (physisorbed/chemisorbed) waters are ascribed to water vapor in the free volume and to components’ surfaces, respectively. The total potential radiolytic hydrogen inventory from the water vapor and from waters ascribed to surfaces has been calculated assuming all the water produced molecular H 2 . The residual water that is chemically incorporated into the bulk of a hydrated oxide, i.e., chemisorbed water, and its total potential hydrogen inventory has been calculated. These calculations are at the physical limit of material available and are used for a bounding assessment purpose only.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA) issued back in 2008, along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SA). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed the prior PAs and SAs and has been tasked to update the facility’s PA. For operating the E-Area facility, a Waste Inventory Tracking System (e.g., WITS) is actively employed by waste generators where every radionuclide entering the facility (to be buried in one of its many disposal units1) must be either directly or indirectly accounted for. Since there is a large number of radionuclides in existence (>3,000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP-107) has provided guidance on the subset of radionuclides requiring further assessment in landfills such as the E-Area LLWF. The ICRP-107 publication provides critical radiological information on 1,252 radionuclides of 97 elements. This database is the critical starting point for developing a consistent inventory limit system. The explicit measurement and tracking of all 1,252 ICRP-107 radionuclides can be reduced when process knowledge, burial history, and radiological aspects are factored into conservative groundwater and intruder screening processes. Across the DOE complex these screening processes have been historically performed using the methodology suggested by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) as presented in their original report (NCRP 1984) and then refined in a later report (NCRP 1996). In the recommended screening models employed within this report the traditional NCRP models are updated to better handle progeny and better reflect the known characteristics of E-Area. This improved screening process is referred to as the “NCRP-like” method. Various upgrades to the traditional NCRP methodology have been used by others (e.g., NRC funded effort by Kennedy and Strenge 1992). The more detailed models by Kennedy and Strenge (1992) were considered in this effort and are compared to the results from the more traditional NCRP-like models. The groundwater and inadvertent intruder screening analyses presented in this report start with this 1,252 radionuclide list and reduces it down to more manageable lists that are applicable to the various disposal unit types contained within E-Area. In order to reduce this starting list, some level of exposure risk must be considered acceptable. Historically, a dose (or concentration level) has been compared with a screening criterion set to 1% of a performance measure (e.g., a betagamma dose not to exceed the 4 mrem/yr beta-gamma performance measure x 0.01 = 0.04 mrem/yr). Thus, if a radionuclide produced a bounding or screening-level dose (or concentrations) less than the screening criterion, it could be safely removed from further consideration. Several tiers of screening and bounding level analyses have been considered in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) Material Test Reactor (MTR) (Fuel Inspection Program Report)

The AMCAP MTR Fuel Inspection Program, a special inspection program comprised of four inspection campaigns, examined a total of ten (10) pre-selected aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel core spent nuclear fuel assemblies (ASNF) stored in the L Area Disassembly Basin (L Basin) at the Savannah River Site. A full description of the inspections and the results are reported. The fuel had been stored in bundled-tube storage (Vertical Tube Storage) for periods of 18 to 21 years. The prior service experience of the individual 10 assemblies varies, but all included irradiation followed by wet storage at international research reactor sites prior to shipment to the US and storage in L Basin. The 10 assemblies were expected to be among the “worst"’ in terms of prior corrosion damage of the entire inventory of the direct-bundle-stored ASNF in L Basin. The inventory of MTR ASNF in L Basin will continue to be stored in the bundled-tube configuration or in slug-storage buckets with inserts pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The MTR fuel inspections focused on collecting information for characterization of the material condition of the ASNF considering various types of aluminum fuel corrosion degradation of its assembled materials in water storage. A custom-designed Fuel Inspection Table was used to stage the fuel for remote, enhanced visual examination (close-up video imaging & recording) with controlled lighting and positioning that enables reproducibility of imaging conditions. The inspections were conducted by fuel subject matter expert staff from Spent Fuel Project Engineering (SFPE) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Stills captured from the video records were used to compare the corrosion evolution from previous records, as available. This evaluation of the inspection results including the comparison to the previous inspection results demonstrate that the water quality and the storage configuration of ASNF in L Basin do not cause aggressive corrosion degradation of the fuel; mitigation of the prior corrosion degradation of the fuel also appears to have been achieved with the good water quality conditions of L Basin. Recommendations are made for future inspection of the fuel to trend corrosion degradation and demonstrate continued safe wet storage of the ASNF in L Basin. The next fuel examination is recommended to be performed in 5 years.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Destructive PIE and Safety Testing of Six AGR-2 UO 2 Capsule 3 Compacts

The Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification Program’s second irradiation experiment (AGR-2) was irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) from June 2010 to October 2013 (Collin 2014). The fuel compacts in this experiment held either tristructural isotropic (TRISO)-coated spherical kernels of uranium oxide (UO2) or TRISO-coated kernels containing both uranium carbide and uranium oxide phases (UCO). There were six separately monitored and controlled capsules in the AGR-2 test train. Capsule 3 held twelve compacts containing UO2-TRISO particles fabricated by BWX Technologies Nuclear Operations Group. The AGR-2 TRISO particles were fabricated in a pilot-scale fluidized-bed chemical vapor deposition (FB-CVD) furnace with a coating chamber inner diameter of 150 mm (Phillips, Barnes, and Hunn 2010), which was a change from the first irradiation experiment (AGR-1) particles that had been coated in a lab-scale FB-CVD coating system with a chamber inner diameter of 50 mm (Lowden 2006). The TRISO particles were overcoated with resinated graphite flake at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the overcoated particles were pressed into one-inch-long, half-inch-diameter cylinders (Hunn, Montgomery, and Pappano 2010). Each cylindrical compact held an average of 1,543 TRISO particles with 9.6% enriched UO2 kernels that had a nominal diameter of 500 μm (Hunn, Savage, and Silva 2012). Capsule 3 compacts were irradiated to average calculated burnups of 9.01–10.69% fissions per initial metal atom (FIMA), and the average calculated fluences of fast neutrons with energies E n > 0.18 MeV were 3.05–3.53×10 25 n/m 2 (Sterbentz 2014). The calculated time-average, volume-average Capsule 3 compact temperatures were 996–1,062°C. However, Capsule 3 compact temperatures varied several hundred degrees across each compact, and the timeaverage minimum (TA min ) and time-average maximum (TA max ) temperatures were between 889–999°C and 1,072–1,105°C, respectively (Hawkes 2014). After irradiation, the AGR-2 test train was transferred from ATR to the INL Materials and Fuels Complex for inspection and disassembly (Ploger, Demkowicz, and Harp 2015). The initial inspection included dimensional metrology of the compacts and graphite fuel holders. Like all the AGR-2 compacts, the compacts in Capsule 3 shrank slightly during irradiation, as expected, with an average length reduction of 1.07–1.24% and an average diameter reduction of 0.13–0.41%. Post-irradiation examination (PIE) of the capsule components was completed to measure select fission products ( 90 Sr, 110m Ag, 134 Cs, 137 Cs, 144 Ce, and 154 Eu) outside the compacts (Stempien and Demkowicz 2020). This involved gamma counting of the graphite and graphoil spacers at the top and bottom of each capsule, acid leaching for radiochemical analysis of fission products on the metallic capsule components, and burn-leach analysis of the graphite holders. The total amount of 110mAg measured on the Capsule 3 components was 13% of the calculated capsule inventory. This was significantly lower than the amount of 110m Ag measured on the three UCO capsule components, which ranged from 32–70%. The lower 110m Ag release in Capsule 3 was likely due to lower peak temperatures compared with the UCO fuel capsules (Hawkes 2014). Measured inventories of the other select fission products were also lower in Capsule 3.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Best Practices for Shielding Analyses of Activated Metals and Spent Resins from Reactor Operation

