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At least 1,153 records · Page 64

The Next Generation NC3 Enterprise: Opportunities and Challenges

The 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review emphasized the importance of modernizing the existing nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Heightened awareness of US reliance upon technology developed in the 1970s and emerging challenges posed by frontier technologies spurred Secretary of Defense Mattis to task USSTRATCOM with identifying the technologies, processes, and institutions needed to build a next-generation NC3 system. General Hyten, USAF Commander, has noted that this will require an “overhaul of our existing processes from requirements definition to systems engineering and integration, acquisition, and budgeting. A framework is required for modern processes to enable delivery of a flexible, continuously evolving, threat-driven set of capabilities.” This brief, prepared in response to Gen. Hyten’s call for memoranda to address the “Next Generation NC3 Enterprise,” outlines three distinct approaches to NC3 modernization, each with a system lifecycle of approximately 50 years (2030-2080): upgrading the existing system, a hybrid approach to integrating new technologies, and creating an entirely new NC3 architecture. It is organized as follows: First, it outlines the integral role of NC3 in strategic operations. Second, it examines the current status of NC3 tools and the contemporary challenges that future systems must address. Third, it provides a series of paths forward for USSTRATCOM’s consideration. Fourth and finally, it recommends a “hybrid” approach to maintain the strengths of the current NC3 architecture, increase the resilience of the system, and leverage the advantages of new sensing, ISR, and communication technology.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Roll-to-Roll Direct Coating of Catalyst Inks on Membrane Films: Progress and Challenges

Further development of low temperature electrolysis (LTE) systems is of importance to ensure the renewable hydrogen production for hydrogen-based energy systems. The membrane electrode assembly (MEA) is a key component of the LTE system and typically contains a catalyst coated membrane (CCM). To enable the U.S. Department of Energy's hydrogen production cost goal of $2/kg, high volume manufacturing processes will be required to lower manufacturing costs of the CCM. A promising way for high-throughput manufacturing of CCM is using roll-to-roll (R2R) methods that allow the direct coating of electrodes on membrane films. However, there are many challenges with this methodology, both in the coating process as well as with web handling. In this talk, we discuss the membrane-ink interaction by evaluating the solvent uptake of a Nafion membrane system and verify the coatability of various inks through lab-scale coatings onto this system. Furthermore, rheology and surface tension data of the ink will be discussed together with the resulting morphology of the coated electrodes. The R2R-processed CCMs will finally be analyzed using electrochemical performance data and the results put in context with the challenges that the mass production of CCMs for LTE system faces to date.

39 EE - Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies (EE-3F↗

Opportunities and Challenges for Human-Machine Teaming in Cybersecurity Operations [Panel Discussion]

Many of the challenges associated with cybersecurity operations are also ripe opportunities for the application of human-machine teaming. Advances in cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and machine learning promise the technology to achieve the level of intelligence and sophistication necessary to create a true intelligent teammate. This panel gathers experts from across the community to discuss the challenges and opportunities for human-machine teaming in cybersecurity operations.

Cybersecurity, Human-Machine Teaming↗

Challenges in simulating ground interacting nuclear explosions

This paper summarizes recent above-ground nuclear explosion simulations as part of a broader effort to better characterize conditions within a fireball that may influence the chemical evolution of bomb materials and other materials entrained from the local explosion environment. A critical component of this work is validation against historic footage of atmospheric testing, requiring that we understand how the frequency-dependent sensitivity of the utilized film footage influences data captured in such images. We focus first on the early physics of a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere before discussing some of the technical challenges we seek to capture in late-time models that include more complex emplacement conditions and subsurface features. We discuss required physics packages (compressible hydrodynamics, radiation transport, as well as necessary ancillary tables such as equations of state (EOS) and opacities). Additionally, we note reasonable “shortcuts” one may make and their limitations, e.g., using ideal gas EOS, replacing spectrally resolved radiation with spectrally averaged radiation, and exchanging deterministic transport with diffusion. We then discuss an approach to achieving an equilibrated initial stress state for problems where buoyancy and subsurface lithostatic stress are important. Our methodology is presented in the context of LLNL’s ALE3D multiphysics code but may readily be implemented in other codes. In this paper, we start with a description of the challenges of NUDET simulations, followed by a presentation of the simulated intensity (flux) as it would appear on an analysis of the Dixie test. We then progressively introduce additional complexity in subsequent sections (near-surface burst and gravity initialization) before concluding.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Challenges in Automated Detection of COVID-19 Misinformation

