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SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS

The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.

graph analysis↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nevada National Security Site Site-Directed Research and Development Report (FY 2018 Annual Report)

This report compiles multiple articles describing activities developed and performed under the Site-Directed Research and Development Program for the benefit the Nation during Fiscal Year 2018. Sustained investment and ongoing core innovation are the keys to successful research and development programs. These elements drive the Site-Directed Research and Development (SDRD) Program and provide solutions to some of the most challenging problems our nation and our allies face. Our Nevada enterprise, consisting of both our management and operating entity and our NNSA field office, is aggressively investing in SDRD and injecting innovation through strategic partnerships. Our partnerships with universities, industry, and our sister institutions within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) build upon our core capabilities and allow us to create innovative solutions to support our mission requirements. In 2018, we raised the investment level of SDRD for only the second time in the history of the program. Nearly at our congressionally authorized limit, SDRD has substantial resources to successfully address numerous issues. Investment is only one part of the equation; innovation is generated through collaborations that bring discovery and provide the “technical differentiation” and the return on investment we seek. This report demonstrates an enduring theme of how partnerships help us drive the best outcomes and provide the maximum impact possible, while using our resources efficiently.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Completion Report for Well ER-20-12: Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa

Well ER-20-12 was drilled for the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada National Security Administration Nevada Field Office in support of the Underground Test Area Activity. The well was drilled from October 2015 to January 2016 as an addition to the Central and Western Pahute Mesa corrective action units 101 and 102 the Phase II drilling program. Well ER-20-12 was identified based on recommendations of the Pahute Mesa Guidance Team as a result of anomalous tritium detections in groundwater samples collected from Well PM-3 in 2011 and 2013. The primary purpose of the well was to provide information on the hydrogeology in the area downgradient of select underground tests on Western Pahute Mesa and define hydraulic properties in the saturated Tertiary volcanic rocks. The main 46.99-centimeter (cm) (18.5-inch [in.]) borehole was drilled to a depth of 765.14 meters (m) (2,510.3 ft) and the hole opened to 66.04 cm (26 in.); followed by the 50.80-cm (20-in.) surface casing, which was installed and sealed with cement; and a piezometer (p4) was set in the Timber Mountain welded-tuff aquifer (TMWTA) between the casing and the open borehole. The borehole was continued with a 46.99-cm (18.5-in.) drill bit to a depth of 1,326.53 m (4,352.16 ft), and an intermediate 24.44-cm (9.625-in.) casing was installed and sealed to 1,188.72 m (3,900.00 ft) A piezometer (p3) was installed across the Calico Hills zeolitic composite unit (CHZCM) (lava-flow aquifer [LFA]) in the annulus of the open borehole. Two additional piezometers were installed and completed between the intermediate casing and the borehole wall, one (p2) in the CHZCM and one (p1) in the Belted Range aquifer (BRA). The piezometers are set to monitor groundwater properties in the completed intervals. The borehole was continued with a 21.59-cm (8.5-in.) drill bit to a total depth of 1,384.80 m (4,543.33 ft), and the main completion 13.97-cm (5.5-in.) casing was installed in the open borehole across the Pre-Belted Range composite unit (PBRCM). Data collected during hole construction include composite drill cutting samples collected every 3.0 m (10 ft), geophysical logs, hydrophysical logs, percussion core samples, water-quality measurements (including tritium), and water-level measurements. The well penetrated 1,384.4 m (4,543.33 ft) of Tertiary volcanic rocks. The stratigraphy and lithology were generally as expected with one noted exception. A thick lava-flow and related ash-flow tuffs were identified as Calico Hills Formation (Th), and no Crater Flat units were noted. Additionally, many of the Thirsty Canyon and Timber Mountain units were thicker than expected. Fluid levels measured in the borehole during drilling are the following: (1) on November 2, 2015, Navarro measured the fluid level in the borehole at a depth of 492.33 m (1,615.25 ft) below ground surface (bgs); (2) Schlumberger and COLOG recorded fluid levels during geophysical logging on November 4 and 5, 2015, at a depth of 492.86 m (1,617 ft) and 492.25 m (1,615 ft) bgs, respectively; and (3) on December 4, 2015, COLOG and Navarro measured fluid level in the 20-in. casing with an open borehole to 1,326.54 m (4,352.16 ft) bgs at 575.77 m (1,889.00 ft) and 574.03 m (1,883.3 ft) bgs, respectively. These and subsequent water-level measurements indicate a potential head difference of greater than 76.2 m (250 ft) for groundwater in aquifers above and below the Upper Paintbrush confining unit (UPCU). As expected, tritium was occasionally measured above the Safe Drinking Water Act limit (20,000 picocuries per liter [pCi/L]). Lab analysis on four bailed samples and taken from the undeveloped well indicate that the tritium activities average approximately 36,545 pCi/L. All Fluid Management Plan (FMP) requirements for Well ER-20-12 were met. Analysis of monitoring samples and FMP confirmatory samples indicate that fluids generated during drilling at ER-20-12 met the FMP criteria for discharge to the lined sump and designated infiltration area. All sanitary and hydrocarbon waste generated was properly handled and disposed of.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Proceedings of the 2009 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2009: Ground -Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 21-23 September, 2009 in Tucson, Arizona,. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States’ capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Proceedings of the 30th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 30th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 23-25 September, 2008 in Portsmouth, Virginia. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States’ capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Dark Energy Survey Year 1 Results: redshift distributions of the weak-lensing source galaxies

