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At least 1,153 records · Page 64

Leaves as bottlenecks: The contribution of tree leaves to hydraulic resistance within the soil–plant–atmosphere continuum

Within vascular plants, the partitioning of hydraulic resistance along the soil-to-leaf continuum affects transpiration and its response to environmental conditions. In trees, the fractional contribution of leaf hydraulic resistance (R leaf ) to total soil-to-leaf hydraulic resistance (R total ), or fR leaf (= R leaf /R total ), is thought to be large, but this has not been tested comprehensively. Here, we compiled a multi-biome dataset of fR leaf using new and previously published measurements of pressure differences within trees in situ. Across 80 samples, fR leaf averaged 0.51 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.46-0.57) and it declined with tree height. We also used the allometric relationship between field-based measurements of soil-to-leaf hydraulic conductance and laboratory-based measurements of leaf hydraulic conductance to compute the average fR leaf for 19 tree samples, which was 0.40 (95% CI = 0.29-0.56). The in-situ technique produces a more accurate descriptor of fR leaf because it accounts for dynamic leaf hydraulic conductance. Both approaches demonstrate the outsized role of leaves in controlling tree hydrodynamics. A larger fR leaf may play a role in protecting stems from loss of hydraulic conductance. Thus, the decline in fR leaf with tree height would contribute to greater drought vulnerability in taller trees and potentially to their observed disproportionate drought mortality.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Fractal analysis for assessing the level of modulation of IMRT fields

Purpose: To investigate the potential of three fractal dimension (FD) analysis methods (i.e., the variation, power spectrum, and variogram methods) as metrics for quantifying the degree of modulation in planned intensity modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) treatment fields, and compare the most suitable FD method to the number of monitor units (MUs), the average leaf gap, and the 2D modulation index (2D MI) for assessing modulation. Methods: The authors implemented, validated, and compared the variation, power spectrum, and variogram methods for computing the FD. Validation of the methods was done using mathematical fractional Brownian surfaces of known FD that ranged in size from 128 x 128 to 512 x 512. The authors used a test set consisting of seven head and neck carcinoma plans (50 prescribed treatment fields) to choose an FD cut-point that ensures no false positives (100% specificity) in distinguishing between moderate and high degrees of field modulation. The degree of field modulation was controlled by adjusting the fluence smoothing parameters in the Eclipse treatment planning system (Varian Medical Systems, Palo Alto, CA). The moderate modulation fields were representative of the degree of modulation used clinically at the authors' institution. The authors performed IMRT quality assurance (QA) on the 50 test fields using the MapCHECK device. The FD cut-point was applied to a validation set consisting of four head and neck plans (28 fields). The area under the curve (AUC) from receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis was used to compare the ability of FD, number of MUs, average leaf gap, and the 2D MI for distinguishing between the moderate and high modulation fields. Results: The authors found the variogram FD method to be the most suitable for assessing the modulation complexity of IMRT fields for head and neck carcinomas. Pass rates as measured by the gamma criterion for the MapCHECK IMRT field measurements were higher for the moderately modulated fields, and a gamma criterion with 1 mm distance-to-agreement and 1% dose difference showed a clear separation between the 94% pass rates of the moderate and high modulation groups. From the ROC analysis of the test set, the authors found the AUC of the variogram FD, number of MUs, average leaf gap, and 2D MI methods to be 0.99 (almost perfect), 0.91 (excellent), 0.91 (excellent), and 0.92 (excellent), respectively. A cut-point of FD > 2.25 correctly identified 92.8% of the high modulation fields and 100% of the moderately modulated fields in the validation set, satisfying the condition of no false positives. Conclusions: Of the three FD methods investigated, the variogram method is the most accurate and precise metric for identifying high modulation treatment fields. It is also more accurate and precise than the number of MUs, the average leaf gap, and the 2D MI. Although MapCHECK IMRT QA does a reasonable job at identifying high modulation fields, the variogram FD method provides one with the opportunity to quantitatively and accurately assess modulation and adjust overly modulated fields at the treatment planning stage before they are sent to the treatment machine for QA or patient treatment.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Proteins Needed to Activate a Transcriptional Response to the Reactive Oxygen Species Singlet Oxygen

