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At least 1,153 records · Page 64

NASA Composite Materials Development: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges

Composite materials have emerged as the materials of choice for increasing the performance and reducing the weight and cost of military, general aviation, and transport aircraft and space launch vehicles. Major advancements have been made in the ability to design, fabricate, and analyze large complex aerospace structures. The recent efforts by Boeing and Airbus to incorporate composite into primary load carrying structures of large commercial transports and to certify the airworthiness of these structures is evidence of the significant advancements made in understanding and use of these materials in real world aircraft. NASA has been engaged in research on composites since the late 1960 s and has worked to address many development issues with these materials in an effort to ensure safety, improve performance, and improve affordability of air travel for the public good. This research has ranged from synthesis of advanced resin chemistries to development of mathematical analyses tools to reliably predict the response of built-up structures under combined load conditions. The lessons learned from this research are highlighted with specific examples to illustrate the problems encountered and solutions to these problems. Examples include specific technologies related to environmental effects, processing science, fabrication technologies, nondestructive inspection, damage tolerance, micromechanics, structural mechanics, and residual life prediction. The current state of the technology is reviewed and key issues requiring additional research identified. Also, grand challenges to be solved for expanded use of composites in aero structures are identified.

Tenney, Darrel R.↗

Lessons Learned for Cx PRACA. Constellation Program Problem Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Process and System

This slide presentation reviews the Constellation Program Problem Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Process and System (Cx PRACA). The goal of the Cx PRACA is to incorporate Lessons learned from the Shuttle, ISS, and Orbiter programs by creating a single tool for managing the PRACA process, that clearly defines the scope of PRACA applicability and what must be reported, and defines the ownership and responsibility for managing the PRACA process including disposition approval authority. CxP PRACA is a process, supported by a single information gathering data module which will be integrated with a single CxP Information System, providing interoperability, import and export capability making the CxP PRACA a more effective and user friendly technical and management tool.

Kelle, Pido I.↗

Challenges and Lessons Learned From Resurrecting a Legacy Research Flight Controller

Resurrecting the legacy Inner Loop Thrust Vectoring research flight controller to investigate the tail shock region brought unique challenges. This report documents these challenges and lessons learned from a stability and controls perspective. The flight test approach for flight envelope expansion and probing tests, as well as limited flight test results, are presented. Recent advances in sonic boom reduction technology have contributed to a resurgent interest in civilian supersonic cruise flight. These advances have focused only on fore body shaping, however, and little, if any, experimental flight data are available to develop and validate design tools for the tail shock region. In January of 2009, the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center completed research flights to investigate the tail shock region of a highly modified F-15 aircraft by probing the shock waves around it, using another F-15 aircraft. To adjust the lift distribution and plume shape, a decade-old research flight controller from the Inner Loop Thrust Vectoring project was required. To investigate the tail shock region, the lift distribution was changed by adjusting the canard position, and the plume shape was changed by adjusting the nozzle area and thrust vectoring.

Dees, Ray A.↗

The Evolution of Extravehicular Activity Operations to Lunar Exploration Based on Operational Lessons Learned During 2009 NASA Desert RATS Field Testing

This paper will present options to evolutionary changes in several philosophical areas of extravehicular activity (EVA) operations. These areas will include single person verses team EVAs; various loss of communications scenarios (with Mission Control, between suited crew, suited crew to rover crew, and rover crew A to rover crew B); EVA termination and abort time requirements; incapacitated crew ingress time requirements; autonomous crew operations during loss of signal periods including crew decisions on EVA execution (including decision for single verses team EVA). Additionally, suggestions as to the evolution of the make-up of the EVA flight control team from the current standard will be presented. With respect to the flight control team, the major areas of EVA flight control, EVA Systems and EVA Tasks, will be reviewed, and suggested evolutions of each will be presented. Currently both areas receive real-time information, and provide immediate feedback during EVAs as well as spacesuit (extravehicular mobility unit - EMU) maintenance and servicing periods. With respect to the tasks being performed, either EMU servicing and maintenance, or the specific EVA tasks, daily revising of plans will need to be able to be smoothly implemented to account for unforeseen situations and findings. Many of the presented ideas are a result of lessons learned by the NASA Johnson Space Center Mission Operations Directorate operations team support during the 2009 NASA Desert Research and Technology Studies (Desert RATS). It is important that the philosophy of both EVA crew operations and flight control be examined now, so that, where required, adjustments can be made to a next generation EMU and EVA equipment that will complement the anticipated needs of both the EVA flight control team and the crews.