The COVID-19 pandemic has made the dangers of the spread of misinformation obvious but despite much global effort to curbing its spread, fake information about the pandemic keeps proliferating. In this paper, we address the development of automated methods for verification of claims about COVID-19 and discuss the challenges associated with this task. We focus on labeled data collection, limitations of existing models, and difficulties of applying misinformation detection models in practical applications. Our initial analysis indicates label imbalance may be a particular challenge for developing claim verification models and we discuss options for alleviating this issue.

Herrmannova, Dasha↗

The Tracking Machine Learning challenge : Throughput phase

This paper reports on the second "Throughput" phase of the Tracking Machine Learning (TrackML) challenge on the Codalab platform. As in the first "Accuracy" phase, the participants had to solve a difficult experimental problem linked to tracking accurately the trajectory of particles as e.g. created at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC): given O($10^5$) points, the participants had to connect them into O($10^4$) individual groups that represent the particle trajectories which are approximated helical. While in the first phase only the accuracy mattered, the goal of this second phase was a compromise between the accuracy and the speed of inference. Both were measured on the Codalab platform where the participants had to upload their software. The best three participants had solutions with good accuracy and speed an order of magnitude faster than the state of the art when the challenge was designed. Although the core algorithms were less diverse than in the first phase, a diversity of techniques have been used and are described in this paper. The performance of the algorithms are analysed in depth and lessons derived.

Amrouche, Sabrina↗

Contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence and competition: A SOCOM perspective. Part of Section: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands

Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine demonstrates the challenge for strategic deterrence and competition of countering contentious narratives and disinformation about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during conventional regional wars against a nucleararmed adversary. Moscow uses both tailored, contentious narratives and targeted disinformation about WMD in Ukraine to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in support of its deterrence and competition objectives vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. Since December 2021, Moscow has made a focal point of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in its efforts to establish a permissive environment for its military buildup on the border with Ukraine and then its military intervention. These information tactics also demonstrate an opportunity for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are a case study for considering how SOF can contribute to strategic deterrence and competition objectives, specifically countering adversary gray-zone information efforts to alter regional security orders.1 Such a role is in line with the 2022 Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy, which provides a framework for the evolution of SOF into “a force capable of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation as a key contributor of integrated deterrence” (United States Special Operations Command, 2022). This paper briefly examines this strategic challenge and SOF opportunity, focusing narrowly on the distinction between contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and the role of SOF in countering these gray-zone information tactics. The nuclear dimension of Moscow’s contentious narratives and disinformation in the “special military operation” is of particular interest because it demonstrates the distinction between strategic efforts to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in Moscow’s favor. This distinction between influence and disruption is less clear with Russia’s contentious narratives and disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine, as disinformation about these two types of WMD appears to overwhelm contentious narratives. We believe this distinction is useful for policymakers and warfighters responsible for countering gray-zone information tactics because it provides a framework for crafting tailored responses to contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and other WMD. The chapter concludes with a discussion of efforts that could be undertaken by SOF in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders to address this aspect of adversary gray-zone information tactics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Island Power Systems With High Levels of Inverter-Based Resources: Stability and Reliability Challenges

As many island power systems seek to integrate high levels of renewable energy, they face new challenges on top of the existing difficulties of operating an isolated grid. With their drastically declining cost, variable renewables, such as wind and photovoltaics (PVs), are increasingly being integrated into island grids to reduce the use of imported fuels. These deployments of renewable energy are dominated by PV and wind generators, which bring unique challenges of their own.