Singlet oxygen ( 1 O 2 ) is a reactive oxygen species generated by energy transfer from one or more excited donors to molecular oxygen. Many biomolecules are prone to oxidation by 1 O 2 , and cells have evolved systems to protect themselves from damage caused by this compound. One way that the photosynthetic bacterium Rhodobacter sphaeroides protects itself from 1 O 2 is by inducing a transcriptional response controlled by ChrR, an anti-σ factor which releases an alternative sigma factor, σ E , in the presence of 1 O 2 . Here we report that induction of σ E -dependent gene transcription is decreased in the presence of 1 O 2 when two conserved genes in the σ E regulon are deleted, including one encoding a cyclopropane fatty acid synthase homologue (RSP2144) or one encoding a protein of unknown function (RSP1091). Thus, we conclude that RSP2144 and RSP1091 are each necessary to increase σ E activity in the presence of 1 O 2 . In addition, we found that unlike in wild-type cells, where ChrR is rapidly degraded when 1 O 2 is generated, turnover of this anti-σ factor is slowed when cells lacking RSP2144, RSP1091, or both of these proteins are exposed to 1 O 2 . Further, we demonstrate that the organic hydroperoxide tert-butyl hydroperoxide promotes ChrR turnover in both wild-type cells and mutants lacking RSP2144 or RSP1091, suggesting differences in the ways different types of oxidants increase σ E activity.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Navajo Generating Station and Air Visibility Regulations: Alternatives and Impacts

Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced in 2009 its intent to issue rules for controlling emissions from Navajo Generating Station that could affect visibility at the Grand Canyon and at several other national parks and wilderness areas. The final rule will conform to what EPA determines is the best available retrofit technology (BART) for the control of haze-causing air pollutants, especially nitrogen oxides. While EPA is ultimately responsible for setting Navajo Generating Station's BART standards in its final rule, it will be the U.S. Department of the Interior's responsibility to manage compliance and the related impacts. This study aims to assist both Interior and EPA by providing an objective assessment of issues relating to the power sector.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

LBNE Lattice & Optics for Proton Extraction at MI-10 and Transport to a Target Above Grade

For the Long Baseline Neutrino Experiment (LBNE) at Fermilab 120 GeV/c protons will be transported from the Main Injector (MI) to an on-site production target. The lattice design and optics discussed here has the beam extracted vertically upwards from MI-10 and the keeps the majority of the line at an elevation above the glacial till/rock interface and terminates on a target at 10 ft above grade. The LBNE beamline discussed here is a modular optics design comprised of 3 distinct lattice configurations, including the specialized MI {yields} LBNE matching section and Final Focus. The remainder of the line is defined by six FODO cells, in which the length and phase advance are chosen specifically such that beam size does not exceed that of the MI while also making the most efficient use of space for achromatic insertions. Dispersion generated by variations in the beam trajectory are corrected locally and can not bleed out to corrupt the optics elsewhere in the line. Aperture studies indicate that the line should be able to transport the worst quality beam that the Main Injector might provide. New IDS dipole correctors located at every focusing center provide high-quality orbit control and further ensure that LBNE meets the stringent requirements for environmental protection.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Technical Basis for Evaluating Software-Related Common-Cause Failures

The instrumentation and control (I&C) system architecture at a nuclear power plant (NPP) incorporates protections against common-cause failures (CCFs) through the use of diversity and defense-in-depth. Even for well-established analog-based I&C system designs, the potential for CCFs of multiple systems (or redundancies within a system) constitutes a credible threat to defeating the defense-in-depth provisions within the I&C system architectures. The integration of digital technologies into the I&C systems provides many advantages compared to the aging analog systems with respect to reliability, maintenance, operability, and cost effectiveness. However, maintaining the diversity and defense-in-depth for both the hardware and software within the digital system is challenging. In fact, the introduction of digital technologies may actually increase the potential for CCF vulnerabilities because of the introduction of undetected systematic faults. These systematic faults are defined as a “design fault located in a software component” and at a high level, are predominately the result of (1) errors in the requirement specification, (2) inadequate provisions to account for design limits (e.g., environmental stress), or (3) technical faults incorporated in the internal system (or architectural) design or implementation. Other technology-neutral CCF concerns include hardware design errors, equipment qualification deficiencies, installation or maintenance errors, instrument loop scaling and setpoint mistakes.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Solid Waste Management Units And Areas Of Concern Annual Long-Term Monitoring & Maintenance Report For Calendar Year 2016.

