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Savannah River nuclear solutions criticality safety training and qualification program and professional development/retention - 14507

Many years ago, at the Savannah River Site, the need for technically competent and qualified criticality safety (CS) staff was identified. Over the intervening years an extensive training and qualification (T and Q) program was developed. In 2008 Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS), the current site M and O contractor, inherited the T and Q program developed by the prior site contractors. Since then SRNS has initiated changes to the T and Q program to better fit the current regulatory environment, ensuring compliance with ANSI/ANS-8.26 [1], and implementing the idea of continuous improvement. Currently, a significant fraction of the SRNS CS staff either will be or are eligible for retirement. Therefore, SRNS is pursuing recent Nuclear Engineering college graduates and/or experienced criticality engineers. The challenges associated with hiring and maintaining criticality staff include, but are not limited to, increased workforce mobility and increased competition for fewer criticality resources. For example, the recent trend in company benefits is to eliminate longer term benefits such as pensions to make the benefits more transportable in terms of 401 Ks and Health Savings Accounts. In addition, there have been reductions in DOE funding for professional development through participation in ANS committees or attendance at Criticality related conferences. SRNS has investigated a number of possibilities on how to retain CS staff, but in the current environment has not identified any 'golden eggs'. Regardless, SRNS is exploring additional paths to incentivize the engineers to stay long term. SRNS is working to improve/maintain its workforce by creating a CS engineer pipeline. SRNS provides a training budget for new engineers and offers a formalized and mentored training program. For experienced criticality engineers, the SRNS T and Q program is flexible enough to allow 'credit' for previous accomplishments at other sites. SRNS is also striving to be proactive in supporting professional development by identifying specific monies in the planning phases of the annual budget requests. The current posture of SRNS is to maintain 'open' requisitions for both experienced staff looking for other opportunities, and for recent college graduates. As opportunities arise, either from within or without, SRNS evaluates the potential candidates and advances offers of employment. Until the longer term need is met SRNS intends to hire at least two staff members per year. Those staff members then enter the T and Q program and when appropriate, based on their experience and/or training accomplishments, begin assisting the current staff with program/facility CS support. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Securing Future Energy Supplies: From Renewables to Microreactors

This session will provide insight into how future energy deployments, critical to national-level programs focused on reducing carbon emissions, can be secured-by-design using lessons learned from current energy infrastructure. It will begin with an overview of current threats and risks associated with renewable energy assets and systems, primarily wind and solar, focusing on their control architecture and key system functions for both efficient and safe operations. This talk will then translate the key takeaways from current renewable infrastructure into applications for securing future energy systems, including microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), based on planned concepts of operations and control. Microreactors and SMRs are intended to be factory-assembled with commercially available components and deployed in more remote or distributed environments, necessitating centralized control centers, remote monitoring, and offsite maintenance and technical support. All of these factors lead these assets to a security posture and controls more similar to today's renewable energy assets than today's nuclear reactors, which represents a significant shift in mindset for the nuclear industry. This talk will provide justification for this shift as well as a path forward to motivate securing these groundbreaking technologies from the outset of their design and deployment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance: DistribuTECH Workshop

Idaho National Laboratory, the Department of Energy’s Grid Deployment Office, and other national laboratories are collaborating to ensure the U.S. energy infrastructure is reliable, resilient, and secure. This involves strategically leveraging digital technologies to modernize the grid, enhance its resilience against all hazards and disruptions, and fortify national energy security across a diverse energy portfolio. In this workshop you will learn about Idaho National Lab’s Technical Assistance programs, where organizations will be matched with a national laboratory subject matter expert to focus on their key topical area. The technical assistance offered through this track is designed to be responsive to a rapidly changing regulatory landscape and cutting-edge technologies that enhance grid reliability and efficiency. Users will be guided through a tailored analysis and mitigation program to determine their current security posture and given assistance in evaluating supply chain and protection choices against potential consequences.