Bell, Ernest R., Jr.↗

Lessons Learned in Launching Ares I-X

The Ares I-X flight test, scheduled for 2009, is the first opportunity for the Constellation Program and Ares Projects to obtain important data on the in-flight loads, first stage recovery, and ground-handling characteristics of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. The flight test vehicle will incorporate a mix of flight and mockup hardware, reflecting an acceptable representation of the mass and outer mold line characteristics of the operational Ares I vehicle. It will be powered by a four-segment solid rocket motor from the Space Shuttle inventory and will include a fifth, inert spacer segment and new forward structures to make it the same shape as the Ares I first stage. The vehicle also includes mass simulators for the upper stage, Orion crew module, and launch abort system to match the outer mold line of Ares I; an active roll control system; and avionics derived from Shuttle and Atlas hardware. This suborbital mission will take the flight test vehicle from stacking in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) through liftoff, maximum dynamic pressure, first stage separation, and recovery. Ares I-X presented NASA with unique project management challenges. This presentation will address those unique challenges, including managing a virtual nationwide team under a constrained timeline; designing and building the launch vehicle and ground systems; working concurrently with Space Shuttle activities; and integrating technical and management functions. It also will identify key data collected and lessons learned from the flight that will be applied to future exploration missions.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

Project Interface Requirements Process Including Shuttle Lessons Learned

Most failures occur at interfaces between organizations and hardware. Processing interface requirements at the start of a project life cycle will reduce the likelihood of costly interface changes/failures later. This can be done by adding Interface Control Documents (ICDs) to the Project top level drawing tree, providing technical direction to the Projects for interface requirements, and by funding the interface requirements function directly from the Project Manager's office. The interface requirements function within the Project Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Office would work in-line with the project element design engineers early in the life cycle to enhance communications and negotiate technical issues between the elements. This function would work as the technical arm of the Project Manager to help ensure that the Project cost, schedule, and risk objectives can be met during the Life Cycle. Some ICD Lessons Learned during the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Life Cycle will include the use of hardware interface photos in the ICD, progressive life cycle design certification by analysis, test, & operations experience, assigning interface design engineers to Element Interface (EI) and Project technical panels, and linking interface design drawings with project build drawings

Bauch, Garland T.↗

Lessons Learned From The EMU Fire and How It Impacts CxP Suit Element Development and Testing

During testing a Space Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) pressure garment and life-support backpack was destroyed in a flash fire in the Johnson Space Center's Crew systems laboratory. This slide presentation reviews the accident, probable causes, the lessons learned and the effect this has on the testing and the environment for testing of the Space Suit for the Constellation Program.

Metts, Jonathan↗

Thermoelectric Converter for Loop Heat Pipe Temperature Control: Experience and Lessons Learned

This paper describes the theoretical background and implementation methodology of using a thermoelectric converter (TEC) for operating temperature control of a loop heat pipe (LHP). In particular, experimental results from ambient and thermal vacuum tests of an LHP are presented for illustrations. The most commonly used state-of-the-art method to control the LHP operating temperature is to cold bias its compensation chamber (CC) and use an electrical heater to maintain the CC at the desired set point temperature. Although effective, this approach has its shortcomings in that the electrical heater can only provide heating to the CC, and the required power can be large under certain conditions. An alternative method is to use a TEC, which is capable of providing both heating and cooling to the CC. In this method, one side of the TEC is attached to the CC, and the other side is connected to the evaporator via a thermal strap. Using a bipolar power supply and a control algorithm, a TEC can function as a heater or a cooler, depending on the direction of the current flow. Extensive ground tests of several LHPs have demonstrated that a TEC can provide very tight temperature control for the CC. It also offers several additional advantages: (1) The LHP can operate at temperatures below its natural operating temperature at low heat loads; (2) The required heater power for a TEC is much less than that for an electrical heater; and (3) It enhances the LHP start-up success. Although the concept of using a TEC for LHP temperature control is simple, there are many factors to be considered in its implementation for space applications because the TEC is susceptible to the shear stress and yet has to sustain the dynamic load under the spacecraft launch environment. The added features that help the TEC to withstand the dynamic load will inevitably affect the TEC thermal performance. Some experiences and lessons learned are addressed in this paper.