Long-term controls were maintained at 21 Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) in accordance with the requirements of the “Long-Term Monitoring and Maintenance Plan for SWMUs and AOCs Granted Corrective Action Complete with Controls” in Attachment M of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Operating Permit, which took effect February 26, 2015. Maintenance and controls at these SWMUs and AOCs are described and documented in this report. Conditions requiring maintenance or repair activities were not identified for any of the inspected SWMUs or AOCs. Based upon the inspections performed and site conditions observed, the administrative and physical institutional controls in place at the SWMUs and AOCs are effectively providing continued protection of human health and the environment. This report does not present monitoring and maintenance activities for SWMU 76, the Mixed Waste Landfill; those activities adhere to the approved MWL LTMM Plan, Section 4.8.1 requiring a separate annual report which will be submitted to the NMED by June 30, 2017.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Submittal of Solid Waste Management Units and Areas of Concern Annual Long-Term Monitoring and Maintenance Report for Calendar Year 2017

This SWMU and AOC Annual Long-Term Monitoring and Maintenance (LTMM) Report for Calendar Year 2017 (Annual LTMM Report) details the measures performed for 21 Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) in accordance with the requirements of the “Long-Term Monitoring and Maintenance [LTMM] Plan for SWMUs and AOCs Granted Corrective Action Complete with Controls” in Attachment M of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Operating Permit (Permit), which took effect February 26, 2015. This Annual LTMM Report does not present the measures for SWMU 76, Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL), as the applicable MWL reporting adheres to the approved MWL LTMM Plan, Section 4.8.1 and requires a separate annual report which will be submitted to the New Mexico Environment Department by June 30, 2018. Measures at these SWMUs and AOCs include surveillance of site conditions and maintenance of institutional controls. Conditions requiring maintenance or repair activities were identified at three of the inspected SWMUs and AOCs (SWMUs 45, 46, and 87) during the Permit-required annual site inspections. One SWMU identification sign located at SWMU 46 and two identification signs located at SWMU 87 were replaced due to weathered lettering. Evidence of erosion was observed at SWMU 45 during the annual site inspection; erosion controls will be implemented as needed to prevent the inadvertent exposure of hazardous wastes or hazardous waste constituents. SWMU 45 is located on the sloped border of Tijeras Arroyo south of Technical Area-IV. The erosion controls planned for the Tijeras Arroyo Escarpment will address not only SWMU 45, but also SWMUs 46 and 229 as a best management practice. SNL/NM personnel plan to complete this work in calendar year 2018. The status and progress of this project will be reported in the 2018 Annual SWMUs and AOCs Annual LTMM Report for Calendar Year 2018 to be submitted to the New Mexico Environment Department on March 31, 2019, as required by the Permit. Based upon the inspections performed and site conditions observed, the administrative and physical institutional controls in place at the SWMUs and AOCs are effectively providing continued protection of human health and the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Solid Waste Management Units and Areas of Concern Annual Long-Term Monitoring and Maintenance Report for Calendar Year 2015, March 2016

Long-term controls were maintained at 21 Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) in accordance with the requirements of the Long-Term Monitoring and Maintenance Plan for SWMUs and AOCs Granted Corrective Action Complete with Controls in Attachment M of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Operating Permit which took effect February 26, 2015. Maintenance and controls at these SWMUs and AOCs are described and documented in this report. The need for maintenance or repair activities were not identified at any of the inspected SWMUs or AOCs. Four repairs identified in 2014 were completed in 2015. Based upon the inspections performed and site conditions observed, the administrative and physical institutional controls in place at the SWMUs and AOCs are effectively providing continued protection of human health and the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RCT Continuing Training: Item Release and RAM Control [Slides]

Welcome to the online RCT Continuing Training. This quarter’s topic will review the fundamental elements of radioactive material control and releasing items from controlled areas to include: evaluation if an item may be released and the actions necessary to perform a release from a controlled area.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Developing and Evaluating a Smart Curtailment Strategy Integrated with a Wind Turbine Manufacturer Platform