IBRs↗

Opportunities and Challenges for Remote Microreactor Operations

The nuclear industry is developing new advanced reactor technologies, and many companies are embracing this advancement by pursuing the development of microreactors. The term microreactor generally refers to a nuclear reactor with an operating power of 20 MW or less. The power range of microreactors makes them appealing for many use cases, such as powering remote communities, mining sites, and military bases. Most of the microreactor designs being pursued will incorporate remote facility operations into the final product. However, no framework has yet been developed to determine what remote operations systems require for reliable, resilient, and secure operation of a microreactor. This work identifies the challenges unique to remote operations and monitoring for microreactors specifically regarding instrumentation and control, communication methods, regulatory requirements, and operational policies. The types of commands and sensor measurements that must be transmitted between the facilities as well as methods for verifying the trustworthiness of these signals are assessed. This work evaluates the security, reliability, and performance requirements that must be met when considering the selection of communication hardware and protocols for use in remote operations. Also, an assessment was performed to study how remote operations fit within current regulatory requirements and what may need to be updated in regulatory policy to allow for remote operation. Finally, the operational contingencies unique to remote operations that must be in place for response to abnormal events are identified. This paper details these challenges and research opportunities to provide a foundation for the design of remote operation systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Challenges and Lessons Learned Performing Subsurface Investigations at a Radiologically Contaminated Site in an Urban Area - 17391

At the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Maywood Superfund Site (FMSS) the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has performed minimally intrusive (i.e. non-excavation) sub-surface investigations in soils, underneath roadways, and within buildings to generate information needed to determine whether contaminated material was present and to delineate the nature and extent. Given that thorium-232 (Th-232) contaminated material is present below various surfaces and that the current iteration of the Multi-Agency Radiation survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) has only marginal guidance on evaluating and releasing subsurface data, survey design and implementation required detailed up front planning and post investigation analysis and reporting. This paper will discuss the approaches USACE utilized during a recent roadway investigation, some of the challenges encountered, a discussion of techniques used and results obtained, and an overall summary of pitfalls identified and lessons learned for future efforts. In order to evaluate selected areas, direct push technology was utilized in conjunction with plastic tubing to facilitate core capture and sample collection. PVC piping was inserted in each bore hole to prevent borehole collapse and facilitate downhole gamma logging. Soil samples were collected from the surface, from native material or the bottom of the boring, and from the interval or intervals which exhibited elevated downhole gamma readings, and from areas with an identifiable marker of contamination (i.e. soil discoloration) at the judgement of the field staff. Data was collected and evaluated using the approaches laid out in MARSSIM as best possible. As MARSSIM was developed to only address surface contamination, USACE, in agreement with regulators and stakeholders, utilized a 'varying plane' approach, where samples are evaluated as if on a single plane, and only the highest concentration encountered at any point is considered. Because the areas investigated were not easily cast into simple geometric shapes adhering to MARSSIM design criteria, it was important to ensure that Survey Unit design for Class 1 Survey Units were reasonable. All Class 1 SUs were contiguous survey units. Class 2 survey units were allowed to be non-contiguous provided that they are situated in close proximity to one another and share the same geology, conceptual site model, history, and radionuclide concentrations. The information contained in this paper will benefit Projects working with subsurface contamination which may require subsurface investigation and an understanding of the logistical, technological, and regulatory challenges. The ultimate outcome of this effort was the successful delineation of areas of contamination which will facilitate current utility work and guide future remediation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Integrating commercially available remote systems to address current D and D challenges - 15399

