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At least 1,135 records · Page 63

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NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross references and recommendations.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

NASA NTRS2007

CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) Connectors in Space Flight Applications

This report documents the current status of CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors in GSFC spaceflight applications. To the extent the information is known, this report summarizes to what component quality level each NASA contractor (referred to as OEM in this report) procured the parts, and what board level and system level testing was performed. The report also provides the current status of the reliability assessment for each GSFC project based on the results of testing and FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis). This report addresses how the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors came into existence, and how these became the connector style chosen by many designers of space flight hardware. It identifies the design philosophy and the lack of robustness which has led to several known failure modes. These failure modes include fretting of connector pins during vibration, shock and thermal cycling, exposure of underplating, and increased resistance, including brief excursions to very high resistance. Each of these are signs of aging, which becomes an increasing concern for long duration orbiting space flight applications. This report addresses the mitigation strategy to replace CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors with space qualified Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors. The Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors are pin-to-pin compatible with the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors and meet all of the same technical requirements, except the ability to hot mate, and to mate directly with a CompactPCI of the opposite gender. A detailed comparison of the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connector and the Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connector is provided to describe the ruggedness of Hypertronics connector for space flight applications. Finally, this report makes recommendations for flight hardware for the future missions where the hardware is yet to be built, as well as for the hardware which has already been built with CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors.

Williams, Richard↗

NASA NTRS1991

On-board fault management for autonomous spacecraft

The dynamic nature of the Cargo Transfer Vehicle's (CTV) mission and the high level of autonomy required mandate a complete fault management system capable of operating under uncertain conditions. Such a fault management system must take into account the current mission phase and the environment (including the target vehicle), as well as the CTV's state of health. This level of capability is beyond the scope of current on-board fault management systems. This presentation will discuss work in progress at TRW to apply artificial intelligence to the problem of on-board fault management. The goal of this work is to develop fault management systems. This presentation will discuss work in progress at TRW to apply artificial intelligence to the problem of on-board fault management. The goal of this work is to develop fault management systems that can meet the needs of spacecraft that have long-range autonomy requirements. We have implemented a model-based approach to fault detection and isolation that does not require explicit characterization of failures prior to launch. It is thus able to detect failures that were not considered in the failure and effects analysis. We have applied this technique to several different subsystems and tested our approach against both simulations and an electrical power system hardware testbed. We present findings from simulation and hardware tests which demonstrate the ability of our model-based system to detect and isolate failures, and describe our work in porting the Ada version of this system to a flight-qualified processor. We also discuss current research aimed at expanding our system to monitor the entire spacecraft.

Fesq, Lorraine M.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the purge, vent and drain subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Purge, Vent and Drain (PV and D) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter PV and D hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET disconnect.

Bynum, M. C., III↗

DOE OSTI2026

Hazard and risk analysis framework for nuclear power plant–based integrated energy systems

Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.

08 - HYDROGEN↗

NASA NTRS1999

Guidelines for Proof Test Analysis

These guidelines integrate state-of-the-art elastic-plastic fracture mechanics (EPFM) and proof test implementation issues into a comprehensive proof test analysis procedure in the form of a road map which identifies the types of data, fracture mechanics based parameters, and calculations needed to perform flaw screening and minimum proof load analyses of fracture critical components. Worked examples are presented to illustrate the application of the road map to proof test analysis. The state-of-the art fracture technology employed in these guidelines is based on the EPFM parameter, J, and a pictorial representation of a J fracture analysis, called the failure assessment diagram (FAD) approach. The recommended fracture technology is validated using finite element J results, and laboratory and hardware fracture test results on the nickel-based superalloy Inconel 718, the aluminum alloy 2024-T3511, and ferritic pressure vessel steels. In all cases the laboratory specimens and hardware failed by ductile mechanisms. Advanced proof test analyses involving probability analysis and multiple-cycle proof testing (MCPT) are addressed. Finally, recommendations are provided on how to account for the effects of the proof test overload on subsequent service fatigue and fracture behaviors.

Chell, G. G.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.

