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At least 1,135 records · Page 63

Recommended Functionalities for Improving Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources: Preprint

The legacy electric grid is transitioning into a 'present' modern grid due to increasing penetration of intermittent renewable generation at the distribution side, also known as distributed energy resources (DERs). Monitoring and control of such DERs requires extensive data-exchange and bidirectional communication networks. This bidirectional communication paves the way to cyber vulnerabilities and risks for new kinds of cyber-attacks that may have destructive impacts on power system operations. Since IEEE Std. 1547-2018 does not discuss cybersecurity measures for DERs, cybersecurity controls should be developed for securing DER systems at all three levels: device level, communications level, and applications level. This paper discusses the current industry's best practices related to DER cybersecurity and proposes recommended functionalities for improving the cybersecurity posture of DERs. These practical recommended functionalities have been discussed and verified with the industry through a DER cybersecurity working group and are meant to improve the device level security of DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

W87-1 Modification Program (Maintaining the Stockpile)

NNSA resumed work on a W78 warhead replacement, designated as the W87-1, in fiscal year (FY) 2019 following the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. By replacing the legacy W78, the W87-1 will maintain continuity for the ground-based leg of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The warhead is named the W87-1 to reflect that it has a similar primary design to the W87-0 and will fly in a similar reentry vehicle. The W87-1 is based on a previously-tested nuclear component and will include an insensitive high explosive primary that had been designed and tested with advanced safety features. The warhead will be fielded by FY 2030 on the U.S. Air Force (USAF)’s Ground Based Strategic Deterrent. The W87-1 will not provide new military capabilities, yet it will provide enhanced safety and security compared to the legacy W78. The W87-1 will be certified without the need for additional underground nuclear explosive testing.

Source record↗

The Next Generation NC3 Enterprise: Opportunities and Challenges

The 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review emphasized the importance of modernizing the existing nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Heightened awareness of US reliance upon technology developed in the 1970s and emerging challenges posed by frontier technologies spurred Secretary of Defense Mattis to task USSTRATCOM with identifying the technologies, processes, and institutions needed to build a next-generation NC3 system. General Hyten, USAF Commander, has noted that this will require an “overhaul of our existing processes from requirements definition to systems engineering and integration, acquisition, and budgeting. A framework is required for modern processes to enable delivery of a flexible, continuously evolving, threat-driven set of capabilities.” This brief, prepared in response to Gen. Hyten’s call for memoranda to address the “Next Generation NC3 Enterprise,” outlines three distinct approaches to NC3 modernization, each with a system lifecycle of approximately 50 years (2030-2080): upgrading the existing system, a hybrid approach to integrating new technologies, and creating an entirely new NC3 architecture. It is organized as follows: First, it outlines the integral role of NC3 in strategic operations. Second, it examines the current status of NC3 tools and the contemporary challenges that future systems must address. Third, it provides a series of paths forward for USSTRATCOM’s consideration. Fourth and finally, it recommends a “hybrid” approach to maintain the strengths of the current NC3 architecture, increase the resilience of the system, and leverage the advantages of new sensing, ISR, and communication technology.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Nuclear Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface

The nuclear supply chain attack surface is a large, complex network of interconnected stakeholders and activities. The global economy has widened and deepened the supply chain, resulting in larger numbers of geographically dispersed locations and increased difficulty ensuring the authenticity and security of digital assets. Although the nuclear industry has made significant strides in securing facilities from cyber-attacks, the supply chain remains vulnerable. This paper outlines supply chain threats and vulnerabilities and provides a Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface diagram to illustrate the complexity of securing hardware, firmware, software, and system information throughout the entire supply chain lifecycle. The knowledge presented in this paper provides a foundation to use in cybersecurity supply chain risk analysis and to guide future supply chain research and development efforts leading to enhancement of a nuclear facility’s overall security posture.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integration of Data Analytics with Plant System Health Program