Many current D and D challenges across the DOE complex require some form of remote handling expertise and equipment. For example, high visibility projects such as Building 324 D and D and the recovery of wastes from the Alpha-Caissons and the 618 10-11 caissons at Hanford all require the development and application of advanced remote systems. Additionally although alternate solutions and options are being sought, robotic/remote systems will likely be required for completion of D and D at Savannah River Site's Building 235-F, at the West Valley Demonstration Project and many other DOE facilities that are scheduled for D and D. Similar systems are also needed to support the UK cleanup program on projects such as the decommissioning of the Pile Fuel Cladding Silo. As a result, there are a significant number of R and D and Technology Development projects underway in order to address the growing need for remote systems in D and D. In addition to these significant R and D efforts, there are also numerous remote systems in use in multiple applications in both nuclear and non-nuclear industries and the use of remote systems at the Fukushima Daiichi plant has been extensive in the past 12-24 months. In many cases, the systems developed are customized for their given application but there are also multiple systems in use which could be applied to the worldwide D and D challenge either directly or with some minor adaptation. During FY14, the Office of D and D and Facility Engineering (EM13) funded a review/assessment of the current state-of-the-art of robotics and remote technologies in order to generate a baseline of what is available, what has been used where and for what applications and what has been successful and what hasn't. Where possible, the assessment was extended to identify remote systems that have been used in non-nuclear industries but which, with limited modification, may have application in the nuclear industry. The work also included a review of the most recent publicly available TBuRD (Technical Baseline and Underpinning R and D) activities being undertaken by the UK NDA and their Site Licensed Companies (SLCs) in the area of remote systems in order to compile a searchable database of both available, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) remote systems and developing technologies. Other suitably qualified organizations in the US and the UK (such as UK National Nuclear Laboratory, SRNL, PNNL ORNL, OC Robotics and others) were also engaged to identify other ongoing technology development efforts which may be of interest and benefit to the decommissioning community. In all, of the order of 500 remote systems were identified and cataloged in both hard copy and as a searchable database. These systems were categorized in terms of their main application e.g. manipulator, wheeled land-based platform, track land-based platform, water-based platform, air-based platform, end effectors, sensor, crawler etc to clearly demonstrate the depth and breadth of available systems in each category. In addition, single page summaries of each system were produced and used, in a workshop setting, to identify technologies which, when integrated with other currently-available technologies, could provide a workable system to address existing needs. An initial workshop was held with CH2 Washington Idaho (CWI) and DOE Idaho in August 2014 to explore how the available systems could be integrated to address current and future D and D needs at that site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CHALLENGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELECTROREFINING PROCESS AT Y-12

In order to ensure future capabilities of the Y-12 site as older buildings retire, a new process was developed, the Metal Purification Process. The purpose of this new process is to provide a simpler and more efficient uranium metal purification that the previous multi-staged, complex chemical processes. The basis for this technology currently exists in the US DOE complex, but it has not been utilized on a large scale for uranium at higher enrichments. The system requires larger-geometry vessels and furnaces in order to meet the through-put requirements. The crux of the process is the electrorefining cell, consisting of several concentric liners and an unfavorable geometry cylindrical crucible. Within the crucible, a molten Li-CL-KCL-UCL3 salt electrolyte is present. ‘Dirty’ metal is placed into a loading basket and loaded into an electrorefining cell. Here, the metal reacts into the molten salt within the cell to form UCL3, while ‘clean’ metal simultaneously plates out from the salt electrolyte in the form of metal dendrites. These dendrites are then collected and removed from the cell. After removal from the cell, the dendrites are taken to a furnace to remove adhered salts. Then, the salt-free dendrites are moved to a separate furnace for consolidation into the final product form. The development of the Criticality Safety Evaluation for this complex system brought with it many NCS Challenges and lessons learned. These challenges include: design decisions for ensuring subcriticalty in the electrorefining cell during abnormal conditions, the interface of the main glovebox system with auxiliary systems such as the purification system and designated storage, implementation of mass tracking, and concerns from production and operation regarding the movement of material within the system.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project: Optimizing use of This National Asset to Treat Challenging Radioactive Waste From Other Department of Energy Sites - 16064

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) is a world-class radioactive waste treatment facility with a highly experienced and innovative workforce located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The AMWTP's state-of-the-art capabilities include a 62-ton super-compactor, remote cutting and sorting, macro-encapsulation systems, assay units, drum repackaging, waste characterization, and payload assembly and loading. Since operations began in 2003, the facility has been the largest shipper for contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). It has successfully processed over 56,000 cubic meters (m{sup 3}) of CH TRU waste and mixed low-level waste (MLLW) from the Idaho Site and approximately 700 m{sup 3} of CH TRU waste from 15 other DOE sites. While the AMWTP is nearing successful completion of its Idaho mission, other DOE environmental cleanup sites will require safe and proven capabilities to treat, package, characterize, and certify legacy radioactive waste inventories well into the next decade. In addition, DOE's national security, nuclear energy, and science programs need sustainable treatment capabilities to support ongoing and new missions. The AMWTP could continue to serve a vital role beyond its current Idaho mission to help address these larger DOE needs. To this end and in recognition that AMWTP's current priority is to complete the processing and removal of Idaho waste, DOE's Office of Environmental Management has initiated strategic planning to assess the feasibility of continued AMWTP operations to treat challenging radioactive waste from other generator sites consistent with existing regulatory agreements. This paper describes AMWTP's unique capabilities and identifies potential benefits, opportunities, and possible solutions to packaging and transportation challenges to fully use AMWTP as a national asset. A panel discussion of subject matter experts with audience participation would help to inform DOE's strategic planning on how best to use this national asset into the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Addressing the Legacy Waste Challenge - IAEA Activities in Support of Member States - 16304