This report investigated best practices for performing shielding evaluations of Type B waste packages, as defined in 10 CFR Part 71 regulations on packaging and transportation of radioactive material, or packages for which the contents are not defined before loading and may include a broad range of nuclides, geometries, and non-fuel materials. The following non-fuel waste streams were analyzed: Activated metals from decommissioned commercial power reactors, including Type 304 stainless steel, reactor vessel steel, and Inconel, Control blades from boiling water reactors, Neutron-activated corrosion products on surfaces of activated metals, and Spent resins from power plant operations. Measured elemental compositions, including major constituents and impurities, for steel and Inconel samples from commercial power reactors were used in activation calculations to determine radionuclide inventories in activated metals. For a simplified cask model, 60 Co contribution to the total external package dose rate at 30 days after shutdown varied from approximately 60% to 95%, depending on the activated metal, initial cobalt impurity concentration in the metal, and the thickness of the overpack gamma shield. Its maximum contribution to the total external package dose rate of approximately 100% was reached within the time interval of 2 to 5 years after shutdown and was maintained for up to 45 to 60 years after shutdown, depending on material, initial cobalt impurity concentration, and shield thickness. Thereafter, the 60 Co contribution to external package dose rate decreased with increasing decay time. Cobalt-60 is primarily produced by neutron reactions with the cobalt impurity in steel and Inconel. Other important radionuclides in activated metals contributing to package external dose rate are radionuclides with relatively short decay times, including 51 Cr, 59 Fe, 58 Co, and 54 Mn. These radionuclides may be represented as an equivalent 60 Co activity/source because 60 Co gamma ray emissions are bounding in terms of source strength and energy to other important radionuclides identified in the analyzed activated metals. Approaches for modeling the neutron-activated corrosion products that may be attached to activated reactor components were analyzed in this report. It was demonstrated that a surface source is more conservative than a uniform volumetric source for the treatment of neutron-activated corrosion products with respect to external package dose rates. An analysis of the maximum radionuclide loadings reported on spent resins identified the radionuclides 137 Cs, 60 Co, 134 Cs, 65 Zn, and 58 Co as the primary contributors to external package dose rate. For a resin cooled for 3.08 years, the external package dose rate was entirely produced by the reported 137 Cs and 60 Co inventory. The neutron sources from actinides found on spent resins or activated metals produced negligible dose rates and may be ignored in dose rate analyses. Effects of idealized waste material, source geometry, and spatial material/source distributions on external package dose rates were determined based on dose rate results for a simplified cask model under normal conditions of transport. Type 304 stainless steel, zirconium, and aluminum with adjusted mass densities based on a maximum content weight were analyzed for material modeling effects on external package dose rate. These materials produced identical external package dose rates within the statistical uncertainties of the dose rate estimates. Among four different source geometry configurations with homogeneous material of different mass densities, uniform volumetric source distribution, and the same source strength, the geometry configuration with lowest mass density (i.e., minimum self-shielding effect among the four cases) was most conservative. Spatial source distributions that better represent localized peak 60 Co activity values were more conservative than a uniform volumetric source distribution, assuming the same weight and total source strength per package. The increase in external dose rate caused by localized source peaks can be as much as the ratio between source peak activity density to average activity density, depending on the location of the activated metal with peak activity density. Therefore, the shielding analysis may be simplified if localized peak activities and the average activity per package can be measured/determined and documented at the time of cask loading. For simplicity, external package dose rates may be determined based on average source activity and a uniform volumetric source distribution. The dose rate results from that calculation model multiplied by the ratio of peak activity density to average activity density will produce maximum dose rate values for conservative estimates.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Operational and Mission Highlights A Monthly Summary of Top Achievements September 2020

In August 2020, transuranic (TRU) waste inventory onsite at TA-55 fell below 1,500 containers. Multiple groups within the Associate Laboratory Directorate for Weapons Production (ALDWP) have worked collaboratively to achieve this reduction in waste and residue inventory, all within the constraints of COVID-19 safety requirements.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Comparative Life Cycle Analysis of Scalable Single-Junction and Tandem Perovskite Solar Cell (PSC) Systems