This report summarizes the R&D activities of the Plant Health Management (PHM) project during fiscal year 2020 (FY20). This project focuses on the development of methods that integrate component health data and propagate such information at the system level to evaluate system sources of risk. This project development lives in cooperation with the Risk Informed Asset Management (RIAM) project. The RIAM project, in fact, uses the reliability models and data generated by the PHM project to optimize plant operations (e.g., maintenance/replacement schedule, optimal maintenance posture). This year’s activities for the PHM project focused mainly on the development of two classes of models. The first one includes a series of component reliability models which include aging, testing and maintenance. The second class includes a series of system reliability models which focus on the secondary side of exiting U.S. reactors. These models are based on fault tree logic structures such that they can be used by existing plant PRA software. We also started to focus on the management of health data and we tackled this issue in two directions. The first one focuses on the integration of monitor data with simulation models to assess component health. This approach is moving from a classical data based to a model+data based approach with the goal of improving higher component health information. The second direction focuses on linking equipment reliability data (e.g., maintenance/failure reports, component monitoring data) directly to system reliability models using a safety margin based language rather than a probability based language. The main advantage of a safety margin based language is that it can provide to system engineers more tangible information on system/component health and how it propagates to the system level.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Framework Tool and Training Game Help Utilities ID Cyber Attack Vulnerabilities

PNNL cybersecurity experts developed two novel cyber tools to help utilities and organizations that serve them combat malicious cyber attacks. The first is the Cybersecurity Framework Tool, or CFT. This patented tool provides a way for utilities and their associated vendors to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from emerging cyber threats or vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. CFT provides an easy-to-follow set of best practices, policies, and procedures to improve the cybersecurity postures of critical infrastructure. The second tool is the Cybersecurity Training Game Simulator, a dynamic “train the trainer” tool. The game provides interactive training scenarios based on major cyberattacks that happened in the U.S. during the past decade. Both innovations are available for commercialization. Contact Commercialization Manager Peter Christensen at peter.christensen@pnnl.gov to learn more.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Are You Resilient? Site Energy and Water Resilience Indicators

There is growing interest among operators of individual or co-located facilities to plan for utility disruptions caused by natural hazards and threats. Energy and water resilience at the site level can be characterized as the ability to withstand, adapt, and recover from an energy and/or water supply disruption. But how can a site’s energy and water resilience posture be measured? An evaluation framework with clear performance measures or indicators can help organizations establish what it means to be energy and water resilient and assess progress towards meeting resilience goals across sites and over time. Tracking a consistent set of indicators can help organizations identify problem areas that should be addressed and ascertain if energy and water resilience has improved as a result of investments or operational or policy changes. Resilience indicators also provide a means for organizations with geographically distributed sites to identify common problem areas that may require higher-level attention. This paper outlines an approach that organizations can use to measure site energy and water resilience. This approach was developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Federal Energy Management Program as part of an effort to help federal agencies plan for energy and water resilience in a more systematic and rigorous way. The paper defines a general structure for defining energy and water resilience indicators, and provides example indicators and potential rating methods.

resilience, metrics for resilience, site resilienc↗

Cybersecurity Assessment Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

This growing number of smart devices that support DERs can increase the number of access points outside a utility’s administrative domain, which can increase the potential for cyberattack. With the integration of DERs at federal sites, the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of DER systems must be understood and addressed. This presentation covers two NREL tools available. The Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) is a web-based holistic tool for evaluating cybersecurity posture including governance, physical security and technical management. The Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) extends the DER-CF by applying it to the NIST risk management framework process. It will be downloadable application that runs locally and documents all the major requirements for achieving Authority to Operate the DER.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Smart Semi-Supervised Accumulation of Large Repositories for Industrial Control Systems Device Information

Industrial Control Systems device manufacturers frequently add new features to improve their product performance. Oftentimes, these changes are mainly vendor-driven initiatives, and customers may not be aware of the full impact of these new capabilities on their cybersecurity posture. In the energy sector, this can lead to considerable dissonance between vendor-provided cybersecurity claims and a customer’s responsibility for Operation Technology cybersecurity compliance. Thus, the resulting dynamic verification burden is shifted towards the customer and may pose a significant cybersecurity risk to the energy sector landscape. We found that there is very limited research into cybersecurity auditing for Operational Technology. However, a solution is needed for vetting the vendor-supplied feature claims and their adherence to cybersecurity requirements and standards. We are presently engaged in an effort to develop such a system. This paper demonstrates one vital aspect of this effort in proposing an end-to-end framework to accumulate a large repository of ICS device information for this vetting system, curate the dataset, and conduct extensive processing. This framework is designed to use web scraping, data analytics and Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to identify vendor websites, automate the collection of website-accessible documents and automatically derive metadata from them for identification of product documents relevant to the repository. We have found that this automated approach to vendor identification, document extraction into a product repository, and NLP pre-processing is unique and has not been previously presented in the literature. The preliminary work shows that this is feasible and can produce reliable results with minimum supervision. Future work will be built upon this foundation in order to achieve semi-supervised vetting of device technical information – a vital capability for ensuring that vendor-claimed device cybersecurity capabilities match industry requirements.