The Renewable Energy Wildlife Institute lead a team of scientists, wind developers, and turbine manufacturers in a study to develop and test a “smart curtailment” system intended to help reduce bat collisions with wind turbines. The Vestas Bat Protection System (VBPS) is a newly developed software module within the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system of Vestas turbines. The VBPS combines data from commercially available environmental sensors and the turbine’s built-in sensors with the Vestas SCADA system. VBPS is designed to receive environmental data from sensors on the turbine such as temperature, wind speed, wind direction, time of day, and time of year, relays that information to the SCADA system to determine whether to execute turbine curtailments at any given time. The goals of this study were to 1) develop a bat fatality risk model based on bat activity data and environmental data collected in year 1, and to 2) evaluate the VBPS, using the bat fatality risk model to implement curtailment, in comparison to “blanket curtailment” (turbines curtailed when wind speed is below 5.0 meters per second (m/s)) and “control” (normally operating, feathered below 3.0 m/s) turbines in year 2. The field study took place at a wind energy facility in Iowa during the fall bat migration seasons (July – October) in 2021 and 2022. For VBPS to succeed as a viable strategy for the minimization of bat fatalities, it should meet or exceed the performance of blanket curtailment. Specifically, the VBPS should meet the following performance targets to demonstrate whether it an effective, practical risk reduction measure: (1) Turbines operating VBPS should have equal or fewer bat fatalities compared to turbines operating with blanket curtailment, and significantly fewer bat fatalities compared to control turbines; and (2) Turbines operating VBPS should have greater power production compared to turbines operating with blanket curtailment. The study was completed in accordance with the Statement of Project Objectives and within the terms of the Budget Justification. This Final Report describes the progress, challenges, and outcomes of the study.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL STORMWATER RUNOFF COVERS OVER SLIT TRENCHES

Solid Waste Management (SWM) commissioned this Special Analysis (SA) to determine the effects of placing operational stormwater runoff covers (referred to as covers in the remainder of this document) over slit trench (ST) disposal units ST1 through ST7 (the center set of slit trenches). Previously the United States Department of Energy (DOE) entered into an agreement with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) to place covers over Slit Trenches 1 and 2 to be able to continue disposing Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) solid waste (see USDOE 2008). Because the covers changed the operating conditions, DOE Order 435.1 (DOE 1999) required that an SA be performed to assess the impact. This Special Analysis has been prepared to determine the effects of placing covers over slit trenches at about years 5, 10 and 15 of the 30-year operational period. Because some slit trenches have already been operational for about 15 years, results from analyzing covers at 5 years and 10 years provide trend analysis information only. This SA also examined alternatives of covering Slit Trenches 1 and 2 with one cover and Slit Trenches 3 and 4 with a second cover versus covering them all with a single cover. Based on modeling results, minimal differences exist between covering Slit Trench groups 1-2 and 3-4 with two covers or one large cover. This SA demonstrates that placement of covers over slit trenches will slow the subsequent release and transport of radionuclides in the vadose zone in the early time periods (from time of placement until about 100 years). Release and transport of some radionuclides in the vadose zone beyond 100 years were somewhat higher than for the case without covers. The sums-of-fractions (SOFs) were examined for the current waste inventory in ST1 and ST2 and for estimated inventories at closure for ST3 through ST7. In all cases SOFs were less than one (except for one SOF for ST5 that remained at one), indicating that there should be no unacceptable impacts on operations from placing covers for the cover alternatives that were analyzed. Minimal operational limits provided in Table 4 should be used as the new set of limits for Slit Trenches 1 through 7. ST1 and ST2 are expected to be covered about 15 years after the first disposal in ST1. Because the time of actual placement of covers over the other slit trenches is unknown, this SA did not consider limit increases, only limit decreases. Thus, each minimal operational limit is the minimum of the Performance Assessment (PA) final limit and the limit calculated in this SA if covers were placed at about 5, 10 or 15 years. If other cover times are desired, further analysis will be required.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Reintroduction of Lower Columbia River Chum Salmon into Duncan Creek, 2007 Annual Report.