Efficient, low-cost solar cells based upon perovskites have the potential to transform the US and global energy portfolio and improve energy security if they can be manufactured in an environmentally sustainable manner. However, previous life cycle analyses (LCA) of perovskite solar cells (PSC) used lab recipes to project the environmental impact of industrial PSC production – using materials and processes that may not be representative of industrial productions due to high material waste and complex synthesis – and such studies were limited to a few single-junction technologies. Thus, the goal of this project was threefold: a) to review the most promising for industrial production single-junction and tandem PSC technologies, b) to build life-cycle materials inventories that reflect scalable production of these technologies, and c) to conduct comprehensive life-cycle analysis of these technologies and compare their environmental impact with those of established commercial technologies. In response, this project identified challenges for fabrication transitioning from laboratory to sustainable industrial production, developed life-cycle inventory (LCI) data for scaling to industrial production four promising single-junction and three tandem PSC systems and produced life-cycle-investigations using, as metrics, a complete spectrum of energy, environmental and ecological impact indicators. Special focus was given to the use of lead, silver and indium in PSC. The project used the Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) methodology as standardized by the Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry (SETAC), ISO standards 14040 and 14044, and the International Energy Agency PVPS Task 12 LCA guidelines. LCA allows the calculation of a number of energy and environmental and impact categories, including energy cumulative energy demand (CED), global warming potential (GWP), human toxicity potential (HTP), eco-toxicity potential (ETP), abiotic resource depletion potential (ADP), acidification potential (AP), ozone depletion potential (ODP), photochemical oxidation potential (POP), eutrophication potential (EP). In addition to those, we calculated the Energy Pay-Back Time (EPBT) and the Energy Return On Investment (EROI). We provide LCA impacts for complete perovskite PV systems – including balance of system components – installed at three irradiation levels and considering reference and future potential module efficiencies. Finally, a sensitivity analysis on perovskite lifetime has been performed, considering 10, 20 and 30 years. Contribution analysis of the impacts of each material and layer of PSC shows, that the use of Pb in metalorganic PSC does not result in significant environmental impacts as the major contributions to environmental indicators arise from the use of Ag and encapsulation materials. Solution-based PSC manufacturing was found to be less impactful to the environment than vapor-based fabrication, and roll-to-roll (RtR) printing uses less energy and generates the lowest emissions. PSC produced with RtR manufacturing could reach the same Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROI) as that of crystalline-Si PV within 12 years of life, whereas the most energy demanding spray coating on rigid substrates, would require a 20-yr life to match the EROI of 30-yr lasting silicon PV. This work lays the foundation for sustainability investigations in a comparative context of large-scale production and deployment of PSC. The results of this project have the potential to have a significant impact on the future of PV manufacturing, by providing industry, policy-makers, and academia with insights necessary to choose which, if any, lead-based solar cell life cycles are environmentally sustainable.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Vitrification of Hanford Tank 241-AP-107 with Recycled Condensate

During the vitrification of nuclear waste at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) – the primary mission of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection – the offgas condensate generated from the waste-to-glass conversion is currently planned to be concentrated by evaporation in the Effluent Management Facility (EMF). This concentrated condensate can then be recycled back to the incoming waste and vitrified. To test the recycle process, a test apparatus was designed to mimic the EMF evaporator and used to concentrate a volume of condensate that had been previously produced during the vitrification of Hanford tank 241-AP-107 (referred to herein as AP-107) waste in a continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM). The test apparatus successfully concentrated the AP-107 condensate by a factor of 10 while retaining over 90 % of the technetium-99 ( 99 Tc), Cs, and I inventory. A second portion of AP-107 waste was retrieved by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, given to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and combined with the AP-107 condensate concentrate after undergoing solids filtration and cesium removal by ion exchange. This combination served to approximate the recycling action to be performed at the WTP. After the addition of glass-forming chemicals (GFCs), the combined AP-107 waste and AP-107 condensate concentrate were processed in the CLSM to produce a glass, called AP-107-1R, that was designed to satisfy the WTP baseline requirements (Kim et al. 2012). During the 8.87 hours of processing, 7.27 kg of AP-107-1R glass were produced for an average glass production rate of 1739 kg m 2 d -1 . Compared to the previous run in the CLSM without recycled condensate, the run with the recycle had a greater average glass production rate, but the rate was within the potential range of variability when processing melter feeds with similar composition in the CLSM. The glass produced from the AP-107 recycle run in the CLSM was within 10 % of the target AP-107-1R glass composition with respect to the primary glass components. Analysis of the minor component impurities revealed that their content in the glass product had approached their nominal target after 2 turnovers of the glass inventory in the CLSM while the activity of the minor radionuclides was retained in the glass product. The 99 Tc and total cesium content in the combined AP-107 waste and recycled condensate were maintained at concentrations expected to be experienced at the WTP. During processing in the CLSM, at discrete sampling time periods, the target 99 Tc/Cs mass ratio in the glass formulation varied from 0.9 to 62.9. Across this range, the Cs retention in the glass ranged from 53 to 60 %, while the retention from the entire runtime totaled 68 %, values which align with Cs retention in other scaled melter systems while processing LAW melter feeds at 99 Tc/Cs mass ratios ranging from 1 to 100. The 99 Tc retention in the glass ranged from 22 to 32 %, primarily due to the cold-cap coverage on the glass melt surface, the area covered by reacting melter feed, varying from ~80 % to ~95 % during processing, demonstrating greater volatility of 99 Tc from the glass while more surface was exposed, as expected based on previous 99 Tc volatility studies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Distribution of Infiltration in the 216-U-10, 216-B-3 Pond, and 216-T-4 Pond Systems 1944-1997