Digital assurance↗

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗

Bridging Equipment Reliability Data and Risk Informed Decisions in a Plant Operation Context

Industry equipment reliability and asset management programs are essential elements that help ensure the safe and economical operation of nuclear power plants. The effectiveness of these programs is addressed in several industry-developed and regulatory programs. The Risk-Informed Asset Management (RIAM) project is tasked to develop tools in support of the equipment reliability and asset management programs at nuclear power plants. These tools are designed to create a direct bridge between component health/lifecycle data and decision making (e.g., maintenance scheduling and project prioritization). The goal of this article is to provide a guide for specific use cases that the RIAM project is targeting. We have grouped uses cases into three main areas. The first area focuses on the analysis of equipment reliability data with a particular emphasis on condition-based data, such as test/surveillance reports and component monitoring data. The second area focuses on the integration of equipment reliability into system/plant reliability models to determine system/plant health and identify the components that are critical to maintain an operational system. Lastly, the third area manages plant resources, such as maintenance activities and replacement scheduling using optimization methods. Here the primary focus is on supporting typical system engineer decisions regarding maintenance activity scheduling and component aging management. This is performed in a risk-informed context where the term “risk” is broadly constructed to include both plant reliability and economics. This framework combines data analytics tools to analyze equipment reliability data with risk-informed methods designed to support system engineer decisions (e.g., maintenance and replacement schedules, optimal maintenance posture) in a customizable workflow.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

INTEGRATION OF DATA ANALYTICS WITH SYSTEM HEALTH PROGRAMS

Industry equipment reliability and asset management programs are essential elements that help ensure the safe and economical operation of nuclear power plants. The effectiveness of these programs is addressed in several industry developed and regulatory programs. However, these programs have proven to be labor intensive and expensive. There is an opportunity to significantly enhance the collection, analysis, and use of this information to provide more cost-effective plant operation. Additionally, there is an acute industry need to leverage advanced technology to reduce costs and improve operational effectiveness. The goal of this paper is to provide effective and efficient analytical methods and tools to support risk-informed decisions for the equipment reliability and asset management programs at nuclear power plants. This is accomplished by creating a direct bridge between component health/lifecycle data and decision making (e.g., maintenance scheduling and project prioritization). Here we are supporting typical system engineer decisions regarding maintenance activity scheduling and component ageing management. This is performed in a risk-informed context where herein the term “risk” is broadly constructed to include both plant reliability and economics. This framework combines data analytics tools to analyze equipment reliability data with risk-informed methods designed to support system engineer decisions (e.g., maintenance and replacement schedules, optimal maintenance posture) in a customizable workflow. A challenge is that the structure of this workflow strongly depends on the decision that needs to be made, the type of data available, and the constraints that need to be considered. Current methods are designed to provide specific answers to specific problems; however, these methods might prove to be inadequate even when problem settings slightly change (e.g., different types of requirements, additional dependencies between system reliability and economics). We tackled this challenge by designing framework in a flexible and modular fashion such that the user can assemble and customize his/her own workflow that integrates SSC economic lifecycle models (e.g., maintenance and replacement costs), system reliability models, and optimization methods.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Braxton Marlatt Intern Poster

The Internet of Things (IoT) encompasses a vast network of interconnected devices embedded with software, sensors, and network connectivity, enabling data collection and exchange. While IoT technology revolutionizes various industries, it also introduces significant security challenges. This research focuses on enhancing IoT security through the implementation of Zero Trust Architecture concepts, specifically targeting the Network and Device pillars of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Zero Trust Maturity Model. By generating Codified Attack Surfaces (CAS) using custom Structured Threat Information eXpression bundles, this project aims to provide enhanced visibility into network communications, detect vulnerabilities in device firmware, and improve the overall security posture for IoT devices and networks. The methodology involves defining custom STIX schema and objects, collecting data from intra-IoT traffic, external network traffic, and firmware analysis, and automating the conversion and correlation of this data into STIX bundles. The automated generation of attack surfaces offers comprehensive insights into activity, vulnerabilities, and anomalies within an IoT environment, enabling proactive threat identification and mitigation.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

OT Defender Presentation - Hacker Mindset

Presentation on hacker mindset and what utilities may be up against from lone hackers or professional groups, with ideas on how to improve defensive posture.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Hands-On, Heads-Up: Blending Cyber T&E with Data Science-Driven Training in Jupyter Notebooks