Saiidi, Mo J.↗

NASA NTRS1997

NASA Contractor Report: Guidelines for Proof Test Analysis

These Guidelines integrate state-of-the-art Elastic-Plastic Fracture Mechanics (EPFM) and proof test implementation issues into a comprehensive proof test analysis procedure in the form of a Road Map which identifies the types of data, fracture mechanics based parameters, and calculations needed to perform flaw screening and minimum proof load analyses of fracture critical components. Worked examples are presented to illustrate the application of the Road Map to proof test analysis. The state-of-the-art fracture technology employed in these Guidelines is based on the EPFM parameter, J, and a pictorial representation of a J fracture analysis, called the Failure Assessment Diagram (FAD) approach. The recommended fracture technology is validated using finite element J results, and laboratory and hardware fracture test results on the nickel-based superalloy IN-718, the aluminum alloy 2024-T351 1, and ferritic pressure vessel steels. In all cases the laboratory specimens and hardware failed by ductile mechanisms. Advanced proof test analyses involving probability analysis and Multiple Cycle Proof Testing (MCPT) are addressed. Finally, recommendations are provided on to how to account for the effects of the proof test overload on subsequent service fatigue and fracture behaviors.

Chell, G. G.↗

NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

DOE OSTI2022

Wind Turbine Gearbox Failure Detection Through Cumulative Sum of Multivariate Time Series Data

The wind energy industry is continuously improving their operational and maintenance practice for reducing the levelized costs of energy. Anticipating failures in wind turbines enables early warnings and timely intervention, so that the costly corrective maintenance can be prevented to the largest extent possible. It also avoids production loss owing to prolonged unavailability. One critical element allowing early warning is the ability to accumulate small-magnitude symptoms resulting from the gradual degradation of wind turbine systems. Inspired by the cumulative sum control chart method, this study reports the development of a wind turbine failure detection method with such early warning capability. Specifically, the following key questions are addressed: what fault signals to accumulate, how long to accumulate, what offset to use, and how to set the alarm-triggering control limit. We apply the proposed approach to 2 years’ worth of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition data recorded from five wind turbines. We focus our analysis on gearbox failure detection, in which the proposed approach demonstrates its ability to anticipate failure events with a good lead time.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Launch System: CLVTOPS Toolchain for SLS Liftoff Separation Analysis

This presentation showcases the unique technical capabilities of the CLVTOPS multi-body flight dynamics tool chain developed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) for analyzing NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) liftoff events. The CLVTOPS tool chain integrates high-fidelity simulations, geometric algorithms, advanced data analytics, and post-flight telemetry to demonstrate positive clearance between separating bodies and inform design decisions that enhance mission reliability. Proper liftoff separation is crucial to the success of the launch vehicle’s mission; vehicle impacts with the launch tower and supporting components incur a heightened risk of mission failure. For liftoff analysis, the CLVTOPS tool chain enables the integration of vehicle, launch pad, and environmental input models for the investigation of key clearance effectors. Furthermore, a novel capability of the CLVTOPS tool chain allows for verification and validation of trajectory reconstruction via photogrammetric imagery analysis. The following sections will walk through the tool chain, SLS liftoff ground rules and assumptions, model integration, pre-flight verification, and post-flight validation of the Artemis I mission liftoff event.

CLVTOPS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Control, Fault Management, and Grid Support Functionality of an MV AC-DC Solid State Transformer based EV Extreme Fast Charging Station

Electric vehicles (EVs) have become increasingly popular in recent times while revolutionizing the consumer and commercial transportation market. The development of charging infrastructure has become one of the priorities for increasing the adoption of EVs. Extreme fast charging (XFC) technology can reduce the so-called ’range anxiety’ of consumers as they significantly reduce the charging time. With the advent of wide band-gap (WBG) power devices and improvement in power electronic converters, medium voltage (MV) solid state transformer (SST) based XFC system has the potential to replace the traditional XFC stations because of the lower footprint, ease of installation, enhanced control feature, and better system efficiency. The control system design is one of the critical aspects of the SST development process. Careful consideration and detailed analysis are required to find out suitable control method for the SST based on its topology among different centralized and decentralized control architectures. Also, the control parameters selection and potential improvement to the transient response of the controller ought to be investigated. Another major concern of the SST is different types of internal fault which reduces the overall reliability of the XFC system. As a result, designing a robust protection system is essential. Among different fault modes, open circuit switch faults have received significant attention as an active research area because of their likelihood and severe effects on converters. Therefore, the power stages used in the XFC system require functional and accurate open circuit switch fault management methods. An equally significant aspect of this SST based XFC is its compatibility in a microgrid where there is no synchronous generator present. When the grid is not available, the XFC SSTs can provide grid forming capability and continue supplying the critical loads in islanded mode. The transition between grid connected and islanded mode, especially the grid resynchronization process has to be carefully performed for the safety of the microgrid components. The challenges posed by the aforementioned issues have inspired the work done in this dissertation. Here, a 13.2 kV, 1 MVA, AC/DC SST for the XFC system is examined and a comparative analysis is conducted to select the control architecture based on feasibility of implementation and performance. A detailed control parameter design process is demonstrated considering the sensor dynamics and delay. The selected decentralized control method is augmented by introducing a novel sensor-less load current feedforward method to provide better voltage regulation at the DC bus during a change of load. Next, in the fault management section, a hierarchical failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) is proposed to enable a systematic design of the internal fault protection of the XFC SST as there are limited examples in the literature regarding the analysis of the safety and design of the protection of a power electronic converter system. Novel open circuit switch fault management methods for the converters in the system are presented. Finally, XFC SST based MV microgrid operations in grid connected mode and islanded mode are explored. A secondary control method for grid resynchronization is presented and a design process of control parameters is shown to ensure the stability of the secondary voltage and frequency regulation.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The CLVTOPS Toolchain for NASA Space Launch System Liftoff Analysis and Post Flight Validation