We describe the derivation and validation of redshift distribution estimates and their uncertainties for the galaxies used as weak lensing sources in the Dark Energy Survey (DES) Year 1 cosmological analyses. The Bayesian Photometric Redshift (BPZ) code is used to assign galaxies to four redshift bins between z=0.2 and 1.3, and to produce initial estimates of the lensing-weighted redshift distributions $n^i_{PZ}(z)$ for bin i. Accurate determination of cosmological parameters depends critically on knowledge of $n^i$ but is insensitive to bin assignments or redshift errors for individual galaxies. The cosmological analyses allow for shifts $n^i(z)=n^i_{PZ}(z-\Delta z^i)$ to correct the mean redshift of $n^i(z)$ for biases in $n^i_{\rm PZ}$. The $\Delta z^i$ are constrained by comparison of independently estimated 30-band photometric redshifts of galaxies in the COSMOS field to BPZ estimates made from the DES griz fluxes, for a sample matched in fluxes, pre-seeing size, and lensing weight to the DES weak-lensing sources. In companion papers, the $\Delta z^i$ are further constrained by the angular clustering of the source galaxies around red galaxies with secure photometric redshifts at 0.15<z<0.9. This paper details the BPZ and COSMOS procedures, and demonstrates that the cosmological inference is insensitive to details of the $n^i(z)$ beyond the choice of $\Delta z^i$. The clustering and COSMOS validation methods produce consistent estimates of $\Delta z^i$, with combined uncertainties of $\sigma_{\Delta z^i}=$0.015, 0.013, 0.011, and 0.022 in the four bins. We marginalize over these in all analyses to follow, which does not diminish the constraining power significantly. Repeating the photo-z procedure using the Directional Neighborhood Fitting (DNF) algorithm instead of BPZ, or using the $n^i(z)$ directly estimated from COSMOS, yields no discernible difference in cosmological inferences.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

National Open-ocean Energy Laboratory (Final Technical Report)