Ameri, Kimia↗

Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework & Risk Manager

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) provides a holistic assessment for evaluating the cybersecurity posture of DER systems - filling an important gap that expands upon existing cybersecurity frameworks for more modern energy systems. The DER-CF is available as a written framework and an interactive Web tool. Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) process adheres closely to NIST's seven risk management steps: prepare, categorize, select, implement, assess, monitor, and authorize. This added feature is independent of the DER-CF's existing self-assessment and allows managers to focus on the RMF process.

cybersecurity↗

Cybersecurity Governance

Cybersecurity governance helps an organization detect, prevent, and respond to cyber incidents by establishing cybersecurity policies and procedures for use across the enterprise. As modern energy systems become increasingly reliant on smaller and decentralized generation sources-equipped with complex, data-driven communications-governance will be of growing importance for the continued protection of the electric grid. This presentation sheds light on the important aspects of cybersecurity governance, best practices to ensure a culture of cybersecurity, and approaches to frequent monitoring and assessment of an organization's cybersecurity posture.

business requirements↗

Module-OT: A Turnkey Solution for Securing Energy Systems

The Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT) is a flexible and lightweight solution for grid-edge devices focusing on end-to-end security. It is a bump- in- the-wire solution acting as a secure conduit for data between devices or systems across a network. It improves the cybersecurity posture of DER systems by providing authentication, authorization, and data integrity to secure DER communications. Additionally, it performs key management, provides data security through whitelisting Internet Protocol addresses and ports, blocks unauthorized connections, controls user access, and allows serial or Ethernet connections for added flexibility. The core software is portable to various Linux-based operating systems and is developed to be customized by the developer and researcher communities. Module-OT has been validated in the lab, has been demonstrated at a 500-KW PV-plus-storage site, and has been proven ready to secure operational technology devices. Its core functionality meets current standards, including validation procedures of the NIST Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 140-2). Because of its capability to provide an accessible and affordable option for stepping up security across modern energy systems, Module-OT can serve as an effective technological option to standardize cybersecurity moving forward.

cryptography↗

Cybersecurity Certification Standard for Distributed Energy Resources

Cybersecurity Certification Standard for Inverter Based Resources led by UL, and contributed to by NREL, is a certification standard for devices and their cyber security practices. The standard, which is being developed and led by UL, contains certification and testing processes for the devices to be certified before they are deployed in the field. The importance of the standard is to ensure that all DER devices have all the five pillars of cybersecurity, in which the baseline cybersecurity posture of the DER industry will be elevated.

certification standard↗

DER Cybersecurity R&D

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) conducted more than 30 assessments for utilities across the United States with a cybersecurity assessment tool based on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and focused on business process. With funding from the DOE Office of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Federal Energy Management Program, NREL modified the current cyber governance assessment tool to include an assessment process specifically for distributed energy resources (DERs). The Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) was developed to help federal agencies mitigate gaps in their cybersecurity posture for distributed energy systems.

cybersecurity valuation↗

Risk-informed Physical Security Using Dynamic Force-on-Force Modelling Tools (ABSTRACT)