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) promotes the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy including the safe management of radioactive waste. Although safe and effective radioactive waste processing technologies and practices are well established and widespread, the issue of legacy waste remains a challenge for many IAEA member states. The primary source of the world-wide legacy waste inventory has its origins in past nuclear weapons programs and associated research and development activities. Other sources include historical waste in old storage and disposal facilities that were either never intended to be a permanent end-state or are no longer considered adequate from a safety perspective. Additionally, many IAEA member states with less advanced nuclear energy programs, often have small inventories of legacy radioactive waste arising from medical, research and industrial activities but lack the processing capabilities to put these wastes into a safe form for storage and disposal. These wastes have the potential to create a safety and environmental hazard and pose a radioactive waste management challenge for many reasons including lack of characterization data and process knowledge, waste package degradation, or the presence of hazardous or mixed waste components. The Waste Technology Section (WTS) within the Department of Nuclear Energy at the IAEA has an extensive program of activities to support the safe retrieval, processing, storage and disposal of radioactive waste including legacy waste. These include publications, co-ordinated research projects, technical co-operation activities, and information exchange forums including workshops, technical meetings and virtual networks. This paper will present an overview of recent IAEA activities and accomplishments aimed as assisting member states with addressing their legacy waste inventories. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

96 Park Way Vicinity Property Remediation Challenges at the FUSRAP Maywood Superfund Site, Maywood, New Jersey - 19216

The Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Maywood Superfund Site (FMSS), 'the Project,' was transferred to the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in 1997. Shortly thereafter, USACE initiated FUSRAP remediation efforts on 24 commercial and residential properties and, in addition, the Project team evaluated properties previously addressed at the FMSS. One of those properties was located at 96 Park Way in Rochelle Park, New Jersey. The property history included removal of contaminated soil in 1985 by the US Department of Energy (US DOE). Soil sampling performed after removal of contaminated soil indicated the cleanup met applicable guidelines in place at the time. A Five-Year Review of the FMSS conducted by the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) in 2009 found that 96 Park Way did not meet the current residential cleanup levels for the site and recommended additional study and remediation, if warranted. The current levels are established in the approved cleanup plan for the FMSS (known as the Record of Decision [ROD]) issued in 2003. Based on USEPA's recommendation, USACE carefully reviewed all available records for the property. The review considered the differences between the soil cleanup standards used in the 1980's and the 2003 ROD standards, which are slightly more restrictive for deeper soils. The USACE conducted detailed field studies at 96 Park Way in 2014-15 to address the USEPA findings. This work included gamma walkover surveys and soil sampling to depths of approximately 3.5 meters. The results identified three discrete areas at depth that did not meet the ROD residential soil cleanup standard: two areas bordering an adjacent highway (New Jersey Route 17) and one along railroad property adjacent to the site. To address these areas, soil removal actions were conducted in 2016-17. The principal challenge with construction, engineering, and community relations was the property housed two sensitive facilities: a long-term assisted care living facility and a short-term post-surgery rehabilitation center. The operations at these facilities could not be interrupted in any way during FUSRAP activities. The three FUSRAP-impacted areas were addressed and restored in coordination with the USEPA, property management, and local officials. Site restoration presented a particular challenge well after the remedial action was completed, as the property owner and the government disagreed on the level of restoration. Those negotiations are ongoing as of this writing. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Challenges of Repository Operation in an Existing Mine - 19339