Under the authorization provided by Section 634 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140), in 2009 FAU was awarded U.S. Congressionally Directed Program (CDP) funding through the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to investigate and develop technologies to harness the energy of the Florida Current as a source of clean, renewable, base-load power for Florida and the U.S. A second CDP award in 2010 provided additional funding in order to enhance and extend FAU’s activities. These two CDPs in 2009 and 2010 were combined into a single DOE grant, DE-EE0000319, and are the subject of this report. Subsequently, in July 2010 funding was made available under a separate contract, DE-EE0004200. Under that funding, DOE’s Wind and Water Power Program designated FAU’s state of Florida marine renewable energy (MRE) center as the Southeast National Marine Renewable Energy Center (SNMREC). This report discusses SNMREC activities funded by the DE-EE0000319 grant, but will make reference, as appropriate, to activities that require further investigation under the follow-on grant. The concept of extracting energy from the motions of the oceans has a long history. However, implementation on large scales of the technologies to effect renewable energy recovery from waves, tides, and open-ocean currents is relatively recent. DOE’s establishment of SNMREC recognizes a significant potential for ocean current energy recovery associated with the (relatively) high-speed Florida Current, the reach of the Gulf Stream System flowing through the Straits of Florida, between the Florida Peninsula and the Bahamas Archipelago. The proximity of the very large electrical load center of southeast Florida’s metropolitan area to the resource itself makes this potential all the more attractive. As attractive as this potential energy source is, it is not without its challenges. Although the technology is conceptually simple, its design and implementation in a commercially-viable fashion presents a variety of challenges. Beyond the technology itself (and, especially, the effects on the technology of the harsh oceanic environment), it is important to consider the possible environmental impacts of commercial-scale implementation of oceanic energy extraction. Further, because such implementation represents a completely new undertaking, the human resources required do not exist, so education and training programs are critical to eventual success. This project, establishing a national open-ocean energy laboratory, was designed to address each of these three challenges in a flexible framework allowing for adaptive management as the project proceeded. In particular: the technology challenge, including resource assessment, evolved during the project to recognize and address the need for a national testing facility in the ocean for small-scale prototype MRE systems developed by industry; the environmental challenge became formalized and expanded during the permitting process for such a testing facility; and the human resources/societal challenges, both in terms of the need for education and training and in terms of public acceptance of MRE, stimulated a robust outreach program far beyond that originally envisioned at SNMREC. While all of these activities at SNMREC are ongoing, a number of significant milestones (in addition to the contributions listed in the appendices) were achieved under the auspices of this award. These include: Planning and site selection for the first-phase test facility, offshore of Dania Beach, FL, including some equipment for the facility, submission of an Interim Policy Lease Application to the U.S. Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), and completion of an Environmental Assessment by BOEM and a positive Consistency Determination by the State of Florida; Measurements using acoustic profilers of the current structure and variability in the vicinity of the site under a variety of weather conditions, seasons and time durations; Design and implementation of instrumentation for the first phase of the offshore testing facility, the wet- and top-side data acquisition systems, and shore-based analysis systems; Implementation of a laboratory-scale dynamometer system to test generators of up to 25 kW capacity using real-world (simulated) forcing; Completion of 24 months of (airborne) marine vertebrate surveys and associated analysis of sea turtle offshore activity, marine mammal vocalization research, and ocean current turbine hydrodynamic noise characterization; Development of a secondary-school (nominally grade 10) curriculum about hydrokinetic MRE, “Energy from the Oceans: The New Renewable”, and training of over 200 high-school teachers in its use and in how to educate their colleagues in application of the material in the classroom; Presentations to over 50 interested civic groups in the region on various aspects of MRE in SE Florida A series of public lectures to over 600 residents of south Florida to provide broader education on MRE. Development of an interactive kiosk for installation in local science museums. These, and other accomplishments detailed in this report contribute to a comprehensive ongoing program at the SNMREC to support the affordable, responsible, and achievable commercialization of MRE. Many of the tasks of this award are continued or will be verified with follow-on funding DE-EE0004200, and its goal: the installation of the world’s first offshore ocean current turbine testing and validation capability.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

Framework for Modeling High-Impact, Low-Frequency Power Grid Events to Support Risk-Informed Decisions

Natural and man-made hazardous events resulting in loss of grid infrastructure assets challenge the electric power grid’s security and resilience. However, the planning and allocation of appropriate contingency resources for such events requires an understanding of their likelihood and the extent of their potential impact. Where these events are of low likelihood, a risk-informed perspective on planning can be problematic as there exists an insufficient statistical basis to directly estimate the probabilities and consequences of their occurrence. Since risk-informed decisions rely on such knowledge, a basis for modeling the risk associated with high-impact low frequency events (HILFs) is essential. Insights from such a model can inform where resources are most rationally and effectively expended. The present effort is focused on development of a HILF risk assessment framework. Such a framework is intended to provide the conceptual and overarching technical basis for the development of HILF risk models that can inform decision makers across numerous stakeholder sectors. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 2014 Standard TPL-001-4 considers severe events for transmission reliability planning, but does not address events of such severity that they have the potential to fail a substantial fraction of grid assets over a region, such as geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), extreme seismic events, and coordinated cyber-physical attacks. These are beyond current planning guidelines. As noted, the risks associated with such events cannot be statistically estimated based on historic experience; however, there does exist a stable of risk modeling techniques for rare events that have proven of value across a wide range of engineering application domains. There is an active and growing interest in evaluating the value of risk management techniques in the State transmission planning and emergency response communities, some of this interest in the context of grid modernization activities. The availability of a grid HILF risk model, integrated across multi-hazard domains which, when interrogated, can support transparent, defensible and effective decisions, is an attractive prospect among these communities. In this report, we document an integrated HILF risk framework intended to inform the development of risk models. These models would be based on the systematic and comprehensive (to within scope) characterization of hazards to the level of detail required for modeling risk, identification of the stressors associated with the hazards (i.e., the means of impacting grid and supporting infrastructure), characterization of the vulnerability of assets to these stressors and the probabilities of asset compromise, the grid’s dynamic response to the asset failures, and assessment of subsequent severities of consequence with respect to selected impact metrics, such as power outage duration and geographic reach. Specifically, the current framework is being developed to;1. Provide the conceptual and overarching technical paradigms for the development of risk models; 2. Identify the classes of models required to implement the framework - providing examples of existing models, and also identifying where modeling gaps exist; 3. Identify the types of data required, addressing circumstances under which data are sparse and the formal elicitation of informed judgment might be required; and 4. Identify means by which the resultant risk models might be interrogated to form the necessary basis for risk management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Faster-than-real-time Simulation with Demonstration for Resilient DER Integration