A modeling system to simulate fate and transport of contaminant plumes in groundwater beneath the Central Plateau to support the Cumulative Impact Evaluation (CIE) and Composite Analysis (CA) is being developed. The CIE will evaluate the cumulative effect of multiple Central Plateau radiological and chemical sources on groundwater quality. This will enable cleanup decisions to be evaluated in the context of all Central Plateau waste sites and existing groundwater conditions. The purpose of this Environmental Calculation File (ECF) is to partition the infiltration of wastewater and contaminant inventory between the main pond and each expansion lobe of the 216-B-3 Pond system, and to partition the infiltration of wastewater and contaminant inventory between the ditches and ponds of the 216-U-10 Pond and 216-T-4 Pond systems.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Status Update on the High Precision Isotopic Measurements on High Burnup LWR Fuel in 2020

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is currently investigating the feasibility of directly disposing dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs) in a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) repository. Criticality during the repository performance period (10,000 years or more) is one of the major concerns related to direct disposal of DPCs, specifically as the system undergoes degradation in the repository environment and timeframe. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is developing an as-loaded criticality analysis methodology using full (actinides + fission products) burnup credit that exploits the inherent criticality margin associated with actual canister-specific loading configuration. Burnup credit criticality analysis requires validation of the depletion/decay codes used to generate the burned isotopic inventory of an assembly by comparing the code-predicted inventory with experimentally determined isotopic data. Currently, isotopic measurement data for boiling water reactors (BWR) SNF are limited, and additional measurements will be highly beneficial for BWR burnup credit analysis, which is essential to demonstrate disposability of BWR DPCs. Moreover, new pressurized water reactor (PWR) samples of isotopic measurements will expand the PWR sample population and consequently will greatly improve sample statistics. In turn, this will reduce uncertainty in the computational determination of the isotopic composition of commercial SNF and eliminate additional penalties currently used for lack of data. As part of the isotopic analysis task, eight diverse, high burnup (HBU) samples from several PWR rods are being dissolved and isotopically analyzed to provide high-quality measurement data for PWR SNF to reducing the uncertainties associated with PWR isotopic depletion validation. The isotopics of interest focus on nuclides important to burnup credit, shielding, and decay heat in PWR SNF. Additionally, eight high burnup BWR fuel samples from the Limerick nuclear power plant have been identified for measurement to support reducing uncertainties associated with BWR isotopic depletion validation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Assessment of Electrode Contamination Mitigation at 0.5 MA Scale

The Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories uses current pulses with peaks up to 27 MA to drive target implosions and generate high energy density conditions of interest for stockpile stewardship programs pertinent to the NNSA program portfolio . Physical processes in the region near the Z Machine target create electrode plasmas which seed parasitic current loss that reduce the performance and output of a Z experiment. Electrode surface contaminants (hydrogen, water, hydrocarbons) are thought to be the primary constituent of electrode plasmas which contribute to loss mechanisms. The Sandia team explore d in situ heating and plasma discharge techniques by integrating requisite infrastructure into Sandia's Mykonos LTD accelerator, addressing potential impacts to accelerator operation, and reporting on the impact of these techniques on electrode plasma formation and shot performance. The in situ discharge cleaning utilizes the electrodes of the accelerator to excite an argon-oxygen plasma to sputter and chemically react contaminants from electrode surfaces. Insulating breaks are required to isolate the plasma in electrode regions where loss processes are most likely to occur. The shots on Mykonos validate that these breaks do not perturb experiment performance, reducing the uncertainty on the largest unknown about the in situ cleaning system. Preliminary observations with electrical and optical diagnostics suggest that electrode plasma formation is delayed, and overall inventory has been substantively reduced. In situ heating embeds cartridge heaters into accelerator electrodes and employs a thermal bakeout to rapidly desorb contaminants from electrode surfaces. For the first time, additively manufactured (AM) electrode assemblies were used on a low impedance accelerator to integrate cooling channels and manage thermal gradients. Challenges with poor supplier fabrication to specifications, load alignment, thermal expansion and hardware movement and warpage appears to have introduced large variability in observed loss, though, preventing strong assertions of loss reduction via in situ heating. At this time, an in situ discharge cleaning process offers the lowest risk path to reduce electrode contaminant inventories on Z, though we recommend continuing to develop both approaches. Additional engineering and testing are required to improve the implementation of both systems. .

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Annual Status Report (FY 2020): Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low Level Waste in the 200 East Area Burial Grounds

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-SD-WM-TI-730). The estimates are compared with requirements of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and performance objectives defined in companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 Chg 1and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 is expected. A new PA study was initiated in fiscal year (FY) 2019 for evaluation of active disposal sites within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in 200 East; Trenches 31 and 34 in 200 West) due to extended time elapsing between the current annual status report and the original PA for the active disposal sites. The new PA for the active disposal sites is expected to be completed in FY 2021. Within the active burial grounds in the 200 East Area, low-level waste and mixed low-level waste will continue to be disposed of in the dedicated U.S. Navy reactor compartment trench at the 218-E-12B Burial Ground (Trench 94). During this reporting period (FY 2020, from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020), two reactor compartments were disposed in Trench 94. Results from sorption experiments are summarized for this reporting period to quantify the efficacy of concrete waste forms in retaining key radionuclides (e.g., technetium-99 and iodine-129). The test durations ranged from 1 to 3 months. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 East Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis1 assumptions of a post-closure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are located in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination. This area will remain after final environmental remediation and the proposed shrinkage of Hanford Site boundaries to small sections within the 200 East and 200 West Areas in the Central Plateau (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-707) estimates that the 200 East LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions nor the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained.

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DOE OSTI2021

SECARB-USA: Needs Assessment Framework for Storage Complexes (Task 2.1.b)

A team of SECARB storage experts examined 63 formations at 39 sites that were selected to represent the range of diversity of newly assessed, as well as well-advanced, storage prospects in the SECARB region. We inventoried the data needs triggered by the requirements to obtain a Class VI UIC storage permit, the data needs that results from the requirement to create geocellular fluid flow models to support that permit, and by pragmatic and best practice inputs such as public acceptance, regulatory readiness, and pore space leasing. We anchored both the needs inventory and the processes for and cost of meeting the needs with data from 9 sites in in the SECARB area that have advanced far in characterization. Results show that the total cost of characterization prior to obtaining a permit is convergent, because the permit and modeling requirements drive projects to obtain the same types of data for all cases. The high cost data that control cost are 1) drilling, coring, core-testing, logging, sampling and testing a characterization well and 2) collection of a 3-D seismic survey to map reservoir and confining system properties over the area of the plume or the area of elevated pressure. In 5 of our case study sites we determined that one or both of these costs could be avoided because the needs are met by available data.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