Ku, Jentung↗

Constellation Program Design Challenges as Opportunities for Educational Outreach- Lessons Learned

The Texas Space Grant Consortium (TSGC) and the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Education Office both have programs that present design challenges for university senior design classes that offer great opportunities for educational outreach and workforce development. These design challenges have been identified by NASA engineers and scientists as actual design problems faced by the Constellation Program in its exploration missions and architecture. Student teams formed in their senior design class select and then work on a design challenge for one or two semesters. The senior design class follows the requirements set by their university, but it must also comply with the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) in order to meet the class academic requirements. Based on a one year fellowship at a TSGC university under the NASA Administrator's Fellowship Program (NAFP) and several years of experience, lessons learned are presented on the NASA Design Challenge Program.

Trevino, Robert C.↗

Selected Lessons Learned over the ISS Design, Development, Assembly, and Operations: Applicability to International Cooperation for Standardization

This slide presentation reviews some of the lessons learned in the sphere of international cooperation during the development, assembly and operation of the International Space Station. From the begining all Partners shared a common objective to build, operate and utilize a crewed laboratory in low orbit as an international partnership. The importance of standards is emphasized.

Hirsch, David B.↗

The Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Space Flight Chart: Lessons Learned Gone Viral

This presentation will explore the surprising history and events that transformed a mundane spreadsheet of historical spaceflight incidents into a popular and widely distributed visual compendium of lessons learned. The Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Space Flight Chart (a.k.a. The Significant Incidents Chart) is a popular and visually captivating reference product that has arisen from the work of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Flight Safety Office (FSO). It began as an internal tool intended to increase our team s awareness of historical and modern space flight incidents. Today, the chart is widely recognized across the agency as a reference tool. It appears in several training and education programs. It is used in familiarization training in the JSC Building 9 Mockup Facility and is seen by hundreds of center visitors each week. The chart visually summarizes injuries, fatalities, and close calls sustained during the continuing development of human space flight. The poster-sized chart displays over 100 total events that have direct connections to human space flight endeavors. The chart is updated periodically. The update process itself has become a collaborative effort. Many people, spanning multiple NASA organizations, have provided suggestions for additional entries. The FSO maintains a growing list of subscribers who have requested to receive updates. The presenters will discuss the origins and motivations behind the significant incidents chart. A review of the inclusion criteria used to select events will be offered. We will address how the chart is used today by S&MA and offer a vision of how it might be used by other organizations now and in the future. Particular emphasis will be placed on features of the chart that have met with broad acceptance and have helped spread awareness of the most important lessons in human spaceflight.

Wood, Bill↗

Space Shuttle Program Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) Success Legacy -Major Accomplishments and Lessons Learned

This presentation has shown the accomplishments of the PASS project over three decades and highlighted the lessons learned. Over the entire time, our goal has been to continuously improve our process, implement automation for both quality and increased productivity, and identify and remove all defects due to prior execution of a flawed process in addition to improving our processes following identification of significant process escapes. Morale and workforce instability have been issues, most significantly during 1993 to 1998 (period of consolidation in aerospace industry). The PASS project has also consulted with others, including the Software Engineering Institute, so as to be an early evaluator, adopter, and adapter of state-of-the-art software engineering innovations.

Orr, James K.↗

Working and Learning with Knowledge in the Lobes of a Humanoid's Mind

Humanoid class robots must have sufficient dexterity to assist people and work in an environment designed for human comfort and productivity. This dexterity, in particular the ability to use tools, requires a cognitive understanding of self and the world that exceeds contemporary robotics. Our hypothesis is that the sense-think-act paradigm that has proven so successful for autonomous robots is missing one or more key elements that will be needed for humanoids to meet their full potential as autonomous human assistants. This key ingredient is knowledge. The presented work includes experiments conducted on the Robonaut system, a NASA and the Defense Advanced research Projects Agency (DARPA) joint project, and includes collaborative efforts with a DARPA Mobile Autonomous Robot Software technical program team of researchers at NASA, MIT, USC, NRL, UMass and Vanderbilt. The paper reports on results in the areas of human-robot interaction (human tracking, gesture recognition, natural language, supervised control), perception (stereo vision, object identification, object pose estimation), autonomous grasping (tactile sensing, grasp reflex, grasp stability) and learning (human instruction, task level sequences, and sensorimotor association).