The US electric grid is facing operational, stability, and security challenges. Transmission system operators need some measure of visibility into distribution system renewable generation. Distribution system generation needs to support transmission system voltage. The grid is experiencing an expansion in measurement systems. How to take full advantage of this expansion and defend against attacks, both cyber and physical, poses additional challenges. The Faster-than-real-time Simulation with demonstration for Resilient DER Integration project set out to do the following: a. Flatten the voltage profile through the feeders and system for cost saving and voltage stabilization needs. b. Increase the amount of intermittent distributed energy resources (IDERs) that could be deployed on a utility feeder and provide 100% or more energy needed for the demands on that feeder, and c. based on an accurate model (Digital Twin) of the utilities system, be able to detect any abnormalities on the utilities distribution system. To manage the voltage and increase IDER penetration (a,b), Graph Trace Analysis is employed in a time-series, optimal power flow to coordinate the time-varying feedback control setpoints of a distribution feeder’s utility control devices. Under the coordinated control are a Load Tap Changing Transformer, a voltage regulator, and five switched capacitor banks. The feeder serves over 2000 customers, the feeder secondaries are modeled, and the feeder has 2.3 MW of PV generation, corresponding to a 17.4% penetration of PV generation. The feeder model has over 12,000 components, where every customer load bus and PV generator are modeled. The accuracy of the power flow solution is compared against historical meter voltage measurements, the improvement in conservation voltage reduction energy savings as a function of the coordinated control desired voltage profile is investigated, and the increase in PV penetration of the coordinated control over the existing control is presented. To achieve improved control performance while observing system operation constraints, bellwether Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) voltage measurements are used to adjust the desired voltage profile used by the optimal power flow analysis. To detect and alleviate or negate attacks or failures on the distribution and transmission utility grids (c) the grid needs to be resilient and self-healing. In this project software was designed to do just that. At the center of the software is an Integrated System Model (ISM) that spans from transmission to secondary distribution. The ISM is employed in real-time abnormality detection, voltage stability forecasting, and multi-mode control. Testing results are presented for: 1—attacks on utility infrastructure; 2—energy savings from optimal control; 3—distribution system control response during a low voltage transmission system event; 4—cyber-attacks on PV inverters, where physical inverters are used in hard-ware-in-the-simulation-loop studies. Contributions of this work include real-time analysis that spans from three-phase transmission through secondary distribution; an approach for detecting abnormalities that employs measurements from three independent measurement systems; and a multi-mode distribution system control that responds to cyber-attacks, physical attacks, equipment failures, and transmission system needs.

Integrated System Model, Graph Trace Analysis, Adv↗

Transition Core Planning and Safety Analyses in Support of LEU Fuel Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR)