In an era of increasingly sophisticated threats to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity professionals must be more than just aware; they must be immersed, agile, and equipped to operate in environments where failure is not an option. Nowhere is this truer than in the nuclear sector, where cyber-physical systems, regulatory scrutiny, and insider threat potential demand a new generation of hands-on, technically fluent defenders. This paper presents a unified training approach that integrates Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (T&E) with data science techniques using Jupyter Notebooks as the interactive lab environment. The program centers on a modular, scenario-driven curriculum designed to build not just knowledge but practical capability in the assessment and defense of radiation detection systems, firmware interfaces, and operational security postures.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

U.S. Department of Energy Consequence Management Under the National Response Framework

Under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the National Response Framework, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has specific responsibilities as a coordinating agency and for leading interagency response elements in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). Emergency response planning focuses on rapidly providing response elements in stages after being notified of a nuclear/radiological incident. The use of Home Teams during the field team deployment period and recent advances in collecting and transmitting data from the field directly to assessment assets has greatly improved incident assessment times for public protection decisions. The DOE’s Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) based in Las Vegas, Nevada, has successfully deployed technical and logistical support for this mission at national exercises such as Top Officials Exercise IV (TOPOFF IV). In a unique response situation, DOE will provide advance contingency support to NASA during the scheduled launch in the fall of 2009 of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). The MSL rover will carry a radioisotope power system that generates electricity from the heat of plutonium’s radioactive decay. DOE assets and contingency planning will provide a pre-incident response posture for rapid early plume phase assessment in the highly unlikely launch anomaly.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cyber Security and Resilient Systems

The Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has become a center of excellence for critical infrastructure protection, particularly in the field of cyber security. It is one of only a few national laboratories that have enhanced the nation’s cyber security posture by performing industrial control system (ICS) vendor assessments as well as user on-site assessments. Not only are vulnerabilities discovered, but described actions for enhancing security are suggested – both on a system-specific basis and from a general perspective of identifying common weaknesses and their corresponding corrective actions. These cyber security programs have performed over 40 assessments to date which have led to more robust, secure, and resilient monitoring and control systems for the US electrical grid, oil and gas, chemical, transportation, and many other sectors. In addition to cyber assessments themselves, the INL has been engaged in outreach to the ICS community through vendor forums, technical conferences, vendor user groups, and other special engagements as requested. Training programs have been created to help educate all levels of management and worker alike with an emphasis towards real everyday cyber hacking methods and techniques including typical exploits that are used. The asset owner or end user has many products available for its use created from these programs. One outstanding product is the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems document that provides insight to the user when specifying a new monitoring and control system, particularly concerning security requirements. Employing some of the top cyber researchers in the nation, the INL can leverage this talent towards many applications other than critical infrastructure. Monitoring and control systems are used throughout the world to perform simple tasks such as cooking in a microwave to complex ones such as the monitoring and control of the next generation fighter jets or nuclear material safeguards systems in complex nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It is the intent of this paper to describe the cyber security programs that are currently in place, the experiences and successes achieved in industry including outreach and training, and suggestions about how other sectors and organizations can leverage this national expertise to help their monitoring and control systems become more secure.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An Anticipatory and Deceptive AI Utilizing Bayesian Belief Networks

The U.S. military defines antiterrorism as the defensive posture taken against terrorist threats. Antiterrorism includes fostering awareness of potential threats, deterring aggressors, developing security measures, planning for future events, interdicting an event in progress, and ultimately mitigating and managing the consequences of an event. Recent events highlight the need for efficient tools for training our military and homeland security officers for anticipating threats posed by terrorists. These tools need to be easy enough so that they are readily usable without substantial training, but still maintain the complexity to allow for a level of deceptive reasoning on the part of the opponent. To meet this need, we propose to integrate a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) model for threat anticipation and deceptive reasoning into training simulation environments currently utilized by several organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD). BBNs have the ability to deal with various types of uncertainties; such as identities, capabilities, target attractiveness, and the combinations of the previous. They also allow for disparate types of data to be fused in a coherent, analytically defensible, and understandable manner. A BBN has been developed by ORNL uses a network engineering process that treats the probability distributions of each node with in the broader context of the system development effort as a whole, and not in isolation. The network will be integrated into the Research Network Inc,(RNI) developed Game Distributed Interactive Simulation (GDIS) as a smart artificial intelligence module. GDIS is utilized by several DoD and civilian organizations as a distributed training tool for a multiplicity of reasons. It has garnered several awards for its realism, ease of use, and popularity. One area that it still has room to excel in, as most video training tools do, is in the area of artificial intelligence of opponent combatants. It is believed that by utilizing BBN as the backbone of the artificial intelligence code, a more realistic and helpful training experience will be available and enemy combatants that move and strategize with purpose will be obtained.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Relationships between dead wood and arthropods in the Southeastern United States.