Ambrose, Robert↗

Multiple Kernel Learning for Heterogeneous Anomaly Detection: Algorithm and Aviation Safety Case Study

The world-wide aviation system is one of the most complex dynamical systems ever developed and is generating data at an extremely rapid rate. Most modern commercial aircraft record several hundred flight parameters including information from the guidance, navigation, and control systems, the avionics and propulsion systems, and the pilot inputs into the aircraft. These parameters may be continuous measurements or binary or categorical measurements recorded in one second intervals for the duration of the flight. Currently, most approaches to aviation safety are reactive, meaning that they are designed to react to an aviation safety incident or accident. In this paper, we discuss a novel approach based on the theory of multiple kernel learning to detect potential safety anomalies in very large data bases of discrete and continuous data from world-wide operations of commercial fleets. We pose a general anomaly detection problem which includes both discrete and continuous data streams, where we assume that the discrete streams have a causal influence on the continuous streams. We also assume that atypical sequence of events in the discrete streams can lead to off-nominal system performance. We discuss the application domain, novel algorithms, and also discuss results on real-world data sets. Our algorithm uncovers operationally significant events in high dimensional data streams in the aviation industry which are not detectable using state of the art methods

Das, Santanu↗

Challenges and Lessons Learned in the Application of Autonomy to Space Operations

NASA's Space Operations Management Office (SOMO) is working toward a goal of providing an integrated infrastructure of mission and data services for space missions undertaken by NASA enterprises. A significant portion of this effort is focused on reducing the cost of these services. We are interested in the potential of autonomy to reduce operations costs. SOMO services support space missions, but are not part of the mission objectives; therefore the level of acceptable risk is very low. In fact, SOMO could be effective ly prevented from applying autonomy if customers merely perceive it as adding risk to their mission(s). We are interested in this workshop from the standpoint of understanding what can be done to realize the potential cost savings due to autonomy while maintaining acceptable risk and serving the needs of our customers. We would like to present our lessons learned so far in adopting autonomy and automation, which we think will contribute to clarifying the challenges facing the use of such technology. SOMO provides services to a diverse and ambitious set of mission customers. Many of these missions are groundbreaking missions for which communications, data, and other operations requirements sometimes cannot be clearly articulated early in the program. This motivates a need for systems that are robust in the face of unanticipated situations so that customer missions are not unreasonably constrained or impacted by "shortcomings" in SOMO services. One of SOMO's primary goals is to realize a paradigm in which SOMO acts as a service provider to organizations that fly space missions for NASA, other government agencies, and even the commercial sector. These organizations purchase SOMO services "by the pound" as customers. We have to provide systems that are not experiments themselves, but rather stable bases from which to do bold experiments. To this end, SOMO also seeks to work closely with industry to see that robust autonomy technology gets infused into products and services for the space industry and beyond. The potential for application of these technologies spans space-based communications networks (e.g. TDRSS) and ground-based assets including communication and tracking antenna systems, data networks, and control centers. There are several problems that are candidates for the application of autonomy, if it can be made reliable enough, including: antenna control, antenna scheduling, communication link scheduling and operation, navigation, attitude determination, fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (for spacecraft or ground assets), and mission-level planning and scheduling. Some attempts have been made to apply autonomy and automation in these areas in the past with varying degrees of success. We will present relevant case histories and the lessons inferred from them. Combining this past experience with anticipated future needs, we can clarify the challenges that must be met in order to realize the benefits of autonomy.

Forrest, David J.↗

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗

Hypergolic Propellants: The Handling Hazards and Lessons Learned from Use

Several unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, the Titan Program, and a few others have occurred over the past several decades. Spill sites include the following government facilities: Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. Until now, the only method of capturing the lessons learned from these incidents has been "word of mouth" or by studying each individual incident report. Through studying several dozen of these incidents, certain root cause themes are apparent. Scrutinizing these themes could prove to be highly beneficial to future hypergolic system testing, checkout, and operational use.

Nufer, Brian↗