The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR®) is one of six U.S. High Performance Research Reactors (USHPRR), including one critical facility, that is working with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program to convert from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The M3 Reactor Conversion USHPRR Project objectives include the development of LEU fuel element designs that will ensure safe reactor operations and to maintain the existing experimental performance of each facility. The work is being conducted through many inter-related activities being completed by four Project Pillars: Fuel Qualification (FQ), Fuel Fabrication (FF), Reactor Conversion (RC), and Cross Cutting (CC). A new type of LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium-10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo) is expected to allow the conversion of those USHPRR, like MURR, requiring higher density fuels. The very-high-density LEU U-10Mo monolithic fuel is currently undergoing irradiation testing and post-irradiation examination under a planned and documented fuel qualification effort. The FQ Pillar will document fuel property and fuel performance data and qualify the fuel for use in these reactors. The FF Pillar is fabricating fuel for ongoing and future irradiation tests, as well as conducting fabrication demonstrations to validate or update preliminary fabrication assumptions. The FF Pillar is also working to develop and install commercial manufacturing capacity with the U-10Mo monolithic fuel to produce prototypic fuel. Working with the RC Pillar at Argonne, MURR has progressed through a preliminary fuel element design using preliminary data for the proposed monolithic alloy of U-10Mo. Analyses were completed in previous work that found for typical equilibrium operations with the preliminary LEU fuel element design, in conjunction with a power uprate to 12 MW and appropriate changes to the MURR Limiting safety system settings (LSSS), MURR will have adequate margins to safety for steady-state operations and postulated transient accidents and will have experimental performance in key locations that meets or exceeds current operations with HEU fuel. The purpose of this work is to develop a sequence of transition cycles that will enable MURR to transition from operation with the reactor core loaded with fresh LEU fuel elements only to typical equilibrium operations with mixed-burnup cores following conversion while meeting operational requirements on safety and experimental performance. It is expected that the use of fresh LEU fuel at conversion and subsequent low burnup of the LEU fuel elements that will initially be available for use following conversion will result in critical control blade positions that will substantially change the axial power distribution in the core and the neutron flux available in key experimental locations relative to equilibrium LEU operations. Given the constraints of MURR safety margins, operational practices, and production and research, a novel method has been developed to identify a transition sequence that minimizes the time MURR operates atypically compared to the current prototypic cycles using HEU fuel. The proposed transition sequence moves quickly to the same sort of equilibrium cycles for the LEU fuel that have already been evaluated in documented preliminary safety analyses. Although shifting the neutron flux peak to the lower half of the core during initial cycles with LEU at 12 MW reduces the experiment performance in some key locations relative to current HEU operations at 10 MW, all LEU cores provide an average performance that meets or exceeds that of HEU. An LEU cycle is reached that meets or exceeds the level of experimental performance predicted for current HEU and equilibrium LEU operations in more than 450 key locations identified by a reactor specialist at MURR by the 23rd cycle following conversion and that afterwards will enable MURR to consistently meet its experimental performance requirements. The proposed transition sequence only requires the fabrication of 34 fresh LEU elements in the first year of operation and does not exceed the anticipated availability of fresh elements that can be produced by the fuel fabricator. By the third year after conversion, 22 fresh LEU elements will be required each year, which is the same as expected for equilibrium LEU operations and the same as current operations with HEU fuel. The proposed transition sequence thus combines a relatively short time period before equilibrium burnup is achieved, a temporary increase of fuel elements needed annually relative to typical operations that are within the production capabilities of the fuel fabricator, and demonstrates comparable experimental performance of the LEU cores relative to current HEU operations. Further measures may be taken to reduce any initial experimental performance penalty even further, where possible, by repositioning certain experiments to leverage the increased performance in the lower axial experimental positions in the initial cycles following conversion or leaving the experiments in the irradiation facilities longer in order to achieve the required neutron fluence. This analysis may require refinement depending on the experimental facilities in use at the time of conversion. Nonetheless, the results presented here, including the experimental performance, core burnup, and critical control blade positions throughout the transition cycles, show that the proposed transition cycle fuel management patterns are consistent with what is expected and desired for MURR operation with LEU U-10Mo fuel. Detailed core power distributions from the neutronics models were also used to evaluate safety margins during steady-state operations for the selected transition cycles and the equilibrium LEU core. It is shown that there are adequate safety margins for both steady-state operations and postulated accident scenarios. For the steady-state operations with the preliminary LEU fuel element design the analysis predicts at least 2.49 MW margin to the onset of flow instability at the LSSS power of 15 MW. Considering the LSSS power is 125% of full license power, the margin to OFI is sufficient. In addition, the critical heat flux ratio at LSSS power is well above the requirement of CHFR > 2.0 from NUREG-1537 for all considered cases. For postulated transient accidents, the minimum margin to the fuel temperature safety limit is at least 109 °C. In summary, the proposed sequence of core loadings for MURR operations following conversion to LEU fuel and a power uprate to 12 MW provides sufficient safety margins for both steady-state operations and postulated transient accidents during a proposed sequence of transition cycles to equilibrium operations. Analysis has shown that there are some local experimental performance penalties during the initial cycles. Although there are local shifts in the experimental performance, on average all LEU cores at 12 MW have equal or higher performance than HEU at 10 MW. Temporary adjustments are being planned that will produce suitable experimental performance during these cycles. The results indicate that for the equilibrium LEU core the experimental performance exceeds that of current HEU operations in all key locations while also demonstrating sufficient safety margins.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Field evaluation of remote wind sensing technologies: Shore-based and buoy mounted LIDAR systems