Physical security requirement of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the US is regulated in a mainly prescriptive manner. This “one size fits all” approach may consequently overlook plant-specific characteristics which are beneficial for the inherent safety and security of the plant. Although a performance-based security measure has been promulgated in 10 CFR 73.55(r), current evaluation methods generally emphasize static and conservative assumptions on physical security uncertainties. This conservatism contributes to the overall operational and maintenance costs, which account to 70% of total operating expenditures for an NPP. This paper describes an ongoing work at the Idaho National Laboratory within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway, which aims to optimize physical protection system with regards to system effectiveness and dollar costs. To achieve this goal, a risk-informed approach to physical security is proposed. This approach leverages the Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool to model facility infiltration and Force-on-Force (FoF) engagement in a dynamic manner. The dynamic FoF analysis was conducted by coupling human performance uncertainties modeled in EMRALD to existing commercial 3-dimensional FoF software, i.e. SCRIBE3D, AVERT and Simajin. Meanwhile, risk analysis was accomplished by coupling the attack outcomes to existing plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model with FLEX strategy. This approach reduces the conservatisms in security modeling and further acknowledges the possibility for plant operators to mitigate the attack outcomes. A sabotage attack on a hypothetical NPP facility was devised to demonstrate the proposed methodology. Dynamic FoF rules were implemented in EMRALD coupled to SCRIBE3D. This dynamic evaluation revealed an additional 21% system effectiveness in protecting the target set relative to the static modelling approach. Furthermore, the conditional core damage probability could be reduced by up to 46% by crediting operator actions in mitigating the sabotage outcomes. We evaluated the relative importance of each component of the physical security posture included in the model and assessed tradeoffs between components to identify potential opportunities for cost reduction while maintaining a specific level of system effectiveness. Results of the cost analysis will be presented in the conference. This study is expected to help NPP operators in allocating resources optimally to satisfy the security requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Development of Analysis Methods that Integrate Numeric and Textual Equipment Reliability Data

Within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway is performing collaborative research on the development and deployment of technologies designed to assist operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) to reduce operating costs improve plant reliability and availability. One of the RISA research areas is focusing on the development of methods and tools designed to optimize plant operations (e.g., maintenance/replacement schedules, optimal maintenance postures for plant structures, systems, and components [SSCs]) in a manner that is more cost effective than current approaches and makes better use of available SSC health data. The Risk-Informed Asset Management (RIAM) project targets this research area by creating a direct bridge between component equipment reliability (ER) data and system engineer decision making regarding maintenance activity scheduling and component aging management. In this respect, one challenge that NPP system engineers are facing is that the amount of ER data being continuously generated is not only extremely large in size, but it comes in different forms: textual (e.g., condition or maintenance reports) and numeric (e.g., generated by monitoring systems). All these data elements provide them with valuable insights and information regarding: 1) the discovery of anomalous behaviors or degradation trends, 2) the identification of the possible causes behind such behaviors/trends, and 3) the prediction of their direct consequences. However, several challenges have proved to be roadblocks to this process. While some of these challenges are technical in nature (i.e., data are often distributed over several physical servers/databases), others are conceptual in nature: data elements come in different formats (e.g., numeric or textual), and measured values have different scales (e.g., vibration spectra and oil temperature). The activities performed by the RIAM project during FY23 directly tackles the need to simultaneously integrate the analysis of ER data in all its forms, numeric and textual. Note that such task has never been performed before due to the complexity of the systems under consideration but, most importantly, because of the technical challenges behind the harmonization of ER data formats and the lack of adequate computational methods to analyze them. Our approach borrows ideas and concepts from the medical field where integration of several data sources is vital to assist medical practitioners to perform correct diagnosis and indicate optimal treatments. In our view a NPP asset is equivalent to a patient in a medical context. The main difference is the complexity of a human body is a magnitude more complex when compared to typical assets commonly present in NPPs (e.g., centrifugal pumps, or motor operated valves). This simplifies our first requirement when analyzing heterogenous ER data formats: to put data into “context”. Context is here intended as the additional piece of information that is needed by ER data analysis tools to understand what these data elements are referring to, i.e., which king of knowledge they are generating. In our context, this knowledge can be translated into models that capture the form and functional architecture of assets/systems, their dependencies, and how they interact. These models actually emulate the knowledge that that NPP system engineers possess about assets and systems; this is their key of success when analyzing ER data, their challenge is ability to handle large amount of data. Here, we employ model-based system engineering (MBSE) models of systems and assets to represent and capture their architecture and functional, i.e. cause-effect, relations. Then, ER data elements are processed by identifying first of all which elements of the developed MBSE elements they are referring to. For numeric ER data this task is fairly easy since it is possible to precisely pinpoint what MBSE elements the corresponding sensor are observing (e.g., bearing temperature of a centrifugal pump). Task is much harder for textual data since the information contained in issue or maintenance reports needs to “be understood” by a computational tool. Here we called this process as “knowledge extraction”. Once again, we borrow the experience in the medical field where methods to extract knowledge from textual data have been developed in the past decade. The missing element for us is the availability of a complete dictionary of NPP related concepts (in addition to the MBSE models presented earlier) that can put “text into context”. In FY23, such dictionary has been developed along with all the computational elements required for knowledge extraction. Lastly, once numeric and textual ER data elements have been processed and “understood”, then the last step is the discovery of possible cause-effect relations among them. This is performed by observing if a logical connection through the MBSE models exists, and if the