The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) listed Lower Columbia River (LCR) chum salmon as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in March, 1999 (64 FR 14508, March 25, 1999). The listing was in response to the reduction in abundance from historical levels of more than one-half million returning adults to fewer than 10,000 present-day spawners. Harvest, habitat degradation, changes in flow regimes, riverbed movement and heavy siltation have been largely responsible for this decline. The timing of seasonal changes in river flow and water temperatures is perhaps the most critical factor in structuring the freshwater life history of this species. This is especially true of the population located directly below Bonneville Dam, where hydropower operations can block access to spawning sites, dewater redds, strand fry, cause scour or fill of redds and increase sedimentation of spawning gravels. Prior to 1997, only two chum salmon populations were recognized as genetically distinct in the Columbia River, although spawning had been documented in many Lower Columbia River tributaries. The first population was in the Grays River (RKm 34), a tributary of the Columbia River, and the second was a group of spawners utilizing the mainstem Columbia River just below Bonneville Dam (RKm 235) adjacent to Ives Island and in Hardy and Hamilton creeks. Using additional DNA samples, Small et al. (2006) grouped chum salmon spawning in the mainstem Columbia River and the Washington State tributaries into three groups: the Coastal, the Cascade and the Gorge. The Coastal group comprises those spawning in the Grays River, Skamokawa Creek and the broodstock used at the Sea Resources facility on the Chinook River. The Cascade group comprises those spawning in the Cowlitz (both summer and fall stocks), Kalama, Lewis, and East Fork Lewis rivers, with most supporting unique populations. The Gorge group comprises those spawning in the mainstem Columbia River from the I-205 Bridge up to Bonneville Dam and those spawning in Hamilton and Hardy creeks. Response to the federal ESA listing has been primarily through direct-recovery actions: reducing harvest, hatchery supplementation using local broodstock for populations at catastrophic risk, habitat restoration (including construction of spawning channels) and flow agreements to protect spawning and rearing areas. Both state and federal agencies have built controlled spawning areas. In 1998, the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) began a chum salmon supplementation program using native stock on the Grays River. This program was expanded during 1999 - 2001 to include reintroduction into the Chinook River using eggs from the Grays River Supplementation Program. These eggs are incubated at the Grays River Hatchery, reared to release size at the Sea Resources Hatchery on the Chinook River, and the fry are released at the mouth of the Chinook River. Native steelhead, chum, and coho salmon are present in Duncan Creek, and are recognized as subpopulations of the Lower Gorge population, and are focal species in the Lower Columbia Fish Recovery Board (LCFRB) plan. Steelhead, chum and coho salmon that spawn in Duncan Creek are listed as Threatened under the ESA. Duncan Creek is classified by the LCFRB plan as a watershed for intensive monitoring (LCFRB 2004). This project was identified in the 2004 Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) revised Biological Opinion (revised BiOp) to increase survival of chum salmon, 'BPA will continue to fund the program to re-introduce Columbia River chum salmon into Duncan Creek as long as NOAA Fisheries determines it to be an essential and effective contribution to reducing the risk of extinction for this ESU'. (USACE et al. 2004, page 85-86). The Governors Forum on Monitoring and Salmon Recovery and Watershed Health recommends one major population from each ESU have adult and juvenile monitoring. Duncan Creek chum salmon are identified in this plan to be intensively monitored. Planners recommended that a combination of natural and hatchery production would be the most likely way to produce the most rapid sustainable improvement in chum runs. Specifically, it was assumed that improving habitat conditions would promote efficient natural production, and that the most rapid way to rebuild the run would be to combine releases of an appropriate stock into the improved habitat. WDFW's recovery strategy for LCR chum salmon, as outlined in the WDFW Grays River and Washougal Hatchery Genetic Management Plans (HGMP), is as follows. First, determine if remnant populations of chum salmon exist in LCR tributaries. Second, if such populations exist, develop stock-specific recovery plans involving habitat restoration that include the creation of spawning refugias, supplementation where necessary, and a habitat and fish monitoring and evaluation plan.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

MC&A System Effectiveness Tool (MSET) (Presentation 2)

MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material control and accountability (MC&A) system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MC&A functions defined based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. MSET analysis is based on performance of the entire MC&A system including defense-in-depth attributes and sensitivity analysis of changes in the system, both positive and negative. MSET analysis considers: accounting; containment; access control; surveillance capabilities of the system; and other interfaces with the physical protection systems that provide detection of an unauthorized action. MSET performs a system effectiveness calculation evaluation against a defined performance metric. MSET uses PRA techniques to analyze the MC&A system. MSET is a tool for evaluating the system effectiveness of MC&A systems during self-assessment or external inspection. MSET has been developed, tested, and benchmarked by the U.S. DOE. In collaboration with the U.S. DOE, Rosatom is developing a Russian version (MSET-R) planned for pilot implementation at select material balance areas in 2011. MSET has been shown to be an effective training and communication tool for MC&A.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 2 of 2 – Insights into Developing a Cloud-hosted Security Technology

A Sentry Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS) is a stand-alone security system that provides detection, assessment, and communication of priority alarms as an additional means of thwarting internal and external threats to sites that maintain radiological material. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform is an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS that relays priority alarm information to the identified response stakeholders. Sentry-SECURE is hosted in a cloud environment that abstracts the data owner’s and data consumer’s platforms to allow for greater information sharing. This promotes situational awareness amongst authorized users and enables future innovation among modern response platforms. When securely architecting a cloud solution such as this, the use of design paradigms can be an effective tool to increase the accuracy and reliability of cyber- and information-security-related decisions made throughout the development process. This approach also supports the categorization of design considerations into three levels: industry concepts, project approaches, and data protections for digital processes. Industry concepts consist of the notional underpinnings that guide or motivate a security process, system, or design but often lack any tangible attributes. Project approaches represent decisions made during the design and development process to prioritize a solution, method, or practice above another that may provide a comparable functional output but lacks a desired security benefit. Data protections for digital processes represent the selection, integration, and implementation of specific controls for a given asset. This paper will explore specific examples of how Sentry-SECURE has been designed to account for considerations at each of these three levels, while balancing the operational intent of the platform with the security enhancements necessary to maintain data integrity, availability, and confidentiality.

assessment, RMS, security, physical, cloud, Cyber ↗

National and International Assistance in the Technical Assessment of Nuclear and other Radiological Materials out of Regulatory Control

Considerable resources are dedicated worldwide to detect illicit materials of all types amid the concern of their potential use in criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Of particular concern are illicit nuclear and radiological materials as they have potential to cause serious harm to the general public if not maintained under regulatory control. As such, the international community has developed recommendations and guidance for States and their Competent Authorities to establish, implement, maintain, and strengthen their nuclear security regimes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides recommendations for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control through the publication Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, Nuclear Security Series No.15. Based on this guidance and national/international practical experience and best practices, the international community has made considerable advances in the detection, interdiction, and adjudication of nuclear and other radiological materials out of regulatory control. The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation has national/international experience to share on providing emergency responders and front line officers assistance in the technical assessment of interdicted nuclear and other radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Integrated Operations for Nuclear: Work Reduction Opportunity Demonstration Strategy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Plant Modernization Pathway has been working with industry for a number of years to leverage digital technology to extend the life and improve the performance of the existing fleet through modernized technologies and improved processes for plant operation and power generation. This includes development of modernization solutions to improve reliability and economic performance while addressing US nuclear industry’s aging and obsolescence challenges. The objective of these efforts is to deliver a sustainable business model that enables US nuclear industry to remain competitive. Digital Infrastructure (DI) research has established a technical foundation for these efforts. This effort began with technical analysis and support for a safety-related instrumentation and control (I&C) pilot upgrade being performed at Constellation Energy Generation’s Limerick Nuclear Plant. The following publicly available reports were produced as part of this effort. • INL/EXT-20-61079, Vendor-Independent Design Requirements for a Boiling Water Reactor Safety System Upgrade [1] • INL/EXT-20-59371, Business Case Analysis for Digital Safety-Related Instrumentation & Control System Modernizations [2] • INL/EXT-20-59809, “Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Pilot Upgrade: Initial Scoping Phase Implementation Report and Lessons Learned [3] • INL/RPT-23-72105, Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Upgrade: Conceptual – Detailed Design Phase Report and Lessons Learned [4]

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