In developing a national energy strategy, the United States has a number of objectives, including increasing economic growth, improving environmental quality, and enhancing national energy security. Wind power contributes to these objectives through the deployment of clean, affordable and reliable domestic energy. To achieve U.S. wind generation objectives, the Wind and Water Power Program within the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) instituted the U.S. Offshore Wind: Removing Market Barriers Program in FY 2011. Accurate and comprehensive information on offshore wind resource characteristics across a range of spatial and temporal scales is one market barrier that needs to be addressed through advanced research in remote sensing technologies. There is a pressing need for reliable offshore wind-speed measurements to assess the availability of the potential wind energy resource in terms of power production and to identify any frequently occurring spatial variability in the offshore wind resource that may impact the operational reliability and lifetime of wind turbines and their components and to provide a verification program to validate the “bankability” of the output of these alternative technologies for use by finance institutions for the financing of offshore wind farm construction. The application of emerging remote sensing technologies is viewed as a means to cost-effectively meet the data needs of the offshore wind industry. In particular, scanning and buoy mounted LIDAR have been proposed as a means to obtain accurate offshore wind data at multiple locations without the high cost and regulatory hurdles associated with the construction of offshore meteorological towers. However; before these remote sensing technologies can be accepted the validity of the measured data must be evaluated to ensure their accuracy. The proposed research will establish a unique coastal ocean test-bed in the Mid-Atlantic for the evaluation of LIDAR-based wind measurement systems to validate the accuracy of remotely measured wind data in marine applications. Specifically, the test-bed will be utilized to systematically evaluate the capability of emerging scanning LIDAR and buoy mounted vertically profiling LIDAR by: (1) Evaluating a fixed scanning LIDAR against land-based 50 and 60 meter high meteorological masts fitted with research quality cup-vane and/or sonic anemometers; (2) Evaluating a buoy mounted vertically profiling LIDAR fixed on land and floating in a sheltered bay against a co-located 60 meter high meteorological mast fitted with a research quality cup-vane and/or sonic anemometers and the fixed scanning LIDAR; and (3) Offshore field evaluation of both LIDAR platforms through a comparison of the fixed scanning LIDAR data and data obtained by the buoy mounted LIDAR located 10 miles offshore. The proposed research will systematically validate Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) based wind measurement systems and assess the temporal and spatial variability of the offshore wind resource in the Mid-Atlantic east of New Jersey. The goal of the proposed project is to address the technical and commercial challenges of the offshore wind energy industry by validating and assessing cost-effective, over ocean wind resource characterization technologies. The objective is to systematically evaluate the capability of both scanning and vertically profiling LIDARs to accurately measure 3D wind fields through comparison with fixed met masts and intercomparison among LIDAR platforms. Once validated, data collected by both buoy mounted vertically profiling LIDARs and shore-based, pulsed horizontally scanning LIDARs can be used to accurately assess offshore wind resources and to quantify the spatial and temporal variability in the offshore wind fields. One of the fundamental research questions to be addressed in phase 1 is the assessment of various measurement and data processing schemes to retrieve accurate wind vectors in the marine environment over large sampling ranges (10 to 12 km) and varying atmospheric aerosol levels. Atmospheric conditions and aerosol content within the coastal ocean region of the Mid-Atlantic seaboard of the US can vary significantly over short time periods in response to frontal passages and extratropical and tropical low pressure system passage offshore of the coast. Since aerosols provide the scattering medium for the determination of LIDAR Doppler shifts in the atmosphere the accuracy and range of LIDAR derived velocity measurements as a function of variation in aerosol content in the marine environment is a key research question to be addressed. In phase 1, it is desired to capture as much variation in atmospheric conditions and aerosol content as possible. To this end, collocated measurements of LIDAR and standard anemometer wind fields will be captured by the project PIs over all four seasons and during specific events (e.g., coastal low pressure system passage) in year 1. Additionally, since the meteorological masts are permanent structures, additional events can be captured over the three year duration of the field research project. All research instruments are owned by Fishermen’s Energy and made available to the PIs though a lease agreement