A generally accepted principle related to long term management of radioactive waste/ spent fuel is the isolation in a geological repository. In Germany, the disposal operation of low-level waste (LLW) and intermediate-level waste (ILW) started in the Asse II mine in 1967 and in the former German Democratic Republic in the Morsleben repository in 1971. After the German reunification, the responsibility for the existing sites changed several times until the Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung (BGE) became new license holder for both sites in 2017. The BGE is responsible to carry out the operative tasks of searching for a high-level waste (HLW) repository, the planning and construction of the Konrad repository for the emplacement of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW), the operation of the Asse II mine including the retrieval of the emplaced waste, and the preparation for the closure of the Morsleben repository. Nevertheless, the challenges of repository operation in an existing mine have not changed in all these years, as the regulatory framework is mainly written for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and is difficult to adapt for a repository mine. In particular, conditions in a mine are substantially different from 'clean' above-ground nuclear installations. Dust due to mining activities, relatively high temperatures, and a corrosive atmosphere in a salt mine might be present. Therefore, the usability of the repository for several decades during the different operational phases, i.e. planning, construction, emplacement, and closure, can only be ensured by continuous maintenance. Furthermore, the atomic law is applicable for above-ground facilities and the mining law for mines of every description. The difficulty of geological repositories is to ensure that both laws are going to be applied above and below ground with no regulatory framework tailored especially for such sites. A special case is the Asse II mine where the mining law was applied from the very beginning, before the atomic law needed to be established later on and now requires the retrieval of the radioactive waste before decommissioning. In this presentation, similarities and differences in the legal framework of the repositories in the responsibility of BGE and some operational experiences throughout the years are described. This applies to the radiation protection regime, the excavation ratio, the host rock stability and the backfilling concepts of the mining areas. Further challenges arise from the demonstration of long term safety according to the state-of-the-art of science and technology for either existing repositories/ mines or those under construction or planned. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 51: Idaho Transuranic Waste Challenges, Solutions and Implications for the Future (3/5)

This panel focused on the retrieval, characterization, treatment, certification, and shipping of transuranic (TRU) waste at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site, Idaho, USA. The INL began receiving TRU waste from offsite generators (primarily the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, USA) beginning in 1954. Until 1970, the INL Site disposed of barrels, boxes, and other debris in a shallow, unlined landfill. Beginning in 1970, the INL Site began storing TRU waste on an asphalt pad, which was then covered with several feet of soil. This practice continued until the late 1980's at which time a large air support building was erected over the waste. In the mid-to-late 1990's, the air support building was removed and a massive building was constructed over the entire dirt mound. Contractors retrieved the waste from the early 2000's through February 2017 to support an Idaho Settlement Agreement milestone that required the retrieval of 65,000 cubic meters of TRU waste and removal from Idaho. This panel focused on the Idaho Transuranic Waste Challenges, Solutions and Implications for the Future. The Idaho Transuranic Waste Program includes buried and stored waste retrieval and processing of contact- and remote-handled transuranic waste. Over the duration of the program, the Idaho site has conducted targeted retrieval of buried waste from the 1950's and 1960's; designed, permitted, built, operated, and completed the mission of a facility to process 65,000 cubic meters of waste; and shipped more than 57,000 cubic meters of waste to WIPP. Presentation proposed: Transuranic Waste Challenges and Solutions (Hoss Brown, Fluor Idaho, LLC (USA), John McCoy, Fluor Idaho, LLC (USA), James Malmo, US DOE (USA), Doug Pruitt, Department of Energy Idaho Field Office (USA), Kenneth Princen, US DOE (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 61: Challenges in the US DOE HLW Tank Management Program

Approximately 50 people attended this panel session which focused on the successes and challenges in DOE high-level radioactive tank waste management with special emphasis on tank waste processing and waste disposition. Panelists discussed approaches, results, and lessons learned in addressing challenges in construction, start-up, and processing of tank waste and its ultimate disposition that is critical to tank waste management at Hanford, Savannah River, and Idaho sites. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Liquid Waste Program at the Savannah River Site (James Folk, US DOE (USA)); 2 - Progress on Hanford's Tank Waste Treatment Mission (Tom Fletcher, US DOE (USA)); 3 - Idaho Tank Waste Program (Joel Case, US DOE (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