This paper showcases the unique technical capabilities of the CLVTOPS multi-body flight dynamics toolchain developed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) for analyzing NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) liftoff events. The CLVTOPS toolchain integrates high-fidelity simulations, geometric algorithms, advanced data analytics, and post-flight telemetry to demonstrate positive clearance between separating bodies and inform design decisions that enhance mission reliability. Proper liftoff separation is crucial to the success of the launch vehicle’s mission; vehicle impacts with the launch tower and supporting components incur a heightened risk of mission failure. For liftoff analysis, the CLVTOPS toolchain enables the integration of vehicle, launch pad, and environmental input models for the investigation of key clearance effectors. Furthermore, recent enhancements to the CLVTOPS toolchain allow for validation via photogrammetric trajectory reconstruction and plume pressure impingement estimation on the tower. The following sections will walk through the tool-chain, SLS liftoff ground rules and assumptions, key models, standard analysis, recent enhancements, and post-flight validation of the Artemis I mission liftoff event.

CLVTOPS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Guidelines for predicting stress in cemented doublets undergoing temperature change

This work explores quick predictive methods for calculating potentially risky stresses and deflections in cemented doublets experiencing temperature change that agree well with finite element analysis. There are three failure modes of interest: cohesive failure of the adhesive, delamination (surface bond failure or debonding), and glass fracture. Adhesive theory, confirmed by finite element analysis, predicts stress singularities that complicate interpretation of the stress calculations. The presence of a stress singularity indicates the breakdown of linear elastic assumptions, but damage initiation and stress singularities are related. The authors find that geometry details near a bond edge can exacerbate or minimize damage initiation and stress concentrations. Because the interpretation of the stress results is complicated, the authors investigated predicted stresses in doublets that have been successfully tested between -40 and 85 °C. This study found that the product (ΔT ∙ Δα) should be less than 189 ppm, where ΔT is the temperature excursion and Δα is the difference in glass coefficient of thermal expansion. If the product (ΔT ∙ Δα) is equal to or greater than 189 ppm, further analysis and testing is warranted. But the authors also show that the fabrication process can significantly influence stress failure, particularly with large diameter doublets.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Guidelines for predicting stress in cemented doublets undergoing temperature change

This work explores quick predictive methods for calculating potentially risky stresses and deflections in cemented doublets experiencing temperature change that agree well with finite element analysis. There are three failure modes of interest: cohesive failure of the adhesive, delamination (surface bond failure or debonding), and glass fracture. Adhesive theory, confirmed by finite element analysis, predicts stress singularities that complicate interpretation of the stress calculations. The presence of a stress singularity indicates the breakdown of linear elastic assumptions, but damage initiation and stress singularities are related. The authors find that geometry details near a bond edge can exacerbate or minimize damage initiation and stress concentrations. Because the interpretation of the stress results is complicated, the authors investigated predicted stresses in doublets that have been successfully tested between -40 and 85 °C. This study found that the product (∆T ∙ ∆α) should be less than 189 ppm, where ∆T is the temperature excursion and ∆α is the difference in glass coefficient of thermal expansion. If the product (∆T ∙ ∆α) is equal to or greater than 189 ppm, further analysis and testing is warranted. But the authors also show that the fabrication process can significantly influence stress failure, particularly with large diameter doublets

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem, Volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