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Erosion Control Measures at Oak Ridge Reservation Landfills Oak Ridge, Tennessee - 19190

URS-CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) manages the cleanup of the 2,200-acre East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) for its client, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The ETTP was contaminated with radioactive, hazardous and industrial wastes generated by more than 40 years of national defense and energy missions. In disposing of low-level radioactive and other wastes from demolition activities, the UCOR approach relies on the availability of onsite facilities to streamline disposal, reduce costs and enhance cleanup schedules while confining shipments and related hazards onsite. The sanitary/industrial waste facility, known as the Oak Ridge Reservation Landfill Facility (ORRLF) is a solid waste operation that receives and disposes of sanitary/industrial, construction/demolition and classified, special waste; and spoil materials types of waste generated at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge facilities. ETTP is the primary generator; however, the landfill accepts waste from Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), Oak Ridge National Laboratory and other DOE prime contractors in the Oak Ridge area. ORRLF's mission is to receive nonhazardous, non-radioactive, and non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)-regulated solid wastes. Approved operations include receiving, compacting, and covering wastes; leachate management, site drainage; erosion control and prevention, inspections, maintenance and recording keeping. The Oak Ridge Reservation has three separate State of Tennessee-permitted active landfills (Landfill IV, Landfill V, and Landfill VII) that meet different disposal needs -- classified industrial waste, industrial waste that includes office trash and cafeteria waste, and construction and demolition debris,. As with a typical landfill, strategic waste placement and covering involves moving a lot of soil, usually resulting in large areas of exposed land. After increased sediment was noted in streams following heavy rains, a concerted erosion prevention and sediment control effort began in 2017. While not uncommon for landfills, the ORRLF staff knew they could do better in controlling sediment. In response, the ORRLF staff developed an approach of aggressive revegetation, ditch improvements and other erosion controls. Staff developed a list of all the areas that needed the most attention and requested resources. UCOR management arranged funding for needed improvements. The oldest of the three landfills is Industrial Landfill IV, which opened in 1989 and has an expected remaining 60 years of life. Therefore, how the landfills are maintained/managed today directly affects the compliance posture, the capacity, and the infrastructure in the future. A systematic, aggressive and multi-pronged approach was taken to address the major concerns first, then continue with longer-term, and/or lower priority projects. Buy-in was obtained from both craft and supervision, resulting in approaches like 'Ditch of the Month'. In addition, management support at the highest levels has provided resources and recognition that further fuels progress. After working on the site for the past year, what used to be exposed brown hills looks more like a golf course now. Now that the grass is established and other erosion controls are in place, the amount of sediment leaving the site has been reduced, and the appearance of the landfills is improved. Vegetation dissipates the kinetic energy from rain droplets while the root system helps hold the soil in place, and wire-reinforced silt fences and straw wattles have greatly improved erosion control. Improved ditches reduce the runoff velocities allowing sediments to fall out of suspension in the stormwater before they reach the receiving waters, and structures are in place to let finer sediment settle in ponds rather than going downstream. In addition, the project has added more stone to roadways to minimize tracking dirt down the road as an average of 20 to 40 trucks per day enter and leave the site. Ongoing landfill erosion and sediment control must be funded and maintained continually. The lack of attention to either resource will negatively affect the condition of the landfill fairly quickly. Constant compliance commitment is necessary to ensure protection to the environment, the operator/workers and the public. Operations must include sediment control, pond maintenance and clean out, road maintenance and construction, erosion prevention, seeps repair, leachate management, landfill expansion, mowing and grounds upkeep and much more. Knowledgeable/experience staff is also crucial. Knowing how to build lifts, create leachate drainage windows, respond to high rains events, compact waste will impact operations today and future operations into the closure / post closure periods. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dynamic attack surfaces in nuclear power plants - 162

In this paper, we will summarize a group of architectural principles that inform the development of secure control system architectures, followed by a methodology that allows designers to understand the attack surface of components and subsystems in a way that supports the integration of these surfaces into a single attack surface. We will then show how this methodology can be used to analyze the control system attack surface from a variety of threats, including knowledgeable insiders. We close the paper with an overview of how this approach can be folded into a more rigorous mathematical analysis of the system to define the system's security posture. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