as part of the DOE grant. Energy Fishermen’s Energy will be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the scanning LIDAR and met mast anemometers. On a daily basis, environmental data and systems performance indicators will be transmitted from each measurement station to the Fishermen’s project team consisting of both in-house personnel and equipment manufacturer engineers. Data sets include compiled LIDAR files as well as data sets from ancillary sensors. Diagnostic parameters to be monitored include standard deviations of measured values, battery levels and charging systems output, and the operational status. Once data have been confirmed as complete and reliable, files will be transferred to the Garrad Hassan (a subcontractor to Fishermen’s Energy) for incorporation in to the validation database, which is accessible to other scientific team members. Data collection times and durations will be determined by the PI and Co-PIs in consultation with instrument engineers to ensure the capture of data representative of the expected range of mid-Atlantic atmospheric conditions (e.g., temperature, moisture, coastal low pressure systems, tropical systems, rain, snow, fog). The collection and processing of the data is a function of site specific measurement requirements (Kelley et.al. 2007; Hannon et.al. 2008). To determine the optimal profiles of wind speed and direction from the LIDAR radial velocities as a function of azimuth angle, rigorous estimates of the bias and random error of each radial velocity estimate are required. Lockheed Martin Coherent Technologies, Inc., under contract with Fishermen’s Energy, will provide analyses of raw and processed data using various scan patterns to determine optimal performance settings for the pulsed scanning LIDAR. Once optimized, appropriate processing and analyses techniques will be evaluated by Garrad Hassan for use in validating the accuracy of the LIDAR wind field measurements against the standard anemometer measurements from the meteorological masts. The most attractive capability of the scanning LIDAR is the ability to provide high spatial resolution observations in a three-dimensional volume which provides superior statistical accuracy due to the large number of samples obtained. Each radial scan provides measurements in 100 range gates over a distance of 10 to 12 km at an update rate of 5 to 10 Hz and rotation of 2.5° per second. Each rotation at a fixed azimuth requires 2.4 minutes. Depending on the number of azimuths desired a complete scan can take up to 10 minutes or longer to complete. Once collected the radial velocities are processed to produce vector wind velocity estimates based on a set of data distributed in angle and range around points of interest, typically a standard grid within the radial wind map. To calculate wind vectors over a limited spatial area of interest for the comparison of data with other measurement platforms a localized least-squares approach has been applied by Hannon et.al. (2008) and a Variation Assimilation (VAR) processing technique has been applied by Chan and al Assimilation (VAR) processing technique has been applied by Chan and Shao (2006). Additionally, Kelley et.al. (2007) applied a “stare” technique that fixed a scanning LIDAR in both azimuth and elevation angles to measure over collocated sampling volumes of the LIDAR and a 3D sonic anemometer mounted to a fixed mast. Although the stare technique is limited to wind directions aligned with the sampling radial of the LIDAR, it does provide a direct comparison of sampling volumes. Each of the processing techniques described above (and possibly others) will be evaluated to determine the validity of the LIDAR derived wind fields in the marine environment. Numerical methods such as linear regression and comparison of probability density functions of wind fields measured by each instrument platform will be used to assess the processing techniques. Linear regression has the advantage of directly evaluating corresponding pairs of wind data measured by each instrument and can lend insight into deviations and bias between instruments as a function of wind speed. Assessment of the coherency between the probability density function of the wind measured by each instrument provides insight into processes that may not be accurately resolved by each instrument at specific frequencies. Once processed and assessed the most appropriate technique will be utilized to provide valid wind measurements from the pulsed scanning LIDAR. A detailed analysis of the measurement data from the LIDAR and the three meteorological towers and comparison of the coastal wind characteristics from the different systems will be performed by the CO_PI at NREL. This analysis will evaluate how the WT LIDAR performance and measurement of the wind characteristics vary with distance from the LIDAR and by atmospheric conditions; using the tower measurements at different distances (4.8, 9.6, and 19 km) from the LIDAR as a reference. The comparative analysis will include, to the extent possible, evaluation of parameters such as wind speed and direction distributions, wind shear, turbulence intensity and their variations by atmospheric conditions, month or season, and time of day.

17 WIND ENERGY↗