The importance of dead wood to maintaining forest diversity is now widely recognized. However, the habitat associations and sensitivities of many species associated with dead wood remain unknown, making it difficult to develop conservation plans for managed forests. The purpose of this research, conducted on the upper coastal plain of South Carolina, was to better understand the relationships between dead wood and arthropods in the southeastern United States. In a comparison of forest types, more beetle species emerged from logs collected in upland pine-dominated stands than in bottomland hardwood forests. This difference was most pronounced for Quercus nigra L., a species of tree uncommon in upland forests. In a comparison of wood postures, more beetle species emerged from logs than from snags, but a number of species appear to be dependent on snags including several canopy specialists. In a study of saproxylic beetle succession, species richness peaked within the first year of death and declined steadily thereafter. However, a number of species appear to be dependent on highly decayed logs, underscoring the importance of protecting wood at all stages of decay. In a study comparing litter-dwelling arthropod abundance at different distances from dead wood, arthropods were more abundant near dead wood than away from it. In another study, grounddwelling arthropods and saproxylic beetles were little affected by large-scale manipulations of dead wood in upland pine-dominated forests, possibly due to the suitability of the forests surrounding the plots.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms and fissile material reductions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nanostructured Lanthanum Halides and CeBr3 for Nuclear Radiation and Detection

Scintillator materials are used to detect, and in some cases identify, gamma rays. Higher performance scintillators are expensive, hard to manufacture, fragile, and sometimes require liquid nitrogen or cooling engines. But whereas lower-quality scintillators are cheap, easy to manufacture, and more rugged, their performance is lower. At issue: can the desirable qualities of high-and low-performance scintillators be combined to achieve better performance at lower cost? Preliminary experiments show that a LaF{sub 3}:Ce oleic acid-based nanocomposite exhibits a photopeak when exposed to {sup 137}Cs source gamma-radiation. The chemical synthesis of the cerium-doped lanthanum halide nanoparticles are scalable and large quantities of material can be produced at a time, unlike typical crystal growth processes such as the Bridgeman process. Using a polymer composite (Figure 1), produced by LANL, initial measurements of the unloaded and 8% LaF{sub 3}:Ce-loaded sample have been made using {sup 137}Cs sources. Figure 2 shows an energy spectrum acquired for CeF{sub 3}. The lighter plot is the measured polymer-only spectrum and the black plot is the spectrum from the nanocomposite scintillator. As the development of this material continues, the energy resolution is expected to improve and the photopeak-to-Compton ratio will become greater at higher loadings. These measurements show the expected Compton edge in the polymer-only sample, and the Compton edge and photo-peak expected in the nanophosphor composites that LANL has produced. Using a porous VYCORR with CdSe/ZnS core shell quantum dots, Letant has demonstrated that he has obtained signatures of the 241Am photopeak with energy resolution as good at NaI (Figure 3). We begin with the fact that CeBr{sub 3} crystals do not have a self-activity component as strong as the lanthanum halides. The radioactive 0.090% {sup 138}La component of lanthanum leads to significant self-activity, which will be a problem for very large detector volumes. Yet a significant strength of the nanostructure detector concept is the ability to create extremely large detector volumes by mixing nanoparticles into a transparent matrix. This would argue for use of nanoparticles other than lanthanum halides. Nanocomposites are easy to prepare; it is much less costly to use nanocomposites than to grow large whole crystals of these materials. The material can be fabricated at an industrial scale, further reducing cost. This material potentially offers the performance of $300/cc material (e.g., lanthanum bromide) at a cost of $1/cc. Because the material acts as a plastic, it is rugged and flexible, and can be made in large sheets, increasing the sensitivity of a detector using it. It would operate at ambient temperatures. Very large volumes of detector may be produced at greatly reduced cost, enhancing the non-proliferation posture of the nation for the same dollar value.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